The Routledge Companion to Actor-Network Theory by Blok, Anders et al.

The Routledge Companion 
to Actor-Network Theory
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a wide range of scales and sites. Chapters in the final section discuss ANT’s involvement in ‘real world’ 
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to energy consumption monitoring; from queer sex to Korean cities. A comprehensive introduction by 
the editors explores the significance of ANT more broadly and provides an overview of the volume.
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STS, and anyone wishing to engage with ANT, to understand what it has already been used to do and 
to imagine what it might do in the future.
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Near ANT: 20 years after ‘actor-network theory and after’
Welcome to our actor-network theory (ANT) companion. The companion is both the fig-
ure and the forum that this volume seeks to assemble, in order to continue and to interrupt 
current conversations about the past, present and future of ANT. This volume aims to make 
an intervention in the ways we speak, do inquiry and think with ANT, paying attention to 
what it means to invoke this acronym to describe a specific intellectual practice. As such, the 
curating of the following 38 contributions should be understood as an attempt to articulate a 
critical and constructive response to the enthusiastic ‘reception’ that ANT has enjoyed in the 
social sciences, humanities, design and artistic disciplines in the last 10–20 years in particular 
(see Jacobs & Frickel, 2009: 51), a reception that, in our eyes, amounts to an ambivalent sign 
of ANT’s simultaneous success and demise, a mark of its continued livelihood and a signal of 
a potential death-by-exhaustion. 
Since everything in this volume is about ANT, one way or the other, an initial char-
acterisation is called for. Put (too) simply, ANT denotes a family of conceptual and meth-
odological sensibilities that grew out of French-British studies in the sociology of science 
and technology from the late 1970s onwards (see among others Akrich & Latour, 1992; 
Callon, 2001; Latour, 2005; Law, 2009; Michael, 2016; Mol, 2010). While often ascribed 
to Bruno Latour, ANT is nothing if not a collective achievement, with Michel Callon, 
 Madeleine Akrich, Antoine Hennion, Vololona Rabeharisoa, John Law, Annemarie Mol, 
Vicky  Singleton and others central to its emergence and subsequent trajectory. Among a 
host of alternative labels, ANT is known sometimes as a ‘material semiotics’ (Law & Mol, 
1995), in that it entails a basic ontological claim that all entities in the world – from nanopar-
ticles to bodies, groups, ecologies and ghosts – are constituted and reconstituted in shifting 
and hybrid webs of discursive and material relations (Latour, 1988). Accordingly, ANT has 
been at the forefronts of conceptualising new predicaments beyond the ‘modern divides’ 
 between nature and culture, the technical and the social (Latour, 1993). In ANT, processes 
and relations run deep and literally stretch the world, also undoing scalar modes of conceiv-
ing the social as a dialectical articulation of agency and structure, the local and the global, 
the big and the small (Callon & Latour, 1981).
Actor-network  theory 
as a companion
An inquiry into intellectual practices
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While we come back in the second section of this introduction to unfold some more of 
ANT’s complicated intellectual genealogy, it is not our aim here, or in the companion writ 
large, to add more layers to a purportedly ‘canonical’ ANT (Domènech & Tirado, 1998; 
 Inglis & Thorpe, 2019; Schüttpelz, 2013). Similarly, we do not aim in this introduction to 
unpack all the translations and equivocations that have catapulted ANT into such an influen-
tial intellectual project in the current intellectual landscape. Still, as a mode of emphasising 
the timeliness of this companion, it might be important to begin by at least venturing some 
ideas about why the most heterogeneous fields of intellectual and creative practice have of late 
embraced ANT as a new semantics and analytical repertoire. Let us advance three hypotheses: 
The first one concerns the widely misunderstood principle of generalised symmetry pro-
posed by early ANT as a methodological strategy to remain agnostic concerning the question of 
what counts as an actor in a given setting and course of events (Callon, 1986; Callon & Latour, 
1992; Latour, 1999a). The alleged symmetry between humans and non-humans that this prin-
ciple is oft taken to universally authorise remains perhaps the strongest selling point of ANT. 
It allows not just to radically challenge the grand social theories that have shaped our intellec-
tual landscape during the second half of the 20th century, but also to align the ethico-political 
commitments of sociocultural researchers in widely different fields with the varying ontologies 
of their interlocutors, be they environmentalists, technology developers, indigenous people, 
designers, accountants, economists or whichever. Generalised symmetry, in short, contributes 
to ANT success by seemingly making it endlessly versatile and extendable into new domains.
The second hypothesis pertains to a more specific methodological injunction, namely, the 
need to attend to materials, devices and artefacts, that is, to the various objects that shape the 
social (Latour, 1991, 1992, 1996b; Law, 1987; Law & Singleton, 2005). Besides the sociocul-
tural sciences, ANT has become extremely important for the various disciplines concerned 
with ‘thing-making,’ especially design, architecture and contemporary arts (Björgvinsson, 
Ehn, & Hillgren, 2012; Halsall, 2016; Yaneva, 2009). Here, it provides a language, a concep-
tual repertoire to think with and about things, in terms of the ‘sub-political’ agendas  inscribed 
in their designs but also the different ways in which things overtly politicise states of affairs 
(Fogué & Rubio, 2017). Consequently, ANT has played an important role in rethinking the 
democratic challenges associated with the making of our socio-material worlds and made 
major intervention in current conceptualisations of ‘participation’ (Callon,  Lascoumes, & 
Barthe, 2009; Latour, 2004; Marres, 2012). It is no surprise that ANT is currently becoming 
influential among design disciplines, not to mention its influence in the arts, where ANT is 
widely referenced when speaking about the agential capacity of things.
The third hypothesis is historical. If Ulrich Beck (1992) was crucial to think the techno-
scientific risk culture of late modernity, the latest work of Bruno Latour (Latour, 2017, 2018), 
in particular, has become critical to think our current predicament in the (so-called) Anthro-
pocene. Latour, one of ANT’s key founders and theorists, is nowadays a highly influential 
public intellectual of the contemporary, actively participating in current debates on climate 
change and planetary ecological crises. There is much irony and more than a little intellec-
tual wriggling involved in this widening embrace of a thinker who, 30–40 years ago, found 
himself widely accused of the cardinal sin of ‘relativism’ amongst the scientific establishment 
(see e.g. Dawkins, 1998). There is also, more importantly, a real concern that Latour’s public 
presence may come to overshadow ANT’s collective achievements. 
The increasing popularity of ANT in a wide array of fields is startling and ambivalent to 
say the least, especially considering that already two decades ago, key ANT scholars declared 
an end to what was first called ANT. Indeed, the volume Actor-Network Theory and After 
(Law & Hassard, 1999) marked an end of ANT as a theoretical position fully embedded in 
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the field of science and technology studies (STS) and thus mostly concerned with problems 
of technoscience and biomedicine. Concomitantly, it marked the beginning of broader and 
more open-ended inquiries into other fields of practice, such as the economy (Callon, 1998), 
cultural taste (Hennion, 1993), social movements (Rabeharisoa & Callon, 1999), transna-
tional government (Barry, 2001), design (Callon, 1996) and urbanism (Latour & Hermant, 
1998). Similarly, emerging inquiries drew inspiration from conceptual figures different from 
that of the classic actor-network, such as fractality (Law, 2002), multiplicity (Mol, 2002) and 
performativity (MacKenzie, Muniesa, & Siu, 2007) – moves that were later dubbed ‘post-
ANT’ (see Gad & Bruun Jensen, 2010). 
Thus, while in the last 20 years ANT has tended to become itself an ‘immutable mobile’ 
(Latour & Woolgar, 1986), in the sense of a highly mobile label for a stabilised conceptual 
repertoire concerned with generalised symmetry, networks and non-humans, ANT scholars 
have tended to become after- or post-ANT scholars, experimenting with ANT as a much 
more ‘mutable mobile’ (de Laet & Mol, 2000). In the latter mode, scholars have coined a 
widening array of after- and post-ANT conceptual repertoires, to the extent that the very 
concept of actor-networks has long lost its centrality, as ANT-informed analysts these days 
are more likely to speak, say, of assemblages and enactments. All along, however, actor- 
networks remain good company to think with and beyond. 
In this spirit and against the backdrop just drawn up, the challenge for this volume is to 
reclaim ANT not as a theory, but as an open-ended intellectual project that can only remain 
successful if it keeps reinventing itself. In other words, the question we need to ask is how to 
respond to the ‘after ANT’ (or post-ANT) predicament and the trajectories of intellectual 
development that embody it? Which kind of approach and book would not hasten the death 
but rather extend ANT as a vibrant intellectual practice for the future? 
It is with these questions in mind that we have put together this Companion to ANT, 
aiming to make visible the many companions of ANT who are out there, across many dif-
ferent settings, doing research that extends ANT in new and interesting directions. Indeed, 
for us as editors as well as for our many contributors – albeit in importantly varying ways – 
this also involves affirming that ANT may well be one of the best companions around for 
contemporary intellectual practices committed to think, explore and engage current and 
oftentimes worrying sociocultural, politico-ecological and technoscientific predicaments 
writ large. In this conjuncture, ANT can help us to spark curiosity and open inquiries, to 
unpack modernist and colonial ontologies, to encounter a multitude of human and more-
than- human interlocutors, to experiment with research devices, to invent new conceptual 
repertoires and to care for the accounts we give of others’ practices and worlds. 
While creating space and visibility for some of the more original extensions of ANT 
presently at work around the world is indeed an ambition of this companion volume, ours 
is then not simply a book about current ANT-inspired research. Rather, it is a collective 
exploration into what it takes and entails to think ‘near ANT.’ We take this figure from 
Abdoumaliq Simone (2014) and his reflections on the ‘near South,’ an interstitial space that 
challenges standard geopolitical constructs of ‘North’ and ‘South,’ yet still remains close to 
them.  Indeed, Simone deploys the term advisedly to propose also to ‘keep near’ concepts of 
neo- liberalism, democracy and even development, that is, to not quite deploy such terms 
but also not discard them entirely when accounting for (near-) South liveabilities (see also 
 Minh-Ha’s notion of ‘speaking nearby,’ in Chen, 1992). In a similar mode, this volume ex-
plores modes of thinking and speaking near ANT, that is, not simply deploying the existing 
ANT canon of concepts, research strategies and writing experiments, but keeping them near 
as a source of questions, problems and inspiration. 
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Moving from an ‘after ANT’ to a ‘near ANT’ intellectual project, this volume aims to 
demonstrate and help to further articulate two conditions of an intellectual space in which 
ANT may continue to thrive. The first one is providing an anti-exceptionalist account of 
ANT. Indeed, thinking ANT as a companion, thinking near ANT, demonstrates that this 
is not an exceptionally powerful intellectual apparatus, but rather part of quite specific en-
actments of a more-than-human social inquiry. It is important to recognise the existence of 
a whole field of neighbouring intellectual practices (epitomised by authors such as Donna 
Haraway (1991), Isabelle Stengers (1997), Tim Ingold (2000) and Karen Barad (2007)), where 
ANT has never been alone. This is not to say that we do not recognise qualities that make 
ANT excel (why else put together a Companion?). Rather, it means that we are operating in 
an expanded field of post-, non- or more-than-humanist problematisations of the common 
world(s) we construct and inhabit. ANT, we believe, needs to feed on and explore its capac-
ities and limitations in this wider ecology.
The second condition for this intellectual project is the continuing ‘ex-titutionalisation’ of 
ANT. If the figure of ‘after ANT’ proposes a stabilisation of what ‘ANT’ was and what ‘post-
ANT’ would be – leading to dichotomous distinctions concerning key conceptual figures of 
complicatedness/complexity, networks/fluids or translation/multiplicity – then the notion of 
‘near ANT’ refuses distinctions that might stabilise, institutionalise or canonise what ANT is in 
any finalised or teleological sense. This does not mean that ANT has no identity whatsoever; 
indeed, the willingness to accept and endorse its own continual translation and re-specification 
across time and space might be said to belong to just such an ANT identity. Yet, as Annemarie 
Mol (2010) remarks, this is less the identity of a ‘theory’ or a coherent framework, and more 
the identity of an adaptable and open repository: More a notebook than a central perspective. 
To be more specific, we would claim that ANT’s identity is not defined by any kind of 
conceptual or methodological core. Rather, it is defined through a certain mode of doing 
intellectual work, certain kinds of intellectual practices and sensitivities, which include ways 
of doing conceptual resemblances and differences differently. The ANT we are interested to 
continue pursuing is thus a moving target that is constantly allying with and making visible 
actors and articulations that challenge otherwise stabilised conceptualisations of ‘the social.’ 
The ANT we are interested in is an intellectual project that is always in beta: It does not 
construct edifices, but amounts to a continuous production of prototypes, partially broken 
yet productive intellectual devices that open up further questions and the need for further 
prototypes (Corsín Jiménez, 2014). Committing to ‘ex-titutionalise’ ANT is to cultivate 
ANT as an open-ended and experimental becoming, sensitive to variations in its conceptual 
and empirical repertoire (see Jensen, 2014).
In articulating this agenda, we are not claiming for ourselves any kind of radical or even 
moderate novelty. Indeed, as hinted, we are quite closely following Annemarie Mol (2010) 
in her account of the ‘sensitive terms’ and the ‘enduring tensions’ of ANT, right down to 
the  actor, the network, the theory and the hyphen (see also Latour, 1999b). In proposing the 
analogy of ANT as a ‘notebook,’ Mol is gesturing towards the kinds of family  resemblances – 
not identity, not sameness – that exist among the various ‘pages’ (or ‘versions’) of ANT’s 
growing repertoire. There is, in ANT, no singular theoretical or methodological vision, 
she affirms, but rather ‘a rich array of explorative and experimental ways of attuning to 
the world’ (Mol, 2010: 265). Questions of translation, ordering and coordination in diverse 
 socio-material practices and worlds sit centrally in this array; yet, analysts continually refract 
and respecify such questions under novel conditions of inquiry. The present volume projects 
this image well, we believe, in that it traces and indeed stages such intellectual dialogues 
across a wide range of ANT’s settings and versions.
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Mol’s invocation of the many family resemblances in the ANT notebook is also fitting 
to describe what holds this volume together – a volume for encountering ANT’s many 
companions. Here, however, the slight refraction in metaphor may matter: While ‘family’ 
connotes kinships and ordered lineages, ‘companion’ carries connotations of evolving ac-
quaintances and friendships of a more mutualistic kind. This is the sense in which Donna 
Haraway (2008) – herself, clearly, a core ANT companion – speaks of dogs as companion 
species. While families quarrel, sometimes over petty details, companions feed, Haraway 
suggests, on recognising the ‘significant otherness’ of their partner in crime. If readers find in 
this volume reasons for making ANT their companion in any of these senses, drawing near 
to it if only sometimes to recognise its otherness to their own intellectual concerns, then we 
will consider this volume a success. 
Alongside ANT: probing into an intellectual practice
The question this volume sets out to explore is what ANT entails as an intellectual practice 
or, perhaps, as a group of companionate intellectual practices. More specifically, we are 
interested in probing how ANT’s intellectual practices are and should be changing to keep 
their relevance in the future. In this sense, this volume is interested in exploring the ANTs to 
come, in extending important trajectories and seeing how they might bend or twist further. 
In contrast to the notion of an ‘after’ ANT, the intellectual practices we would like to explore 
is thus better imagined as being ‘alongside’ ANT or, in some senses, even ‘before’ ANT, in 
the sense that they engage with ANT as something unfinished, always in the making.
We speak then of an ‘intellectual practice’ to stress two angles from which we explore 
what ANT is or could be. The first angle is relatively straightforward: We are interested 
in ANT as a ‘practice’ in the broadly pragmatist sense of the concept, that is, as a doing not 
defined by an underlying logic, but by a transactional engagement in a specific ecology of re-
lations and by the production of certain sets or types of effects (Bateson, 1987; Dewey, 1925). 
In the first half of this section, we discuss some of the elements that shaped the ecology in 
which ANT as an intellectual practice unfolded. By doing this, we hope to make apparent 
the radically different intellectual, political and planetary ecologies in which ANT is prac-
tised today. The second angle from where we propose to look at ANT is its articulation as 
an ‘intellectual’ practice, by which we understand it not just as a mode of knowing, but also 
of intervening in the world. At the end of this section, we will briefly point to some of the 
public, ethical and political commitments of ANT, thus anticipating a concern that crosses 
the whole volume.
Situating ANT in the ecologies that made it possible requires us to begin with the back 
then embryonic field of STS, which, as we have noted already, is where ANT was developed 
in the 1980s and 1990s by a small group of scholars based in Western and North European 
universities. Doing this is important, in order to avoid unrealistic myths of origins. Just to 
be clear: ANT was not born in a Renault Five with Latour behind the wheels (see Harman, 
2009), but rather in the context of a broader scholarly movement committed to turning 
age-old philosophical questions concerning the nature of knowledge, science and truth into 
questions amenable to historical and empirical inquiries (Bloor, 1991 [1976]). Indeed, prior to 
ANT coming into existence, the first major intervention of Bruno Latour and Steve Woolgar 
(1979/1986) was in co-creating the field of the so-called laboratory studies (Knorr-Cetina, 
1981; Lynch, 1985; Traweek, 1988), proposing to look at and account for how scientific 
knowledge is produced in practice by ethnographic or anthropological means. Yet, charac-
teristically, what came to constitute ANT was not the ethnographic method per se (although 
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this remains important), nor any single-minded commitment to the sociology or philosophy 
of science, which it would soon enough overflow. Rather, the key contention was a debate 
about ‘the social’ in the field of  STS, which famously led Latour and Woolgar to take out the 
adjective ‘social’ from the 1986 edition of their Laboratory Life (which was then subtitled ‘the 
construction of scientific facts’). Here, ANT came into its own via something like an open 
declaration of war against otherwise widespread ideas of social constructivism in the study 
of science and technology, epitomised by the title of the oldest journal in the field Science, 
Technology and Human Values (1967), but also across the board of sociocultural sciences. 
To be sure, the writings of  Bruno Latour, in particular, raised some flags among analyt-
ical philosophers of science, in a 1990s climate of ‘science wars’ pitting (so-called) ‘realists’ 
against (so-called) ‘post-modernists’ (see Latour 1999c). However, the real ‘war’ of ANT was 
always against the idea that reality is purely and simply a social, symbolic or discursive con-
struct. In this sense, all of early ANT was involved in bringing back in the ‘missing masses’ 
of sociocultural studies, whether in the shape of scallops and scallop-hatching equipment 
contributing to regional fisheries development (Callon, 1986); machines that travel as part of 
technology transfer schemes to developing countries (Akrich, 1992) or long-distance vessels, 
winds and currents co-determining the fate of European colonialism (Law, 1986).
The philosophical import of such claims about the hybrid, semiotic-material and tech-
noscientific nature of ‘the social’ has not been lost on ANT’s ‘first wave.’ A foundational 
ANT text, for instance, Latour’s Irreductions (1988) – published as an annex to his detailed 
historical case study of Louis Pasteur and his microbes – reads as a metaphysical treatise on 
the ontological irreducibility of all ‘existents’ and the processual and constructivist (but not 
‘socially constructed’) nature of ‘the real.’ Some years on, Annemarie Mol (2002) would add 
to and further such ontological interests when she deployed her ethnographic work into the 
diagnostics and treatment of atherosclerosis in a Dutch hospital to argue that ‘reality’ is not 
singular, but rather consists in a multiplicity of partly overlapping, partly disjunctive realities 
or worlds. In such steps, ANT gradually came to be identified as a style of ‘empirical philos-
ophy’ (see Gad & Jensen 2010).
While the intellectual radicalness and originality of such propositions should not be in 
doubt, we also want to register a certain hesitation, at this point, as to whether such an iden-
tification of ANT is by itself adequate to its present and future flourishing. On the one hand, 
amidst still more frequent claims to ‘new materialist,’ ‘speculative’ and ‘ontological’ turns 
in philosophy and sociocultural studies (Bryant, Srnicek, & Harman, 2011; Dolphijn & van 
der Tuin, 2012; Holbraad & Pedersen, 2017), shaped in part by ANT, one might be forgiven 
for thinking that a mere continuation of ANT’s original impetus would nowadays amount 
to pushing against open doors (although, we add, important philosophical differences do 
remain). On the other hand, as ANT has spread widely and to divergent effects across vast 
landscapes of sociocultural study and fields of practice around the world, it is perhaps less 
than self-evident why one would want to insist on its philosophical orientation and pedigree, 
in particular? Beyond science and technology, would we not want to keep the stakes of ANT’s 
interventions a bit more open-ended?
A second important characteristic of the intellectual ecology within which ANT emerged 
is the fact that STS were a radically interdisciplinary or even anti-disciplinary endeavour, 
witnessing a constant experimentation with slightly different approaches and a playful pro-
liferation of what are, today, rather unrelatable acronyms (SSK, EPOR, SCOT, SST, LTS, 
etc.). Only ANT and STS, it seems, stuck. This does not mean, of course, that early STS were 
a constraint-free space. Quite to the contrary, STS (and with it ANT) came of age in the 
midst of institutional and biographical attachments to the natural and engineering sciences. 
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The number of influential STS scholars with a background in science and technology is sig-
nificant. Notably, the scholar who actually invented the notion of ‘actor-network  theory,’ 
 Michel Callon (1981), was himself a retrained engineer – like his colleagues  Madeleine 
Akrich and Antoine Hennion (also a musicologist) – working at the École des Mines, an elite 
institute of technology situated in Paris. Attendant commitments were also practical, in that 
this French branch of ANT developed amidst a particular ecology of practice oriented to 
problems of technoscientific innovation (Akrich, Callon, & Latour, 2002a, 2002b) and situ-
ated amidst various collaborations with technoscientific disciplines, private corporations and 
governmental agencies.
Our point here is not to rehearse well-worn debates as to whether or not this particular 
trajectory of emergence of ANT led to a certain ‘critical’ blind spot towards questions of 
power and domination (de la Bellacasa, 2011; Star, 1991) – although we recognise the con-
tinued importance of these debates and will indeed revisit them intermittently throughout 
the volume. Rather, in the spirit of thinking ANT as intellectual practice, the question to be 
asked today, we believe, is about the many influences on and effects of various ANTs across 
the whole span of settings and domains to which it has subsequently travelled. Such travel 
clearly entails that other problems, other questions, other accounts and other interventions 
have been emerging under the collective banner of ‘ANT,’ even as the shifts and turns and 
proliferations involved have perhaps not always attained (enough) visibility and acknowl-
edgement. Our volume indeed seeks to address and rectify this issue, even as we remain 
acutely aware of its own limitations (more on this in sections 4 and 5).
There is every reason to suggest that, in moving in many directions at once away from its 
early implication into engineering-heavy settings, ANTs of many hues retain and redo some 
of their interdisciplinary and indeed anti-disciplinary inclinations. Such is likely to be the 
case, for instance, when sociocultural scholars friendly to ANT engage with medical doctors 
and other health professionals over clinical and corporeal realities (Cussins 1996); when they 
discuss with designers and architects on the construction of buildings and entire cityscapes 
(Latour & Yaneva, 2008) or when they intervene amongst environmental scientists, activ-
ists and concerned citizens embroiled in controversy over ‘natures’ (Blok, 2010). Yet, few 
have attempted to take stock of attendant shifts and reconfigurations in intellectual practice, 
whether in terms of the minutia and politics of methods, the craft and skill of collaboration 
or the very question of how constraints and possibilities of world-making interventions differ 
across sites and settings. 
Finally, in this initial line-up, it strikes us as particularly important to emphasise that early 
ANT also involved an inventive writing practice that became possible in a very unique ecol-
ogy of scholarly publishing. The work of Bruno Latour has been a constant experimentation 
with literary devices: The male anthropologist of Laboratory Life (Latour & Woolgar, 1986) 
and the female anthropologist of An Inquiry into Modes of Existence (Latour, 2013); the imagi-
nary figures of Science in Action (Latour, 1987); the polyphony of voices, documents and dia-
logues in Aramis, or the Love of Technology (Latour, 1996a); the parables and allegories collected 
in Pandora’s Hope (Latour, 1999c), etc. The list is indeed infinite. Relatedly, John Law has 
not just proposed to follow the figure of mess as a method for the social sciences (Law, 2004), 
but also to experiment with fractal and baroque modes of description (Law, 2002; Law & 
 Ruppert, 2016) to develop ways of relating to the complexities and multiplicities of practices 
that modernist cultures and languages do not permit. He has also cultivated a radically direct 
and apparently colloquial but carefully crafted mode of writing about profound philosophical 
and theoretical problems. So has Annemarie Mol, whose Body Multiple (2002) experiments 
with empirical philosophy as textual practice.
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Yet, important as these creative writing practices of ‘first wave’ ANT scholars have been 
and are, they remain only part of the palette of inspirations and imaginative aspirations 
which scholars near ANT might nowadays want to mobilise. Indeed, the whole question 
of the modes and media of ANT-informed scholarship ‘besides’ or alongside writing has 
itself emerged as an important topic of exploration, as inquirers search for other and possibly 
more engaging ways of intervening in and ‘inventing’ the social (Marres, Guggenheim, & 
Wilkie, 2018). In this light, it is indeed striking that the most successful aspects of Latour’s 
own art exhibitions (Iconoclash, Making things public, RESET Modernity) have arguably been 
the book-catalogues published on their occasion (see Blok & Thorsen, 2016). While texts 
and literary devices arguably retain a certain privileged position in the world of scholarship 
for good reasons – as evinced, of course, by the choice of medium for this very companion 
volume – a more radical commitment to multimodal making as a mode of knowing (see 
Dattatreyan & Marrero-Guillamón, 2019) is increasingly shaping contemporary intellectual 
practices near ANT as some contributions to this volume will show.
These and other elements that have shaped ANT as an intellectual ‘practice’ can be un-
derstood as what is alongside, and in some sense prior to, the set of propositions that we 
otherwise call ANT. As such, they are indeed ‘before’ ANT, in the specific sense of being 
prior to any particular way of doing ANT. Through the previous discussion, it also becomes 
apparent that while we seem to have a clear understanding of the ecologies that produce what 
we called the ‘first wave’ of ANT scholarship, we know little about what ANT as an intel-
lectual practice might imply today or in the future. In a related spirit, as noted, this volume 
seeks to explore some key elements of contemporary intellectual practices that are shaping 
new ANTs. The volume thus does not make one programmatic proposition for the future of 
ANT. Rather, it aims at probing and shaping intellectual spaces for future ANT engagements 
and thus to allow ANT to keep its currency of intellectual curiosity for the years to come. It 
is in this sense that we like to think of this volume as not simply grasping a current moment 
in social theorisation, but as an open project of future-making, where at stake is not what 
ANT is or was but what it could become.
This brings us to the second angle on the notion of ‘intellectual’ practice that we sug-
gested earlier: Taking intellectual work to mean primarily and inherently an engagement 
with matters of common concern and thus with publics and politics, featuring ANT as an 
intellectual practice allows us to stress that ANT involves more than a family of epistemic 
practices, narrowly construed. It is rather that ANT’s epistemic practices are also shaped by 
more-or-less specific ethical commitments, senses of political urgency and public concerns 
of varying kinds. This is important for our volume in a double sense. First, in line with a 
core ANT claim, the volume aims to display and discuss the subtle ‘ontological politics’ 
(Mol, 1999) that co-shapes every epistemic practice, ANT included. On top of this, we are 
interested in exploring the currency of ANT as an intellectual practice of giving shape to 
and articulating matters of public concern and thus of intervening in the various domestic to 
world affairs that its protagonists are concerned with. In short, we are interested in exploring 
ANT as a public intellectual practice.
Again, there are many precursors of such ‘intellectual’ practices in the genealogy of 
‘first wave’ ANT scholarship, too many to recount. Let us, however, point to three ethico- 
political problematisations that have gone hand in hand with ANT scholarship. The first one 
turns around the problem of ‘technical democracy’ in technoscientific innovation, economic 
markets and regulatory bodies. In this context, ANT’s commitment to symmetry acquires 
a different meaning: How to create conditions for the shared engagement and co-inquiry 
by technical experts and by publics of materially affected and concerned people with a view 
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to their joint articulation of matter of common concern? By reworking the divide between 
facts and values (Latour, 2004) and engaging the machineries of public participation (Callon 
et al., 2009), ANT has been practised as a project of ‘civilizing’ markets, of bringing matters 
of concern into democracy and thus ultimately as a project for democratising existing forms 
of representative democracy.
Along a related yet different trajectory, ANT is sometimes mobilised to pursue a fun-
damental critique of detached, modernist understandings of ‘the political’ in order to fore-
ground alternative ontologies of attachment, material participation and care. Annemarie 
Mol’s (2008) engagement with the problems of neo-liberal ‘choice’ and questions of care 
in contemporary health is a case in point. By exploring the tensions involved when patients 
are configured in a logic of choice as either paying customers or rights-bearing citizens, 
Mol critically exposes the exclusion of the body from conventional market and democratic 
figurations as well as delineates an alternative logic of care based on a collaborative attempt 
to attune medical knowledge and technologies to diseased bodies and complex lives. On a 
related line of exploration, Noortje Marres (2012) has proposed to bring back the everyday 
ecologies of artefacts and spaces into the centre of current imaginations of political partic-
ipation, which does not just imagine citizens without bodies, but also without attachments 
to things. While exploring people’s reflexive engagements with the material settings shaping 
their everyday life, Marres aligns with and contributes to feminist theories that vindicate the 
intimate, the private and the domestic as key sites of political participation. 
Finally, Bruno Latour’s (2018) more recent engagement with climate change and ecologi-
cal crises has gone hand in hand with a critical reflection on the current rise of  right-wing and 
nationalist forms of populism not just in Europe and the US, but also in Russia, China and the 
global South. By unpacking the connections between climate denialism, populism and so-
cioecological inequalities, as noted, Latour is becoming an increasingly influential voice in 
current public debates in the Euro-American world.
These are only three examples of how ANT works and translates jointly as epistemic and 
public practice. Such public interventions, of course, come with no guarantees and with 
plenty of risks. As the ANT saying goes: Translation is also betrayal, and the fate of ideas is 
always in the hands of future users. Such realisation, however, is no excuse for not making 
the attempt, and indeed only serves in this volume to motivate a stronger and more self- 
reflexive interest in the variable modes, conditions and effects of ANT-inspired interventions 
into public–political affairs. 
Around ANT: the volume as a hybrid forum
If we agree to think of ANT as an intellectual practice, in its twin epistemic and public senses, 
then a companion to ANT needs to be designed as a device for probing into the contemporary 
ecologies, versions and experiments with this intellectual practice in all its concrete situated-
ness. Rather than a blueprint of any kind, the challenge is to map out, showcase and seek to 
further the whole array of solidly ANT-informed practices at work across the globe and which 
contain within them the seeds of interesting new developments. Such, at least, is the challenge 
we have posed to ourselves as editors of this volume. This has already proven a productive 
one, we believe, in that it has triggered many conversations among and beyond our group of 
contributors about the affirmative and possibly detrimental implications of pursuing the en-
deavour. Let us briefly articulate some of the principles we derived from the aforementioned.
The first and in some sense core principle, hinted to in the aforementioned, is that the 
volume should not include the authors that first invented ANT as we know it, the ‘first wave’ 
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as we have termed it. To put this differently, the volume should not follow only or even 
primarily the well-known actors, the many ‘fathers’ and many ‘mothers’ of ANT, but rather 
attempt to map the equally plentiful new voices that are adding different bits and pieces to 
the conversation. We want to be very clear, lest we be misunderstood, that we mean by this 
move no disrespect whatsoever towards this ‘first wave,’ in relation to whose rich intellectual 
legacies everyone in this volume (editors included) are grateful inheritors. Were we in the 
business of ‘handbook-ing’ ANT, so to speak, we would surely summon the texts and voices 
of precisely the scholars cited in this introduction but not included in the volume. Yet, as 
noted, for a companion volume to do its job, we believe, it needs to keep track of where the 
action is going, to tack alongside and near to the many movements of ANTs.
One way of thinking of this is to imagine a present-day intellectual ‘issue public’ for whom 
the future of ANT is a key matter of concern, and whose members are engaged in exploration 
and inquiry ‘in the wild’ as to what kind(s) of effect(s) ANT has and might have for intellectual 
practice. In this sense, as editors, we are in some sense following ANT’s own ‘messy’ methods 
of trying to articulate a multiplicity (of ANTs) and to map issue publics (of engaged, ANT- 
inflected intellectual practices). Yet, from this follows an immediate afterthought: How could 
one even begin to map what is going on with ANT these days? How could we produce an even 
remotely reliable map of people, sites and issues that have been opening up new and interesting 
ANT-related conversations? What principles of mapping could we follow? 
Assuming and accepting the impossibility of looking at the field from the outside, we 
decided to initially go by but then also to carefully challenge, stretch and extend our own 
connections into various interrelated fields and regions. We were happy to recognise that 
we already enjoyed strong connections to brilliant colleagues (and oftentime friends, com-
panions indeed) active in quite divergent intellectual and practical fields, but also situated in 
different geographical regions within and indeed beyond Europe. Starting from such con-
nections, we attempted to make a few ‘ jumps’ in the process, using also bibliometric and 
other tools, to follow the ‘weaker ties’ allowing us to engage and invite sympathetic co- 
travellers who will be able to also challenge orthodoxies in interesting ways. In the process, 
mapping turned into more of a collective endeavour, as prospective authors and interested 
colleagues would offer up new suggestions, and as we ourselves learned about adventures of 
ANT research ‘elsewhere.’
As a companion or, perhaps, a companion of companions, we fully recognise that this 
volume is inherently unfinished, and not only due to constraints of space and our incapacities 
as co-mappers. Rather, the volume is unfinished in the more principled sense that it is meant 
to bring new travellers on board and to inflect new conversations. In this sense, in the end, 
the companion is not in fact a map, but rather a set of possible routes through the sometimes 
inscrutable and in any case variegated landscape of contemporary and potentially future en-
gagements with ANT. Or, conversely, it is a map, but only once we agree to take a map to 
entail a set of signposts in a vastly more extended landscape, and indeed as itself folded up in 
a ‘notebook’ style where new pages should be added as more territory is traversed.
The second overarching principle to which we have adhered as editors is that the volume 
should avoid the otherwise very real risk of reifying what is in fact a never-ending and quite 
overwhelming conceptual productivity of ANT intellectual practices. Well beyond ‘actors’ 
and ‘networks,’ any list of ANT-inflected concepts would quickly grow long. For starters, we 
would have agencements, agnosticism, assemblies, attachments, Baroque epistemology, cir-
culating references, centres of calculation, complicatedness, controversies,  cosmopolitics, 
distributed action, Dingpolitik, earthbound, ecology of practice, factishes, generalised 
symmetry, heterogeneous engineering, immutable mobiles, interobjectivity, inscriptions, 
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irreductions, issue publics, matters of concern, mediation, messy methods, modes of exis-
tence, multiplicity, non-humans, object-topologies, obduracy, oligopticons, ontological 
politics, orderings, overflows, parliament of things, performation, plasma, qualculation, 
spokespersons, sociologist-engineers, translation, treason. And the list could go on, at the risk 
of transforming ANT into a self-referential theoretical system.
The trouble here, we believe, is that such a list by itself  poses no real intellectual chal-
lenge, even as each of the concepts represents a powerful conceptual production and inter-
ventions developed, in most cases, in close relationship to specific empirical engagements 
with different fields and sites of practice. Indeed, apart from science and technology, many 
of these conceptual productions have arisen when studying music, medicine, global health, 
economics, ecology, politics, law, religion, visual and performing arts, cities and so on. And 
while it might thus seem tempting to deploy such thematic or field-based markers in the ser-
vice of generating order and overview in ANT’s many encounters and developments, such a 
move would run the serious risk of reinstating that very ‘domain ontology’ of the social (as 
consisting in economy, politics, science, religion and so on) that ANT scholars have always 
sought to resist. Much as with the conceptual list, traversing through each one of these ‘fields’ 
 represent little by way of productive challenge.
So how to think of a more challenging and, eventually, more productive forum for the ex-
tension of ANT into the future? Perhaps the most important decision in this regard has been 
to think of the volume as an opportunity to join and further extend a range of ongoing, but 
not yet quite charted or stabilised conversations about ANT’s capacities. Accordingly, instead 
of starting with what we already know ‘about ANT,’ as editors, we decided to focus on all 
the issues that lie ‘around ANT’ and which we do not quite know yet, even if this collective 
‘we’ is taken (concretely or figuratively) as having been near and alongside (versions of ) ANT 
for a while or indeed all along – to focus then on the kinds of things, specifically, that we, as 
editors, would like to ask to some of our companions out there. 
This editorial decision implies that each of the 38 contributions to this volume provides 
a uniquely expert response to a very specific question. In each case, while we as editors de-
veloped the initial questioning based on our reading of the author’s existing work, as set in 
the wider ANT realm, the final question and hence chapter titles developed in close dialogue 
between editors and authors, with plenty of negotiation, revision and tinkering, as well as 
the occasional tensions and disagreements. Traces of this process still hover in the back- or 
foreground of many contributions, in the hope of doing justice to the dialogical imagination 
with which we have striven to assemble this volume as a hybrid forum.
Looking back at the long back-and-forth exchanges with our authors, in some cases in-
cluding more than a handful of versions, we reckon a kind of ‘abductive’ method of inquiry, 
in the sense that the final chapters, and thus the ideas contained in each response, may not 
always be quite identical to what editors or authors alike had in mind upon embarking on the 
writing process. This is true, even as the roles played imply that while we as editors asked 
the initial questions, by way of responding to them, authors also become responsible – and 
literally ‘response-able,’ as Donna Haraway (2016) would say – for the direction traced by 
their ideas. Indeed, as anthropologist Annelise Riles (2006) notes in a related context, the 
very form of the intellectual response, which we simulate and play with in this volume, is an 
interesting and demanding epistemic and ethical endeavour, full of questions of author- and 
colleagueship. And while we make no claim to having fully mastered questions and responses 
as a form of intellectual collaboration, we hope to have achieved with this volume some of 
the ‘more subtle, creative, and careful genres of empathy and intellectual appreciation among 
colleagues’ to which Riles (2006: 26) rightly gestures.
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All of this implies that one might think of this companion as an attempt to chart out 
the collective journey of ANT so far, and to elicit pointers for new routes ahead. In devel-
oping the questions needed for such a tour around ANT, certain cross-cutting organising 
principles started to suggest themselves, gradually coalescing into what is now the section 
structure of the volume. While we do not wish to overemphasise the ‘trick’ of central per-
spective over what has, of course, also been a rather messy process of ordering chapters, the 
final structure and the route it suggests is also not entirely random or haphazard. Indeed, it 
pertains to what one might think of as itself an idealised version of an intellectual practice, 
this time concerned with the different aspects or facets of ANT’s intellectual practices 
which one would conceivably want to visit, sooner or later, in the process of drawing near 
to ANT. 
Each of the six sections of the book will have an introduction written by some combina-
tion of the three editors, motivating further the framing of the section and previewing each 
of the contributions within it. For present purposes, then, we will be very brief. Section 1 
gathers a series of questions and explicit reflections concerning some key elements of the 
ANT paradigm(s), focusing on the modes of weaving ANT’s conceptual–empirical inquiries. 
Authors’ contributions variously reflect upon modes of problematising, inquiring, compar-
ing, conceptualising, writing and criticising with or near ANT.
Sections 2 and 3 focus on the specific position of ANT in larger intellectual fields. For 
section 2, we asked authors to critically explore and discuss some of the many sources of 
ANT, genealogically speaking, paying also special attention to silenced, forgotten or poten-
tial sources that can still enrich ANT as an intellectual practice. In section 3, in turn, we 
are concerned with friendly problematisations of former and current developments of ANT. 
Thus, in short, while section 2 is about practices of sourcing ANT, section 3 is rather about 
dialogues, controversies and sympathetic differences with and in ANT.
Sections 4 and 5 explore ANT as a moving intellectual practice. In section 4, we ex-
plore how moving beyond the study of science and technology to inquire into various other 
 socio-material phenomena and fields has led to the production of new conceptual, method-
ological and ethical challenges. Relatedly, in section 5, we explore how moving through 
different sites, in this term’s emplaced and virtual senses, may both challenge and change 
ANT to take such sites’ spatio-temporal specificities and scalar economies seriously. Finally, 
section 6 addresses some of the public and professional uses of ANT directly, by exploring 
what happens to ANT as an intellectual practice when it travels outside academia and works 
as a resource for public intellectuals, for architects, for designers, for communication consul-
tants and so on.
To reiterate, as editors we are quite ready to accept and embrace the suggestion that ours 
is an incomplete tour near, alongside and around ANT, also potentially when it comes to our 
joint ability to imagine and encode the many aspects of this intellectual practice into sections 
and questions. Prosaically, some things and issues (besides ‘ANT first wavers’!) simply did 
not end up in the book due to the unavailability of or the unforthcoming circumstances of 
prospective authors (which explains, for instance, why section 2 contains no entry on either 
of the two Michel’s, Serres and Foucault, as otherwise important ANT sources). In other 
instances, imaginable questions searched in vain for their author-to-come. In still other in-
stances, no doubt, our own situated limitations will be the more obvious. It is hardly the 
case, for instance, that no interesting ANT work is undertaken in ‘Africa’ by ‘African’ or 
‘Africa-based’ scholars, and all the more likely that we have simply failed as editors in this 
case to sufficiently counteract postcolonial forces at work in the academy writ large. We hope 
to have succeeded on other accounts.
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On that note, time now to hand over the word to the real protagonists of this volume, that 
is, to the authors of the following 38 chapters who kindly and courageously took up the chal-
lenge of responding (‘response-ably’) to our many (‘questioning’) questions. We invite the 
reader to explore this volume’s many contributions in whichever order deemed appropriate 
for one’s own intellectual and practical purposes. Hopefully, as reading progresses, there will 
be ample opportunity to digress and to follow new leads through other chapters or, equally, 
through other ANT, near-ANT or not-so-near-ANT sources (to which reference is made 
throughout). As editors of this Companion to ANT, we can only hope that readers will want 
to put its resources to work in ways we have not and could not imagine – and in doing so, to 
become themselves the new companions of ANT.
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It cannot be repeated enough: ANT is neither a theory nor a method. So, what is it? A pro-
ductive answer has been that ANT entails a sensitivity for engaging with the world – not a 
central perspective, but an open repository of terms and texts, concepts and accounts, enact-
ing and testing modes of attuning to the social life of things, to what an actor might be and to 
how things and actors coexist, clash, differ and associate. The figure of the repository evokes 
Thomas Kuhn’s first understanding of scientific paradigms as sufficiently unprecedented and 
sufficiently open ‘exemplars’ to which scholars come back looking for inspiring problema-
tisations. ANT could be then understood as a repository of paradigms that have shaped the 
intellectual practices of a whole community of scholars. 
The contributions to this section deepen this understanding of ANT as a repository of par-
adigms by paying attention to what lies ‘besides’ (para) what is said and ‘shown’ ( deiknynai) in 
such exemplars – the most literal meaning of the concept of paradigm. This also corresponds 
to the second and most influential way in which Kuhn deployed the concept of a scientific 
paradigm: A ‘matrix’ of concepts, methods, sensibilities, procedures, values, commitments 
and assumptions permitting the collective and collaborative advancement and articulation 
of scientific inquiries. So, while what is said and shown in paradigmatic ANT exemplars 
resembles a plural repository of concepts and accounts, what lies besides these exemplars is a 
certain mode (and skilled practice) of relating theory and methods, concepts and descriptions, 
problems and valuations, and epistemic devices and critical commitments. Exploring ANT 
as a scientific paradigm in this second sense requires us to focus less on ANT terms and texts 
than on ANT as a skilled practice or a mode of doing.
With this aim in mind, we invited authors to reflect upon modes of problematising, 
inquiring, comparing, conceptualising, writing and criticising with or near ANT. We cer-
tainly do not think that these elements cover all key aspects of ANT nor that the responses 
offered by our authors reflect an uncontested doxa: There are more questions to be asked and 
lot to discuss. Yet, our authors offer conceptually powerful and truly original engagements 
with at least some elements of ANT paradigm(s).
The tour de force begins with Daniel López-Gómez’s chapter addressing this section’s con-
cerns straight on. ‘What if ANT wouldn’t pursue agnosticism but care?’, he asks, answering 
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with a story of initiation into the arts and crafts of ANT. Drawing on his work during the 
last 15 years on care arrangements for older people, López explores the epistemic and ethico- 
political effects of two modes of problematising with ANT. If the agnostic mode was essen-
tial to problematising the sociotechnical setting-up of a telecare system, the care mode forced 
itself upon the researcher through experiences of disconcertment resulting from encounters 
with the fragile daily life arrangements of telecare users. López explores the different types 
of ethico-political commitments for ANT researchers resulting from agnostic and caring 
modes of doing ANT.
We engage secondly with practices of making concepts. Adrian Mackenzie sets off his 
discussion of such practices with two observations: Firstly, concepts are not fundamentally 
different from any other objects; and, secondly, by often using the suffixes -ant and -ent, 
ANT has a tendency to create concepts denoting transitive relations. ANT concepts, he then 
suggests, might be better understood as ‘conceptants’ – a term that figures concepts as actants. 
Accordingly, the key question is how to make concepts more real. Mackenzie argues that 
there are some important lessons to be learned from how marmalade, clothes, code and salto-
flips are made. Drawing on personal experience, ethnographic research and media accounts, 
Mackenzie discusses how ANT concepts can be made sticky, strong, trackable and lively.
Is this the radical empiricism that ANT aims to cultivate? And is this in any sense eth-
nographic? Britt Ross Winthereik’s contribution is the first of many in this volume that 
reflects upon current encounters of ANT and anthropology. In her case, the focus is on how 
the ethnographic is and has been practised and conceptualised in both fields. Drawing on 
fieldwork research in a technology fair, Winthereik describes how she encountered not just 
interlocutors and technical artefacts, but also concepts that reflected and diffracted the con-
cepts she would bring into the field. She suggests that ANT’s radical empiricism – epitomised 
in the dictum ‘follow the actors’ – could be productively reinvented through an ethnography 
of conceptual relations and recursions. 
Atsuro Morita engages with a similarly productive and equivocal question: Can ANT 
compare with anthropology? By recounting the history of comparison in anthropology and 
situating ANT in relationship to this history, Morita makes an important case to think 
ANT’s self-description as an infralanguage – where the concepts and problems of a practice 
need to be stronger than those of the analyst – as related (and thus comparable) to the deploy-
ment of recursive comparisons in anthropology – where anthropological modes of thinking 
and inquiring are compared with the modes of thinking and inquiring encountered in the 
field. Following a technology transfer project from Japan to Thailand, Morita complicates 
anthropology’s intellectual history by showing how travelling machines trigger practices of 
comparison ‘in the wild,’ which again invite the analyst to juxtapose comparisons and seek 
for lateral connections among them. Morita proposes the notion of lateral comparison as a 
mode of rethinking ANT’s infralanguage as something that is never neutral and always en-
tangled in the trajectories of peoples and things.
The question is, indeed, who writes these stories. Or, as José Ossandón argues in his 
contribution, which are the conceptual personas that articulate ANT theoretical, method-
ological and political sensibilities. Ossandón explores this issue in relationship to recent ANT 
work on markets and by means of the question of how to write after Michel Callon’s perfor-
mativity. The project starts with an exploration of the implicit instructions and sometimes 
rather explicit slogans aimed at formatting research personas (and, as it has turned out, whole 
armies of Callonian researchers) for the study of markets – instructions that invite to make 
making-offs, inversions and patchworks. In a second step, Ossandón introduces the readers 
to the characters or personas that some of the most renowned Callon followers enact in their 
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texts not the least to comply with Callon’s instructions. Importantly, the ‘performative detec-
tives,’ the ‘philosophical ethnographers’ and the ‘market reformists’ the reader of such texts 
will encounter are not idiosyncratic articulations of singular authors, but resonate with some 
of the key conceptual personas of ANT writ large.
This is all fine, fellow social scientists might argue, but can ANT be a critique of capital? 
This is precisely the question Fabián Muniesa addresses. In his contribution, he revises the 
conceptual repertoires used by Latour and Callon to analyse the making of scientific knowl-
edge and technology development, the study of accounting, economics and marketisation, as 
well as the exploration of the economic theologies of the Anthropocene. For all three mo-
ments, Muniesa demonstrates the extent to which capital is unpacked by ANT scholars as an 
operation of translation, that is, as a mode of conversion of different things into assets that can 
be mobilised for certain purposes. Continuing with this problematisation of capital, Muniesa 
proposes a more systematic research programme not of capitalism, but of capitalisation and 
the epistemic practices, political configurations and valuation regimes that make conversions 
into capital possible. Critique is here to be understood as a method for examining tensions in 
current practices of capitalisation.
Michael Guggenheim has written the last contribution to our first section. In it, he fea-
tures a colourful palette of modalities that critique can take in and with ANT. The question 
he poses – namely, ‘how to use ANT in inventive ways so that its critique will not run out of 
steam?’ – involves a double critique of Latour’s critique of critique. It does not just imply that 
ANT has always been in the business of critique, but also that the way ANT has done cri-
tique might require reinvention. To make this argument, Guggenheim speculatively expands 
Latour’s suggestion that critical theorists resemble blasé tourists capable of going anywhere 
mounted on their budget flights. Exploring critique as a mode of displacement, Guggenheim 
reconstructs how the critical expeditions of ANT into different fields and sites have enacted 
at least three further modes of travel: Ecotourism among natural scientists, spa-holidays in 
the studios of architects and designers, and executive business travel above the clouds of 
modernity. As an alternative, Guggenheim proposes vindicating the speculative, playful and 
multisensorial modes of exploration and learning of the exchange student, who jumping into 
unforeseen situations articulates critique not as the examination, but as the experimental 
modification of practices.
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The question that opens this chapter does not seek to introduce new theoretical arguments to 
the passionate and long-standing debate concerning the epistemic, methodological and polit-
ical attributes of ANT’s agnosticism (see, for instance, Callon & Latour, 1992; Gad & Bruun 
Jensen, 2010; Pels, 1996).1 As is now well known, the radicalisation of agnosticism led to a 
post-social shift with well-known consequences for Science and Technology Studies (STS) 
and beyond.2 Neither does the opening question aim to present care as an alternative para-
digm, ethos or frame that would reveal and overcome the problems to which the adoption of 
agnosticism might lead. The question is certainly triggered by some sort of discomfort with 
ANT’s agnosticism, but points towards a more speculative yet practical concern. The paper 
attempts to appraise the pragmatic consequences that ANT’s repertoires have in our inquiries. 
As the notion of repertoire suggests, there is no appreciation here of the structural consistency 
of agnostic and care repertoires, neither is there a discussion about their intrinsic attributes. 
What I am interested in testing here are their pragmatic affordances, what these repertoires 
can do to our empirical engagements and what these engagements can do to them, that is, the 
differences these repertoires can contribute to making in our empirical inquiries.
This type of testing exercise is not very common in STS and ANT literature,3 which 
is quite surprising if we bear in mind that the most recognisable figures in ANT literature 
have repeatedly insisted since its inception that ANT should not be treated as a ready-made 
theory or method (Callon, 1999; Latour, 1999a), but as a repertoire (Mol, 2010, p. 261) that 
is diasporic (Law, 1998), increases sensibility and is shaped by the convoluted multiplicities of 
our case studies.4 But this lack of attention to the pragmatic affordances of these repertoires 
is even more striking if we acknowledge that doing ANT is not about producing ‘innocent’ 
descriptions but rather about intervening (through these descriptions too) in the ontological 
becoming of the actors we ‘follow’ and with whom we also become entangled during our 
inquiries. ANT repertoires do intervene in the framing of empirical engagements since they 
affect the establishment of settings and relationships with the actors and the way their accounts 
and concerns shape our own and are articulated by the repertoires we try to articulate. In fact, 
ANT scholars usually commit to nurturing their repertoires with challenging and complex 
empirical cases in the aim of producing conceptual, political, methodological and even aes-
thetical displacements. 
1




What if ANT pursued care?
Due to all these considerations about how ANT should be understood and handled, 
Annemarie Mol (2010, p. 261) suggested that ANT scholars should be considered ‘amateurs of 
reality.’ This would mean, following Hennion, that ANT scholars are ‘experts in the consequen-
tial testing of objects they are passionate about,’ and that ‘they confront them’ and ‘thus accu-
mulate an experience that is always challenged by the way in which these objects deploy their 
effects’ (Hennion, 2007, p. 75). I do think that ANT scholars should be considered as such, but 
I also think that, much more often, we should confront our repertoires in the same way that 
amateurs confront their passionate objects. Without incorporating amateurs’ appreciating ges-
tures towards our own repertoires, ANT will continue to be too easily treated as a ready-made 
theory or methodology regardless of the threatening messages of burying ANT if its amateur-
ish character is not respected (see, for instance, Actor Network and After, Law & Hassard, 1999).5
This contribution is a very modest remedy to this situation. As amateurs do, it seeks to 
pursue a reflexive and pragmatic confrontation with the ANT repertoires we articulate in 
order to test how they shape our case studies and are shaped by them. The aim of this paper 
is precisely to contribute to doing so by performing a consequential testing of the agnostic and 
care repertoire in a particular case study. To do so, I will draw on an ethnography case study 
I conducted on a telecare service some time ago. It is a case study I have written much about 
and to which I did not wish to return, I must confess.6 However, after several attempts, 
I have finally come to terms with the idea that retracing my steps might be instructive of the 
pragmatic reflection I would like to pursue in this volume. In this regard, I will examine 
the ‘disconcertments’ (see also Jerak-Zuiderent, this volume) that the encounters with the 
telecare users produced in my fieldwork, which shifted the focus of my analysis from the 
sociotechnical setting-up of the telecare system to the fragility and affordances of the older 
peoples’ daily life arrangements. As a result of this, the pragmatic differences between the 
agnostic and care repertoires will be sketched out and discussed in light of the classic ANT 
literature and current debates on care and STS (Martin, Myers, & Viseu, 2015; Latimer & 
Puig de la Bellacasa, 2013; Puig de la Bellacasa, 2017).
Doing agnosticism with telecare
Last year, 76 people aged 65 or over died alone at home in Madrid. So far this year, a fur-
ther 53 have died and the total figure for 2002 may well exceed one hundred. The num-
bers can be extrapolated to other major Spanish cities, where there are increasingly more 
elderly people living alone, either as a result of a decision they have made or due to inevi-
table circumstances. The most painful aspect of these figures is the certainty that many of 
these people could have been helped in time to save their lives or that they suffered long 
hours of agony without medical support or the comfort of a friendly companion. It is gen-
uinely annoying to know that the vast majority of such cases can be avoided through sim-
ple telecare systems, in use in many cities around the world. These programmes provide 
the elderly person living alone with a wristband or pendant and a special telephone device 
which allows them to immediately call for assistance from anywhere in the home. A fall 
or fainting loses its deadly potential and instead becomes a treatable medical condition.
(Editorial, 2002, p. 8)
This El País editorial, published after the 2002 heat wave, offers a perfect snapshot of telecare 
when I began to study it. Telecare was seen as a technology that could offer ‘security’ to 
older people living on their own and their family members. It was a system that could make 
the provision of elderly care in ageing societies more sustainable, as well as more accessible 
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and ethical because institutionalisation could be delayed, and older people given greater 
autonomy. In contrast to this, some critics considered that telecare was indeed reinforcing 
the problem by outsourcing care to their recipients and their families and impeding a fair 
redistribution of care across social class, ethnicity and gender. While in the former approach, 
technology was emphasised as an agent of transformation, in the latter, transformation takes 
place elsewhere and technology merely facilitates or hampers it.
At that time, coming across the classic ANT texts was an invitation to construct an 
agnostic repertoire with respect to both approaches. According to the programmatic text 
about the scallops (Callon, 1986), the ANT analyst must not ‘change registers when mov-
ing from the technical to the social aspects of the problem’ (Callon, 1986, p. 200). In other 
words, the analyst must set aside the ‘religious respect for purity’ (Latour, 1981, p. 210) and 
stop thinking in terms of two ontological regions, each with its own characteristics that 
demand differing explanations. Either as a technological cause or as an epiphenomenon of 
social transformations, telecare should be explained using the same repertoire. There is no 
single repertoire for doing so, but the analyst must take on two methodological principles 
when choosing one.
The first of these obliges the analyst not to consider his/her repertoire as more valid than 
others per se (Callon, 1986, p. 200). Initially, an analyst should not take any ontological po-
sition with regard to the explanations given by those involved in the case, including those 
given by the analyst. At that time, this methodological requirement was highly significant for 
me, as it meant putting the way in which the case had been theorised in quarantine. 
In the beginning, I considered telecare as relevant because it had the potential to empiri-
cally feed a theoretical discussion we were having around the notion of ‘extitution,’ a concept 
from Serres (1995) we draw on to understand the material configuration of power in ‘virtual-
ized’ institutions (Tirado Serrano & Domènech i Argemí, 2013). Telecare became the perfect 
example case to address the virtualisation of care and I took ANT as a theory that revealed 
the topological materiality of extitutions. For this reason, this first ANT principle was indeed 
not fully taken up. ANT was supposed to favour an agnostic approach with respect to any 
ready-made explanations, including those based on ANT studies. As Latour warned, ‘ANT 
is first of all a negative argument. It does not say anything positive on any state of affairs’ 
(Latour, 2005, p. 141). Thus, it turned out to be crucial for me to learn how to situate myself 
in the centre of the empirical generativity of the case study. I shifted away from trying to de-
velop explanatory concepts and towards adopting concepts that would enable me to capture 
the various and complex ways in which the telecare service was set up. In other words, a more 
thorough reading of ANT’s programmatic texts – such as Callon (1986) – made me approach 
telecare in a more modest and exploratory manner, as a multiplicity and collective endeavour 
that required me to follow and learn from the actors, including those that had been silenced 
or were apparently less concerned. 
Besides not imposing a grid of categories on the actors, the other principle that any ANT 
repertoire must fulfil is not to repeat the analysis the actors suggest (Callon, 1986, p. 200). 
That is the reason why controversies for ANT are the precise situations that make agnosticism 
the most heuristically wise attitude. As there is no single definition of the issue at stake but 
rather multiple and unstable ones, being agnostic is in fact being realistic towards the actors 
involved in the controversy and their different accounts. However, the telecare case did not 
resemble the classic sociotechnical controversy and it was quite hard to refrain myself from 
either repeating the actors’ repertoires or imposing my own. Telecare was already a stabilised 
technology and the service was established quite successfully ten years ago. Also, most of the 
actors I encountered (managers, technicians, users, relatives and alarm centre agents) tended 
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to draw on very stabilised and ‘powerful’ explanations regarding the autonomy and capacities 
of older people and the peace of mind the service gave to their relatives. Their actions did not 
seem controversial and there was therefore no need to produce alternative accounts. 
Due to this, my analytical strategy was based on paying greater attention to those fric-
tional situations in which the service was put to the test – that is, ‘trials of strength’ (Akrich & 
Latour, 1992) through which the invisible, embedded and silenced work that endows  telecare 
with its functional attributes was brought to the fore, similar to what Star calls ‘infrastruc-
tural inversions’ (Star, 1999, p. 380). These frictional situations appeared, for instance, when 
users would not open the door to installers, would not wear the pendant or used it for other 
purposes; when installers would place the telecare equipment in noisy rooms because it was 
the only location that the user would accept; or when call centre operators would estab-
lish more personal ‘relationships’ with service users as a way of providing better care, even 
though this was explicitly discouraged by the managers to reduce the number of burnouts. 
These frictions became the heuristics of my agnostic repertoire. Firstly, they enabled ques-
tions of sociological interest to be placed on the same level as the practical problems the actors 
had to face without favouring any particular perspective. Secondly, the attentiveness to these 
frictions also brought to the fore the work undertaken by less visible actors such as installers, 
maintenance workers, volunteers and relatives and the role of protocols and all sorts of stan-
dardised procedures for organising their work that are key parts of the infrastructure for the 
provision of care (López, Callén, Tirado, & Domènech, 2010). Thirdly, the focus on these 
frictions paved the way for the deployment of a monistic material-semiotic repertoire that 
could render the delivery of care (López et al., 2010) and the ‘autonomous’ life of their older 
users (López & Domènech, 2008) accountable as temporary outputs of the same heteroge-
neous engineering processes (Law, 1992).
To understand the policies, the technological designs and the provision of services, the 
agnostic repertoire turned out to be extremely important. Despite the fact that care prac-
tices, organisational cultures, technical devices, bodies, spaces and subjective dispositions 
needed to be transformed for the telecare to be designed and implemented (Hyysalo, 2004; 
Pols, 2012), this was concealed by the usual representations of telecare as a technical fix for 
the ageing society (Mort et al., 2015). Thus, by putting forward a nuanced and empirically 
grounded comprehension of what these innovations did in practice and how they were un-
leashed and tamed (Pols & Willems, 2011), the agnostic ANT repertoire contributed to 
opening up a critical discussion about the social and political implications of framing telecare 
as a plug-and-play, cost-effective and user-friendly solution. It was crucial to bring to the 
fore its constitutive multiplicities and also the power struggles involved in their design and 
implementation. However, the downside of this was that the agnostic repertoire also seemed 
to make me quite insensitive towards the ‘violence’ of the aforementioned frictions, to its 
uneven distribution and consequences for the actors at stake; it was as if I could point out the 
struggles without being touched or moved by them. 
entangled with reluctant telecare users, shifting  
from agnosticism to care
My disconcertment started to grow as I spent more time with the telecare users at their homes. 
Unlike in the conversations I had with the telecare workers, the queries I put to them – 
mostly women around 80 living on their own – were just a pretext to talk about other issues. 
These tended to revolve around their day-to-day routines and experiences; life-story and 
biographical memories; their relationship with relatives, neighbours, friends; stories about 
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the neighbourhood and other places where they used to live; personal beliefs, convictions, 
fears, etc. There was almost no trace of the telecare system in these conversations. I have to 
confess that initially it was slightly irritating to be unable to channel interviews towards the 
topics I wanted to talk about. Nevertheless, little by little I realised that these conversations, 
despite looking tangential to the topic of my interest, were in fact far more relevant to my 
research on telecare. It turned out to be abundantly clear not only that telecare had to be 
continuously arranged in particular ways to become a ‘solution’ but that this entailed rear-
ranging, even straining, other arrangements that were already in place. What mattered was 
not the adoption or rejection of the telecare service, neither was it important whether or not 
the way in which the service was used could be problematic or lead to future developments. 
What became relevant were the multiple arrangements that the people I encountered had to 
devise to continue living as they wanted, as well as the fragility of those arrangements and the 
‘violence’ that gerontechnological innovations such as the telecare system exerted on them.7
Either for good or bad, the lives of the users with whom I shared afternoons of long con-
versation already relied on ecologies of other, more or less, dense and operative arrangements, 
which were usually more informal but also more embedded than the telecare system. These 
arrangements endow their daily lives with continuity and richness, as they enable them to 
have and perform various social identities. For instance, some of the users I interviewed 
during the installation process used to phone or meet up with their relatives or neighbours 
at least once a day. These meetings were important for keeping in contact with the people 
they care about, to help them or to get help from them without an explicit request. Some 
had even devised ‘hacks’ to let the neighbours know about their situation without having to 
contact them, for example, by rolling up the window blinds of the bedroom every morning 
to communicate that they were fine.
These ‘little’ arrangements were so important that some users had the feeling of 
‘ abandoning’ them, and what goes with them, with the incorporation of telecare into their 
daily life. The aforementioned hacks would become useless and the meetings and phone calls 
would be less frequent, shrinking the possibilities for reciprocal care and perhaps contribut-
ing to defining them merely as recipients of care. That is why many users ended up leaving 
the pendant in the drawer or, in a situation of emergency, were more inclined to phone some-
body with whom they had a day-to-day relationship (usually a relative) than asking for help 
from an anonymous system activated by an alarm button. However, these arrangements were 
not seen, in most of the cases, as innocent either. In most of the cases, social workers, service 
providers and many relatives and users welcomed telecare because they realised that these ar-
rangements were far too demanding and could lead to situations of exploitation or negligence 
due to an uneven gender and class-based distribution of care work (Mort,  Roberts, & Callén, 
2012). Most of the users decided to have a telecare device at home because they wanted to 
stop being a burden for their close acquaintances. 
The most striking thing was that, despite the importance of these mundane arrangements 
and the harmful or beneficial consequences associated with maintaining them, they were 
usually disregarded by managers, policymakers and technology developers. Nobody but the 
users seemed to care about them. It was as if acknowledging their existence would ruin the 
image of telecare as an innovation that came to fulfil a void in the user’s life and as a tech-
nology designed to cover necessities that could not be covered otherwise. The consequences 
a simple telecare system could have on these arrangements were usually left unattended and 
rather than considering the users’ reluctance and ‘misuse’ of the service as ways of accommo-
dating and maintaining those arrangements, managers, policymakers and technology devel-
opers viewed them as mere barriers to overcome in future developments.
9
What if ANT pursued care?
A serious consideration of the users’ reluctance and aforementioned arrangements was at 
odds with the agnostic repertoire. I needed a repertoire that not only made the heteroge-
neous engineering process of the telecare service and its power struggles visible, but that also 
made us sensitive to the violence that this entails. As the work of Star (1991, p. 29) shows, 
to ‘translate’ is to exercise power: some elements are endowed with the capacity to delegate, 
coordinate and translate other elements into specific programmes of action, while others are 
translated, coordinated and become delegates of others instead. The way of making us aware 
of the violence of these translation processes seemed to be to consider the attachments we 
build in our inquiries, not only as potential entrapments that we need to put on hold to safe-
guard our agnostic analysis, but also as something that we need to learn to cultivate.
The precautionary measures which the agnostic repertoire of ANT encourages adopting 
enable the analyst to capture the agonistic multiplicity of world-making processes in their 
case studies (Latour, 1991). However, the violence that goes with the translation processes 
tends to be ‘cushioned’ by its deliberately formalistic and ‘poor’ semiotic repertoire – Star’s 
critique is pretty incisive in this regard (Star, 1991) – which according to Latour is the most 
valuable attribute of ANT (see, Latour, 1999a). The ‘poorer’ the repertoire, the lower the risk 
of being entrapped by dominant network-explanations, and therefore the higher the chances 
that a plurality of actors can make their concerns and categories relevant in the description 
of the analyst, which is the main thrust of ANT.8 However, what can be seen as a powerful 
diplomatic and scientific device to be able to freely move across domains without imposing 
reductionist accounts onto the ontological plurality of the world can also lead the analyst to 
become desensitised to the violence of the translation manoeuvres he/she is aiming to de-
scribe. Thus, instead of opting for a ‘poor,’ almost aseptic, repertoire, I believe that a more 
sensitive repertoire should be developed. Rather than putting any form of attachment, either 
to theories, actors or data, in quarantine, what we need is a repertoire to re-attune these at-
tachments so as to generate new situated sensitivities that do care about the becoming of the 
beings with whom we have become entangled, which in my case were the small neglected 
arrangements of the telecare users.
What would a care repertoire do to ANT?
If we go back to the programmatic question about the conditions of ANT repertoires, a care 
repertoire for ANT would not be valued on the basis of its capacity to translate others. As was 
suggested by Callon (1986), becoming an obligatory passage point is indeed the felicity con-
dition of the ANT repertoire that was proposed to renew the sociology of innovation, the so-
called sociology of translation. Neither would a care repertoire for ANT be concerned with 
adding ‘dimensions’ to a problem or to increasing the recalcitrance of the object of inquiry so 
that more relations and actors are included in our accounts. This would certainly make the 
repertoire more objective and diplomatic, both in political and scientific terms, as Latour and 
Stengers would put it. From my experience in the telecare case, I would say instead that a care 
repertoire for ANT would be devoted to the task of attuning the conditions under which one 
becomes sensitive and able to respond to a situation, whether these be concepts, experiences, 
methods, etc. As Maria Puig de la Bellacasa (2017) has said, a matter of care ‘is not only a 
matter of sensitivity, of ways of being affected and affecting,’ it also entails a ‘strong sense of 
attachment to something’ and a ‘material doing’ (Puig de la Bellacasa, 2011, p. 90) – a crucial 
nuance that the feminist tradition brings into the discussion about the ‘matter of concern’ 
(Latour, 2004). Thus, a care repertoire for ANT would account for a situation based on the 
possible consequences that it might have for those affected by the situation, which necessarily 
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includes the ‘analyst.’ It would not only describe but ‘re-scribe’ the onto-normativities of a 
given situation (Mol, 2012; Pols, 2015).9
Therefore, while an agnostic repertoire is deployed to afford the analyst the ability to move 
freely across multiple constituents, a care repertoire, in contrast, implies both a never-ending 
work of tinkering (Mol, 2010) and a political/ethical commitment to the becoming of those 
with whom we become entangled during our inquiries and with whom we share a situation. 
It concerns attachments that cannot be disregarded, but also their making and unmaking, 
that is, ‘being alongside’ (Latimer, 2013) in order to explore and ‘test’ the good and bad they 
bring about. Therefore, a caring repertoire for ANT does not allow free movement. It does 
not seek to multiply the attachments; to express itself in multiple ways; to explore the myriad 
ways of being something. The problem a care repertoire attempts to address is not the lack of 
‘mobility’ but the inability to appreciate, test and respond to the situated becoming that our 
accounts also contribute to making possible (and impossible) with those whom we become 
entangled within the course of our inquiries. 
Given this, hesitation is therefore crucial for the pragmatics of ANT repertoires, where we 
can learn to hesitate in different ways. In the agnostic case, it is an epistemic and diplomatic 
mechanism of dis-identification, to become an absent presence, that seeks to bring other 
actors and thereby the possibility of other ‘becomings’ into the situation. In the case of care, 
to hesitate is to ‘stay with the trouble’ (Haraway, 2016), responding without any assurance 
and certainty to the situated becoming of the beings with which one becomes entangled. 
It entails inventing new ways of responding, which are not innocent but entail ontological 
interventions that may also convey forms of violence, exclusion and domination to which it 
is crucial to be attentive to, and, again, responsive to. This care repertoire could be consid-
ered ‘generatively unsettling’ (Murphy, 2015) and should contribute to ‘take better care of 
how we care’ (Martin et al., 2015, p. 631). It thus implies taking sides, participating, acting, 
making a choice, taking a position, but without taking for granted a general or fundamental 
principle on which these actions would safely and coherently be grounded. That would pre-
vent us from troubling the arrangements and responses we produce in our accounts, that is, 
exploring and testing the consequential objections of our ANT repertoires.
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Notes
 1 In contrast to other agnostic approaches such as the Strong Programme, ANT enacted agnosticism 
not ‘as the doubting of values, powers, ideas, truths, distinctions, or constructions, but as the doubt 
exerted against this doubt itself, against the notion that belief could in any way be what holds any 
of these forms of life together’ (Latour, 1999b, p. 276).
 2 With ANT’s agnosticism, ‘the social’ shifted from being a distinctive reality, the realm of the in-
tersubjective beliefs and social imaginaries, from which both truth and falsity, success and failure 
could be explained, to be considered something that should be explained symmetrically as the 
result of materially heterogeneous entanglements.
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 3 For a very interesting case of consequential testing of ANT repertoires, see Munk & Abrahamsson 
(2012). Aligned with this, this text also proposes a discussion that has resonances with the special 
issue Unpacking Intervention in Science and Technology Studies, edited by Zuiderent-Jerak and Jensen 
(2007), particularly Vikkelsø’s contribution (2007) on ANT descriptions, as well as Zuiderent- 
Jerak’s paper ( Zuiderent-Jerak, 2016) about interventions as a method of producing both STS 
knowledge and new normativities. These contributions have been very inspiring. 
 4 As Law has insisted, ‘we can only understand the approach if we have a sense of those case studies 
and how these work in practice’ (Law, 2009, p. 141).
 5 For example, even though agnosticism has been defined as ‘a sturdy theoretical commitment to be 
taken so as to forbid the analyst to dictate to actors what they should do’ (Latour, 1997, p. 375), the 
theoretical arguments waived to make this ‘strong polemical stance’ prevail in the academic arena 
seem to have gained more attention than the pragmatic consequences its undertaking might have 
had in shaping the empirical engagements of our case studies.
 6 A large proportion of the work on telecare was undertaken collectively with Francisco J. Tirado, 
Nizaiá Cassián, Blanca Callén, Miquel Domenech and especially with Tomás Sánchez Criado, with 
whom I have co-authored several papers. Telecare has been a research topic in my PhD and later 
as part of the FP7 EU project EFORTT (Ethical Frameworks for Telecare Technologies for Older 
People at Home –http://www.lancaster.ac.uk/efortt/), which ended in 2011.
 7 For a more detailed discussion about the possibilities the term “arrangement” brought to the case 
study, see López (2015, p. 93).
 8 For Latour (1981), agnosticism was considered important so as not to be captured by the agonistic 
logic of technoscience, where the production of facts and technological innovations entails purifi-
cation processes in which certain actors are completely silenced: lay people, refuted theories, failed 
artefacts, rejected innovations, etc. For this reason,
from the very beginning, ANT has been sliding in a sort of race to overcome its limits and to 
drop from the list of its methodological terms any which would make it impossible for new 
actors (actants in fact) to define the world in their own terms, using their own dimensions and 
touchstones.
(Latour, 1999a, p. 20)
 9 In this regard, the reciprocal capture of STS and design practices that Alex Wilkie (see in this vol-
ume) identifies in the pro-compositional and retroscriptive practices of certain design practices might 
have resonances with a care repertoire if the exploration of situated “becomings” was oriented 
towards testing the consequential effects of our modes of engagement and intervening rather than 
pursuing the proliferation of the new.
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How to make ANT 
 concepts more real?
Adrian Mackenzie
Let us, according to characteristic ANT pedagogical practice, begin by following some cases 
of making broadly understood, asking of each – marmalade-making, sewing a seam, add-
ing some code to software and training to do a backflip – how they do-ably become real. 
 Marmalade-making, sewing flat-felled seams in denim, rebasing a branch in a git code re-
pository and doing a backflip are all eminently doable, albeit extraordinarily ordinary trans-
formations of the relations between people and things. These practical transformations – of 
Seville oranges and sugar, of thread and twill, of a history of work done by programmers 
or of a body jumping off the ground – condense, accumulate, collect, equip, institute and 
configure things in different ways. They are not simple or even mundane transformations, 
but actually change something in the world. They are not transcendent ideas, propositions 
or discursive formations. But like ANT concepts, they come into being as a way of inhab-
iting problems. They heterogeneously render some things inseparable (for instance, human 
<-> non-human; modern <-> non-modern; culture ↔ nature). To make or create an ANT 
concept should, at least for the purposes of experiencing something of the slowing down and 
buoyant immersion I associate with ANT, result in something as sticky, strong, reachable and 
mobile as marmalade, seams, code or flips.
How can a concept take on reality like marmalade, a seam, a code repository or a backflip? 
While I won’t provide a recipe for cranking out concepts, I think it is possible to locate in the 
ferment of ANT a set of reality-inducing moves, some of which crystallise as concepts.1 In 
order to address the reality or physis of such concepts, the writing of this piece seeks to con-
struct or cobble together a concept of ANT concepts. The concept I’d like to make do with 
in writing this piece is the conceptant, a concept of the reality-doing of ANT concepts. I’m 
hoping that the word play – concept + ant – does not slide or bounce away from the problem 
of concocting the reality of ANT concepts.
Stickiness: the accumulated consistency of marmalade
In Britain, the term ‘marmalade’ is reserved for jam made with citrus fruits. In Danish, 
Finnish, French, German, Italian and Spanish at least, the term includes jams and preserves 
made from almost any fruit. In Portuguese, the term refers to quince paste. In this discussion, 
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I refer to orange marmalade exclusively.2 Despite reports over the last five years of a great 
decline in marmalade-eating at breakfast tables in England, the 3,000 entries at the possibly 
uncool annual Dalemain Mansion International Marmalade Competition in northern Cum-
bria suggest interest in marmalade-making simmers on (Figure 2.1).
Making marmalade is a relatively isolated and perhaps extraordinary annual event. It is 
one of the many cooking activities in which the process has a different reality to its prod-
ucts, even a product that endures in the glowing jars with their slices of orange suspended 
in translucent amber jelly. The recipe is short: cut oranges into thin or wide strips and soak 
them in water overnight, cook the oranges, add the sugar, boil and test if it has reached a 
setting consistency, ladle into sterilised jars standing them upside down so they vacuum seal 
themselves on cooling, and then check them the next day to see the bright jewels of fruit. 
Marmalade-making lightens the gales and darkness of January or February (in the Northern 
Hemisphere), and then carries through a year of eating or giving away.
Pectin, a polysaccharide whose dynamic molecular reconfigurations are still not fully 
understood, sets marmalade. In marmalade-making, pectins switch from their role as struc-
tural elements in fruit skin to an associative agent. During the boiling phase, branching and 
changing bonds of pectin soaked from the oranges form a network mesh that holds water, 
sugar and fruit in a colloidal solution. During cooking, sugar keeps water molecules away 
from pectin branches; citric acid from the oranges alters the negative charge on the pectin 
branches, so that they can bond with each other to form the associations that give marmalade 
colloidal consistency and translucency.
The consistency of ANT concepts depends, rather like the setting of marmalade in 
its combination of solids and liquids, on some different components rendered inseparable 
within them. ANT concepts tend to become molecular association machines and this 
machinic- becoming is characteristic of their antics. The tendencies to build ANT ma-
chines remain operational over decades: the Hume Machine, co-word analysis, or Tarde 
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Figure 2.1  Pectin molecule
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Figure 2.2  Flat-felled seam
models, to name a few. In this setting, a grammatical suffix can operate as the setting 
agent. Rather than -ity, -ism, -ment, -ness or -isation, I start the train of association from 
the -ant/-ent suffix:
-ant/-ent: (a) a personal agent, as agent, claimant, president, regent; (b) a material agent, 
as coefficient, current, ingredient, secant, tangent, torrent; esp.  in Med., as aperient, 
astringent, emollient, expectorant.
(Oxford English Dictionary 2017)
Core ANT concepts such as actant hack the -ant/-ent suffix. -ant/-ent channels agency 
through the deltas of persons, materials and movements. Given that ANT largely concerns 
agents in their differences (people, things, events, situations, configurations, etc.), the -ant 
suffix introduces a characteristic reversibility into ANT concepts. -ant and -ent work as a 
coefficient, mix as an ingredient and sometimes run a tangent through ANT work. Because 
-ant/-ent doesn’t pick and choose between entities, or  between person and things, concepts 
plugged into  the suffix switch easily between people and things: president and aperient, and 
resident and repellant can be conceived together. Instability in the -ant/-ent fixation ani-
mates many ANT concepts, or conceptants. It imbues them with heterogeneity, exposes and 
sensitises them to mixtures and differences, and increases their stickiness in many situations. 
Symbolic and physical, legal and impersonal, ANT concepts, like the massive marmalade 
spill in the kitchen scene of Paddington Bear, get into a surprising number of places by means 
of such suffixes.3
Sewing seams in reality
It would be strange, given that ANT cut its teeth on the associations of people, devices, 
things and others, if this molecularity didn’t shape up in some form or figures. A  divergent 
series of para-discursive elements – diagrams, figures, graphics, software, techniques, exper-
iments, exhibitions, events – swerve away from words and their propositional configurations. 
These extra-discursive events are not commonly found, if at all, in other concept-making 
practices. (For critical philosophies, the only things to be found in figures or diagrams, in 
events or exhibits, are the concepts preceding their construction. Kant even requires a math-
ematician that ‘he must not ascribe to the figure anything save what necessarily follows from 
what he has himself set into it in accordance with his concept’ (Kant 1963, 19; Figure 2.2).)
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Let us diagram the conceptant in order to attempt the swerve. Idling several hours at 
an inner Manchester skate park, I strike up conversation in the cafe with a former fashion 
retail manager about jeans. He trawls the city’s charity shops buying all the Levi jeans he 
can find to send for resale in Japan. Jeans from the 1970s are especially valuable. While 
jeans wear out in the knees, crotch, cuffs or backside, and are sometimes deliberately 
ripped, distressed, bleached and washed with stones and chemical to create the appearance 
of rugged encounters with cattle and dirt, it is rare to find jeans coming apart at the seams. 
(Recent fashions in Japan of jeans consisting solely of seams attest not only to the durability 
of seams jeans.).
Many realities have seams. Jeans, along with other fabric-based equipment such as tents 
and backpacks, usually have flat-felled seams.4 Flat-felled seams are made by laying the ma-
terials to be joined on top of each other, running a line of stitches near the edge, trimming 
one side of the seam, folding the wider seam allowance over and under the smaller seam and 
pressing, and then sewing a second line of stitches as close to the end of the fold as possible. 
Putting in a flat-felled seam requires at least two runs through a sewing machine, and two 
folds in the material. The resulting seam has no raw edges visible, and ripping the seam apart 
is very difficult because the folded fabrics pull in the same direction.
The lovely combination of stitching-folding-stitching that so durably joins materials in 
flat-felled seams differs from marmalade-making. Here too, there is a relative inseparability. 
The slow wear and tear of jean seams, and the difficulty in altering them (to narrow the 
width of legs on jeans means undoing the flat-felled seams running up the sides of each leg, 
an arduous task), is a figure for joints in concepts, and also for how we might think of giving 
them a more equipped reality.
The diagrammatic components of conceptants equip them by stitching language and fig-
ure together, folding the sayable and the visible in such a way that they pull together not 
apart. Like jeans, backpacks or tents, their equipmental workability depends on sewing such 
seams. The seam provides a way of thinking of a concept’s empiricism. Para-discursive el-
ements of conceptants are not always recognisable or admissible to Theory, since they re-
semble and are a form of empiricism, albeit a radical or relational one.5 A component of the 
concept threads through moments in particular places (marmalade-making, a conversation 
of the skate park, at the sewing machine, etc.). An ethnographic empiricism of ANT func-
tions as a material whose weave forms an observational fabric, full of threads to be picking 
up and folding over. Rather than a drone view, the diagrammatic component of concepts 
weaves or sews, criss-crossing and pinching together planes of the empirical. The many case 
studies – proteins, particle accelerators, arteriosclerosis, financial trading rooms, electric cars, 
muscular dystrophy patients, climate models, call centres and satellites – weave a twill, to 
which a concept adds seams, weaving in and out textures, textiles and texts in pursuit of a 
seam of inseparability.
Rebasing the collective in the distributed mode: ‘everything is local’
Contemporary software making relies heavily on code version control systems to address the 
problem of distribution in its several senses. Software making is distributed across people, 
places, infrastructures (cloud compute, etc.) and time (indeed rendered continuous, as in 
‘continuous deployment’ (Mackenzie 2016)). The git version control system allows distrib-
uted making in all three senses. Tracking and publishing each modification allow parallel, 
non-linear histories to happily coexist, and provisionally appear as a ‘release’ or a ‘version’ 












Figure 2.3  Rebasing a branch
Git, whose motto ‘everything is local’ has a distinctly ANTish resonance, is an extraordi-
narily clever arrangement. Take the example of the git rebase command. Given two branches 
of a code repository that have diverged (usually as a result of different programmers working 
on the code repository independently), a software project effectively exists in two different 
realities. The rebase command allows a form of time travel in which the changes in one 
branch are ‘replayed’ on another branch. Rebase replays the ‘commits’ – the operation of 
making more or less atomic snapshots of the state of a project permanent and visible to others 
(by cryptographically hashing them in the same way that Bitcoin does) – to construct a lin-
ear history from a process that is essentially non-linear, branching, collective and divergent. 
Rebasing is described as dangerous – ‘using a chainsaw on LSD’ in one colourful description 
(Tomakyo 2008) – because it ‘alters history’ and if the history is shared, then people will 
care about it. The Golden Rule of git rebasing is, therefore: ‘never rebase on a public branch’ 
(Atlassian 2017).
The case of git rebasing is instructive. At first glance, git is a technical implementation 
of ANT’s worst nightmare: the flattening of richly non-linear histories of associations and 
references into a neat, linear history of progress. Or is it? The tracking of references (refs 
in git terminology), and the merging or rebasing of histories of changes entails a revers-
ible accumulation and ordering of references. Other histories remain reachable within the 
repository. This is the whole point of git. The making of concepts also entails gathering 
and tracking of references, their movement and reshaping in ways that permits their trac-
ing and retrieval. From the standpoint of the graph of hashed references, forming a richly 
brachiated history, logging collective entanglements of commitment and rebasing alters 
but retains a reachable non-linear history. Both -ant/-ent particle and the diagram with its 
ethnographic seams seek to construct a radical relationality, to underscore inseparability 
rather than separability, to hold the multiple chains of references that matter to actors rather 
than minimise them.
Conceptants differ from other concepts in large part in their relation to objects typically 
found in sciences and technologies. Sciences, technologies and their hardly mundane ob-
jects (positrons, microbes, arteriosclerosis, climate models, aircraft, wave turbines, etc.) differ 
from the mundane objects favoured by philosophy in its meditations on candles, stones, jugs 
and bridges. ANT concepts, it should be said, respond to the problems of agency associated 
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with sciences, medicine and engineering in specific situations, but they are often ‘rebasing 
public branches,’ to speak gittishly, or ‘reconstructing specific situations’ to speak like Dewey 
(Dewey 1957, 91). Conceptants extend into other domains (markets, finance, institutions, 
education, health, etc.) by unravelling threads of calculation, experiment, device or inscrip-
tions. But conceptants differ because they carry with them complicated, at times extraor-
dinary or somewhat indeterminate things such as ‘body multiples’ (Mol 2003) or ‘material 
participations’ (Marres 2012).6
Rather than freebasing, conceptants rebase technical or scientific situations along with 
the various public knowings, working and living with these objects on the part of scientists, 
patients, users, engineers and others, all of which belong in the referential repository. The 
mode of existence of knowledge, as (Latour 2007) terms it, consists in all its correspondences 
and transfers between knowledge, people and things. There is no denying the flattening 
that occurs in conceptants, and this flattening can arouse indignation as well as fascination. 
Conceptants rebase, in the way git rebases, richly brachiated histories, always maintaining 
everything as local. In doing so, they revise a shared history but maintain the reachability of 
the chain of references that make it sharable.
Given the Cambrian explosion of knowledge-things we live with, can we expect lots of 
conceptants rebounding and rebasing sciences and technologies, incorporating their diverse 
commitments in a flatter history? Even though we can list many conceptants, they are quite 
rarely made. Like the Bitcoin blockchain, a lot of mining goes into them, and their coinage 
is finite. This again is a consequence of their recursive, switching character, their resolve 
‘not to jump’ and their tendency to move along connected paths. The rarity of conceptants 
does not mean that they are comets, travelling in from outer realms, awaited and observed as 
stellar events (even if clever rebasing can give that impression). It would be better to thinking 
of conceptants as points of condensation or accumulation, consistent with other conceptants. 
Their creation, like Bitcoins, slows down as their power of condensing chains of references 
increases, and as they maintain consistency with other conceptants by making continuous 
paths, equipped with para-discursive elements, distributed across many people and places, and 
somewhat instituted (in conference, journals and other documents such as this handbook).
Conceptants have a powerful correlational or resonant aspect, despite the bad press cor-
relation has recently received (in the context of representations thinking about things for 
speculative realism, and in context of causality for data science and predictive analytics). 
Correlation or resonance between concepts is not such a bad way of thinking about how 
conceptants cohere as it allows to comprehend the equipped, accumulated, collective and in-
stituted features of conceptants in time, the results of which can be seen as not only engaging 
so many academics in debate but in existing as things in the world. To use the git analogy, 
conceptants are in continuous deployment.
Learning to salto
The physis of concepts in ANT abhors a void. ANT concepts do not affirm separations, 
divides, gaps, breaks, discontinuities, chasms or voids. Almost every pedagogy of ANT 
concepts warns against dividing or separating. ANT concepts deprecate attempts to jump, 
especially the forms of jumping – the salto mortale – from subject to object or culture to na-
ture, or from humans to non-humans. They don’t gravitate towards accounts of science and 
technology such as Hannah Arendt’s that refer to ‘freedom from the shackles of earth-bound 
experience’ (Arendt 1998, 265; Figure 2.4).
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Jumping, however, can be a sign of great excitement, ebullient energy or an attempt to 
leap to save life in times of danger. According to YouTube exponents, where many how-to-
backflip videos can be found, it is possible to learn to do a standing backflip in five minutes. 
Learning to backflip in such a short time – why not do it now, before you finish reading 
this? – might seem miraculous.7 I’ve tried to do it, but didn’t manage in five minutes. The el-
ements of learning the backflip or somersault include a whole body jump, a power- backwards 
roll from sitting, a macaco (Caporeira single-handed back handspring), culminating in the 
full backflip. In each of these steps, practised for around 45 seconds, the backflipper is spend-
ing more and more time upside down and above the ground. For instance, the power- 
backwards roll remains fully on the ground, but enjoyably upside down for a good part of a 
second. While a full flip only lasts 0.5–0.75 seconds from go to woe, the transformation of 
body in relation to ground is striking (so to speak). The flip is an event, a gap-becoming, that 
temporarily constructs a bridge in the air for a muscle-skeletal body using rotational mass and 
elasticity as a central component.
The risk in talking about ANT concepts at all is doing an accidental flip. Concepts, by 
virtue of the history of their practice, their concretisation and their mode of existence, tend 
to jump, bounce and flip backwards into a mind position. They are prone to mentation. 
A subject–object gap opens up in the immediate vicinity of most concepts of the concept. 
Conceptants, by contrast, are somewhat mindless, in the sense that they enter at a lower 
level, avoiding the questions of mind, looking for arrangements that give rise to occasional 
mind-effects, or to mindedness.
It is necessary to risk something in order to benefit from the thrill of the backflip and 
arrival back on two feet. Despite their somewhat bad name in ANT literature, somersaults 
and flips do happen, can be learned and might on occasion be worth doing. They have a 
bad name because they imply gaps, chasms or discontinuities (nature-culture, premodern- 
modern, subject-object, etc.). As anyone who has learned to somersault or flip knows, they 
are fun, even exhilarating, and accomplished in a coordinated movement, shaping and posi-
tioning of bodies in relation to the always imminent return to ground, in fact to almost the 
same place. Conceptants might be seen as harnessing or stabilising jumps, drops, flips and the 
like in the same way that the preparatory jumps, power-rolls and macacos scaffold a nascent 
backflip. Conceptants sometimes flip, and perhaps need to for physico-aesthetic effect.
Figure 2.4  Salto
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Conceptants are not immune to, and in fact rely on, moments of idealisation, moments of 
departure from the ground, associated with flip. They lack the regulatory form ascribed to 
them by much philosophy (e.g. Immanual Kant in his Critique of Pure Reason presents ‘pure 
concepts’ in the form of categories as aspects of the appearance of objects in general, prior 
to any experience). Although they are not the regulatory forms that govern and order expe-
rience, conceptants externally resonate with ideals (‘the concept of freedom’) even as they 
rebase specific situations.
The reality of conceptants
How are ANT concepts made? Every word of that question skids into problems and possibili-
ties. You may have noticed that I did not answer the original question ‘how to make ANT con-
cepts?’, altering it instead to ‘how to make ANT concepts more real?’ or better, ‘how to make 
do with ANT concepts?’ The elements I’ve assembled in the conceptant address the problem 
of the reality of ANT concepts: a grammatical particle – -ant/-ent – that switches  recursively 
between humans and non-humans; a diagrammatic component that not only brings different 
fabrics together but finds ways of folding the sayable and the visible together; a workflow 
for wrangling versions, for rebasing repositories of shared references; and a jump, a salto non- 
mortale, a way of marshalling energy to spring from the ground, a tumble of idealisation. In 
slightly more conventional terminology, this account of conceptants concerns the forms of 
accumulating, equipping, collecting and instituting that make ANT concepts more real.
I don’t know whether these elements exhaust the reality of ANT concepts. They may, due 
to their exoteric derivation from marmalade-making, sewing, coding and acrobatics, wash 
out of the mainstream of ANT work. Regardless of their derivation, and even their relation 
to other forms of thinking, what I have sought to connect and hold together in the concep-
tant is the combination of excitement and relief that it is possible to experience in reading 
ANT accounts (in my case, reading Laboratory Life, Science in Action and ‘The De-scription of 
Technical Objects’). It might not be possible today for an existing or new conceptant to im-
press in the same way after several decades of accumulation. It should, however, be possible 
for the setting, joining, rebasing and flipping operations to set in motion vibrations of the 
concept, with the peculiar energies flowing through it, sometime akin to music, yet within 
a different horizon, resonating with states of affairs.
Notes
 1 A point of accumulation of publications, of events, of stories, of a discipline, an institution, ANT 
concepts arise from a ferment, something undergoing transformation around it. Concepts surface 
from a broth, an archive of documents and publications associated with the term ‘ANT,’ as infra-
structurally and documentarily constructed and practised in the publication of ANT books and 
articles on web-accessible platforms, and indexed through publication databases such as Thomson 
ISI or the ANT resource. In this discussion, I draw on an archive of documents and publications 
associated with the term ‘ANT,’ as infrastructurally and documentarily constructed and practised 
in the publication of ANT books and articles on web-accessible platforms. The complete data set 
of this object can be found at [https://github.com/rian39/ant/data]. Bibliographic objects have a 
special function in conceptants. It is not accidental that much ANT work, especially in the more 
document-oriented versions, has worked with publications (Latour et al. 2012). But they could 
also be websites, tweets or other inscriptions. The documentary component, whether in co-word 
analysis (Callon, Courtial, and Penan 1993) or in ANT-oriented digital sociology (Marres 2017), 
anchors analysis of accumulation, of density, or large numbers, of universals. Hence, it’s an import-
ant component, like a probability distribution, because it comprises many variations.
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 2 EU Directive 79/693/CEE defines it according to the British usage. While the first large com-
mercial batch of marmalade made with Seville oranges is usually attributed to a Dundee woman, 
whose merchant husband purchased a cargo of Seville oranges from a storm-damaged Spanish ship 
sheltering in Dundee, Scotland in 1700 (Scot-breakfasts first began to include marmalade in the late 
18th century; England followed in the 19th century), I refer to non-commercial practice.
 3 To attribute the consistency of ANT concepts to a grammatical particle such as -ant might seem 
incompatible with the ontological diversity of ANT. The special situation of the making of ANT 
concepts, however, has been documents and texts. The working through of the semiotic operations 
of shifting first explored by structural linguists such as Roman Jakobson was generalised by early 
ANT into heterogeneous networks of actants (Akrich 1992). What started out as a graphical anal-
ysis of sentence structures becomes networks of actants organised and operating in different ways 
around centres, through displacements and detours, and in enrolments. Inscription, the crossover 
entity, the trace-structure that criss-crosses the most formal, abstract or institutional formation 
with technical and commercial, physical and practical coinages, carried the shifting, recursive -ant/
ent suffix across the different domains and settings into which ANT ebbed and flowed as it explored 
laboratories, clinics, engineering projects, machines, architecture, infrastructures, markets, laws 
and devices, or any of the other situations that might be listed on the ANT itinerary.
 4 The French seam is closely related to the flat-felled seam, but has less visible stitching. Just as strong, 
it is more common in formal garments.
 5 For all their anti-correlationalism, object-oriented philosophy and speculative realism seem reluc-
tant to take steps towards any empirical conversion. A component of the conceptant passes through 
material practicalities towards an outside that it cannot be separated from. Maybe every conceptant 
has some extra-discursive elements, whether in the form of diagrams (network graphs, the many 
actor-network visual forms), in ways of writing outside the lines of statements (in stories, in im-
ages, in odd typography, paratextual forms, dialogues and artworks), in seams of technical practice 
(sewing seams with materials, cooking, dialogues, fabrication, exhibitions, etc.) and probably many 
other things I can’t think of (activism?). A conceptant might even be characterised by its exteriority, 
by its own irreduction (Latour 1987) to discourse, to propositions enunciated in words.
 6 New materialisms of recent years also embrace complicated or extraordinary entities, but they tend 
to mobilise them in more orderly conceptual configuration.
 7 Backflips have also been done in wheelchairs, and as I write, the first humanoid robots are backflip-
ping nicely. Meanwhile, some humans are doing standing double backflips (e.g. Aaron Cook).
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In a more-and-other-than-human world, we need an ecological epistemology, argue  Christina 
Hughes and Celia Lury, and propose a methodology of returns (Hughes & Lury, 2013). In this 
chapter, I argue for an epistemology that follows concepts as they enter into conversation 
and convince each other of a different being. Below, I return to the radical empiricism of 
actor-network theory (ANT), more specifically the ‘follow the actor’ dictum. This was a 
key element in ANT’s methodology and the one that has been instrumentalised. As a simple 
instruction, ‘follow the actor’ does not outline any specific kind of action, nor does it explain 
anything. It is an invitation for in situ sense-making and sorting out relations and attachments. 
Extending the suggestion put forward by Hughes and Lury that we need an ecological rather 
than a social epistemology, i.e. one that is relational and lateral, my ambition in this chapter 
is to upcycle the ANT dictum as it may prove generative for new generations of fieldworkers.1
Initially, ‘follow the actors, whose concerns you share’ was a radical proposition (Blok & 
Jensen, 2011; Callon, 1987). It was radical, because it required the bracketing of all a priori 
assumptions that the researcher could possibly have about the chosen field of study. It meant 
that a fieldworker would need to acknowledge that she would never be able to bound her field 
in advance of the study. The proposition implied accepting that not only would the empiri-
cal field continuously emerge as a consequence of researcher engagement, but so would the 
conceptual framework that framed and nurtured this engagement.
In the years that have passed, ‘follow the actor’ has often been translated into a soft require-
ment in STS to use the ethnographic method in ways that allow researchers to attend to practices. 
While ethnography can surely be seen as a method that is suited for observing practices, we 
need to attend to the possibilities in fieldwork for analytical and conceptual regeneration. The 
anthropological concept does not function ‘as a kind of surplus value extracted by the “observer” 
from the existential labour – the life – of the “observed”’ (Viveiros de Castro, 2003). Instead, 
following actors around, attending to practices, is all about attending to emergent concepts 
and theories in ways that allow for determining ‘the problems posed by each culture’ (ibid.). 
Fieldwork requires attending to experience and participation, as well as to apparatuses for cat-
egorising, formalising and knowing the world, informants’ as well as the ethnographer’s own. 
In the relations between anthropological ethnography and ANT ethnography (‘follow 
the actor’), there are differences and shared histories. In this chapter, I will attend to some 
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of these when telling an ethnographic story, in which concepts (technological and analytical) 
play an important role. I do so to be able to ask about how fieldworkers might at one and 
the same time be radically empirical and radically analytical in their descriptions as we use 
ethnography in ways that allow for engaging with a more-and-other-than-human world. 
I conclude by arguing that ANT has something to offer to those, who would like to play with 
cross-overs between the empirical and the conceptual as they are brought together in field-
work and analysis. I add to ANT’s dictum the possibility of analytical regeneration through 
thinking about concepts as fieldworkers’ companions. To benefit from this offer, we must 
subject ourselves to the more-and-other-than-human agency of the concepts that surround 
us when we engage with the world.
Blurred lineages and separations
Ethnography is the name of a practice of immersion into ways of life that hold an assumed 
foreignness. It is not a ‘timeless’ practice (Dalsgaard & Nielsen, 2016), but a mode of immer-
sion that nevertheless anticipates a point in time, the time of writing, in which immersion in 
an empirical field is no longer a possibility (Strathern, 1999). According to Marilyn Strathern, 
a main characteristic of ethnography is the paradox that the ethnographic method tends to 
produce an overwhelming, but insufficient amount of data, as the ethnographer aims to ‘ob-
serve everything,’ while knowing that at the time of writing, she is likely to be missing data. 
Since ethnography, like other data-intensive practices, is predicated upon the production of 
both too much and too little data, ongoing analysis is needed. This is happening in many 
different locations, also when ethnographers don’t have their minds set on doing analysis. 
Analysis is a formalisation practice that is systematic, yet open enough to let the ethnographic 
material form unexpected relations and draw in contexts that were unavailable during field-
work. Thus, ethnographic analysis involves navigating a constant threat of collapse between a 
situation of data collection and a situation of conceptualisation and analysis (Strathern, 2018).
I refer to Strathern’s analytical ethnography here because she presents an extensive  critique 
of the concept of the network that forms the theoretical rationale for the method of following 
actors around. Her article Cutting the Network formed a contact zone between anthropology’s 
ethnography and ANT’s version of it (Strathern, 1996). She makes the point that there are 
different kinds of collapse to be found between empirical and conceptual worlds, but that 
these should never be assumed to be shared with informants, who will have other conceptu-
alisations, of what ‘a relation’ should be taken to mean, for example. 
Historically, anthropological ways of thinking and doing have inspired Science and 
Technology Studies – and vice versa (Hess, 2001), and over the years their connections and 
detachments have multiplied (Andrea Ballestero, 2017). Now, let us have a look at how field-
work has been accounted for in the past. 
In 1997, David Hess wrote a piece in Cyborgs & Citadels for ‘perplexed anthropologists’ 
advising them on how to ‘live in Science and Technology Studies.’ The chapter reads as a 
field guide for anthropologists of science and technology in an emerging interdisciplinary 
field of STS. His aim was to identify familiarity and difference between anthropology and 
STS and make sense of what he saw as certain differences in their epistemologies and meth-
odologies. In so doing, however, fieldwork is flattened and ethnography accounted for as the 
practice of going to a foreign place with an empty mind. ‘Science and technology’ is not like 
a remote village, Hess tells anthropologists, and is already being studied by STS researchers 
(Hess, 1997). By framing his argument as a matter of ‘living’ in either STS or anthropology, 
Hess turns ethnography into a battlefield where disciplines demonstrate their expertise. Hess 
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also points out that while ethnography may be anthropology’s preferred method, ownership 
does not belong solely to anthropologists. Hess outlines three research strands where he finds 
certain affinity between anthropologists’ and STS scholars’ interests, and where he surmises 
that cross-fertilisation has already happened. Here, fieldwork is taken hostage in an identity 
political game. 
This problematisation takes immersion to be the main instrument through which an 
 ethnographer can interact with and get closer to the discourse and practices of her interloc-
utors. Early ANT scholars puzzled over this problem of distance, or rather lack of distance. 
Latour and Woolgar were concerned that laboratory culture was too familiar. According to 
Hess, this was a problem that anthropologists who work in cultures unlike their own were 
less likely to face (Hess, 2001). Latour and Woolgar wanted a certain distance from the sci-
ences and scientists under study, and they appealed to the idea of ‘anthropological strange-
ness’ for that sense of distance (Hess, 1997). One way in which distance was achieved was by a 
playful rendering of ‘the anthropologist’ in the text (Latour, 1993; Latour & Woolgar, 1979). 
This way of placing the anthropologist front and centre in the text was one way of coming to 
terms with the problem of representation. This was a construction of epistemic positions and 
practices of positioning. Latour and Woolgar did not aim for full representation of the sci-
entists, whose work they studied. This was seen as a provocation by some and as a refreshing 
new way of accounting for the difference between researcher and researched. 
Ethnography was taken up by ANT as a suitable method for knowledge production and 
fieldwork became a key element in the development of ANT as an analytical–methodological 
approach (Latour, 1983, 1987, 1993; Latour & Woolgar, 1986). The notion that analysts of 
science and technology should aim to follow actors around has later been taken up as akin 
to ethnographic immersion, with the difference that ethnography in the ANT tradition was 
never about making thick descriptions (Baiocchi, Graizbord, & Rodríguez-Muñiz, 2013). As 
Latour jokingly told in an interview, ANT is about seeking to do ethnomethodology, semiot-
ics and metaphysics all at once (Ihde, Crease, Jensen, & Selinger, 2003). 
ANT’s relational redescriptions of laboratory work and other technologically mediated 
practices happened around the same time as sociologists elsewhere were making inquiry into 
the complicatedness of analysing modern technoscience (Knorr-Cetina, 1981;  Knorr- Cetina, 
1983). Only very few anthropologists would study science and engineering at the time, and 
ANT studies could have been taken up as part of a growing body of literature of anthro-
pology ‘at home,’ i.e. conducted in Euro-America. It seemed to be an enduring familiarity 
between the ethnographer and the object of study that got in the way for ANT’s transforma-
tion into ANThropology. Despite the use of ethnography and despite questions pertaining 
to scientific cultures, ANT studies never really became part of the anthropological canon. The 
‘scrupulous detour through the empirical’ that ANT argued for (Ang, 2011; Latour, 2005) 
was not recognised by anthropologists as sufficiently anthropological, or as scrupulous in just 
the right way ( Jensen, 2017). For the critics, ANT was not sufficiently articulate about its 
own grounds for claiming to know about the knowledge practices of others as well as the 
politics of its (non)methods (Holbraad, Pedersen, & Viveiros de Castro, 2014).
Lateral ethnography
One of the texts in which ANT’s radical empiricism is coined is Latour’s rendering of sci-
entists’ work on the edge of the Boa Vista rain forest, a text that became world-famous as 
a chapter in the greatest hits collection Pandora’s Hope. Here, Latour argues that one should 
not look for 
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a correspondence between words and things as the ultimate standard of truth. There is 
truth and there is reality, but there is neither correspondence nor adequatio. To attest and 
to guarantee what we say, there is a much more reliable movement – indirect, crosswise, 
and crablike – through successive layers of transformations.
(Latour, 1999: 64)
Knowing, as expressed here, is a result of attending to transformations between ‘words and 
things.’ Knowing reliably, then, is to follow the actors (words and things) through succes-
sive layers of transformations. Moving across in a crablike manner means doing the work of 
detailing the empirical as well as paying attention to and detailing the ontological transfor-
mations happening underway. The difficult part is staying on the same empirical–conceptual 
plane as those whose existence, lives and deeds are studied, including the Boa Vista forest and 
its material representations. Where this turns social theory into ontology akin to the cultures 
under study became a much-debated issue (Blaser, 2010; Gad, Jensen, & Winthereik, 2015; 
Holbraad & Pedersen, 2017; Maurer, 2005; Mol, 2002). The trouble arises because moving 
sideways implies laterality in the data-collection that puts concepts and theories on the same 
plane as those whose practices the concepts are about. This means that the research attends 
to and participates in both empirical worlds and in the shaping of concepts and theories that 
are already part of these worlds (Gad & Jensen, 2016). ANT assumes that if power, inequality, 
etc., are already part of the social worlds under study, and not something to be unveiled, what 
the fieldworker brings to the table is re-articulation though translation rather than revelation 
(Latour, 1984, 1994).
What might such a translation look like? Coming to STS from anthropology, Atsuro 
Morita offers a version of lateral ethnography in his analysis of technology as a comparative 
device, in his case, a harvester (Morita, 2014; this volume). Morita studies a case of technol-
ogy transfer, where a Japanese harvester is put to use in Thailand. Involved in the mainte-
nance and repair of the harvester, Morita argues, is the attendance to how the machine was 
originally imagined and designed. Thai mechanics need to both be able to imagine what 
fields and crops the harvester was designed for and compare these imaginings to the fields 
and crops where the harvester is now put to use. A lateral, comparative mode of comparison 
is made possible by the conceptualisation of the harvester as a conceptual machine that is 
flexible enough to work in different contexts, yet embeds elements from both. 
‘The ethnographic machine’ avoids comparisons that would need a third referent outside 
the practices that the comparison aimed to elucidate, in order to work (see Helmreich, 2011). 
The comparison is embedded in machinic parts, user imaginations, harvesting practices, 
fields in Thailand and Japan and the conceptualisation of their relation. We here see how 
‘following actors’ is never simply a feat but includes attending to comparisons made in the 
field as well as concepts embedded in technological devices. 
We can now build on these insights about relations between the empirical and the con-
ceptual and move on to another machinic experience, one that I had with a technological 
prototype, which allowed me to revisit the ‘follow the actor’ methodology. The following 
description of my encounter with an analytical–empirical prototype is done to respond to the 
question if ANT’s radical empiricism is indeed ethnographical. My description of a techno-
logical prototype forms an entry point into the discussion of the empirical and the conceptual 
and demonstrates the openings that occur when the analysts can no longer uphold the ‘I say, 
they say’ distinction that grew out of an understanding that our analytical concepts were fun-
damentally different from the concepts ‘found’ during fieldwork. This distinction is funda-
mental in ethnographic writing and in practising ethnography, and while it has already been 
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problematised by works on laterality, I offer another example of their entwinement. What 
this chapter adds to existing work on lateral ethnography is a focus on concepts as companions. 
I take companions to mean fellow travellers that help open our worlds, but which can also be 
overly talkative in joint exploration of the already crowded spaces of humans and things in 
which we move as ethnographers. 
A relational predisposition
I am at Bella Center, at the Energy Europe fair, to meet with two of my interlocutors, who 
are visiting the fair as part of a publicity event for the marine renewable energy sector in 
 Denmark. The purpose of the meeting is to discuss a collaborative exhibition focusing on ma-
rine renewable energy and the social and political practices around prototyping.2 I have a few 
hours on my hands before the meeting, so I stroll around the impressive halls where technol-
ogies for harnessing energy from renewable sources are on display. This fair is huge and many 
different artefacts, including electric cars and small wind turbines, fill the enormous halls. The 
audience is clearly international. Visitors stop by the various booths and ask for information 
or browse the pamphlets for details about what is on show. As I enter into one of the smaller 
halls, a familiar face greets me. It belongs to the inventor Snorre Rastrup, an invented name, 
who is manning the booth occupied by the Danish Wave Energy Association. He shakes my 
hand eagerly and talks a little about some recent travelling he has done. He seems surprisingly 
uninterested in my questions about the Wave Energy Association’s booth and its visitors. After 
the chat, I move on and enter into a much larger exhibition hall. Compared to the previous 
hall, which had no clear theme, this hall is dedicated entirely to solar energy. 
I am surprised to see a white metal construction moving smoothly up and down amidst 
the black, shiny surfaces of hundreds of solar panels. It is only when I get closer that I rec-
ognise this machine as Snorre Rastrup’s wave-to-energy conversion prototype. Next to me, 
a man is in conversation with a retailer. They discuss the possibility of installing Rastrup’s 
converter near his house by the Black Sea. The retailer assures him that this is indeed possible 
and that electricity production for his mansion could then come from a mix of renewable 
sources, including wind and solar power. The wave converter appears alien amidst the solar 
panels, but what puzzles me the most is finding this prototype located among solar panels and 
far apart from its inventor. During technical demonstrations, inventors and prototypes are 
usually near to each other in case something should go wrong. 
What made me focus on the detachment of Snorre Rastrup and his prototype in this mo-
ment? They were in different exhibition halls, the inventor and his prototype, but still close 
enough for the inventor to come by if anything happened. Rastrup did not want to talk about 
prototypes with me, so I had not expected that he had brought one. Being taken by surprise 
that there was indeed a prototype was thus partly enacted by the space and partly by him not 
wanting to ‘talk shop’ with me as an ethnographer. I found the separation puzzling, as if Snorre 
should have been standing next to his prototype. Was this interpretation based on a failure 
on my part to, in the moment, suspend an existing theoretical and conceptual apparatus that 
assumed an inventor and a prototype to be visibly connected. A relational bias, so to speak. 
It was also puzzling to see the wave energy convertor in the solar panel exhibition hall; 
I was unable to make sense of it; yet, the display captured my full attention. I recall the feeling 
of being taken by surprise by something that seemed quite normal by everyone else. Marilyn 
Strathern writes about being dazzled by the experience an ethnographer can have, when 
she realises that she cannot let go of a particular observation upon returning from fieldwork 
(Strathern, 1999). I could not let go of the image in my mind of the prototype surrounded by 
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solar panels. But what was equally captivating was my sense that the prototype had pressed 
upon me a particular analytical disposition. 
Alberto Córsin Jiménez argues that what some prototypes do during demonstrations is 
that they entrap the imagination of their audience ( Jiménez, 2017). This conceptualisation 
is akin to the conceptualisation made by another inventor in our study. He described the 
purpose of a prototype as that of demonstrating its natural place in the world. To him, this 
entailed building trust. The inventor described how a good prototype was able to make him 
trust that he could ‘make a future’ for it. Similarly, if at a demonstration the audience become 
trusting champions for the prototype, it is more likely to become a commercial product. 
Of course, the wave energy converter was not entirely on its own. As I said, there was a 
retailer, who was also demonstrating solar technologies. But would he be able to care for and 
nurture the prototype to perform at its best? I worried about this, but then recalled Snorre’s 
relaxed smile and his small talk. After all, he had been just a few hundred meters away, and 
he could check up on the device whenever he wanted to. I tried to make sense of the incident 
by thinking of it as a practical doing of ontological politics. 
During the demonstration, the wave converter namely also demonstrated its capacity to 
work politically. Snorre Rastrup did not stand next to it to explain the technical function 
of the prototype; he was not present to explain how solar panels and wave energy conver-
sion might work together in the future. Among dissimilar technologies, the prototype both 
demonstrated the capacity of its hydraulic system to smoothly follow the movements of 
imaginary waves, and a green transition that would involve a number of different renewable 
technologies. With this placement, the wave converter was not just another potential product 
on display. It was an artefact that made the proposal that in the future, energy consumers will 
get their energy from a mix of sources, wave energy being one of them, wind another, solar 
power a third and so on. The prototype subtly transformed the organisation of the fair that 
separated an emerging industry (wave energy) from established ones (like solar). 
Thinking of a prototype as a political intervention is informed by Andrew Barry’s notion 
of technological demonstration sites as political machines (Barry, 2001). What is important 
here is not whether political principles or ideologies formed the reason for the placement 
of the wave energy prototype, but the effect of the placement. It was the possibility and 
specificity of a dazzling ‘sight’ that could turn a technical concept into a political question 
because it addressed the question of how society should be fuelled in the future (see Political 
Machines ch. 8).
At the Energy Fair bodies and things were acting jointly in achieving an effect: The 
prototype, the inventor, the retailer, the Russian visitor, the imagination of a dacha at the 
Black Sea, the exhibition halls, the solar panels, the ethnographer and so much more. In an 
ANT ethnography, a disposition would be to see networks and infrastructures (black-boxed 
networks). This was exactly what happened at first. It puzzled me to think that physical 
 detachment – even if this was just momentarily – could be a means to the end of creating a 
future for an object. At last, I realised that the puzzle was less about the separation of inventor 
and prototype than it was about my difficulty as an ethnographer to suspend my previous 
knowledge and theories that assumed co-location. 
Concepts are devices that help us deal with the puzzlements generated by fieldwork. In 
that sense, they help us make the strange familiar. But concepts also work in curious ways. 
They help us establish relations with unfamiliar phenomena, and as such help extend our 
understanding of the world and of the concepts and their limitations ( Jimenez & Willerslev, 
2007). At the same time, and this is where the radical empiricism of ANT is helpful, by ac-
cepting that concepts are of the world, they become part of what is in the world, as well as 
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what might become. The encounter at the Energy Fair demonstrated that this is the case for 
the concepts that are ‘analytical’ as well as for the concepts that are ‘technological.’ If they are 
good at capturing ethnographers’ imagination, both the abstract and the material concepts 
are prototypes for things we would like to make in the future. 
Companion concepts
In specifying companionship, Haraway shows that companionship is a form of sym-biology. 
It is about being implicated in one another in ways that are caring and often very complicated 
(Haraway, 2016).3 Natural science has traditionally worked with foundational definitions 
of concepts that new scientific findings can then expand or overturn and replace. Concepts 
are extended or rejected. Based on studies in natural science laboratories, early ANT made 
it clear that concepts may be considered foundational by their users, but are also always in-
scribed in objects (Latour, 2000). ‘Follow the actor!’ was thus a method to detect the multiple 
ways in which ‘words’ and ‘things’ were assembled in practice. The dictum has been taken by 
many as an invitation to describe and analyse technological agency, but there have never been 
‘ just’ artefacts that act. There will be inventors and there will be ethnographers, and other 
care-takers as well. Still, the uptake of ANT’s empiricist credo that social scientists should 
follow actors in their world-making activities has sometimes been interpreted as if an ANT 
approach would imply putting less emphasis on the conceptual aspects of such activities than 
on the materialities that are also present. As anthropologist Mateo Candea has pointed out, 
the lab ethnographies might have been empirically more complicated, if, for example, Latour 
and his colleagues had attended to how scientific–biological concepts are both modifiable 
and are also to some extent set in time and space; they come with histories and are part of 
both scientists and ethnographers’ embodied history (Candea, 2013). 
To be taken from this is that analysts as well as interlocutors both bring concepts into 
the ethnographic encounter. While both active, these concepts will not be the same. The 
inventor brought a concept-prototype, a wave energy converter; the ethnographer brought 
the concept-prototypes of the network and the infrastructure (black-boxed network). My 
concept-prototypes did not materialise in the social field of the technical demonstration. 
Nevertheless, encountering an inventor both with and detached from his concept at the 
Energy Fair created a puzzle: Were the concepts of network and infrastructure that the eth-
nographer brought to the social field to be trusted? Was there a future for those concepts? 
Could anything be made out of them? Perhaps only through continuous detachment and 
relation-making. Like Snorre Rastrup needed to detach from his concept to make an inter-
vention in local energy politics, I had to detach from my preferred concepts to write about 
ANT’s radical empiricism as ethnographic.
The point is not so much that ethnographers need to detach from the familiar to see 
something new, but rather that we must follow actors in many different ways. Ethnographers 
follow by following somebody’s reasoning, by making an analogy, by adding a context that 
was not there initially or by cutting off something else as irrelevant. This way ‘follow the 
actor whose concerns you share’ is about both recognising technological agency and about 
the possibility of novel exchanges with concepts that help suspending what ethnographers 
already know. Following in multiple ways could then allow for the concepts that are already 
present (e.g. the technological concept) to engage in a conversation with the concepts we 
bring (network, infrastructure, detachment). Together, they might convince each other of a 
different becoming (de la Cadena, 2015).
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What this means is that the concept-prototypes that ethnographers bring are in a state of 
testing in a way that can be compared to technological concepts or prototypes that are in a 
similar provisional state. We bring theories and concepts to the field and they interact with 
all that which surrounds them, and with that which they are expected to describe or explain. 
Concepts have in them the capacity to play with us, but also create persistent troubling. They 
are our companions in fieldwork and analysis, and we have to trust that there is a future for 
them as they transform into something quite other.
I set out to upcycle ANT’s radical empiricism asking if it is ethnographic. The answer to 
this question is that as we follow how things, people and projects become what they are, we 
encounter concepts. These concepts are part and parcel of the empirical-material world, and 
if we are willing to let them work as prototypes, they can become our companions as we 
parse relations and detachments. Taking ‘follow the actor!’ seriously as an actor on that scene 
requires us to attend to the many possible meanings of ‘following.’
Notes
 1 Wikipedia: Upcycling, also known as creative reuse, is the process of transforming by-products, 
waste materials, useless or unwanted products into new materials or products of better quality or 
for better environmental value.
 2 One year after this first meeting, the exhibition was realised through the design of a ‘digital walk-
ing stick’ (Winthereik, Watts, Maguire 2019). The exhibition was carried out as part of the research 
project titled ‘Marine Renewable Energy as Alien: Social Studies of an Emerging Industry,’ con-
ducted in collaboration with Laura Watts and James Maguire between 2013 and 2016, and funded 
by DFF-FSE grant no. 0602-02551B.
 3 Donna Haraway in her Companion Species Manifesto writes about the intense companionship 
between her and her dogs (Haraway, 2003). Inventor and ethnographer have become what they are 
through engaging with concepts, but are they companion species? Do inventors and ethnographers 
exchange properties with concepts. The greyish metal construction that was later attached to a car 
does certainly not part-take in Snorre ś biological system in just the same way as Donna Haraway’s 
dogs leave biological traces in her body. Yet, they do take up space in each other’s worlds, like, 
analogously companion concepts take up space in ethnographers’ worlds.
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Comparison occupies an interesting place in social science. While being the archetype of 
‘scientific method’ to provide causal explanations (Krause 2016), comparison also highlights 
difference and diversity, thereby playing a critical role in provincialising seemingly uni-
versal or hegemonic viewpoints, particularly those of ‘the West’ (Gingrich and Fox 2002). 
Comparison thus often denotes different or even contradictory practices. This is particularly 
tricky when one reflects on recent debates on comparison inspired by actor-network the-
ory (ANT). In these debates, the authors from different disciplinary traditions, particularly 
those from anthropology and sociology, tend to discuss different aspects of comparison 
inspired by ANT.
On the one hand, despite the constructionist critique that questioned the comparison of 
societies and nations as independent entities (Deville et al. 2016; Gingrich and Fox 2002; 
Sørensen 2008), this form of comparison is still entrenched in a commonsensical attitude 
in and around sociology: ‘If someone studies a social movement in Finland and in  Norway, 
it is assumed that something about these countries can explain the observed difference’ 
(Krause 2016: 52). ANT involves a radical critique of that ontology of comparison. Made-
line Akrich and Vololona Rabeharisoa (2016) have, for instance, recently discussed in 
detail their troublesome experience with comparison in their EU-funded research project 
on patient groups across Europe, where the idea of the nation state as the predominant 
‘context’ for comparison repeatedly arose in discussions and hindered their effort to pur-
suit an alternative mode. In this context, ANT-inspired sociologists have turned to explore 
infrastructures of  comparison  – assemblages of conceptual, technical, institutional and 
bureaucratic elements that make social scientific comparison possible. This enables them 
to experiment with technicalities of comparison to envision their potentialities (Deville 
et al. 2016; Sørensen 2008).
On the other hand, anthropologists have historically been interested in comparison in 
relation to the Benjaminian understanding of translation as expansion and transformation of 
the language to which the text is translated (Asad 1986). In this tradition, comparison con-
cerns making connections between indigenous (whatever this means) ideas and social scien-
tific concepts originated in Europe and North America. In this translational connection, the 
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former forces the latter to expand or transform themselves. For anthropology, comparison 
serves this kind of translation between ‘us’ and ‘them’ that enables the provincialisation of 
universal claims (Candea 2017; Strathern 1987; Viveiros de Castro 2004). 
Because of these different histories, ANT’s impact has been felt differently in these disci-
plines. While ANT has provided sociologists insights into experimenting with comparison 
as technoscientific practice, it has stimulated anthropologists, as I will discuss in detail in 
this article, to reconsider comparison’s role for translation, the latter also a key idea in ANT. 
By making accessible ANT-inspired debates on anthropological comparison to the ANT 
community, I aim to contribute to concerns for provincialising the Western notions now 
increasingly relevant among ANT scholars (Law and Lin 2017; Nakazora 2018; Verran 2002) 
due to changing circumstances of its major academic base, namely, science and technology 
studies (STS) (Fu 2007; Medina 2018).
The growing interest in the multiplicity of knowledge practices in the non-West raises 
some important challenges to STS. Cultures and societies imagined as autonomous enti-
ties played a central role in the imagination of the geography of diversity in the 20th cen-
tury (Strathern 1992; Yanai 2018). But STS scholars have elucidated much more complex 
arrangements of difference that require a new vocabulary. New currents of ‘non-Western’ 
STS, which define themselves as intersections of  Western-origin STS and other thoughts 
and activism, explore not only the diversity of knowledge practices, but also the hetero-
geneity of the practice of STS itself (Fu 2007; Law and Lin 2017; Morita 2017). This also 
concerns unequal relationships between languages and knowledge traditions, an issue 
that has long been discussed in postcolonialism and anthropology (Asad 1986; Clifford 
1997; Verran 2002). Therefore, just like for feminism (Strathern 1988; Haraway 1991), 
for non-Western STS, multiplicity concerns not only the subject of study, but also the re-
searcher’s subjectivity and further complicates the topology of difference in non-Western 
STS (Morita 2017).
These debates on non-Western STS concern some of the central claims of ANT. In a 
classic paper, Latour (1988a) criticises explanation in social science for reducing phenom-
ena to a predetermined list of causes. He notes: ‘(a)ctors have […] very strong ideas about 
what framework is, who is responsible, what counts as an explanation and who is innocent’ 
(1988a: 174). He eventually rearticulated this point by arguing that ANT should use an 
infralanguage, a ‘banal’ and ‘meaningless’ language in order to allow actors to have stronger 
voice than the researcher (Latour 2005: 30). ANT’s call for infralanguage seems quite rel-
evant to non-Western STS’s concern about how to articulate local problematisations and 
languages that are often marginalised in international academia. Moreover, ANT’s com-
mitment to infralanguage brings together a new vocabulary to imagine multiplicity. By 
denying the hierarchical relationship between the analyst and the analysed, ANT allows 
to see ‘explanation’ in terms of movements and connections made by researchers. Latour 
argues that ANT should delineate the movements of scientists and science studies scholars 
symmetrically  (Latour 1988a).
Following this recommendation, the rest of this chapter traces, first, comparison’s 
complex journey from experimental biology, the field where comparison as scientific 
method had spectacular success, to anthropology, where comparison of societies became 
a tool to provincialise the West. In a second step, taking into account the vanishing 
self-evident character of societal units, the chapter turns to another form of comparative 
practice and imagination. In this context, ANT’s imagination of networks of intersecting 
trajectories of travelling actors seems to emerge as the new reality that allows us to see a 
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new form of multiplicity. I will then discuss the new mode of comparison called lateral 
comparison (Gad and Jensen 2016b) that puts the analyst’s and informants’ comparison 
side by side. In the end of this chapter, I will argue how lateral comparison allows us to 
imagine new topologies of difference that concern not only the world that ANT scholars 
and anthropologists explore but also the heterogeneous and partially connected nature of 
their practices. 
Contexts of comparison
It is hard to imagine a better starting point for an ANT reflection on comparison than 
 Latour’s (1983, 1988b) well-known analysis of Louis Pasteur’s vaccination experiment. 
 Indeed, Latour’s story climaxes at a point where Pasteur performed a public comparison at a 
farm in Pouilly le Fort. For the experiment, Pasteur had divided the farm’s animals into two 
groups and vaccinated one with a weakened strain of anthrax bacillus. Then, he inoculated 
both groups with fatal anthrax. The outcome was spectacular. A contemporary observer 
noted: ‘The same number of animals, which had been covered with the palladium of the 
new vaccine, remained invulnerable to fatal inoculation, and were shown, very much alive, 
surrounded by corpses’ (Bouley 1881: 548 cited in Latour 1988b: 87).
It is not very surprising that this kind of powerful comparison captured the hearts and 
minds of many social scientists at the time (Krause 2016). While such stories of comparison 
as ‘the scientific method’ are well-known, Latour draws attention to some important and 
hitherto overlooked aspects of Pasteur’s experimental practice. 
Latour insists that Pouilly le Fort was only one specific moment in Pasteur’s movement 
to connect farms and his laboratory. Earlier, he set up a temporary laboratory in a farm to 
collect anything that deemed relevant to the outbreak of anthrax. Then, he brought some 
of these elements back to his laboratory in Paris. With his well-rehearsed technique of mi-
crobe cultivation, Pasteur successfully isolated anthrax bacillus and identified their different 
strains. Then, he compared the toxicity of these strains in miniature epizootic events in the 
laboratory farm. Through these numerous comparisons, Pasteur gradually understood the 
relationship between the mutation of anthrax bacillus, its varying toxicity and animal im-
munity in his experimental settings. In other words, Pasteur created experimental settings in 
the laboratory ‘so as to reproduce inside its walls an event that seems to be happening only 
outside’ (Latour 1983:154). 
At Pouilly le Fort, Pasteur brought these laboratory phenomena back to the farm again 
for public demonstration. The successful experiment created a situation in which laboratory 
elements became able to explain and allow for practical intervention in epizootic events in 
farms. Latour argues that Pasteur’s experimental success rested on ‘translation,’ creating an 
equivalence between the laboratory and the farm. This translation is a rather selective process:
Only a few elements of the macroscopic epizootics [in farms] are captured in the lab, 
only controlled epizootics on experimental animals are done in the lab, only specific 
inoculation gestures and vaccine inoculant are extracted out of the laboratory to be 
spread to farms.
(Latour 1983: 154)
Importantly, the equivalence of phenomena in the laboratory and in the farm rested on the 
negotiation among involved actors including anthrax bacillus themselves. 
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Recently, Isabelle Stengers (2011) revisited this topic and pointed out the central feature of 
comparison in the experimental sciences: Scientists, she argued, create ‘situations that autho-
rize them to claim that the subject matters that they address lend themselves to quantitative 
comparison’ (49). In the above-mentioned case, Pasteur created a situation in the laboratory 
in which anthrax bacillus dictated the conditions of the comparison at the farm through 
their action on the petri dish and in animals. However, not all the activities called science 
follow this form of comparison. Some of the sciences indeed build centres of calculation by 
collecting samples, reports and statistics, but engage in a different kind of comparison – what 
Stengers (2011) calls ‘unilateral comparison,’ where the subject scientists address is not in-
volved in setting the terms of comparison. The early history of anthropology testifies how 
the experimental form of comparison turned to unilateral comparison through displacement 
from biology to social science.
Nineteenth-century anthropology: from experimental  
to unilateral comparison
In the 19th century, European anthropologists and sociologists such as Herbert Spencer, E. B. 
Tylor and James Frazer enthusiastically adopted the ‘comparative method’ from experimental 
science. However, these scholars are now seen as estranged precursors of social science. The 
‘comparative method’ is precisely one of the reasons they became so obsolete.
Although it was called ‘the comparative method,’ there is nothing in common between 
the 19th-century approach and comparative social research as we know it today. Frazer, for 
example, one of the most prominent figures in this tradition, collected data not only from 
 ethnographic reports of contemporary non-Westerners but also from the Bible, Roman and 
Greek classic texts and so on. As the anthropologist Marilyn Strathern (1987) notes, this style 
of comparison looks so wild that it is almost incomprehensible for those trained in modern 
social science. In mid-20th century, Evans-Pritchard noted that 19th-century anthropolo-
gists ‘thought of  exogamy, totemism, matrilinity, ancestor worship, slavery, and so forth as 
customs – things,’ or stand-alone entities (1951: 40, emphasis added). Based on this peculiar 
ontology, 19th-century anthropologists plotted customs and institution taken from various 
places and times for their comparative endeavours. In stark contrast with the imagination of 
societies as natural contexts for comparison in the 20th and 21st centuries, there was practi-
cally no consideration for social context understood as interrelated customs and institutions in 
a given society, nation or geographic area. Rather than societies and nations as autonomous 
units, 19th-century anthropologists saw a single evolutionary scale of the human as the natu-
ral context of comparison. 
While looking strange to contemporary eyes, 19th-century anthropology was a sustained 
effort to build a centre of calculation. It tried to account for the vast variety of customs of 
peoples by constructing evolutionary stages based on comparison of ethnographic reports 
sent by missionaries, traders and colonial administrators. Like Pasteur’s, this effort connected 
two locations: The desks from which the anthropologists composed tabulations and texts, 
and the fields where ‘primitive people’ outside Europe lived. The two locations were me-
diated by a movement of knowledge-enabling artefacts: In this case the colonial traffic of 
ethnographic reports and other forms of documents. 
However, there was one fundamental difference. While Pasteur’s experimental assem-
blage was designed to confer anthrax bacillus the power to set the conditions of comparison, 
19th-century anthropology’s comparative assemblage did not allow non-Western people to 
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have a say on them. This material assemblage was rather an arrangement for ‘unilateral com-
parison’ (Stengers 2011: 48), in which anthropologists impose the terms of comparison on 
peoples all over the world. Such anthropological project replicated and drew on the political 
geography of colonialism. As with the colonial administration, the ‘natives,’ who are the 
central matters of concern for the practice of comparison, were totally excluded from that 
very practice.
Modern anthropology: from context-making to comparison  
for/in translation
The kind of modern anthropology that Evans-Pritchard advocated defined itself against this 
19th-century form of comparison. While not themselves committed to anticolonial cri-
tique, modern anthropologists tried to mimic scientific comparison where ‘objective’ meth-
ods seemed to prevent the researcher from imposing unilateral comparison. This effort was 
crucial for the rise of the bounded units of societies and cultures as the new natural context for 
comparison.
This new form of comparison was initiated by Bronislaw Malinowski, the iconic figure 
of modern anthropology. In his first ethnographic monograph Argonauts of the Western Pa-
cific (1922), he redefined ethnography as description and analysis of a whole society based on 
long-term direct observation by a well-trained anthropologist. While Malinowski himself 
presented his method as scientific and empirical, he faced the same challenge as the 19th- 
century anthropologists: How to convey to a Western audience the meanings of unfamiliar 
customs and ideas from non-Western worlds. While both needed some textual artifice to 
make such customs understandable to their readers, their solutions were almost opposites. 
Nineteenth-century anthropologists appealed for knowledge their readers already had. Thus, 
stories from the Bible and popular accounts of social evolution served as a context for making 
the customs of ‘primitive peoples’ comprehensible. In this sense, evolutionary comparison 
was also a textual device to persuade readers by creating a shared context. In contrast, Strathern 
(1987: 254) argues, Malinowski
insisted that practices were to be related to other practices […] [He] turned not to prac-
tices found in other cultures but to other aspects of this one culture. […] [T]his led to a 
view of individual societies as entities to be interpreted in their own terms, so that both 
practices and beliefs were to be analysed as intrinsic to a specific social context.
Malinowski’s insistence on social context introduced a new form of comparison between 
‘us’ and ‘them’ as the central analytic of modern anthropology. In contrast with Frazer who 
frequently connected English readers and non-Westerners, Malinowski clearly separated the 
two contexts. Accordingly, the figure of the fieldworker played the central role in mediating 
between these contexts. By witnessing the local life, the fieldworker induces readers to ‘ac-
cept the naturalness of Trobriand ideas in their context’ (Strathern 1987: 261). At the same 
time, he constantly compares ideas and customs from the Trobriand Islands with those from 
the life of British readers, so that they can understand the former in analogy with the latter. 
Malinowski’s literary device is thus essentially comparative.
However, the point of comparison is not simply to connect ideas and customs in  Trobriand 
Islands to those in England. Rather, it also brings about transformation of English ideas. This 
transformative effect, which has been commonly called ‘translation of culture,’ became the 
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trademark of anthropology’s conceptual innovation. Talal Asad notes its working by citing 
Walter Benjamin:
The language of a translation can—in fact must—let itself go, so that it gives voice to 
the intentio of the original not as reproduction but as harmony, as a supplement to the 
language in which it expresses itself, as its own kind of intentio.
(Benjamin 1969: 79 cited in Asad 1986: 156)
Eduardo Viveiros de Castro echoes this vision: ‘[a] good translation is one that allows the 
alien concepts to deform and subvert the translator’s conceptual toolbox’ (2004: 3). 
Comparison for translation does not neatly fit Stenger’s distinction between experimen-
tal and unilateral comparison. In contrast to experimental comparison, the ‘natives’ are not 
in a position to directly dictate the terms of comparison. They are always mediated by the 
text written by the fieldworker. But comparison for translation is not just imposing the ana-
lyst’s terms either. Rather, it works reflexively on the researcher’s own conceptual apparatus. 
ANT: infralanguages of comparison?
Anthropology’s comparison for translation is similar to Latour’s ‘infralanguage, which re-
mains meaningless except for allowing displacement from one frame of reference to the 
next.’ Like in a ‘good ANT account,’ comparison for translation aims to make ‘the concepts 
of the actors to be stronger than that of the analyst’ (Latour 2005: 29–30). 
However, there is one notable difference. Defining infralanguage as ‘meaningless,’ 
 Latour depicts ANT as somewhat neutral. While Malinowski indeed assumed the neu-
trality of his own language (Strathern 1987), anthropologists committed to comparison for 
translation usually questioned this kind of neutrality. Accordingly, what is at stake is not 
so much getting a grip on the other’s language as pushing one’s own language close to, or 
beyond, the limit. More than 50 years ago, Godfrey Lienhardt noted that in this kind of 
translation, ‘it is not finally some mysterious “primitive philosophy” that we are explor-
ing, but the further potentialities of our own thought and language’ (1954: 97, emphasis added). 
Such concern ironically led anthropology to move away from a line of research in which 
nation, region or culture offered the natural context for comparison, bringing about a crisis 
of identity in anthropology, which now seeks to reclaim its capacity for conceptual inno-
vation without drawing on social context (Yanai 2018). In this context, ANT provides a 
vocabulary and imagination of ‘actor-networks’ that eventually has proven to be useful to 
tackle the challenge anthropology is faced with. What has become visible is a new form 
of relationality that connects different practices – precisely the kind of connection that 
Latour elucidated about Pasteur (Strathern 1995). Here, comparison takes on yet another 
significance. While modern anthropologists turned to distinct and bounded societies, or 
what Mol and Law call ‘regions,’ the rising interest in the network topologies of travelling 
practices has led some anthropologists to imagine the space of fieldwork not as bounded 
local context, but as complex entanglement of trajectories of travelling actors (Maurer 
2005; Mohácsi and Morita 2013; Morita 2013). Following ANT’s call for symmetry be-
tween the analyst and the analysed (Latour 1988a), this imagination also highlighted the 
fact that those whom the fieldworker studies also engage with travelling knowledge making 
( Clifford 1997). Here, comparison became a focus for exploring the complex interrelation-




In my fieldwork on technology transfer from Japan to Thailand in the early 2000s, I found 
that comparisons of technologies, organisations, cultures and environments between the 
two countries were constitutive elements of the phenomenon I studied (Morita 2013, 
2014).  Japanese engineers in Bangkok repeatedly compared the two countries in formal 
and informal occasions. Some of them even drew on anthropological and area studies 
literature  written by Japanese scholars. Since my project was about social dimensions 
of technology transfer, this put my project in complex complicity with the engineers’ 
comparisons. 
The entanglement of the engineers’ comparative interests and my own thus became my 
subject of research when I adopted the figure of the network to see my project as a certain 
kind of travel whose trajectory crosses those of others. Through this shift in imagination, 
trajectories of Japanese engineers emerged as an important part of the web of cross-cutting 
paths along which not only them but also Thai mechanics, myself and various artefacts trav-
elled. This shift of perspective also allowed me to see local context as an effect of the incessant 
comparisons that the Japanese engineers engaged. 
Confronted with unexpected reactions from Thai counterparts, the Japanese engineers 
often imagined invisible social and cultural factors influencing their counterparts’ practices 
(cf. Rottenburg 2009). Comparing education systems, traditional values and Buddhism in 
Thailand and Japan, the Japanese engineers mobilised whatever was available to explain those 
reactions. Like Malinowski’s comparison, here comparison created two distinct contexts 
of ‘us’ and ‘them.’ In a sense, my own fieldwork became an attempt to transverse the space 
created by the engineer’s comparison. I travelled to Nakhon Ratchasima, the largest city in 
the Northeast Thailand, to look into small- and medium-scale factories manufacturing ag-
ricultural machinery. These factories constituted one of the target groups of the project. But 
also, the engineers and I saw these factories as appropriate sites to explore the entanglements 
of Thai social relations and engineering practice because of their direct ties with village life 
and agriculture.
However, what I found in Nakhon Ratchasima was not so much a distinctive context, 
but nodes of travelling trajectories of factory owners, machines and second-hand parts 
( Morita 2012). Some of the factory owners had business partners in Japan and visited them 
occasionally. The factory floors were full of second-hand tractors, engines and parts im-
ported from Japan that mechanics routinely fixed, tinkered, remodelled and recombined. 
They also frequently talked about Japanese technology. Notably, there was a notable dif-
ference in their practice of comparison. While the Japanese engineers’ discourse resembled 
comparative social research in which cultural values and social relations are seen as causes of 
observed practices (Krause 2016), Thai mechanics’ knowledge about Japan looked somewhat 
strangely fragmented. Comparisons on the factory floors focused on perplexingly small de-
tails of   Japanese environment and society, which were closely tied with certain designs of 
machines (Morita 2014).
On a fine day at the end of the 2003 dry season, I encountered some farmers com-
plaining about a Japanese second-hand rotary cultivator on the shop floor of a factory 
located in the outskirts of the city. The factory had recently imported the rotary cultiva-
tors from Japan, and the owner of the factory was trying to introduce them to farmers in 
the region. The farmers I encountered were among the first customers to buy the rotary 
cultivators from the factory. They came to the factory to complain that the machine had 
stopped working because weeds had entwined around the rotary blades. In response to this 
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complaint, the owner and the chief mechanic of the factory started checking the machine. 
They asked the farmers about the condition of their field, and they all discussed the possible 
causes of the problem for a while. After a while, the chief mechanic pointed out that the 
angles of the blades were too flat at the moment when the blades contact the ground. He 
then proposed to bend all the blades to about 90 degrees. The farmers agreed to his pro-
posal, and the mechanic and one of the farmers began bending all the blades by using a gas 
burner and pincers. In the following test run on the farmer’s own field, the rotary cultivator 
proved to work efficiently. 
After the event, the chief mechanic mentioned that it was the difference between 
 Japanese and Thai environments that had caused the trouble. According to him, Thai 
weeds are taller and stronger than Japanese ones because of  Thailand’s tropical climate. 
Although the narrow blades of the Japanese rotary cultivator were able to cultivate  Japanese 
paddy fields, they were not able to cut the stronger weeds one finds in the tropical envi-
ronment of Thailand. 
In this episode, it was the machine and its breakdown that evoked comparison of the 
two environments. As Michel Callon notes in his classic article on French electric vehicle 
development, engineers designing a new machine try to ally aspects of the design with 
heterogeneous entities such as its users, infrastructure and the market (Callon 1987). The 
smooth functioning of the rotary cultivator required a specific, stable relationship between 
the machine and the entities in the field, such as the weeds, the soils and the farmer oper-
ating it. This was also an assumption of the mechanics. Therefore, they saw that the rotary 
cultivator’s relations with other entities in the Japanese field had already been inscribed in the 
design of the machine. 
Accordingly, the travel of the rotary cultivator from Japan to Thailand surfaced as the ma-
jor context of the problem in the mechanics attempts. Because a machine works by becoming 
a part of the heterogeneous connections surrounding it, its travel requires new connections 
between its place of origin and the destiny. The mechanics and farmers saw the weeds entan-
gled around the blades as what hindered this connection. At the same time, it also embodied 
the difference between the Japanese environment inscribed in the machine and the actual 
environment in the farmers’ field. The blades entangled with the weeds produced a double 
vision in which the Thai and the Japanese environments were seen at once through their 
difference. 
The episode of machinic comparison exemplifies an important moment for innovation for 
mechanics in local factories (Morita 2012). At the same time, it also provides an opportunity 
for innovation for the anthropologist, as it alludes to another mode of comparison that im-
plies neither the human as its central agent nor separate contexts as its prerequisite, but draws 
on the imagination of trajectories and more than human practice (Morita 2014).
Ethnography: from machinic to lateral comparison
The reflection on my travel in Thailand illuminates the complex connections between di-
verse forms of comparisons. For the Japanese engineers and Thai mechanics, comparison 
works as practical means to engage with intersecting trajectories of travelling humans and 
non-humans. In this landscape, the ethnographer’s comparison becomes part of this web. It 
was my travel from the technology transfer project to the local factories that connected the 
two forms of comparison as well as that of anthropology. Here, my travel also became a sort 
of comparison that enabled to see these comparisons.
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The anthropologist Bill Maurer (2005) calls this kind of knowledge making ‘lateral rea-
sons.’ In his study on Islamic banking and alternative currency movements in the United 
States, he also found that his informants use anthropological concepts, such as that of gift by 
Marcel Mauss, to explain their practice. In response, he has proposed to place the anthro-
pologist’s and informants’ own modes of analysis side by side rather than aiming to elucidate 
the latter by the former. 
My ethnographic take on travelling comparisons (Mohacsi and Morita 2013) closely 
allies with Maurer’s lateral reasons. Putting my own comparison along with the others 
allows me to redescribe the complex workings of the comparisons from my situated tra-
jectory. At the same time, this move also reveals how my comparison itself was composed. 
For example, the Japanese engineers’ comparison that saw culture as an external factor in-
fluencing technology was not what I was after. Nevertheless, it shaped my own travel and, 
thus, comparison. Equally, my encounters with travelling machines and Thai mechanics 
also shape my own analytical take. The juxtaposition of these comparisons became the 
central tenet of my analytical move as well as a means to make explicit how that move 
was constituted.1
Because of this dual effect, lateral comparison seems suitable to articulate complex topolo-
gies of difference in non-Western STS. It allows to locate the researcher’s analytic movement 
at the intersection of different and often incommensurable practices and interests. The ethno-
graphic machine destabilises the notion of comparison of distinct contexts and offers its pos-
sible expansion. Such transformation is exactly what ANT and anthropology are after. In this 
sense, comparison for translation, which is itself going through transformation through the 
encounter with ANT, also holds significance for ANT. By foregrounding the new topology 
of difference, which the very vocabulary of ANT allowed to articulate, comparison for trans-
lation invites ANT to explore new forms of multiplicity and their wide-ranging political 
implications including possible transformations of the relationship between the West and the 
non-West.
Conclusion
About 30 years ago, Strathern (1987) asked what kind of world would emerge if the self- 
evident-ness of social context was coming to an end. In a sense, the encounter between 
ANT and anthropology evolved around this question. Thus, while introducing the anthro-
pological concern of comparison for translation, this chapter has demonstrated the usefulness 
of ANT in exploring the changing landscape of comparison. I took ANT’s imagination of 
intersecting trajectories of travelling actors as a ground upon which various transformations 
of comparison have been staged. Transformations of comparison from experimental to evo-
lutionary to translational and machinic ones became visible because of the use of this imagi-
nation as the context for my argument.
One might argue that this testifies that ANT is, in the end, the right ontology of com-
parative practice, and that its presumption about what a thing, act or relation is allows one 
to see something that stays invisible in other frames. This seems to be what Latour’s ‘banal’ 
and ‘meaningless’ infralanguage implies (Latour 2005). One of Latour’s classic papers alludes 
to this. He notes:
we shall always look for weak explanations rather than for general stronger ones. […] 
Instead of explaining everything with the same cause and framework, and instead of 
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abstaining from explanation in fear of breaking the reflexive game, we shall provide a 
one-off explanation, using a tailor-made cause.
(Latour 1988a: 174)
Christopher Gad and Casper Bruun Jensen (2010: 64) recently questioned this claim as 
a ‘positivist ideal.’ They point out that it assumes ‘the existence of two metalanguages 
(“ researcher’s” and “informant’s”), which are opposed and struggling to get voice in socio-
logical discourse.’ In their view, ANT is now already shifting away from this early formu-
lation by transforming itself through successive encounters with other practices including 
anthropology. They call for a new imagination about ANT, what they call post-ANT, ‘to 
see ANT as allowing for the coexistence of several infralanguages, including [that of ] the 
researchers, which may change and transform precisely because of their partial connection.’ 
(Gad and Jensen 2010: 64).
The lateral comparison depicted in this chapter follows this path. Because there is no neu-
tral position, the coexistence of infralanguages is only possible, as Gad and Jensen (2016b) 
note, by transforming them through the making of partial connections. Therefore, it re-
quires a conscious effort to make explicit the artifice of how the analytical frame is weaved 
through the encounters with others. By gaining inspiration from ANT, as well as femi-
nist anthropology and STS (Haraway 1991; Strathern 1988), lateral comparison attempts to 
make such an explicit mode of analysis by putting analyst’s and interlocutors’ comparisons 
side by side. 
Lateral comparison also seems relevant to the calls from non-Western STS and an-
thropologies that seek ways to articulate its heterogeneous constitution. Being unsatisfied 
with and/or unable to occupy a neutral viewpoint, they are struggling to foreground the 
heterogeneity and situatedness of their practice as a legitimate matter of academic con-
cern. This chapter argues that it might be possible to turn comparison – a notion that has 
always been pertinent to non-Western scholars and practices – into a springboard to move 
towards that direction. ANT’s encounter with other forms of scholarship and practice 
would possibly open up new space for multiplicity that allows further conversation across 
difference.
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The question
The question this chapter asks is ‘how to write after performativity?’ What is this chapter 
about?
Performativity
This chapter is not about performativity in general. It is not about the philosophy of lan-
guage of Austin, it is not about Butler or Derrida. It is about the extension of Actor-Network 
 Theory initiated by Michel Callon to the study of markets. The chapter focuses on what 
Callon has termed – in part in order to distinguish his own emphases from the many other 
branches of the ‘performativity turn’ – ‘performation.’
After performativity
‘After,’ writes Sloterdijk in a different context, ‘is the name for a break, an epoché, in the 
traditional sense of the word, which indicates both the caesura and also the time following 
it’ (Sloterdijk 2017: 50). After Callon’s performativity is not against, versus or even beyond 
performativity. It refers to the possibilities that have been opened after the breach introduced 
by Callon’s research programme. It is, as it were, about the performativity of performativity.
Some famous lines by Callon read: ‘homoeconomicus does exist, but it is not an a-historical re-
ality; he does not describe the hidden nature of the human being. He is the result of a process of 
configurations’ (Callon 1998a: 22). In Callon’s view, the relation between theoretical constructs 
and the reality they refer to is not about representation but, to use Hacking’s (1983) terms, in-
tervention. Just like the model of a new bicycle path prefigures that its users will cycle on the 
right side of the lane and not in zigzag, social scientific theories prefigure particular forms of 
acting. From this perspective (Callon 2007), a theory is successful when it is actualised in prac-
tical interventions that make those involved in their use to act differently. Homoeconomicus is 
the particular type of economic agency performed with economic theory; economic actors be-
come homoeconomicus as they act the roles prefigured in the theories used to organise markets.
5
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This chapter is about the success of  Callon’s theory. This chapter, though, does not in-
spect the ways in which economic agencies have been transformed after they have been in-
tervened with tools that mobilise concepts proposed by Callon. New theories are successful 
not only as they transform their object of study. Actually, most of the times, theories do not 
even reach their objects. Social theories are successful also; they perform, as they transform the 
researchers that use them. To use the term Callon borrows from Deleuze and Guattari, theo-
ries are agencements. Theories distribute agencies, but not only in the sense that they mobilise 
scripts prefiguring the actions of those whose actions are explained, but as they prefigure 
the particular characters that will use them. Economic theories do not only construct the 
homoeconomicus, they also create the economist. 
To write after performativity
New philosophical concepts, Deleuze and Guattari explain (1994), do things: They open 
new horizons for thought and create conceptual personae. Conceptual personae are not the 
philosophers but their alter egos. It is not that any rhetorical character is a conceptual per-
sona and only a few philosophical theories create new personae. Conceptual persona is the 
character that inhabits the position a new philosophical concept invents. Social theory pro-
duces new characters too, but these are characters of a different kind. Social theory composes 
what could be called ‘research personae.’ Social theories do not only provide explanations, 
they teach their readers how to relate with their object of study in new ways. When social 
researchers use social scientific theories, they have to enact these theories’ research personae. 
The question ‘how to write after performativity’ asks about the research personae enacted 
after Callon’s performativity thesis. In order to answer this question, what ought to be done 
first is to clarify the scripts of Callon’s research persona. To write after Callon, however, is 
not simply to repeat Callon’s guidelines. It is also about how uses of his theory develop new 
research personae. The second step is to identify the different personae enacted after (but 
not against, versus, or beyond) Callon’s performativity thesis. This is precisely what the two 
remaining parts of this chapter try to accomplish. 
The following section revisits Callon’s landmark introductory piece to The Laws of the 
Markets in order to identify the particular instructions his approach set for future researchers 
interested in studying markets. This requires dealing with a particular feature of  Callon’s 
writing. As Deleuze (2004) pointed out, some philosophical works, for instance those of 
 Kierkegaard and Nietzsche, are explicitly dramaturgical. These are texts that explicitly in-
struct their readers how to enact and inhabit their proposed conceptual personae. The same is 
the case with some social theories. Garfinkel’s (1999) Studies in Ethnomethodology, for instance, 
is as much a theory about its objects as a set of instructions that researchers should follow 
in order to become ethnomethodologists. Becker’s  (2008) Tricks of the Trade and Latour’s 
(2005) Re-assembling the Social are other examples of texts that teach their readers how to 
enact their proposed research personae. Most of the times, however, the characters featured 
in philosophical and social scientific narratives are those whose actions are to be explained or 
modelled. Thus, conceptual and research personae can and many times remain tacit. This is, 
in fact, the case in most of Callon’s writings. Callon’s writing is in this sense very different 
from Latour’s (Ossandón 2015). While Latour craftily uses devices such as polemics, dialogues 
and diagrams to illustrate the particularities of the research persona his theory creates, Callon 
presents new theories but tends to leave the instructions of how to enact its particular research 
persona implicitly. In order to identify the research persona in Callon’s performativity thesis, 
we therefore have to devise a method. What the next section attempts is to identify Callon’s 
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instructions by analysing the specific modifications he introduced in relation to the case he 
uses as the main empirical illustration of his performativity thesis, namely  Garcia-Parpet’s 
analysis of a strawberry market. The second section revises works that have used Callon’s 
performativity thesis but that enact, I argue, different research personae. The section revises 
three different forms of writing after Callon. I term these personae a  performative-detective, 
a philosophical-ethnographer and a market-reformist. 
The instructions
In 1981, a new market place for the trading of table strawberries was set up in the commune 
of Fontaines-en-Sologne in France. This strawberry market became part of the sociological 
discussion in 1986, when a paper about the case by Marie-France Garcia-Parpet was pub-
lished in Actes de la Recherche en Sciences Sociales. In 1998, Garcia-Parpet’s strawberries began 
a second life when Callon used her study as the central empirical evidence in his famous in-
troduction to the edited collection The Laws of the Markets. In fact, Garcia-Parpet’s piece only 
appeared in English in 2007 when it was included in the book Do Economists Make Markets? 
which consolidated the international academic influence of Callon’s performativity thesis. 
What Callon did not make explicit is that while using Garcia-Parpet’s basic insight, his 
conclusions are radically different to hers. In what follows, Callon’s modifications are used as 
entry points to identify the script – how his theory teaches researchers to relate to markets – 
for the research persona developed with Callon’s performativity thesis. 
Strawberry exchanges forever 
The case at Fontaines-en-Sologne, Garcia-Parpet points out, presents characteristics that 
make it of special interest. She says: ‘our data suggests, that this market is, in some sense, 
a concrete realization of the pure model of  perfect competition’ (2007: 20). This is an ex-
change that – like in economic textbook models – features atomised actors, homogenous 
products, fluid entry and transparent information. This fact, in turn, challenges traditional 
sociological approaches to the economy. Sociologists, Garcia-Parpet explains, would nor-
mally look for issues that deviate from the ideal market. They would search for evidence to 
prove the economists’ idealised view of the economy wrong. What to do with a case without 
such deviations? Garcia-Parpet’s article is an important contribution because it proposes a new 
type of task for future social researchers. Sociologists, now, can explain how a situation like 
the market in Fontaines-en-Sologne ended up organised in this particular way. Sociologists 
can study what Garcia-Parpet labels the ‘social construction of the perfect market.’
When Callon revisited Garcia-Parpet’s case in his 1998 piece, he seems to depart from a 
very similar starting point. Perfect competition, Callon explains, is not merely an abstract 
ideal invention of economists. It is also concrete, a particular mode of organising economic 
exchange. Accordingly, sociologists and other social scientists interested in studying the econ-
omy do not have to limit their work to assessing whether the model is or is not realistic; they 
should study how this is sometimes practically achieved. Garcia-Parpet and Callon, then, share 
a basic starting point. As Garcia-Parpet’s put it: ‘the practices which constitute the market are 
not market practices.’ The real story at Fontaines-en-Sologne is not the one about the actors 
that participate in the strawberry exchange as Garcia-Parpet found them in her fieldwork. The 
situation – with merchants, traders, suppliers, buyers and standardised goods – is what has to be 
explained. The real story is not there; it lies elsewhere. It is in this ‘elsewhere,’ however, that the 
differences start to appear. How does Callon callonise the strawberry market case? 
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Modification 1: from prequel to making-off
These are Garcia-Parpet’s instructions:
The practices which constitute the market are not market practices’ […] ‘The creation 
[of a perfect market] should be seen as a social innovation resulting from the work of a 
number of individuals interested, for different reasons, in changing the balance of power 
between the growers and the buyers’ (37) […] ‘Thus the market is better conceived as a 
field of struggle (46).’
(Garcia-Parpet 2007)
To explain the practical organisation of a situation such as the strawberry market, analysts 
should expand their focus to the story of power struggles in which the relevant participants 
of the exchange have been involved for years. The situation in 1981 is a particular and, as we 
learn in the postscript Garcia-Parpet added to the 2007 version of her article, momentary 
stage in this larger drama. Garcia-Parpet’s study displays a convincing empirical analysis that 
explains how these power struggles ended up configuring the conditions for the ‘perfect 
market.’
While Callon seems to agree with Garcia-Parpet’s analysis, what he points out as crucial 
is very different. In his words:
As the [strawberry market] example clearly shows, the crucial point is not that of the 
intrinsic competences of the agent but that of the equipment and devices (material: the 
warehouse, the batches displayed side by side; metrological: the meter, and procedural: 
regressive biding) which gives her or his action a shape’ (20–21) […] ‘Beyond the ma-
terial procedures, legal and monetary elements which facilitate the framing and con-
struction of the space of calculability, there is a capital, yet rarely mentioned, element: 
economic theory itself (22).
(Callon 1998a)
To use a cinematographic analogy, it could be said that what Garcia-Parpet’s analysis does 
is to construct a prequel. In order to explain the extraordinary situation, you need to un-
derstand how the actors ended up playing the parts in which you met them. If Callon were 
making a movie, his movie would not be a fully dramatised prequel. It would rather be some-
thing like a documentary, a bit like those ‘making-off’ films where the attention goes to the 
technical details behind what we see. His instruction is: You should pay more attention to 
equipment, devices and economic theory itself.
Modification 2: de-contextualise and re-contextualise
The first modification Callon introduced concerns the focus of empirical attention. The 
second modification is theoretical. Remarkably, what Callon does, but not explicitly, is to 
completely reject Garcia-Parpet’s theoretical explanation. His message for future researchers 
could be summarised as: Don’t do as Garcia-Parpet suggests you to do! Interestingly, though, 
Callon does not construct an alternative empirical story. He does not present new evidence 
to challenge Garcia-Parpet’s explanation. Callon’s argumentation does not work at this level. 
What he does is to construct a new theoretical context to situate the case. The new context 
is the outcome of three operations.
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The first theoretical operation is what Abbott (2004) calls an ‘inversion’: A type of heu-
ristic that discovers new explanations by inverting the direction between explanandum and 
explanans. While previous research in economic sociology and economics would disagree 
about almost everything, they share the common assumption that economic agencies pre- 
exist market exchange. Callon, instead, argues that it is calculability (the fact that things are 
calculable and actors can calculate) that has to be explained. Of course, Callon’s inversion 
is not entirely surprising. It is a logical consequence of the extension of Actor-Network 
 Theory. If you will study the economy with ANT, you cannot start from preformed actors; 
you must start from the sociotechnical network and explain agencies as their outcome. It is 
as if at this moment, even though he has been one of its original developers, Callon shows 
that extending ANT to a new area has its price. You must follow its rules. As Callon vividly 
puts it: ‘if we are to avoid the temptation of dualism, we need to banish any explanation sep-
arating the agents from the network, and, in particular, avoid the usual concepts of resources 
or social capital’ (Callon 1998a: 12).
The second theoretical operation is not a consequence of ANT but of Callon’s particular 
style of theorising. Callon constructs theory by knitting pieces of existing theory into a new 
patchwork. To use the film analogy yet again, what Callon does is like editing and montage. 
A bit like filmmaker Harun Farocki, who constructed some of his movies by montaging 
pieces of existing films, Callon cuts and pastes elements of existing theories in order to 
construct a new story. The pieces that Callon mobilises here include elements of social net-
work analysis, sociological theory (Goffman, Simmel and Zelizer), economic anthropology 
(discussions on gift and time by Bourdieu and Thomas), social studies of accounting and 
economics (Guesnerie’s definition of markets). 
Callon, though, does not tell the reader ‘do theory as I do.’ He does not make a method 
explicit, he does not show how he chooses what he picks and what he doesn’t pick. He does 
what he does and leaves it for future researchers to wonder how callonising works. A clue, 
however, can be found elsewhere. The quotation below summarises Callon’s and Muniesa’s 
explanation of the trajectory of economic goods: 
The process of individualization or singularization consists in a gradual definition of 
the properties of the product, shaped in such a way that it can enter into the consumer’s 
world […] The transfer can then take place. The good leaves the world of supply, breaks 
away from it (which is possible since it has been objectified) and slots into another world, 
that of the buyer, which has been configured to receive it. It becomes entangled in the 
networks of sociotechnical relations constituting the buyer’s world.
(Callon & Muniesa 2005: 1233)
What Callon does to Garcia-Parpet’s case is not that different. A piece of evidence is ‘objec-
tified,’ cut from its original context to be re-entered into a different world, where it becomes 
entangled in a completely different network. 
What is the new network for the strawberry market? The third theoretical operation is 
to set a new theory context to relocate the assembled pieces. This operation relates to an 
element that is not always associated with ANT as an intellectual practice. As other chapters 
in this book point out, there is a tension between the usual self-description of ANT, which 
normally stresses a descriptive empiricist stance, and the practice of ANT, which, since the 
beginning, has relied on highly abstract formulations. It is as if the T in the acronym meant a 
particular mode of abstracting. Take, for instance, Callon’s (1984) ‘Some elements of a sociol-
ogy of translation.’ The Actor-Network theorist elaborates concepts – technical notions used 
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to label things which do not necessarily respond to the way in which those things are named 
by those who are studied (i.e. ‘problematization, interessement; enrolment, mobilization’) – 
and the theorist assembles the series of labels into a larger model that works like a flow or 
cycle diagram (‘the four moments of translation’). It is perhaps here where the engineer and 
the sociologist meet! 
The model in the Laws of the Markets works at two levels. The first level is set to explain 
the relation between ‘devices, equipment and economic theory’ and ‘calculative agencies.’ 
Calculable goods and calculable agents are the outcome of framing and formatting, what 
Callon calls ‘performation.’ Performation is, in turn, located in a larger cycle that Callon un-
folds in his second chapter in the book (Callon 1998b). Calculable agencies are challenged by 
issues (for instance, a particular contaminant material and the people affected by it) that were 
not accounted for in the existing frame. Callon uses the metaphor of ‘overflows’: Calculative 
frames are overflown and these overflows trigger new processes of framing and formatting. 
In other words, the field of struggle, suggested by Garcia-Parpet, is replaced with this other 
broad encompassing theoretical dynamic of framing and overflowing.
To sum up, in 1998, Callon introduced his performativity thesis. This theory produced 
a new research persona: It taught future researchers a new form of approaching markets. 
What this section has tried to do is to make the script of this persona explicit. In order to 
do that, the modifications Callon introduced in relation to the main empirical illustration 
of his theory have been reconstructed. The first modification was a matter of focus. While 
 Garcia-Parpet constructed a detailed account of the past of the actors we find in the straw-
berry market, Callon asks us to look at the equipment, devices and economic theory. The 
second modification is theoretical. The strawberry market case is cut from its theoretical 
context and placed in a different model. This model is an assemblage of various pieces of ex-
isting theories and it tells future researchers to look at the intersections between the overall 
dynamic of framing and overflows. These are the main instructions Callon’s 1998 pieces set 
for future researchers interested in the study of markets.
The characters
The previous section was about the research persona created with Callon’s performativity 
thesis. It showed that Callon used Garcia-Parpet’s case to create a new position to approach 
markets. This section explores work conducted after Callon. It revises work that is not set 
against or beyond but that follows Callon’s performativity thesis, and that, a bit like Callon 
did with Garcia-Parpet, has enacted different research personae. The following lines dis-
tinguish three different characters, three different sets of instructions of how to write after 
Callon’s performativity. 
Before moving on, there are two disclaimers to make. Callon’s performativity thesis has 
inspired thousands of papers in several sub-disciplines (Cochoy 2014, McFall & Ossandón 
2014). The distinction between the three different ways of writing after Callon proposed 
here is informed by years of close reading of this literature, but it cannot claim to be exhaus-
tive. The typology should be read as a tentative classificatory hypothesis. Second, it is worth 
mentioning that some of the questions posed here have been asked before. Inspired by Ian 
Hunter’s (2006) critical historical analysis of recent humanities, Du Gay (2010) identified a 
tension in the work of Callon and colleagues. Sometimes, this work is descriptive and em-
pirically oriented, while other times, it is populated by empirically untestable statements. 
Jenle (2015) picked the label Du Gay uses, the ‘theoreticist,’ to characterise the stance of 
work informed by Callon’s performativity programme. He identifies two features: ‘a primary 
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commitment to or prioritization of the development of generally applicable conceptualiza-
tions of markets’ and ‘a lack of concern with the object of study as constituted by an empirical 
state of affairs’ ( Jenle 2015: 216). The exercise here is certainly inspired by these discussions. 
It will be argued, for instance, that Callon’s theory has enabled the development of different 
personae and that these have different stances in relation to empirical inquiry. The point here, 
however, is not to evaluate whether the orientation of the performativity thesis is empiricist 
enough. Neither is it to identify this theory’s overall stance. The point is rather to identify 
the type of research personae, the implicit characters and the rules set to them, enacted with 
and after Callon’s approach to markets.
A performative-detective
If  the strawberry market was the main empirical example Callon used to illustrate the 1998 for-
mulation of his performativity thesis, undoubtedly the most famous empirical study informed 
by this thesis is MacKenzie’s work on derivatives’ markets. MacKenzie’s derivatives’ studies 
are oftentimes seen as a straightforward empirical operationalisation of Callon’s insight that 
‘economics performs markets.’ In fact, this is how MacKenzie himself often describes his own 
work. But, unsurprisingly, the translation is not that straightforward. The research persona in 
MacKenzie’s work is both clearly influenced by Callon’s performativity thesis and proposes a 
distinctively different empirical stance. It is, it could be said, after Callon, but not Callonian.
The most influential paper in the series is MacKenzie and Millo’s (2003) piece in the 
American Journal of Sociology. There, MacKenzie and Millo revise different accepted theories 
in economic sociology and show how these help to partially explain the evolution of their 
case study, the derivatives market in Chicago. Their argument is that there is a missing link, a 
particular formula – the Black–Scholes equation widely used in the valuation of derivatives – 
whose empirical relevance in the case cannot be accounted for with the commonly accepted 
theories in economic sociology. The empirical situation of the market is also the outcome of 
the practical use of economic theory. 
The research persona presented in MacKenzie and Millo’s paper explicitly follows some of 
Callon’s instructions – ‘look at devices and economic theory’ – but does not follow Callon’s 
theorising style. In fact, when the economic situation that has to be explained changes, for 
instance, in his work on the credit crisis (MacKenzie 2011), Mackenzie works with different 
theoretical tools in order to sustain his particular explanation. What MacKenzie and Millo 
do is to transform Callon’s performativity from a general model of markets into an empirical 
hypothesis, or conjecture, a thesis among others to explain a particular outcome. The argu-
ment is constructed a bit like a jury case, a carefully crafted defence to prove a missing link in 
front of a sceptical jury. The researcher in this context, unlike Callon’s ANT theorist, is not 
oriented to construct a general model of the market. Like a detective producing evidence for 
a court case, the researcher appears as a character that has to identify the clues and construct 
proof in order to demonstrate the empirical connection between a specific economic theory 
and the explained economic situation. 
A philosophical-ethnographer
Fabian Muniesa has co-authored some of Callon’s work on markets. In his own work, though, 
Muniesa has also introduced important modifications. It is not that Muniesa has produced an 
‘anti-program,’ e.g. set an agenda against Callon’s performativity. What his work does is to en-
act a research persona for the performativity thesis that is different to Callon’s and MacKenzie’s.
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Callon’s performativity thesis was a model to explain a particular outcome, marketi-
sation, understood in terms of calculable agents and calculative goods. In Muniesa’s work 
(2014), instead, performativity becomes an overall perspective to study a wider variety of 
modes of economic performances – for instance, case-based teaching in business schools, 
perfume testing and financial valuation. This movement becomes more explicit in Muniesa 
and colleagues’ (2017) more recent book, which makes capitalisation – a situation composed 
of investors, investee and assets – and not calculability, the central outcome to be explained. 
As mentioned, in MacKenzie’s work, performativity became an empirical conjecture. The 
fact that the Black–Scholes formula performs the economy is demonstrated because the stud-
ied market starts to resemble the assumptions of the formula that informs the calculative 
devices used by market practitioners. In Muniesa’s work, performativity signals a particular 
stance, a mode of relating to the world of business that is not interested in studying whether 
market A looks like the content of theory B (Ossandón & Pallesen 2016). Empirical research, 
instead, inquires how business reality is constructed through different sets of performances. 
Performative, in this context, acquires a broader sense. It does not refer only to ‘performativ-
ity’ in the philosophy of language sense. It also means performance, in the dramaturgical sense, 
and agencement in the sense of situated economic instances in which specific ways of acting are 
distributed. The research persona proposed in Muniesa’s work does not resemble a detective. 
 Muniesa’s research stance is ethnographic and descriptive, but not empiricist. He does not look for 
clues that can demonstrate a particular empirical link. It is, as in Callon’s case, more speculative. 
However, unlike Callon’s position, Muniesa’s theorising is not oriented at constructing a model 
of its empirical object. Theorising is oriented at conceptualising, identifying and naming the par-
ticular ways in which different performances are realised. The research persona is a philosophical- 
ethnographer: A producer of concepts informed by ethnographic work (Ossandón 2015).
A market-reformist
A third persona produced after Callon’s performativity has been developed by Callon himself. 
As mentioned already, Callon’s 1998 pieces outlined a model on two levels, a descriptive layer 
in which researchers study how devices and economics work in the organisation of specific 
markets, and a second level that situates the process of formatting markets in the dynamic of 
framing and overflows. An important part of Callon’s recent work has been oriented at de-
veloping a new persona whose work is at the intersection of both levels. This position already 
features, although not centrally, in the texts from 1998.
This is the point at which it would make sense to draw up a new contract between so-
ciology and economics […] Thus AST [The anthropology of science and technology] 
can help with the work of framing interactions by improving the visibility of various 
efforts to keep track of overflows as well as the visibility of the disagreements or agree-
ments to which they give rise. Like those satellite imaging systems that enable navigators 
to keep track of their relative positions at all times, the anthropology of science and 
technology can provide the actors with a cartographical outline of overflows in progress, 
thereby paving the way for preliminary negotiations.
(Callon 1998b: 263)
The new persona marks an important modification in relation to Callon’s own early ANT 
work. As Callon explains in his early pieces (for example, Callon 1984), the task of the ANT 
researcher was to reconstruct the traces of how engineers and other technicians problematise 
José Ossandón
54
and construct alliances, and to map and conceptualise these processes. In Callon’s recent pieces, 
anthropologists of science and technology are not only invited to provide social scientific de-
scriptions of the work of other actors. The new persona is somehow closer to what economists 
attempt to do than to early ANT. From this position, markets are not only the object the 
experts that ANT’s scholars study construct, markets also become an object of ANT interven-
tion. Like when economists do policymaking, this new position assumes that well-functioning 
markets are desirable collective outcomes and that the public role of social scientists is justified 
on the basis of the identification and repair of market failures. What Callon does, more clearly 
in his essay ‘Civilizing Markets,’ is to define a new type of market failure: Markets should be 
assessed in relation to their ability to deal with the overflows they might produce. 
To be considered as efficient, a market should pay very careful attention to the numerous 
matters of concern that it creates, and to the groups that express and promote them, thus 
becoming economic agents in their own right.
(Callon 2009: 546)
The new task for social researchers, in this context, is to map controversies, identify over-
flows and help give voice to those affected or orphaned by the development of new markets. 
This new persona is not simply a researcher; it is a market-reformist.
Performativity and ANT as an intellectual practice
To paraphrase Sloterdijk (2013), again, new theories are like secessionist movements, an-
thropotechnic programmes that transform those that exercise them. In the terms used in 
this chapter, new social theories do not only provide new explanations. They produce new 
research personae: They teach and retrain future researchers in new ways of relating with 
their object of study. The object of interest here is not an exception in this regard. Callon’s 
performativity thesis has no doubt been immensely successful. It introduced a new approach 
to the study of markets which has been enacted by an army of callonised researchers. 
What this chapter has tried to do is to identify performativity’s research personae. The 
process of answering this question has been like an exercise in the ‘sociology of translation.’ 
In order to identify the research persona of Callon’s performativity thesis, his instructions of 
how to approach markets, I inspected his translation of García-Parpet’s work. To delimit the 
research personae enacted after Callon’s thesis, the instructions to approach markets informed 
by Callon’s work, I revised how his work has been translated by MacKenzie and Millo, 
 Muniesa and Callon himself. 
What does this exercise say about ANT as an intellectual practice? Two things. First, 
performativity appears like a fractal of ANT. Like other chapters in this book show, ANT 
cannot be reduced to a single intellectual stance. Sometimes, ANT is a particular type of 
modelling heterogeneous networks, other times, it is a more descriptive type of ethnographic 
research, on other occasions, it refers to a form of philosophical conceptual speculation and 
yet at other times, it is a particular political position. Callon’s performativity thesis does not 
only combine these different elements, it has been enacted in all these keys. Second, this ex-
ercise shows that ANT has become a particular type of critical intellectual practice. Doing 
ANT is not simply following the explicit instructions set by canonical texts. To use ANT 
is also a performance, a creative form of acting the instructions that previous theories set to 
us. Future will tell if the new personae created in this process are still after or are beyond or 
against performativity and ANT.
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Can Actor-Network Theory be considered as, transformed into, or used for a critique of cap-
ital? And, subsequently, of the capitalist, the capitalistic or capitalism altogether? The extent 
to which a contribution from ANT can be recognised as a contribution to the critique of 
capital depends on multiple parameters. The explicit purpose of the contribution, first, will 
obviously be most centrally determined by what the critical author wants to do, irrespective 
of the claimed intellectual apparatus. But then, more decisively, the changing meanings of 
the terms in question – ANT, capital and critique – precipitate a situation in which no clear 
rule of interpretation can be established. 
It should be noted from the outset that ANT posits itself, in its canonical sources (Latour 
1993), as both a radical critique of the categories of the modern mind and as a denuncia-
tion of modern critique as perhaps the most salient of such categories (Lezaun 2017; see also 
 Guggenheim, this volume). The scruple put forward by the latest Latour (2013) regarding that 
demystifying achievement, and the concomitant urge to conserve or eventually repair such 
modern categories, is not without interest in this respect. The fact that such preoccupation can 
be transferred to capital is certainly interesting. This is surely a category which is central to 
the operations of the modern mind, and which also operates as the prime vehicle for the pro-
duction of the world as we know it today. How is it addressed, then, within the ANT mind?
Multiple strategies are available for an assessment of the intellectual and investigative 
 positions of ANT – or ANT contributors – in relation to the subject matter. The one adopted 
here, rather modest and incomplete, consists in examining the way in which capital (the no-
tion but also its incessantly malleable reality) features in several paradigmatic contributions 
from Michel Callon and Bruno Latour, two authors who, in their distinctive ways, are cred-
ited for having established the ferment of ANT (this piece unjustly leaving aside, it should be 
noted, many other relevant contributors). In doing so, this presentation relies on an approach 
that interprets ANT in the light of its situation in a particular historical configuration (Mu-
niesa 2015). Three periods are identified in what follows, each characterised by a defining ori-
entation (or lack thereof ) towards capital and its problems: An early ANT period preoccupied 
with issues of scientific production; a middle period focused on the sociology of economics 
and the construction of markets; and a recent period oriented towards issues of ecological 
‘disinhibition’ and its implication for questions of valuation, economic and otherwise. 
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The notion of capital, it should be noted straightaway, is taken here primarily in its mun-
dane sense (the financier’s), that is, as whatever can be considered as an asset and hence work 
as a vehicle for economic power. The notion of markets, also crucial in what follows, is also 
considered as an ordinary term (the merchant’s), that is, as an exchange in which things are 
traded at a price. Supporting the task of accompanying ANT with a prospective hope, the 
piece concludes with a call for an ANT-inspired anthropology of capitalisation.
Competition, technology transfer and scientific capitalisation
The 1970s provided ANT with one of its most characteristic concerns: Competition. The 
category features prominently, for example, in the writings in which Callon first offered its 
singular articulation of the notion of translation, a crucial element of the ANT repertoire. 
The inception of this notion is often referred to a study on aquaculture published in the 1980s 
(Callon 1986), but the problem of translation and its basic definitional tenets were already 
present in Callon’s work a decade before. Callon (1976) suggested that ‘operations of trans-
lation’ are the key for the understanding of the struggles that form the ambits of scientific 
research, technological innovation and industrial policy, and their multiple interconnections.
Market competition was at the heart of the early version of Callon’s notion of translation, 
which was instrumental in the examination of the battle for the electric vehicle in France 
that he was carrying out in that period. The intellectual elaborations found there were 
already guided by the critique of mainstream idioms in both the sociology and the eco-
nomics of science. Attention to the particulars of the semiotic knots that link ‘problematic 
statements’ to one another was already explicit in this early work. The empirical concern 
that nurtured the reflexion was on markets, though: The ‘operations of translation’ that 
were examined there are, most typically, those involved in technology transfer and the cir-
culation and transformation of problematic statements from scientific research to industrial 
commerce (and vice versa).
There was nothing congratulatory, at that time, in Callon’s view on competition within 
the web that links scientific work and economic value. That view, on the contrary, stood as 
the ground from which later sprang his political stand on science as a public good (Callon 
1994). The purpose was rather to imprint in his reader’s mind a sense of realism that would al-
low escaping a vision too heavily marked by the idea of separate spheres or domains –  science 
and the market – that would only communicate through interference. On the contrary, the 
two sets of practices were shown to operate in close tandem (with the tensions this entailed). 
Capital, though, was a notion with little presence in Callon’s analyses. Money appeared as 
a medium for competition and calculation rather than as full-fledged object of inquiry, and 
the categories of financial operation (investment, credit, discounting) were marginalised in 
favour of that of commercial operation (demand, supply, price), certainly more prominent – 
if not invasive – in Callon’s analytical repertoire.
The idea of capital proper, it can be argued, was more emphatically approached (and the-
orised within what would become ANT) in the late 1970s and early 1980s by Bruno Latour. 
The particular blend of semiotic analysis that was introduced in the ethnographic analysis of 
an endocrinology laboratory in the 1970s (Latour and Woolgar 1979; see Mattozzi, this vol-
ume) included as a crucial element the analysis of the several forms of ‘conversion’ – a notion 
close to that of ‘translation’ – between scientific credibility and economic credit, that could 
propel several forms of accumulation and rent. Considering scientific credit, for example, as a 
form of capital (and scientific publication as a form of asset management) was an intuition that 
was already articulated by Latour in that period, with capital explicitly considered not as a 
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thing but as an operation of conversion, that is, as power – with an explicit acknowledgement 
of the debt towards Marx’s Capital in this respect (Latour 1983, 1984).
‘Capitalisation’ indeed, understood as the process of converting something into (or sub-
suming under, one could say in Marxian jargon) a capital form, became a central notion 
in Latour’s Science in Action: A central piece (the apex) in the theoretical engine known as 
‘centres of calculation’ (Latour 1987: 215–257). The fact that this insight could have turned 
into an explicit examination of the operations of money, of the financial industry and of 
the several forms of conversion or translation that govern a capital appraisal of reality 
might seem obvious today. Capitalisation – that is, in short, the process of turning things 
into assets and considering them in their capacity to generate a return on  investment – is 
indeed the rule that determines today, to a considerable extent, the existence and form 
(read: the financing or not) of almost everything, particularly of science ( Muniesa et al. 
2017). But in that period, arguably because of the particulars of scientific and industrial 
policies in France, these authors were more inclined to consider the capitalistic determi-
nations of science from the angle of public policy and public budgeting (Arvanitis, Callon 
and Latour 1986).
Accounting, economics and the construction of markets
The 1990s and 2000s were in part marked, in these two authors’ work, by a drastic engage-
ment with economics’ paradoxes, blind spots and consequences. While recognising the econ-
omistic drawbacks of economic science for a properly realistic account of economic reality 
and abundantly calling, in this respect, for a renewal of the anthropological approach, Callon 
and Latour did also demand the inclusion of the efficacy of economics among the objects that 
an economic anthropologist ought to scrutinise (Callon and Latour 1997). Accounting oper-
ations were certainly featured as a critical target for such an approach (Latour 1996), therefore 
opening a window for an ANT’s take on capital: The valuation methods that it prefers, its 
penchant for monopoly, its grip on the future. 
Yet, markets (not the same as capital) were still unequivocally situated at the forefront 
of the ANT proposal instead: Markets and their taste for liberal trade, for competition and 
for the rule of the here and now. Callon’s (1998) reinterpretation of a study of the economic 
design of an auction market (Garcia 1986) proved particularly effective in incentivising a 
research programme attentive to the calculative configuration of markets (see also Callon, 
Millo and Muniesa 2007; MacKenzie, Muniesa and Siu 2007; see Doganova, this volume). 
Latour’s visual ethnography of the central wholesale food market in the Paris region was also 
meant to fuel the ANT imagination in that direction (Latour and Hermant 1998).
In part due to the polemical tone of Latour and Callon’s formulations, but also of the wider 
challenges posed by ANT for the modern critical mind (Latour 1993), the idea of suspending 
a purely epistemic or purely sociological critique of economic truth in favour of a pragmatist 
examination of economic verification was received in the 2000s with mixed feelings in crit-
ical circles (Muniesa 2016). The contentions, however, largely revolved around the problem 
of the disciplinary imperialism of economics, and of how partial or not to it were Callon 
and Latour. Not around the absence or not of a critique of capital in their writings, though. 
The idea that the conversions or translations capital relies on (things into assets, knowledge 
into credit, prospect into return, time into money) could be dealt with from the intellectual 
perspectives opened by these two authors was not central to the discussion. This is the more 
remarkable in a period in which both Callon and Latour were also acknowledging the in-
fluence of Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, two authors who had laid out in the 1970s an 
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approach to capital as a semiotic, performative assemblage of clear potential ANT resonance 
(Alliez 1996; Deleuze and Guattari 1987; see also Muniesa et al. 2017; Jensen, this volume).
Latour’s own venture into the terrain of economic theory in the 2000s was controlled 
by his interest in Gabriel Tarde, an author that, for essentially philosophical reasons, could 
now be presented as a founder of ANT (Latour 2002). Tarde was the author of a treatise of 
economics – or rather ‘economic psychology’ – whose rediscovery Latour contributed to 
(Latour and Lépinay 2009). Of clear interest for a venture into the styles of thought that 
the categories of political economy require (including capital, considered as a factor of pro-
duction), Tarde’s treatise proves however of little value for a way out of them – well, out of 
them in the direction pointed out here at least. Tarde indeed fuelled a renewed emphasis on 
an intersubjective theory of value, on social influence and the role of opinion, on emotional 
behaviour and economic affect, on marketing, on the economic nature of cognition and on 
the condition of novelty, invention, innovation and valuation within the economic process 
(see Lazzarato 2002). Potentially interesting connections with behavioural economics and 
the sociology of innovation could be laid out from there, but fell short from providing, except 
for a few notable exceptions (Lépinay 2007), the instruments that would have allowed for a 
refinement of the ANT intuition, expressed earlier, of capital as an operation rather than a 
productive factor.
economic theology, ecological disinhibition 
and the enigma of value creation
The 2010s inescapably witnessed, within the circumscribed ANT landscape examined here, 
Latour’s turn towards the critique of environmental eschatology (Latour 2017). The dis-
covery of the debates in the tradition of political theology (especially Carl Schmitt and Eric 
Voegelin) served the purpose of reassessing the impasses of the modern mind already exam-
ined two decades before (Latour 1993, 2013). The notion of capital could quite naturally 
be situated more centrally as an operational motor for that mind, if considered from that 
perspective. Latour is not proceeding explicitly in that direction. But his role in the es-
tablishment of an anthropological assessment of the anthropogenic condition of geological 
and climatic transformations is indeed part of a movement that situates capital at the centre 
of what is meant by ‘anthropogenic’ (Bonneuil and Fressoz 2016) – discussions on how 
the Anthropocene should be better called ‘Capitalocene’ are symptomatic in this respect 
(Moore 2016). Latour’s contribution within these directions (which contain important the-
oretical divergences) resides in situating the sense of ‘disinhibition’ that characterises the 
modern mind’s approach to anthropogenic catastrophe in the wider cosmology – or theo-
logical  unconscious – that defines modernity (see also Fressoz 2012). The extent to which 
this can be recognised as part of an ANT perspective is debatable. But it is possible to argue 
that the ‘conversion to capital’ that Latour identified in early analyses of the operations of 
capitalisation within the medium of modern science could provide a useful template for the 
articulation of an empirical response to the environmental preoccupation.
Why is not capital featuring explicitly as a fully fledged ‘regime of enunciation’ (or ‘mode 
of existence’) in Latour’s signature Inquiry (Latour 2013), then? This is certainly a good ques-
tion, which was repeatedly raised in early collective discussions on the project – perhaps most 
vocally (or vociferously) by Isabelle Stengers in the discussion on the first draft of the manu-
script held at the Colloque de Cerisy in June 2007. After a few meanders, issues of economic 
existence were in the end left, in the version finally published in 2012 (2013 in English), to 
the interface between the rule of desire, need and attachment on the one hand and the rule of 
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rationing, organising, allocating and calculating on the other, augmented with the rule of the 
moral elicitation of the optimum when the arrangement of economic things is to correspond 
to a doctrine of justice (ATT, ORG and MOR, in the Inquiry’s official dialect). This turned 
handy, but certainly left unfinished both the task of identifying in investment a distinctive 
mode of enunciation, and of signalling its moral, political and eventually theological (if need 
be) limits.
Callon’s work in this period does certainly not go down that path. Following a rather 
coherent orientation, Callon endeavours to further strengthen the programmatic call he had 
been articulating since the 1970s on the sociology of markets. The main focus of intellectual 
preoccupation is on the definitional quandaries on what markets amount to, and on how 
their formation can be understood in terms of political compromise (Callon 2009, 2016, 
2017). This includes, then, a political critique of, or rather engagement with, how markets 
are organised concretely, and a – tentative (Blok 2011) – call for a study of how markets are 
contested and transformed, or not, through contestation. In a sense, Callon takes seriously, 
and courageously endorses, a liberal viewpoint that sees in markets, precisely, a critical site, 
that is, a site in which the value of things is submitted to critical consideration. He also 
takes seriously a concomitant sociological viewpoint that sees in markets a battlefield for a 
battle whose rules are dictated by conflicting positions, valuations and situations (see Geiger, 
Harrison, Kjellberg and Mallard 2014). Overall, though, the analytical focus is primarily on 
how ‘economic actors’ achieve ‘coordination’ in this medium, and the political one on how 
‘competition’ and ‘innovation’ are or shall be organised for the better.
But where are the nuts and bolts of capital proper in these latest developments? If ‘mar-
ketization’ is the name of the paradigmatic problem in Callon’s latest writings, the problem 
of capital is, by default, considered as a component to it (e.g. markets for… money?), not as 
a distinctive, singular reality. Latour’s latest considerations on the subject matter are differ-
ent, but the question of the market remains central. It features centrally in the discussion 
of the regimes of enunciation that lie in both political economy’s ideals of optimum and 
equilibrium, in marketing’s arts of capture and desire and in the calculative organisation 
of allocation (Latour 2013). The fact that capital – i.e. value considered from the financial 
 perspective – could constitute a regime of enunciation different from that of the market 
price, and far more determinant in the composition of the modern condition, is left open, 
but not addressed.
Conclusion
Attempts at situating capital at the centre of an ANT inquiry count now on some precedent 
(esp. Muniesa et al. 2017) – which this piece blatantly aims at advertising, for the progress of 
discussion. A possible guiding strategy, it is suggested, would consist in considering capital 
as a semiotic operation (one of conversion or translation), a strategy that is in line with the 
main tenets of the approach elaborated in part by Latour and Callon in the 1970s, and which 
certainly complies with the relational intuition once brilliantly offered by Marx (Muniesa 
et al. 2017: 159–161). ‘Capitalization’ is thus the rhetoric programme, the enunciation appa-
ratus, the semiotic assemblage that is to be deciphered, first and foremost by characterising 
the political configuration of things that it both requires and prompts. 
As the key to this configuration lies in the figuration of ‘the investor’ and its capacity 
to value things properly, the most crucial aspect for this strategy’s investigative felicity is a 
proper engagement with the anthropology of finance and with the particulars of financial 
valuation. The fact that the valuation complex on which the financial industry relies resides 
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not on the idea of market competition but rather on its cancellation is now abundantly doc-
umented (Ortiz 2014), as is the fact that the crux of financial analysis points to considering 
things from the viewpoint of a financier or an investor rather than of a merchant or a trader. 
Falling outside the perimeter of ANT is something that a properly cogent anthropology of 
finance is very well entitled to do (Hart and Ortiz 2014; Ortiz 2013). Keeping track of an 
ANT sense – or of a comparable constructivist, pragmatist sensibility – requires, though, 
emancipating in the most radical possible way from the vernaculars of ‘value’ and ‘value cre-
ation’ that still populate the scholarly critique of capital (Muniesa 2011, 2014, 2017).
The reader may have noticed by now that this assessment focuses on the critique of cap-
ital rather than of capitalism. There is no contention here on the usefulness of a concept – 
‘ capitalism’ – that attempts at characterising a particular form of economic organisation in 
which the means of economic activity largely rely on private ownership and profit. There is 
rather recognition of the fact that its most distinguishable feature is capital, nonetheless: That 
is, capital understood as the operation of capitalistic procedures (as opposed to, say, capital un-
derstood as an amorphous chimera). Narrowing down the investigative lens to the vagaries of 
financial analysis, discounted cash flows, capital budgeting, investment policy, business models 
and such rather amounts, it can be claimed, to an expansion of the wideness of the critical 
scope. These are indeed the techniques through which the ‘proper value’ of things is expected 
to be expressed in all kinds of matters today, and then of those things brought into existence 
(or not) altogether (Birch 2017; Doganova 2014, 2015, 2018; Doganova and Muniesa 2015).
The fact that the directions ‘competition’ or ‘innovation’ can take today are largely 
determined from the perspective of the cost of capital and that the dominant investment 
rationale explicitly requires the eradication of the risks involved in (competitive and inno-
vative) markets – e.g. from the logic of portfolio insurance to the premium on monopolistic 
 concentration – certainly offers promising avenues for research in that direction. The equally 
remarkable fact that protecting things (especially ‘nature’) from the whims of speculative 
markets and the perils of dilapidation insistently translates today into calls for revaluing those 
things properly as assets from which one is expecting a future, that is, transforming them 
into capital (‘natural capital’), is certainly part of the syndrome that a semiotic take on the 
‘conversion to capital’ can elucidate (Muniesa 2017).
So, is ANT a critique of capital? It certainly can be, potentially. With critique, that must 
be said, not in the sense of saying if something is right or wrong (which obviously depends 
on the point of view) but in the philosophical sense of examining the tensions in the meaning 
of a concept from all possible angles, including that from which it does not make sense. This 
ANT potentiality is still to be developed, though. The philosophical lineaments once put 
forward by Deleuze and Guattari (1987) on their take on capitalisation as a distinctive form of 
performative enunciation apparatus, and later by Alliez (1996), for example, on capitalisation 
as the engine that produces the very idea of the future (see also Guattari and Alliez 1984), are 
certainly only missing the empirical, punctilious, investigational nerve that ANT requires 
in order to fuel an inquiry in that direction. Capitalisation can then feature centrally among 
the ‘operations of translation’ (i.e. translation to capital) that Callon’s programme brilliantly 
set out to study, once released from the intellectual spell of the market. It can be revisited 
anew, properly characterised as a distinctively financial ‘regime of enunciation,’ as a crucial 
constituent of the ‘centres of calculation’ that Latour saw populating our ordinary modernity 
and forming its distinctive ‘forked tongue.’ And it can finally be rightly observed as a most 
significant element of the syndrome Latour’s environmental eschatology attempts at captur-
ing, with the entire idea of the Earth as capital being at once, forcefully unnoticed, both the 
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‘Critique behaves like blasé tourists who would like to reach the most virgin territories with-
out difficulty, but only if they don’t come across any other tourists’ (Latour 2013, 85).
It is one of the recurring tropes of ANT to portray itself as nothing but an empiricist 
endeavour to understand the socio-material word, abstaining from the blasé practices of 
critique. When I was drawn to ANT as a student in the 1990s, I became quickly puzzled 
by the strong claims that ANT cannot be delineated, that it is supposed to be a method, or 
a ‘sensibility’ but not a theory, while at the same time the proponents of ANT voiced very 
strong critiques of other approaches (see e.g. Law 2008). Reading ANT texts, it is hard not 
to conclude that ANT itself is a critical theory of sorts, full of critical judgements about the 
world. In short, very often, ANT is like a blasé tourist itself. 
In this chapter, I take up to question ANT’s relationship to critique, not in order to point 
the finger at ANT, but to explore what ANT as a critical theory can accomplish. I ask with 
regard to which element of the world ANT is (not) critical, how and why it is so, and what the 
effects of this selective criticality are.
Taking up the quote by Latour cited in the beginning of this chapter, I use the metaphor 
of travel to do this. Travel is conceived as a mode of exploring the world (in this case the 
world of social science) and reporting about it, to help others to understand that world. In 
other words, to ask about critique means to reflexively think about the travel arrangements 
of ANT – how it relates to sites and practices of study, and how these travel arrangements 
relate to those of other travel groups, that is, other groups of social scientists. In short, I 
suggest to look, in good ANT fashion, at the practices (and the practice of rhetorics), not the 
rhetorics of practice of social research (this chapter deserves to begin with a Bourdieusian 
rhetorical formula).
The goals of this chapter are twofold. The first is a critique of ANT. ANT practitioners 
use the same travel arrangements that others use. I will thus suggest that ANT could be less 
blasé about its own travel arrangements. There is no basis for ANT scholars’ tendency to 
insist on a category split between good ANT travellers and bad tourists for the sake of it; 
they should rather embrace the fact that all travel arrangements have complex socio-material 
effects that are difficult to predict and understand. 
7
How to use ANT in  inventive 
ways so that its critique will 
not run out of steam?
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The second goal is an empirical analysis of the travel arrangements of ANT with the tools 
of ANT. I reconstruct the ways in which ANT practices critique and why. Given the brevity 
required, other versions of ANT exist that cannot be covered here. 
I will first explain what I mean by critique. Then, I will detail why ANT has such a dim 
view of critique and finally I will introduce four different kinds of critique within ANT. 
ANT as a critique of natural science, ANT as a non-critique of design, ANT as a critique of 
theories of society and finally ANT as a speculative critique of social practices.1
What is critique: a primer on travel infrastructures
The main problem of ANT seems to be that its routinised critique of critique begins with 
a naïve understanding of the specific properties of various kinds of travel. Like critical 
theory itself, it assumes that we can read from the travel devices, whether something is 
critique or not.
To understand the problem of critique, let me first elaborate how to conceive of the prac-
tice of critique from an ANT perspective. The most important notion of critique is Marx’ 
‘the self-clarification of the struggles and wishes of the age’ (Marx 1975, 209). For ANT, this 
is problematic, as it does not locate any agency. Luc Boltanski has helpfully summarised the 
notion of critique in a more compatible language: Critique is based on ‘critical judgements on 
the social order which the analyst assumes responsibility for in her own name, thus abandon-
ing any pretention to neutrality’ (Boltanski 2013, 4). The ‘self-clarification’ that Marx hints 
at is an actor called ‘analyst.’ As ANT scholars, we might add that it is not just an analyst, but 
a network that takes responsibility. We could thus say that critique is an arrangement that 
clarifies struggles by taking responsibility in the name of that arrangement, and thus aban-
dons any pretension to neutrality.
For Boltanski, there are two additional elements that matter: First, because critique is 
rooted in an empirical description of a problem, it cannot make recourse to ‘spiritual or moral 
resources of a local character’ (Boltanski 2013, 5). Rather, it needs to engage in a critique 
of the social order, not just some local aspect of it (saying that the sea is dirty is not critique; 
saying that plastic in the sea is a symptom of industrialisation is). None of this hints at an 
abstract definition of critique as blasé tourism. 
Second, critique is reflexive. It needs to bring critical practice to the actors. It must ‘grasp 
the discontent of actors’ and ‘explicitly consider them the very labour of theorisation, in such 
a way as to alter their relationship to social reality’ (Boltanski 2013, 5). From an ANT point 
of view, we could say that critique brings back the outcomes of scholarly research – the new 
world with its new connections – to those who are affected by a problem. Telling people to 
clean the sea up is not critique, making the consumption of plastics difficult so that no more 
plastic is produced is. Again, this does not sound like blasé tourism, but rather like a complex 
job that requires lining up many socio-material elements. 
What confuses ANT and critical theorists alike are two things. First, some seem to think 
that only a specific set of terms such as ‘capital accumulation, class, property relations, land 
rent, exploitation, ….’ can amount to critique (Brenner, Madden, and Wachsmuth 2011, 230). 
Similarly, Fortun complains that the AIME platform (An Inquiry into the Modes of Existence 
(MoE)) has no entries for terms like ‘asbestos,’ ‘disaster’ or ‘petrochemicals’ and therefore is not 
up to the job of critique (Fortun 2014, 317). But as Boltanski’s work with Thévenot has shown, 
there are many different linguistic and material repertoires for critique, and there is no reason 
to restrict critique to a particular set of terms (Boltanski and Thévenot 1991).
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Second, the notion of critique is overtly intentional: Critique is when someone wants to 
engage in acts of critique. Yet, only a cursory glance at the world shows a more complex 
picture. Some actors engage in what they think are acts of critique, but these are roundly 
ignored and fail as critique, while other actors engage in practices they do not conceive of as 
critique, while they are understood and reacted to as if they were critique (Vikkelsø 2007). 
Critique, then, is a situated achievement rather than an intentional act. Equipped with these 
preliminaries, we can have a look at the practices of ANT and how they work as critique, and 
what their particular travel arrangements are. 
Criticising lazy travel modes by taking a budget 
flight: the problem of loose translations
If we allow for critique to be a practice that can occur in different forms and vocabularies and 
if we try to see what is understood in the world as critique, then we can easily see how ANT 
sometimes is a form of critique. ANT, so to speak, is like a tourist on a package holiday who 
moans about how crowded the Costa Brava is. 
ANT denounces the existing practice of all other social science as wrong, because it omits 
the socio-material constructedness of the world from social theory (see, for example, Callon 
and Latour 1992; Latour and Woolgar 1979). More specifically, the failure of critical theory 
is to misunderstand the hidden, powerful ‘macro-actors’ as hidden agents instead of as socio- 
material networks (see the quote at the beginning of this chapter and Callon and Latour 1981). 
This critique of critique is obviously a form of critique itself: These texts do not em-
pirically engage with the research practices of other critical social scientists. Similarly, the 
generic claim of ANT that all other social research does not account for material agency 
operates in a similar, Thomas-Cookish, way. 
But why are many ANT practitioners routinely opposed to critique? Judging all travel for 
not being culturally and ecologically sensitive is in itself a facile move that misunderstands 
the cosmopolitics of travel. This obviously gets at the core of all problems of critique: How 
much should we denounce those in a particular situation for being in that situation, or how 
much should we understand their situation as being a necessity, a practice or a position in a 
field? In what sense is not trying to understand a particular position already a denunciation? 
At its core is the following problem: ANT (rhetorically) dislikes what I have called loose 
translations (Guggenheim 2015). Loose translations are translation steps that make big jumps, 
for example, from one medium to another, or from one kind of argument to another. But 
for ANT, to strengthen a network means to minimise translation steps. The problem of cri-
tique is that it is based on a particularly challenging loose translation, namely the one from 
description to how the world could be changed, or from is to ought. For example, the notion 
of ‘capitalism’ operates as a loose translation that jumps from a complex socio-material ar-
rangement to a single problematic whole. Latour identifies such loose translations with blaming 
‘powerful agents hidden in the dark acting always consistently, continuously, relentlessly’ 
(Latour 2004, 229).
This loose translation is an easy target, because ANT can always point to the gap be-
tween capitalism as empirical multiplicity and problematic whole and claim that the gap is 
unaccounted for. But doing so is a result of its own empiricist image: It cannot imagine that 
a theory, qua being a theory, can make translations that do not start at the object but at the 
theory. ANT must always assume that critique is the worst form of laziness, of trying to insert 
hidden theoretical ‘powerful agents’ as the cause for the way the world is, and the reason that 
the analyst cannot change the world. 
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There is a theoretical problem here: For ANT (social) science is always translation and rep-
resentation. Although it is constructivist in its self-description, the constructivism is ultimately 
representational. There is a gap between the empirical claim when observing scientists, that 
they ‘construct’ and thereby create a world, which always contains a normative and political 
element, and ANT’s self-description as an empirical practice that is merely descriptive. The 
making of the world for ANT always starts with something out there, never with something 
a social scientist would like to achieve. 
In AIME (Latour 2013), Latour offers other ways to deal with the world; yet, these are 
disconnected from (social) science: ‘fiction’ is modelled on an idea of art that is unhinged 
from problems of the world, or ‘morals’ is based on moral reasoning (Latour 2013). But so-
cial science as critique could be imagined as a mode that combines ‘fiction,’ ‘representation’ 
and ‘morals,’ though it is neither of the three (I will later call this ‘speculation’). Such a social 
science would be precisely what focuses on the construction of the world in a triangle of 
what we want to achieve, a given world and the tools we have at our disposal to do so.  Before 
we can explore this further, let me move to another basic versions of ANT as critique.
ecotourism with unintended consequences: 
ANT as critique of natural science
Many ANT texts, beginning with ‘Laboratory Life’ (Latour and Woolgar 1979), manage to 
embark at the same time on a budget airline trip and an ecotouristic adventure (as indeed, 
many tourists routinely do). In the early laboratory studies, ANT tried to tread as carefully 
as possible to not damage the local ecosystem. These studies claim to move away from a nor-
mative philosophy of science towards an empirical analysis of science as practice. By doing so, 
they only want the best for the locals: A more truthful account of laboratory work. Yet, the 
whole situation descends into acrimony. The natural scientists see themselves misrepresented. 
They prefer the previous version in which they appear as heroes in search for eternal truth, 
rather than as muddling, politicking actors. They also claim that they better know what they 
are doing than their observers: Witness what came to be called the science wars (Gieryn 
1999; Jurdant 1998; Sokal and Bricmont 2004). 
In this version of critique, ANT operates in a mode of description. It claims that it only 
describes, that it is not a theory of the world, and that it does not critique natural science. In-
deed, Latour always makes the point that he is a ‘lover’ of natural science.2 Curiously, Latour 
misrecognises the situation when he writes: 
I have rarely heard critiques of the descriptions that ‘science studies’ has given of sci-
entific networks (on the contrary, the veracity of these descriptions has always been 
recognized […]). And yet the alternative versions [we] have proposed … have been hotly 
contested by some of the very researchers whose values we were trying to make compre-
hensible … . The very words ‘network’ and ‘fabrication’ are sometimes enough to shock 
our interlocutors […]. What poor diplomats we have been!
(Latour 2013, 12)
For Latour, it is absolutely crucial to keep apart ‘the accounts the Moderns have invented […]; 
the values they have held to during this same history […]; [and] finally, my own formula-
tion […] of this same experience’ (Latour 2013, 12).
How is it possible that a description by a lover operates as critique of his object of love? The 
description clashes with the self-descriptions of the objects because these self-descriptions are 
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informed by other theories of what these actors are doing. The scientists themselves described 
their own practice with a realist and positivist theory of science. 
The very idea that descriptions and critique can easily be kept apart ironically follows a 
logic of differentiation that ANT has set out to undo. Apart from the fact that many STS 
descriptions were indeed hotly contested by scientists (see e.g. Labinger 1995), the language 
of ‘poor diplomacy’ only shows how little Latour understands his own travel arrangements. 
He insists on keeping descriptions and values apart, because only doing so allows for the 
assumption that the objects of love understand that their own accounts are wrong and those 
of ANT are better. 
Ironically, during the science wars, the opponents of ANT and STS did not bother to keep 
critical accounts, say the feminist versions of Donna Haraway and Evelyn Fox Keller, apart 
from those of the purported lovers. The opponents even failed to spot that feminist scholars 
explicitly criticised ANT for their supposedly uncritical accounts. What mattered for the 
scientists was that they felt misrepresented. 
To sum up, what critique is, and whether it succeeds in the unavoidably reflexive en-
counters with its object, is demonstrably not a quality of the intentions, nor the labelling 
of a scientific theory or approach, but of the encounter with its object. ANT practitioners in 
this second version are like tourists who buy eco-friendly trips to animal reserves and are 
surprised if the locals who live everyday with the animals neither approve of the photographs 
that are taken of them, nor of the advice to let the animals roam free. 
The spa holiday: ANT as a (non-)critique of architecture and design
While the relationship with science has been strained, ANT has had much better relation-
ships with other objects of inquiry, most notably architecture and design (for example, 
Latour has written a regular column for Domus, one of the main architecture magazines, 
and architects such as Alejandro Zaero Polo, Andres Jaque or Nerea Calvillo have em-
braced it). The identical practice of describing socio-material practices has resulted in the 
case of science in the vigorous objection of those described and in the case of design in an 
enthusiastic embrace. 
The travel destination matters to how the relations with the locals pan out. The problem 
is not necessarily the mode of travel, but how the travel mode fits local infrastructures. Spa 
holidays are increasingly popular (I like them too): You don’t venture very far, but do it with 
the least amount of trouble: Everyone is nice to you. Afterwards, the spa hotel publishes your 
praise on their website and your words look very much like theirs. 
Structurally, this second version operates very much like the first: It uses the description of 
a practice to formulate a critique of social science. The empirical description of building and 
design practices serves to critique other social science as ignoring the ongoing recomposition 
of socio-material arrangements at the expense of semiotic or structural analysis. The differ-
ence between science and design is that in the case of the latter, the attribution of agency to 
designers and the notion of ‘fabrication’ and ‘construction’ to describe their work perfectly fit 
their self-description. This is unlike scientists, who abhor the idea that objects in the world 
are connected to their own agency. When Latour alleges that ‘when we try to reconnect sci-
entific objects with […]their web of associations, […] we always appear to weaken them, not 
to strengthen their claim to reality’ (Latour 2004, 237), then this only holds for scientific objects. 
For design objects, the opposite is true, as can be gathered from any architect’s description of 
her project. There are thus no critical effects of ANT descriptions of architecture. The rea-
son is not that ANT practitioners fail to be critical, but because the very same methods and 
69
How to use ANT in inventive ways?
theories that have critical effects in one field fail to do so in a different field. ANT scholars 
end up on spa holidays not because they chose that destination, but because their hosts like 
their travel accounts. 
executive business travel: ANT as modes of existence
Our flight must take place above the clouds, and we must reckon with a rather thick 
cloud cover. We must rely on our instruments. Occasionally, we may catch glimpses be-
low of a land … that remind us of something familiar, or glimpses … of landscape with 
the extinct volcanoes of Marxism. But no one should fall victim to the illusion that these 
few points of reference are sufficient to guide our flight.
(Luhmann 1995, l)
Even ANT practitioners sometimes feel the need to fly above the clouds. Getting somewhere 
far away means that we cannot stop in every village and try to understand how it is different 
from the one next to it. Hence, our reports afterwards are more concerned with talking 
about the quality of different airlines and whether the connections at the airports worked, 
rather than the actual destinations. Such business travel needs to be taken seriously as a prac-
tice, even though most travellers are routinely dismissive of it as a second-hand experience 
of non-spaces. Bruno Latour, in particular, has, in his second career as ‘philosopher’ (Latour 
2010),3 made a business of exploring new airlines and rarely visited airports. Like Luhmann, 
he prefers to bypass the extinct volcanoes.
ANT as a theory of MoE is a full-on critique of ‘modernity’ (Latour 1993, 2013). 
 Modernity here means the way we – which is everyone who uses a vocabulary that refers to 
items such as ‘science,’ ‘politics,’ the ‘environment,’ etc. – understand our world. 
For Latour, the fundamental mistake of modernity is not that it has destroyed the world 
or brings injustice (as critical theorists would have it), but that the way we conceive of how 
anything comes into existence is misguided. As with Luhmann, the main point for Latour 
is that by flying high enough, we learn to avoid prioritising one mode, learn to give justice 
to each mode and ‘learn to respect appearances,’ based on the central notion of ‘felicity con-
dition’: This is the idea that there are specific ways how each mode operates and that it is 
fundamentally futile to overextend this mode as long as we operate within it. 
‘Modes of existence’ (MoE) represent thus a large-scale critique of all other ways of un-
derstanding and critiquing modernity that fail to understand the operation of each mode 
of existence. Hence, Latour’s self-designed tests of whether the theory of MoE succeeds are 
based on how it respects each mode:
does the detection of one mode allow us to respect the other modes? … Can the inquiry 
mutate into a diplomatic arrangement … while a new space is opened up for comparative 
anthropology by a series of negotiations over values?
(Latour 2013, 475)
The enemies of all these tests are theories that are attached to a single mode, such as the exist-
ing philosophy of science, theology, sociology of culture, etc. According to Latour, these all 
fail, first, because they are not based on ethnographic inquiry and second because they reduce 
it to some element that does not correspond to the self-description of the field. 
The notion of ‘ideology’ in critical theory describes something very similar namely, 
the fact that the self-description of the world by existing mode-specific theories is wrong. 
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For ‘critical’ theory, the wrongness of ideology derives from the fact that actors try to ob-
scure the ‘real’ working of these modes in order to exert power over those who do not see 
behind ideology. Ideology justifies a practice that is wrong. 
For Latour, there is nothing wrong with practices, only with descriptions of prac-
tices.4 Thus, the descriptions of Marxists and economists, of philosophers of science and 
 Marxist critics of science, etc., are equally wrong, because they do not match the empir-
ical complexity of the world. One irony of this approach is that it forgets that philosophy 
(of science, the economy, etc.) is also a practice. It is not clear why it should not also be 
taken seriously as empirical phenomenon and thus given the status of being ‘right’ like 
any other practice. 
One important question then is why practices should always be right, and never objects 
of critique, while theoretical descriptions should be critiqued and are almost all wrong. 
 Crucially, here Latour’s critique mirrors the Marxist critique: The standard for critique is 
pregiven by the theory: In the case of Marxists, ideology is always with the others, who are 
deemed to veil the capitalist system. In the case of MoE, it is always the theories that veil the 
logic of MoE. Another irony then is why a theory that purports to take local practices seri-
ously does not allow itself to suggest how such local practices could be critiqued, changed and 
improved? Taking practices seriously in their empirical complexity surely entails to suggest 
that some practices are better than others, once we agree on what these practices are supposed 
to do? A more refined programme, and one probably far more in line with the intention of 
the author, would be to ask how and why descriptions match or do not match practices?
The exchange student: ANT as incubation and speculation
When you are young, you want to go abroad to learn, and you stay with a family whose in-
ternal dynamics will become equally perturbed as your own life by this experimental cohabi-
tation in the name of cultural exchange. In ANT, there are a number of projects and practices 
that come variously under the rubric speculation (Wilkie, Rosengarten, and Savransky 2016), 
inventiveness (Lury and Wakeford 2011) or, our own, incubation ( Guggenheim, Kräftner, 
and Kröll 2017).
There are important differences between these approaches, but they all begin with the 
typical focus of ANT approaches on socio-material entities, ‘a criticality that is oriented 
towards tracing the complex messy entanglements of societies with all their strange, weird 
and wonderful hybrid objects’ (Ward and Wilkie, 2009, 2). But this empirical outlook is not 
guided towards a critique of theories, but towards an experimental modification of practices 
with the help of various devices. Unlike in critical social science, speculative practitioners do 
not denounce practices, nor do they try to change practices according to a given theoretical 
standard. Rather, inventive or speculative methods are employed to change the world in un-
foreseen directions. They begin with the insight that in moments of controversy, the social 
world is performatively opened up. This ‘moment of dispute’ is also recognised by Boltanski 
as a possible moment of critique, ‘when actors express their moral claims … they ‘perform’ 
the social in an innovative way’ (Boltanski 2013, 12). 
But rather than simply analysing such moments, inventive methods aim to create such situ-
ations. Like the student on a gap year, they jump head-on into an unforeseen situation. Many 
of these methods derive not only from social science, but take their leads from scientific 
experiments, design or arts practices. The reason for these choices is that the latter have a his-
tory of self-consciously interfering with socio-material devices into the world. ANT could 
have learned this from its own analysis of such practices, but too often this has not happened. 
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Such inventive methods become tools of critique, because they allow ANT practitioners 
to intervene in practices by giving actors in the field the resources at hand to clarify and 
change their situation. But at the same time, this does not happen with a participatory na-
ivety, in which the social scientists already know what is wrong, what should be achieved or 
even how anything could be achieved. Rather, a methodological, theoretical and material 
repertoire is employed in unforeseen ways. Just like the effects of having an exchange student 
in your house, such work is highly risky, and may be contested by the locals. It does not nec-
essarily play to easy forms of ‘participation’ in which local practices are taken as standards. 
Rather, it brings strategic devices that are strange to the locals to create new situations that 
have not existed before.
Returning home
After this extensive tour of travel modes, we can now answer the question ‘What about 
critique?’ in a rather straightforward way. First, as I have shown, ANT should be a little bit 
less blasé about its own travel arrangements. There are reasons why people take cheap flights 
and ANT practitioners sometimes do so too, for the same reasons. Sometimes, the goal is to 
quickly get somewhere, as we have seen in the version of ANT as critique of social science 
and MoE. Sometimes, ecotourism inadvertently turns into a mess, as we have seen in the 
attempts of ANT to be sympathetic, descriptive and non-critical towards science. Critique, 
in these cases, is not a matter of intention, but of reception. Finally, ANT can also be a 
practice of creating situations in which actors can open up and recompose the world. This 
mode though forces us to give up both the radical empiricism of ANT and the stance that 
we know how to change the world. We then need to engage in a radical encounter with 
the world in which we accept and embrace our practice as intervention, without knowing 
where it will end up. 
Notes
 1 This basic logic of this chapter shares many similarities with the chapters by Daniel López and José 
Ossandon in this volume, though each of us focuses on a different analytical plane.
 2 Latour’s first German book is subtitled ‘investigations of a lover of the sciences’ (Latour 1996).
 3 It is notable that in Latour’s self-understanding as an Anglo-French STS/sociologist/anthropolo-
gist, business travel as writing the ‘Modes of Existence’ equals philosophy. For Luhmann, writing 
in the provinces of Germany, flying above the clouds is easily compatible with sociology.
 4 Muniesa follows this route when considering ANT as critique of capital in this volume.
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Section 2
Engaging dialogues with key 
intellectual companions
Anders Blok, Ignacio Farías and Celia Roberts
While authors affiliating themselves with actor-network theory are generally wary of origin 
stories, few would presumably question the notion that ANT itself is the product of many 
intellectual sources and inspirations brought and wrought creatively together. Overall, such 
flows tend to generate a pattern of repetition and difference, in which certain figures and 
tropes from 20th-century Euro-American intellectual history stand out more clearly than 
do others (and yes, for better or worse, they do tend to be Euro-American!). Eventually, any 
serious engagement with ANT will have to take note of such a patterned hinterland of ideas.
For this section, we invited authors to critically explore and discuss some of the key in-
tellectual sources of ANT, by paying attention both to well-acknowledged (but possibly less 
well understood) and to silenced, forgotten or potential sources that can still enrich ANT 
as an intellectual practice. Quite evidently, the dialogues with key intellectual companions 
staged across the sections’ chapters represent only a rough selection of such potential sources, 
and some well-known figures indeed suggest themselves as missing from the selection (one 
could mention, for instance, the two Michel’s, Foucault and Serres). That said, we believe 
that the selection pertains to a number of encounters already wedded into core ANT con-
cepts and dialogues, as well as points to roads less travelled, and hence further options for 
future collective exploration. 
The section opens with what is arguably a well-known, yet surprisingly under- appreciated 
intellectual encounter: The one between first-wave ANTs, Bruno Latour in particular, and 
French poststructuralist philosopher Gilles Deleuze. As Casper Bruun Jensen details in his 
chapter, the famous quip from Michael Lynch that ‘ANT’ would have been better named 
‘Actant-Rhizome Ontology’ (ARO!), and hence exhibited its debt to Deleuze’s rhizomes up 
front, indeed contains more than a fleeting truth to it. ANT, like Deleuze, exhibits onto-
logical ambitions. Contrary to Lynch’s suggestion, however, Jensen seeks not only to affirm 
this generative connection, but also to suggest ways in which further doses of Deleuzian 
sensitivity might move ANT in more productive directions, not least when it comes to its 
own politics of inquiry.
Taking a clue from the remaining part of Lynch’s suggestion, that of the actant, Alvise 
Mattozzi’s chapter distils an answer to the deceptively simple question of what ANT can still 
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learn from semiotics. As is well known, early (‘French’) ANT in the 1970s learned much 
from the toolbox of semiotics as the study of textual functions, including from Algirdas J. 
Greimas’ so-called actant model of narration. The concept of actants, indeed, remains key 
to the signature ANT move of distributing agency (‘symmetrically’) amongst humans and 
non-humans. Yet, as Mattozzi is keenly aware, the deceptive bit lies in the ‘still’: To him, this 
small word serves to open up a wide-ranging inquiry that takes us not only backwards, into 
the history of semiotics, but also forward, into a potential future of a more semiotics-aware 
ANT.
This exploration is continued, with some importantly different inflections, in the  chapter 
by Jérôme D. Pontille on what the ANT collective has forgotten about its roots in the an-
thropology of writing. Unlike (classical) semiotics, writing is taken here in its most material 
definition: As any act of inscribing, scribbling, tracing and drawing whereby not just science 
attains its cognitive stabilisation (in the ‘immutable mobiles’ studied by ANT), but which 
make possible all forms of state and other organised governing of sociotechnical assemblages. 
Placing ANT in the wider landscape of the anthropology of writing staked out, amongst 
others, by Jack Goody since the 1960s, Jérôme D. Pontille (the name itself, we note, a tex-
tual invention) argues the value of reasserting such a legacy in the present age of informa-
tion automatisation, which threatens to render mundane documentary work invisible and 
strengthen neopositivist imaginaries.
Picking up the theme of conceptual un- and redoing, Noortje Marres’ chapter explores 
overlaps and tensions between ANT and the American-pragmatist lineage in philosophy, 
by way of asking what the former might learn from the latter in attending to its present 
challenges. Foremost amongst these, Marres suggests, is a series of ‘returns,’ to themes 
of interpretation, society, epistemology and critique, which ANT scholars may have too 
smugly believed themselves to have already surpassed. Here, Marres takes inspiration from 
the  pragmatist-inflected notion that ANT’s intellectual project might be less about deflation, 
and more about the reconstruction of how to think about the relation between the problems 
of philosophy and the problems of the world we inhabit together. In saying this, however, 
she also behooves us to note all the various ways in which the intellectual climate of today’s 
world differs from that of the pragmatists’.
In the following two chapters, authors stage their intellectual encounters on the specific 
territory of the body, thus marking out one important direction in which further work in 
the ANT vein lies ahead. First up, Ericka Johnson asks why ANT needs feminist scholar of 
technoscience Donna Haraway for thinking about (gendered) bodies; and she answers in part 
by drawing on her own research experiences in the (hyper-gendered) world of medical–
gynaecological expertise, technologies and patient-directed interventions. Johnson details 
three conceptual gifts from Haraway, which have been taken up widely in the ANT collec-
tive: Those of the modest witness, the cyborg and the material-semiotic apparatus of bodily 
production. Relative to the otherwise kindred conceptual and methodological domains of 
ANT, she argues, Haraway allows for attending to a broader cultural–political arena of power 
structures writ large, including in her consistent problematisation of the very notions of gen-
der, bodies and biologies.
Michael Schillmeier, in turn, proceeds to think with and about a different kind of bodies, 
those suffering from dementia, as well as with a different intellectual companion to ANT, 
the early 20th-century British philosopher Alfred N. Whitehead. Here as well, Whitehead’s 
processual thinking is well acknowledged as a precursor in the ANT canon; yet,  Schillmeier’s 
core claim is that ANT scholars have far from exhausted Whiteheadian resources when it 
comes to thinking about processual and immaterial aspects of experience. Indeed, he claims, 
75
Engaging dialogues
present-day ANT provides only limited conceptual tools in understanding the everyday 
realities, issues, concerns and problems of dementia. Conversely, he suggests, thinking 
‘cosmo-politically’ about the event of dementia, in ways resonant with key Whiteheadian 
themes, provides an avenue for seriously extending and reassembling key ANT tenets on the 
questionability of the social.
In the section’s final chapter, Martin Savransky brings us full circle, in a certain sense, by 
engaging with one of ANT’s key intellectual interlocutors who is herself in equal measure a 
creative heir to the philosophies of Gilles Deleuze, pragmatism, and Alfred N.  Whitehead: 
The contemporary Belgian philosopher of science Isabelle Stengers. Long recognised in 
the Anglophone world as Bruno Latour’s close philosophical ally, Savransky is adamant to 
dramatise the relation of ANT to Stengers differently, in a way that points to hitherto- 
unacknowledged divergences. Such divergence, he suggests, pertains to the very heart of 
ANT and its principle of ‘generalised symmetry’ which, when read via Stengers’ ecologies 
of practice, is finally allowed to become fully situated in its methodological and political 
import. As such, and fittingly for our overall ambition in this section, Savransky leaves us 
with a future-oriented challenge: How will ANT change and mutate in the future, once the 
divergent path held out by Stengers comes to be seriously explored – beyond any simplistic 
sense of intellectual ‘enemies’ and ‘allies’?
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Latour mentions actant-rhizome ontology only once, in his contribution to ANT and After 
(Latour 1999a). There, he recalls actor-network theory by reminding readers about the con-
cerns that led to its development. But he also plays with recalling ANT in the sense of taking 
it back, like a flawed product. Thus, he first recalls the actor, then the network and then 
theory. It is at this point that the strange term actant-rhizome ontology appears:
The third nail in the coffin is the word theory. As Mike Lynch said some time ago, ANT 
should really be called ‘actant-rhizome ontology’. But who would have cared for such a 
horrible mouthful of words - not to mention the acronym ARO? Yet, Lynch has a point. 
If it is a theory, of what it is a theory? It was never a theory of what the social is made of, 
contrary to the reading of many sociologists who believed it was one more school trying 
to explain the behaviour of social actors.
(1999a: 19)
In a gesture often repeated, Latour insists that, ‘faithful to the insights of ethnomethodology,’ 
ANT aims only to learn from the actors what they do, how and why. And he seems to agree 
that actant-rhizome ontology is in some sense a more appropriate name than actor-network 
theory. Only the word is too ugly, a ‘horrible mouthful,’ which would never have caught on.1
Indeed, the ethnomethodologist Michael Lynch, who coined the notion of ARO did not 
intend it as a compliment. It appeared in his review of Geoffrey Bowker’s (1994) Science on 
the Run that was in equal measure a series of complaints lodged against ANT. While Bowker 
was praised for his ‘matter of fact presentations,’ his ANT colleagues were said to ‘engage 
in a kind of conceptual art long on interpretation and short on detail’ (Lynch 1995: 167). 
ANT, Lynch continued, ‘licenses vaguely Machiavellian stories of how innovative persons 
and agencies manage to establish global networks’ (168). If these stories had been advertised 
fairly as ‘“actant-rhizome ontology,” the theory would of course never have caught on in 
the English-speaking world.’ But, alas, the non-event was not to be and ANT did catch on.
Beneath the cosmetic agreement that ARO is a more accurate descriptor than ANT, there 
is thus profound disagreement. Lynch finds silly the idea of extending agency to non-human 
actants. He evidently views the notion of the rhizome as loose and metaphoric. And talking 
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of ontology is, for him, a way of relegating ANT to the realm of the metaphysical. The only 
real point of agreement is that calling ANT ARO would have been a PR disaster.
Of course, Lynch was right that ANT is not a conventional social theory. And if it is 
not a singular ontology either, it is at least a strategy for tracing, articulating and adding to 
the practical ontologies that make up the world (Gad and Jensen 2010). Yet, even though 
ANT is unlikely to be renamed, it seems worth exploring the points of intersection and 
divergence between the famous actor-networks and the Deleuzian rhizomes that inspired 
Lynch’s ironic suggestion (see also Jensen and Rödje 2010). Central will be the question of 
how to extend ANT’s analytical and political sensitivities beyond the immediacy of mate-
rial connections. We will have to learn, with Deleuze (1994: 220), to move ‘from science 
to dreams and back.’
Of the three terms that make up ARO, actant is hardly problematic (see also Mattozzi this 
volume) and Latour’s intermittent use of ontology has already been subject to commentary 
( Jensen 2017). However, the relation between Deleuzian rhizomes and the network remains 
largely unexplored. Accordingly, much of the following will focus there.
Follow the references!
Follow the actors! Given the centrality of this slogan for ANT, it seems only fitting to start 
by tracing what Latour, the actor, has said about and done with Deleuze.2
Following the references, however, is a less than satisfying task because Latour’s engage-
ment with Deleuze, as with most of his intellectual inspirations, is quite sporadic. Even 
though Latour has referred to Deleuze as the greatest French philosopher (alongside Michel 
Serres) (in Crawford 1993: 262), references appear only intermittently and usually without 
much commentary (e.g. Latour 2014: 15; 2016a, 2016b: 312).
Though touched upon only casually, however, certain ideas are clearly resonant. Thus, for 
example, the invocation of a ‘“composite” that “has to hold together on its own,” as Deleuze 
and Guattari would say,’ though appearing only briefly (Latour 2013: 242) is not difficult 
to connect with the crucial notion of hybrid networks that gain reality through processes 
of stabilisation. Similarly, Latour’s (2005: 95n119) approval of Deleuze’s description of rela-
tivism as ‘not the relativity of truth but the truth of relation’ seems more than coincidental, 
since it aligns with his own effort to simultaneously avoid the connotation of constructivism 
with a kind of social or ideologically induced ‘consensual hallucination’ and the fundamen-
talism of believing in truths that escape the networks that articulate them (Latour 2000).
One of the topics to which Latour returns in his scattered Deleuzian remarks is the rela-
tion between difference and repetition (Deleuze 1994).3 Thus, Latour and Lépinay (2009: 39) 
wrote that Gabriel Tarde’s theory conforms to the fundamental principle of Deleuze’s differ-
ence and repetition according to which ‘invention produces differences; repetition allows for 
their diffusion.’ Depicted as the fundamental Deleuzo-Tardean rhythm of social activity, this 
is also, of course, the fundamental rhythm of Latour’s networks.
The network bore early imprints of the rhizome, too. In a mid-1990s article dedicated 
to ‘clarifying’ the many misunderstandings proliferating about actor-networks already then, 
Latour (1996b: 49) stated that:
Literally, a network has no outside. It is not a foreground over a background, nor a crack 
onto a solid soil, it is like Deleuze’s lightning rod that creates by the same stroke the 




Ten years later, Latour (2005: 129) paused to comment that he was indebted to ‘a very special 
brand of active and distributed materialism of which Deleuze, through Bergson, is the most 
recent representative.’ 
It would thus appear that networks and rhizomes are at least close relatives. But can we 
be so sure? In fact, does sifting through the brief Latourian comments on Deleuze make us 
any wiser as to their specific import? It seems that we will have to look further than Latour’s 
own specifications. 
A nearly total affinity?
The introduction to A Thousand Plateaus is organised around several principles of rhizomatic 
analysis. There is a principle of connection and heterogeneity: ‘any point of a rhizome can 
be connected to any other, and must be’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 7). According to the 
principle of multiplicity, the multiple must be ‘treated as a substantive,’ (8) and decoupled 
from ‘any relation to the One as subject or object, natural or spiritual reality, image and 
world.’ The principle of asignifying rupture states that: ‘a rhizome may be broken, shattered 
at a given point, but it will start up again on one of its old lines, or on new lines’ (9). Each of 
these principles is readily discernible in actor-network theory, which, as Latour (1999a: 15) 
emphasised, was indeed intended to convey an image ‘like Deleuze’s and Guattari’s term 
rhizome… a series of transformations – translations, transductions – which could not be 
captured by any of the traditional terms of social theory.’ 
Henning Schmidgen (2015: 23) notes that Deleuzian themes were important to Latour 
from early on. Working under the anthropologist Marc Augé in the Ivory Coast, he ana-
lysed development projects using concepts from Anti-Oedipus (Deleuze and Guattari 1983) 
and found inspiration in its transversal theory of bodies and technology, which saw people 
as component parts in machinic assemblages (Schmidgen 2015: 103), the latter later turning 
into heterogeneous networks (Latour 1987). Schmidgen (2015: 133) further observes that 
both Latour and Deleuze broach the question of what actors and society consist of and what 
holds them together with an attitude of ‘radical openness.’4
There are further resonances. In The Logic of Sense, Deleuze (1990a: 118) wrote that 
individuals are ‘infinite analytic propositions. But while they are infinite with respect to 
what they express, they are finite with respect to their clear expression, with respect to 
their corporeal zone of expression.’ In this dense formulation, we find an antecedent of 
Latour’s (1988) principle of irreduction according to which actors are indeed also ‘infinite 
propositions,’ though at any given moment they do have a specifiable ‘zone of expression.’ 
We also find a precursor to the ANT critique of analyses that assume given distinctions 
between micro- and macro-scales, putting in place instead an analytics of scale making. 
Similar to the Deleuzian formulation, this entails that one can consider an actor as either 
a relatively stabilised entity that relates to others, or as a network composed of changing 
relations. Moreover, Latour (1999b: 287) would write of the world’s composition of ‘many 
different practical ontologies’ (see also Jensen 2017), much as Deleuze (1990a: 125) had 
depicted the ‘frontier established’ by the interactions of heterogeneous forces as a ‘meta-
physical surface.’
The network as a pattern of interacting forces: The image is distinctly Nietzschean (Lee 
and Brown 1994, Jensen and Selinger 2003, Schmidgen 2015: 6). Deleuze and Latour, how-
ever, grapple with their Nietzschean legacies in markedly different ways. While Deleuze 
(1983: 68–73) was adamant that Nietzsche’s thought has nothing to do with the caricature 
that might make right, Latour – no doubt due to the recurrent critique of ANT for its interest 
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in powerful actors, shrewd scientists and scheming politicians – is at pains to distance himself 
from Nietzsche. In Pandora’s Hope (1999b: 216–235), he argued that Socrates and his oppo-
nent, the proto-Nietzschean sophist Callicles, agreed on almost everything, and specifically 
on an elitist conception of politics, which Latour aimed to bypass ( Jensen and Selinger 2003: 
202–9, cf. Deleuze 1983: 58–59). 
Despite this bit of exorcism, Latour’s analyses of bodies and their powers remain strikingly 
resonant with Deleuze’s Nietzsche and Spinoza. Thus, Deleuze’s (1990b) discussion of Spinoza 
revolves around bodily encounters just as Latour (2004) addresses how actors learn to be af-
fected by others, and Latour’s notion of well-articulated facts (1999b, 2000) is reminiscent of 
the evaluative principle of affirmative and reactive forces that Deleuze extracts from Nietzsche.
Only well-articulated if they are kept alive to many concerns and firmly embedded in 
networks, facts exhibit not the relativity of truth but the truth of relation, as Deleuze had 
written. Furthermore, the principle of links and knots that became central to Latour’s (2004a) 
move from matters of facts to matters of concern also has a Deleuzian flavour, resonating 
with the idea that sense must be seen ‘as the problem to which propositions correspond’ 
(1990a: 121). Thus, we can establish a series leading from a radical empirical openness to 
an exploratory and interrogative disposition, to the gradual forming of links and knots and 
eventually to well-articulated propositions and matters of concern. As we can never fully 
know what actors consist of, what power is or how society is composed, the labour of rede-
scribing relations and making propositions adequate to the metaphysical surfaces we inhabit 
continues indefinitely.
Obviously, then, there are significant overlaps and shared inclinations between Deleuze’s 
rhizomes and Latour’s networks. As long as our discussion remains situated on the terrain 
of similarity, however, the rhizome will remain unable to add something very distinctive to 
the network. Furthermore, comparison on the basis of similarity is contrary to the spirit of 
Deleuze and Latour for both of whom difference at once precedes and supersedes identity. It 
is thus time to consider divergence.
Divergence
If the affinity between rhizomes and networks is less than total, where does divergence occur? 
For some commentators, this question has little sense. The philosopher Graham  Harman, for 
example, finds between the network and the rhizome not a series of bridgeable gaps but a 
vast chasm. The ‘metaphysical surfaces’ to which I previously alluded can illustrate the point, 
since Deleuze (1990a: 125) also wrote that they are an ‘effect of deep mixtures – a physics 
which endlessly assembles the variations and pulsations of the entire universe.’ But, Harman 
insists, the idea of an underlying flow of becoming, or a set of pulsations, has no analogue in 
Latour. Moreover, contrary to Deleuzian objects, which are continuously changing, Harman 
(2009: 6) depicts Latourian entities as ‘so highly definite that they vanish instantly with the 
slightest change in their properties.’ Thus, ‘no off-the-cuff remarks by Latour about his fond-
ness for Deleuze can outweigh the utterly … non-Deleuzian foundations of Latour’s own 
metaphysics’ (Harman 2016: 158). Case closed.
Or perhaps not. For while it is indeed difficult to find a Latourian version of a flow of 
becoming,5 ANT objects do not vanish and reappear as instantaneously as all that. Part of 
the issue is that Harman’s metaphysical focus tends to abstract from the objects and issues that 
Latour actually studies. Latour’s philosophical interest, after all, is an empirical one, and as 




If we turn to studies like Aramis (Latour 1996a) or the pédofil of Boa Vista (Latour 1995), 
we do not, in fact, encounter trains and soil samples instantly fading in and out of existence. 
Instead, we are faced with objects that, much like Deleuze’s, are gradually modified as they 
enter into relational composites and begin to exchange properties with other entities. When 
Latour (1999b: 311) advances the notion of ‘relative existence,’ to make it ‘possible to define 
existence not as an all-or-nothing concept but as a gradient,’ thereby allowing ‘for much 
finer differentiations than the demarcation between existence and non-existence,’ we are 
obviously a far cry from an image of things disappearing with the slightest transformation 
(see also Jensen 2010: 19–31). To understand the points of divergence between the rhizome 
and the network, we are thus obliged to make finer discriminations. And no one offers bet-
ter guidance for doing so than the philosopher of science and erstwhile student of Deleuze, 
Isabelle Stengers, who also happens to be one of Latour’s closest intellectual companions (see 
Savransky this volume). 
In We Have Never Been Modern, Latour (1993) was constantly on the attack: The philoso-
phy of science got it wrong, postmodernists got it wrong, social constructivists got it wrong. 
Once their epistemological errors had been fixed, and the false modern dichotomies between 
nature and culture, science and politics bypassed, the path would open to his hybrid parlia-
ment of things in which humans and non-humans could be made to peacefully coexist.
Yet, Stengers (2000: 124) is doubtful: The problems of contemporary science are hardly 
reducible to the ‘error of epistemologists.’6 Moreover, she goes on:
‘error’ does not have to be any more denounced than power. It explains nothing, except 
insofar as it is a product of the network, characteristic of the style of the network that 
belongs to our epoch, and of the political problem it poses.
As we know, however, Latour has spent nowhere near the same energy denouncing power as 
epistemology (Haraway 1997: 33–35; Schaffer 1991; see also Johnson, this volume).
In an early discussion, Nick Lee and Steve Brown (1994: 587) turned Deleuze against 
ANT to make just this point. Rather than rhizomatic, they concluded, the network had a 
tree-structure: ‘All lines (routes, connections) are subordinated to the point, and all points are 
made to resonate with the centre. This is the space of measurement and calculation – ordering 
space.’ And if one follows the scientist-entrepreneur of Science in Action (Latour 1987), it does 
indeed seem that actor-network theory is infatuated with striation, with tree logic, and thus 
with the state, and power. Accordingly, the network appears rather powerless against power’s 
seductions.
While Deleuze and Guattari’s advocacy of minor sciences and lines of flight is often seen 
to epitomise radical politics, it seems that, for Latour, ‘any revolutionary impulses recede 
firmly into the background’ (Schmidgen 2015: 7).7 It is not coincidental that The Invention 
of Modern Science (Stengers 2000) was dedicated to Latour and Guattari ‘in memory of an 
encounter that never took place.’
Stengers, in fact, accepts Latour’s (1999b: 106–108) depiction of scientific truths as the 
consequence of the making of ‘links and knots.’ However, she is quite circumspect about the 
reach of these truths. And the grounds for her concern are simultaneously political and prag-
matic. The fact that scientists manage to create particular facts within the rarefied settings of 
the laboratory confers upon them neither the capacity nor the right to determine the impli-
cations of those facts among a heterogeneous ecology of practices. While the making of a fact 
is an event, since it creates a distinction between a before and an after, the extension of the fact 
depends on other events involving non-scientists that inhabit other practices. The scientist 
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is therefore unable to dictate the scope of the event, and accordingly any attempt to extend 
‘facts’ into other practices is always accompanied by risk.
If Stengers characterises (2000: 64) the ‘parliament of things’ (Latour 1993) as a ‘difficult 
success,’ it is thus not because it fails to conform to any standard critique of science. To be 
sure, the sciences become open to critique whenever they fail to respect the specificity and 
creativity of other practices, thus entering the mode of what Deleuze and Guattari called ma-
jor, or state, science. Conversely, however, the creativity specific to the sciences, that which 
gives them the capacity to formulate their own problems and develop their own solutions, 
must also be acknowledged. The ability to do so, however, is threatened by what could be 
called the affinity for power of the early ANT (Latour 1987).8
The crucial issue is thus to separate the parliament of things from its potential majoritar-
ian inclinations. As Stengers will suggest, this can be achieved by aligning it with Deleuze’s 
notion of adventurous, minor sciences. 
experimental realignments
In an early critique, Nick Lee and Steve Brown (1994: 787) argued that the network’s tendency 
to engulf everything meant the loss of any space for ‘irreducible otherness.’ And the statement 
that ‘literally, a network has no outside’ (Latour 1996b: 49) seems to vindicate this interpre-
tation. We might, however, pause at the word ‘literally.’ Does the space of the other perhaps 
exceed the network in a non-literal manner? Perhaps, as Deleuze would say, virtually? This possi-
bility is at least raised in Reassembling the Social, which introduces the notion of a fluid, formless 
plasma, which has not yet been brought into the collective (Latour 2005: 241ff).9
But then how does such ‘bringing into’ occur? What ties together the rhizome and the 
network on this point is the famous principle of irreduction (Latour 1988), according to 
which the ‘coming together of heterogeneous components…is…the first and last word of ex-
istence’ (Stengers 2018: 105). For scientists, the issue is how to invent the means to bring new 
entities into the collective, which also means protecting them against ever-vigilant sceptics 
standing ready to reduce them to fictions (think of climate change). It concerns learning how 
to confer on non-human entities the capacity to confer back on the scientists the power to 
speak in their name (Stengers 1997: 164).
In accordance with the principle of irreduction, this process of reciprocal conferral has no 
fixed procedure and entails no particular form of relation. Even so, Latour’s career-long em-
phasis on tracing connection tempts a reductive imagination, always in search of material, or 
even better, directly observable, connections (Krarup and Blok 2011). In contrast, Deleuze 
(1994: 220) wrote that imagination ‘crosses domains, orders and levels, knocking down the 
partitions.’ What held his interest was thus a movement ‘from science to dreams and back 
again’: Between what is presently fiction yet may later become real, between plasma and 
network, or between the virtual and the actual. 
Looking to one side, a young face represents science in action. Looking in the other 
direction, a mature, bearded face symbolises ready-made science. I am referring, obviously, 
to Latour’s (1987) famous version of the Janus head. Unfortunately, the usage of this figure 
has become rather formulaic, its interpretation itself ‘ready-made.’ Almost all interest has 
focused on the manoeuvres of scientists as they make facts, while almost all critique has 
centred on the bearded scientists toasting in celebration of their achievements. As Stengers 
(2010: 42) remarks, however, the Janus head depicts a ‘contrasted unity.’ A one-sided focus 




Science critics might well reply that this is precisely the problem. But, Stengers argues, 
Deleuze and Guattari (1994) help to understand why it is unsatisfying to engage scientists’ 
dreams only in the mode of denunciation, for while they ‘certainly did not agree with the 
old bearded-face explanation… they nevertheless asked us to relate science as creation with 
science’s ‘own specific means,’ which are associated, one way or the other, with the possibil-
ity of a scientist getting a beard’ (2005: 154).
At issue is thus a dissociation of two aspects of ready-made science. Learning to celebrate 
the risky achievements of science does not entail endorsement of scientific conquest or de-
nunciation of other practices. The image, instead, is the one in which each science operates 
as its own 
minority adventure, as Deleuze and Guattari positively characterize a minority as what 
does not dream to become a majority. And it is precisely because a minority collectively 
produces a divergence without a dream of convergence, of representing a future majority 
or consensus, that some transversal connections are possible.
(Stengers 2005: 158)
The notion of transversal connections – Deleuzian rhizomes – might nevertheless appear to 
be a far cry from Latour’s parliament of things, which is often seen to embody a fundamen-
tally pragmatic and reformist view.
Consider, for example, Graham Harman’s (2014: 63) exemplification of Latourian politics. 
Although we may feel repulsed by Vladimir Putin’s annexation of parts of Ukraine, Harman 
observes, the sense of outrage and moral superiority must be tempered by the practical re-
alisation that ‘certain chickens are left to the wolves because the collective itself cannot face 
the wolves, under penalty of disruption.’ Had action been taken against Putin-the-wolf, the 
consequences might have been even worse.
One might object that the depiction of Latour as a promoter of pragmatic ‘realpolitik’ and 
conflict avoidance disregards his recent discussions of climate change disruptions as well as 
more programmatic interventions like War of the Worlds (Latour 2002). Adding to the prob-
lem, Harman’s example leaves out consideration of the non-human agency and thing-politics 
so central to the parliament of things. To better grasp the rhizomatic potentials of Latour’s 
material politics, it is fruitful to turn instead to Isabelle Stengers’s (2000: 159) comments on 
the children’s story ‘The Three Little Pigs.’ 
If one reads ‘The Three Little Pigs,’ Stengers observes, no amount of social construction 
will obviate the distinction between the fictive protection of houses made of straw and the 
real protection offered by brick. The narrative thus locates us firmly within a world of ma-
terial recalcitrance. Yet, before this reality is taken as given, and the safety of pigs entrusted 
to ‘experts discussing bricks and cement,’ it is necessary to probe what their solution to the 
problem of wolves will ‘take as acquired.’ Posing this question makes us see that houses made 
of brick are a solution to the problem of the wolf defined as a menace. If we were able to 
invent other relationships with the wolf, our imaginative horizon might extend beyond the 
necessity of reinforcing the walls. Indeed, we might be encouraged to explore a world in 
which chickens, pigs and wolves could coexist. 
Unavoidably, Stengers (2000: 159) wryly notes, experts in ‘protection against destruc-
tive wolves’ will counter that this kind of proposal is idealist, dangerous or impossible. But 
just as scientists are not free to extend the event associated with their laboratory facts into 
other practices, experts in cement and safety are also unqualified ‘to follow through all its 
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consequences the logic of the story they are advocating.’ After all, a principled refusal of, or 
disinterest in, any search for alternative solutions might lead to
a story in which other wolves, even more threatening, will intervene, in which the 
bricks and cement will no longer suffice, in which we will be taken up in an endless 
move toward ever more costly and rigid modes of protection.
Clearly, coexistence is not a matter of mutual affection, and disruption always remains a pos-
sibility. Yet, Stengers’ way of dealing with the threat of disruption relies neither on a return 
to any form of material determinism nor on any kind of quasi-pragmatic reformism. Instead, 
she guides us to a position from where it can be perceived that the distinction between 
 Latourian thing-politics and Deleuzian ‘dreams’ of alternative futures has always been blurry.
Such futures would be shaped by actors learning to confer on other entities (like menac-
ing wolves) the capacity to confer back on their own collectives the ability to imagine and 
materialise different forms of coexistence. 
In a slightly more rhizomatic guise, the parliament of things thus emerges as an institution 
for experimenting with minoritarian practical ontologies.
Rhizome
It is evidently just as pointless to call for a renaming of ANT as it was for Latour to issue his 
original recall. But perhaps a new name is not required to allow the rhizome to infiltrate and 
complicate the network. For one thing, it would impose the obligation on actor-network 
theorists, beneficial in my view, to become less literal-minded about the connections they 
trace. Unable to hide behind actors who they claim to simply follow, they would also have to 
take more risks and be more explicit about why they take them.
What would be extended in this process would thus not be the network as such but rather 
our curiosity about the continuous composition and reconfiguration of the world multiple 
(Omura et al, 2018). The aim would not be to capture within the network all those entities – 
like earth-beings (de la Cadena 2015) or spirits (Ishii 2017) – whose forms do not easily fit, 
but rather to learn to relate to worlds composed by things and forces far more heterogeneous 
and unruly than those ANT has conventionally dealt with (see e.g. Jensen 2015, Jensen and 
Blok 2013, Jensen, Ishii and Swift 2016). At issue is an extension of ANT’s already consider-
able imaginative ontological re-figurations.
In brief, then, parsing ANT through the rhizome offers a way to intensify its experimental 
disposition. Together, ANT and the rhizome continue to work the metaphysical surface.
Notes
 1 As far as I am aware, only Latour has addressed Lynch’s proposal to rename ANT as ARO. Since, 
among the progenitors of ANT, Latour is also the only to regularly invoke Deleuze, the following 
discussion centres on his work.
 2 Henning Schmidgen (2015: 6) suggests that ‘“Even the famous ‘Follow the actors!’ the basic prin-
ciple of the anthropology of science as conceived by Latour, derives from a concept of Deleuze and 
Guattari’s: namely, the ‘nomad, ambulatory sciences”’ (see also Jensen 2012).
 3 This theme particularly held Latour’s attention during the Tardean interval (after the Serresian 
phase, but before Souriau, James and Whitehead took over: As we know Latour changes intellec-
tual predecessors at a dizzying pace). More generally, Difference and Repetition is the Deleuzian work 
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to which Latour returns with the greatest regularity (e.g. 1993: 72, 1996: 49, 1997: 179, Latour and 
Lépinay 2009: 39).
 4 Long before Latour became famous for insisting that We Have Never Been Modern, and Haraway 
(2008) proposed that we hadn’t been human either, Deleuze (2004: 90–94 [1966]) had characterised 
humans as ‘“a dubious existence.”’
 5 As noted below, however, it appears in the form of ‘plasma’ in Latour (2005).
 6 It is curious that Latour defines the problem in terms of error since this situates his analysis on the 
same terrain – of knowledge rather than networks – as the epistemologists whom he criticises. 
Deleuze’s (1990a: 120) characterisation of error in The Logic of Sense as ‘“a very artificial notion, an 
abstract philosophical concept, because it affects only the truth of propositions which are supposed 
to be ready-made and isolated’”’ is very apt here. Here, too, Deleuze’s formulation resonates with 
Latour’s later movement from matters of fact to matters of concern.
 7 On the one side, Latour constantly evokes the language of common sense. On the other, Deleuze 
is constantly on the attack against common sense and good sense (‘“partial truth associated with 
the feeling of the absolute”’ (Stengers 1997: 70)). While Latour likes to don the mantle of diplo-
mat, Deleuze declared shameful Leibniz’ dictum to never aim to overthrow established sentiments 
(Stengers 2000: 15, also Jensen 2006).
 8 Latour has attempted to take such criticisms on board though with mixed success (e.g. Latour 
2004b). Among friendly interpreters (like Henning Schmidgen) as well as staunch supporters (like 
Graham Harman), the image of Latourian politics as fundamentally ‘reformist’ rather than ‘radical’ 
remains strong.
 9 Tellingly, Graham Harman (2009: 132) skips very quickly over this relation.
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Semiotics, still
‘Still’ is the pivot, around which the question I have been asked to answer turns. ‘Still’ con-
nects the past with present and, from there, with the future: It suggests that ANT has previ-
ously learned from semiotics and that it can possibly keep learning from semiotics.
Therefore, ‘still’ acknowledges a long-term relationship between ANT and semiotics. 
Such relationship has been frequently explored, reenacted and recalled by Latour and it has 
been sealed by John Law’s definition of ANT as ‘material semiotics.’ Despite all that, such 
relationship has been often overlooked, disregarded, forgotten.1
Therefore, in order to answer the question making up the title of this contribution, I first 
need to recover the history of such relationship.
Semiotics, then
Semiotics (or semiology) is, from an etymological point of view, ‘the science of signs.’ As 
such, semiotics studies signification as the outcome of sign processes: Something, mate-
rial, present to perception – the sound of a word, the coloured cloth of a flag, the shape 
of an emoticon, the look of a car or the cut of a suit – stands for something else, more 
immaterial, abstract and absent – the meaning of a word, a nation, an emotion, a lifestyle, 
a social class. 
The first founder of modern semiotics, the American pragmatist philosopher Charles 
Sanders Peirce, thought the sign as a threefold relation (Figure 9.1a) among:
-  an object or referent;
-  a representamen, i.e. the actual sign – the configuration, which represents the object;
-  an interpretant, i.e. the further configuration elicited by the representamen, usually in-
tended as the idea created in the mind, but which does not need to be a mental 
representation.
9





Peirce’s (1868) semiotics is a complex classification of signs, developed by considering the 
types of relations the three elements can entertain. The most famous classification is the one 
based on the relation between the representamen and the object, which can produce: 
-  an icon or likeness, i.e. a resemblance, as with a figurative images;
-  an index, i.e. physical or causal relations, like a pointing finger or smoke for fire;
-  a symbol, i.e. conventional relations, like the word ‘dog’ for the domestic barking animal.
The Swiss linguist and originator of structuralism Ferdinand de Saussure is the second 
founder of modern semiotics. Being a linguist, Saussure focused only on verbal language, 
considering it grounded in conventional signs, akin to Peirce’s symbols. However, Saussure 
thought the sign as binary: A relation between a signifier – the sound of a word as perceived – 
and a signified – the concept recalled by the perception (Figure 9.1b).
Despite the focus on verbal language, Saussure ([1916] 1959: 16) acknowledged that lan-
guage is comparable to other sign systems like ‘the alphabet of deaf-mutes’ or ‘symbolic rites.’ 
All of them are studied by ‘semiology,’ i.e. ‘the science that studies the life of signs within 
society.’
Figure 9.1  Signification models: a. Peirce, o = object, r = representamen, i = interpretant (my 
elaboration); b. de Saussure’s ([1916] 1959: 115); c. Hjelmslev’s (my elaboration); 
d. ANT’s (my elaboration)
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Peirce’s one is a philosophical semiotics aimed at developing a theory of knowledge, 
which could provide the rules for scientific inquiries, by considering which kinds of signs are 
used by scientists within their deductions, inductions or abductions. 
Saussure’s one is a scientific semiotics, aimed at providing a method for studying lan-
guages or, more in general, sign systems. Following Saussure’s approach, linguistics and se-
miotics have been developed as methodologies providing terms, categories and models to 
describe-analyse2 sign systems, as well as their specific empirical manifestations.
Semiotics: from signs to relations
All along the 20th century, various semiotics have been elaborated assuming as ground the 
sign and developed through various related notions such as representation, symbol, language, 
code, communication, etc. Within such framework, signs have been often reduced to what 
they represent, according to given societal, cultural or mental structures. Therefore, signs 
have been often reduced to their most de-situated, disembodied and immaterial aspects. Such 
approach to signs is clearly at odds with ANT. No wonder that ‘semiotics readings’ pursuing 
such dualist – material/immaterial-ideal – and transcendent understanding of signifying pro-
cesses have been considered ‘incompatible’ with ANT (Farías and Mützel 2015: 524).
Nevertheless, such incompatibility is the result of a partial view of semiotics, based 
on a simplified and isolated conception of the sign, put forth and adopted, first of all, by 
many semioticians. Such conception of the sign does not, however, pertain neither to 
Peirce nor to Saussure, nor to some of their heirs. Peirce and Saussure developed their 
semiotics by addressing issues that take place beneath and above the sign. They indeed 
intended signs as mediating entities and mediation as a process, taking place through 
relations. Examples of mediating entities considered by semiotics can be: The interpre-
tant, between object and representamen, within the Peircian sign (Figure 9.1a); language, 
between sound and thought (Saussure [1915] 1959: 112); forms between substances of ex-
pression and of content (Hjelmslev [1943] 1961; Figure 9.1c, see below), enunciation between 
language (langue) and speech (parole) (see below). These mediating entities not only allow 
establishing relations, but are constituted by relations: For Peirce (1898), the basic cate-
gories from which signs arise are relational; for Saussure ([1916] 1959: 122), in language 
‘everything is based on relations,’ so that signification is never reducible to the simple 
coupling of signifier-signified, but it has always to be considered in relation with other cou-
plings (Figure 9.1b). The latter approach has been radicalised by the Danish linguist Louis 
Hjelmslev ([1943] 1961), for whom signification is solely based on relations and relations 
among relations, i.e. relations among configurations of relations or, using Hjelmslev’s 
terms, relations among ‘ forms’: A form of expression (signifier) and a form of content (signified) 
(Figure 9.1c).
Signs are then just the ‘tip of an iceberg’ and semiotics is actually concerned with the 
‘complex […] work’ under the ‘tip’ (Marrone 2002: 14, my translation), carried out by rela-
tions and mediations.
While signs, considered as isolated entities reduced to the immaterial representations to 
which they refer, can be of no relevance for ANT (Farías and Mützel 2015: 524), relations 
and mediations certainly are.
Relations have indeed provided the common ground for the exchange between ANT and 
semiotics. It is not coincidence, then, that ANT considers semiotics, not the ‘science of signs,’ 
but the ‘science of relations’ (Law 2002: 49).
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What ANT has learned from semiotics
The ‘semiotic insight’ of ‘the relationality of entities’ (Law 1999: 4), according to which 
‘everything in the social and natural worlds [is] a continuously generated effect of the webs 
of relations within which they are located’ (Law 2008: 141), is what, in general, ANT has 
learned from semiotics. As Annemarie Mol (2010: 257) acknowledges 
In [d]e Saussure’s version of semiotics, words do not point directly to a referent, but 
form part of a network of words. They acquire their meaning relationally, through their 
similarities with and differences from other words. Thus, the word “fish” is not a label 
that points with an arrow to the swimming creature itself. Instead, it achieves sense 
through its contrast with “meat”, its association with “gills” or “scales” and its evocation 
of “water”. In ANT this semiotic understanding of relatedness has been shifted on from 
language to the rest of reality. Thus it is not simply the term, but the very phenomenon 
of “fish” that is taken to exist thanks to its relations.
Because of this extension of relationality ‘from language to the rest of reality,’ of its ‘ruth-
less’ application ‘to all materials,’ ANT has been considered ‘a semiotics of materiality’ (Law 
1999: 4). As such, it ‘forget[s] about signs and signification, […] only retain[ing] the stress on 
interdependence’ (Mol and Mesman 1996: 420), thus producing a version of semiotics which 
‘is not about meaning’ (Mol and Mesman 1996: 429).
And yet, the ‘insight’ of relationality has emerged to be the ground for the relationship 
between ANT and semiotics only at a later stage. 
At first, ANT has learned from semiotics a method. Only through the use of such method, 
the ‘insight of relationality’ has emerged as a shared ground between ANT and semiotics.
In semiotics, indeed, Latour initially found a way to describe-analyse agency (Latour 
2014a), regardless of the ontological status of agents, by considering relations among entities 
and how they are transformed. Latour, together with semiotician Paolo Fabbri, was thus able 
to write the first ANT science studies article, by using semiotics as a ‘methodology’ able to 
take ‘sociology of science at the heart of [scientific] articles’ (Latour and Fabbri 1977: 82, 
my translation). In the following years, thanks also to the collaboration with biologist and 
semiotician Françoise Bastide, Latour and other ANT scholars have drawn on semiotics as 
-  a “method” that allows describing the “interdefinition of actors and the chains of trans-
lations” (Latour [1984] 1988: 11) or that allows “following, along the design phase, the 
user as is inscribed, translated” in a technical object (Akrich 1990: 84, my translation)
-  a set of “tools” “used to compare what Einstein says about the activity of building spaces 
and times with what sociologists of science can tell us” (Latour 1988: 3), 
-  a way to map “a common ground, a common vocabulary, that would be intermediary 
between [empirical descriptions] one hand and the ontological questions […] on the 
other” (Latour 2000: 251). 
ANT has then learned from semiotics an insight about relationality and a method based on 
relationality. While the insight is still relevant as a general theoretical framework, the method 
semiotics provides has been relevant for ANT in a more circumscribed way: Mainly during 
the 1980s and early 1990s, for a limited number of ANT scholars. Nevertheless, for Latour, 
semiotics has continued to play a relevant role as descriptive–analytical methodology, because 
it provides an ‘organon’ or ‘toolkit’ able ‘to record important variations’ (Latour 2014b: 265). 
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A semiotics of relational transformations
What Latour refers to as ‘organon’ for ANT is not semiotics in general, but a very specific 
strand of semiotics: The one developed by the French-Lithuanian semiotician Algirdas J. 
 Greimas and his collaborators (Greimas and Courtés 1979). 
Greimas has turned the linguistics elaborated by Saussure and Hjelmslev into a semi-
otics not only by extending beyond verbal language the signifying configurations to be 
described-analysed, but also dynamicising them, by taking into account signification as a 
transformation occurring among configurations. He has achieved such dynamicisation 
by integrating Saussure’s and Hjelmslev’s framework with narratology and the theory of 
enunciation.
As for narratology, Greimas drew on the analysis of folktales elaborated by Russian folk-
lorist Vladimir Propp and revised it through the relational syntax elaborated by French lin-
guist Lucien Tesnière – the actual coiner of the term ‘actant.’ Thus, Greimas was able to 
develop a narrative syntax – considered the syntactic ground of signification – which allows 
describing transformation of relations among actants. 
As for enunciation, by drawing and operationalising the theory of enunciation proposed 
by the French linguist Émile Benveniste, Greimas was able to describe-analyse the discur-
sive dynamics taking place among various frames of reference. Benveniste introduced the 
notion of ‘enunciation’ in order to account for the individual act of appropriation of lan-
guage (langue) through which speech (parole) is produced. Such appropriation entails various 
tensions between the person, the time and the space from which the appropriation takes 
place and the person, the time and the space within the produced sentence (Figure 9.2). The 
descriptions-analyses of these tensions and of the related dynamics give way to accounts of 
the circulation of meanings through various frames of reference, as well as of the shiftings 
among points of view and of the positionings of utterers and recipients (Figures 9.2 and 9.4).
These are the features that Latour has found interesting in Greimassian semiotics, which 
cannot be found in other semiotics that tend to be more rigid and more bound to signs and 
verbal language, rather than relational transformation more in general.
ANT thus uses Greimassian semiotics to describe the relational transformations it is inter-
ested in. However, it has always used Greimassian tools in a limited way, without borrowing 
‘all of [semiotics’] argument and jargon’ (Latour 2005: 55) and formalism, in order to prevent 
to efface actors’ own language, instead of highlighting it (Akrich 1992a).
Nevertheless, the use of semiotics’ tools has been extended from literary text, initially 
considered by Greimas, to ‘settings, machines, bodies, and programming languages’ (Akrich 
and Latour 1992: 259), thus overcoming the limits that Latour ([1984] 1988: 183) saw in the 
way semiotics had been enacted before ANT.3
Latour’s infralanguage, used in order ‘to help [analysts] become attentive to the actors’ own 
fully developed metalanguage’ (Latour 2005: 49), is indeed built on Greimassian semiotic 
tools and is used in order to account for 
-  narrative dynamics – related to actants’ actions and transformations – through semiotic 
tools like: “actant/actor”, “competence/performance”, “dictum/modus”, “do/make-do”, 
“figurative/non-figurative”, “prescription/proscription/affordances/ allowances”, “pro-
gram/anti-program of action” (Figure 9.3)
-  enunciational dynamics – related to the way actants’ actions and transformations are 
framed and made to circulate: “enunciation”, “delegation”, “shifting in/out/down” 
(Figure 9.2 and 9.4).
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The model built on the category ‘association/substitution’ or ‘AND/OR relations,’ able to 
map relations more in general, is also a semiotic model, coming originally from linguistics 
(Figure 9.3).
Coming out as a semiotics
As we have seen, ANT shares with semiotics – and especially with the semiotics emerged 
from the Saussurean tradition – an interest in describing-analysing relations and media-
tions through specific tools, however forgetting, apparently, about signification (Mol and 
 Mesman 1996: 420). Despite the fact that signification, sense and meanings are not issues 
Figure 9.3  Example of the use of semiotics categories and models (Akrich and Latour, 1992: 
263). Here, the following models are used: ‘AND/OR relations,’ ‘program’ and 
‘anti-program of action.’ The ‘program of action’ is the goal an ‘actor’ wants to 
achieve – in this case the hotel manager wants to have the keys back; the ‘anti- 
program of action’ is the opposite programme, in this case carried out by the 
other ‘actors,’ the customers, and consists in keeping the key. The diagram shows 
the way in which, for each new association (AND), the entire set of relations is 
replaced (OR) by another set
Figure 9.2  Examples of enunciational relations referring to the same narrative relations
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often directly addressed by ANT, they are not forgotten, but reframed, breaking away from 
a dualist and transcendent way of conceiving them, clearly at odds with ANT (Farías and 
Mützel 2015).
Akrich and Latour (1992: 259) assumed meaning as ANT’s object of study by reframing it 
as ‘how one privileged trajectory is built, out of an indefinite number of possibilities.’ Akrich 
(1992a; 1992b) has made clear what ‘trajectories’ are through her research works on technical 
objects. For her, signification takes place through differences emerging through displace-
ments, seen as passages from one moment to another of the configuration of relations char-
acterising a specific technical object or as passages between the actions an artefact disposes 
and the actions a user unfolds. These displacements outline trajectories that can be then seen 
as ‘concatenations of mediations,’ in which each mediator ‘transform[s] […] the meaning or 
the elements it is supposed to carry’ (Latour 2005: 39). More recently, Latour ([2012] 2013: 
236) has clarified that ‘sense’ is ‘the direction or trajectory […] traced by a[ny] mode [of ex-
istence] and […] defin[ing] both the predecessors and the successors of any course of action 
whatsoever,’ whereas ‘signs,’ intended as figures undergoing the same general dynamic of 
sense, characterise one specific mode of existence, i.e. [FIC]tion. Therefore, for Latour, sense 
precedes signs and does not need them to unfold.
This way of conceiving sense (Figure 9.1d), signification and meanings is very far from 
the signifier-signified relation, to which these are often reduced by certain strands of semiotics. 
Yet, it is similar to the dynamics outlined by Peirce for signification, seen as chains of in-
terpretants (Figure 9.1a). Moreover, it complies with signification as intended by Hjelmselv 
(Figure 9.1c), especially if considered, as Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari ([1972] 2003: 241) 
did, like ‘flows of form and substance, content and expression,’ i.e. not as a rigid relationship 
between a signifier determining a signified, but as encounters between different agencements 
(or configurations), for instance, the agencement of the movements of a technological object, 
with the agencement of the movements of users, referring to a situation considered by Akrich 
(1992a; 1992b).
By addressing signification and sense, ANT turns out to be a semiotics in itself. Moreover, 
it turns out to be a quite innovative semiotics, able to combine in a new way the two main 
semiotic traditions, the one derived from pragmatism, more philosophical, and the one from 
structuralism, more scientific. Through a pragmatist reading of the structuralist Greimas, 
homologous to the pragmatist reading of the structuralist Hjelmslev, carried out by Deleuze 
and Guattari ([1972] 2003), ANT is indeed able to provide Deleuze and Guattari’s reflec-
tions on signification an actual descriptive–analytical methodology and empirical grounds 
on which to probe it.
What ANT can learn from other semiotics, still and again
Being ANT a semiotics, the initial question needs to be modified into ‘what can ANT still 
learn from other semiotics?’ 
The answer to this question cannot but waive basic notions like signification, relationality 
and mediation, already appropriated and reformulated by ANT in the process of becoming 
a semiotics.
What is left to learn, as it happened at the beginning of the relation between semiotics and 
ANT, are then descriptive–analytical tools, i.e. terms, categories and models.
Greimassian semiotics, from which ANT has mainly drawn the already learned tools, has 
indeed kept refining old tools and elaborating new ones, of which ANT knows very little, 
since the relation between ANT and semiotics faded during the 1990s. 
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However, new and refined tools are not the only ones ANT can learn. Only few scholars 
have indeed followed Latour’s example and used semiotic tools in a systematic and extended 
way, especially after the 1990s. Therefore, old tools are often unknown to many ANT schol-
ars, so that they can also be learned again.
Given the limited space, I will provide just two examples of the tools ANT can learn anew 
and of their background that needs to be relearned. The two examples will refer to the main 
sets of relations, which these tools allow to describe-analyse.
Narrative relations
As Latour (2014b) has recently noted, the semiotic category of ‘actant/actor’ has been key for 
his work in order to describe the unfolding of agency, by accounting for actions and trans-
formations of any entity. The terms constituting such category have been used by Latour and 
other scholars in at least three ways. Each of them gives relevance to different aspects of the 
terms and of the category.
First, ‘actant’ has been used to point to ‘anything that acts’ (Latour 1992), regardless of its 
ontological status, size, scale, features, etc., thus providing the principle of symmetry with a 
descriptive term.
Secondly, ‘actant’ has been used in tension with the term ‘actor,’ thus having the possi-
bility to distinguish between actants. The fact that anything that acts is an actant does not 
mean that what acts is reducible to the performed action and then that it is ‘ just’ an actant. 
Any actant can enjoy other relations and have other features that distinguish it from other 
actants. Thus, for example, the action of reminding to bring the hotel room’s key back can 
be performed by a written note or by a weight attached to the key (Figure 9.3). They are 
both actants and, as for the action they perform, they are the same actant: They occupy the 
same position within the network manager-desk-key-customer, by providing the latter with 
a certain competence, namely a knowledge. However, on another level, with reference to 
other relations, they are different – they are different actors: A written note, a weight. The 
first is white, flat, made of paper bearing inscriptions; the second is brown, bulgy and made 
of metal. Because of that, notwithstanding they perform the same action related to provid-
ing a knowledge to the customer, they do that in different ways, so that the second results 
to be more effective in contributing to the success of the hotel manager’s program of action 
(Figure 9.3).
Thirdly, ‘actor’ has been intended not just as an actant provided with its various features 
besides the action it accomplishes, but as ‘what is made the source of action’ (Latour 2014a). 
Thus, ‘actor’ has been intended as the specific entity to which agency is attributed, despite 
the fact that agency always unfolds through many actants. Akrich (1993) has called the ‘actor’ 
seen in this way ‘author.’
As we can see, by deploying semiotic tools, ‘variations,’ differences, can be recorded and 
comparisons made, among entities, as well as among their features. Allowing the detailed 
description-analysis of actant-actors and of their actions was indeed the aim of Greimas’ 
narrative grammar. In order to achieve such aim, Greimas elaborated many more terms 
and categories than those actually used by ANT. He, for instance, introduced other levels 
between the actant and the actor like actantial and thematic roles. Thus, for Greimas, any 
actor can cover one or more thematic roles, which, in turn, are performed by covering one 
or more actantial roles.
Akrich (1990; 1993) is one of the few4 to have actually took advantage of a more stratified 
articulation of the ‘actant/actor’ category, by considering also ‘positions’ (Akrich 1990) or 
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‘postures’ (Akrich 1993) – akin to Greimas’ ‘thematic roles.’ Analysing the design process of 
a pay-TV service, she has been able to show that the connection between the receiver and 
the VCR had been neglected, since it would have disrupted the superposition of ‘actant,’ 
‘ position-posture’ and ‘actor-author’ necessary for the service to work. With
-  “actants”, she referred to elements of the receiver related to a certain action, like the 
button “enter”;
-  “position-posture”, she referred to roles assumed by entities, in relation to the milieu 
in which they would act as, for instance, “the subscriber”, “the viewer”, “the paying 
viewer”;
-  “actor-author” she referred to the entity to which the action can be attributed.
For the service to work properly, the three entities need to superpose, so that to the action of 
pushing ‘enter’ corresponds a ‘viewer,’ to which the action can be attributed and thus made 
responsible for payments.
ANT can thus learn again to further articulate the ‘actant/actor’ relation, in order  describe 
and compare more in detail actants and actors. 
Such opportunity is even higher today, thanks to the questioning that both ANT and 
 Greimassian semiotics have carried out of action, in order to give relevance to passions and af-
fects. This parallel reconsideration of action, acknowledged by ANT (Hennion, Maisonneve and 
Gomart 2000), has led both to thematise more and more the role of the body. Jacques  F ontanille 
(2004), French semioticians collaborator of Greimas, has recently proposed to integrate the body 
or, better, a schematic version of it that works for humans as well for non- humans, into Greimas’ 
narrative syntax. Fontanille has thus provided the actant with a body, allowing to account for 
actants’ senses and passions or, more in general, affects, intended as ‘change[s], or variation[s], 
that occur when bodies collide, or come into contact’ (Colman 2005: 11).
Fontanille, in a way similar to the one attempted by Tim Ingold (2007) for the description 
of materials and their perceptions, shows how contacts and collisions among bodies can be 
described as pressures-penetrations and envelopments involving internal substances – like 
flesh – and their envelopes-surfaces – like skin.
I deem Fontanille’s schematisation of the body a new tool ANT can learn from  Greimassian 
semiotics, which allows ANT to address up-to-date issues like affects and to describe their 
unfoldings in detail.
For instance, only by considering the bodies of the actors accompanying the hotel’s key 
( Figure 9.3), we can actually account for their different efficacy. While the written note acts only 
through its inscribed envelope-surface, which has to be taken into account by the customer’s 
body taking a certain distance from it, the weight reminds of its presence continuously when 
in contact with the customers’ body, by pressing the latter on its surface-envelope through its 
specific internal-substance and envelope-surface, which provide weight’s consistency and shape.
Enunciational relations
The Greimassian enunciational model (Figure 9.2) has been key for Latour’s work in order to 
distinguish fiction from science (Latour 1988; Figure 9.4), technology from fiction (Latour 
1992), science from law, to describe religion and, eventually, to organise the various modes 
of existence (Latour [1998] 2017; [2012] 2013). 
Indeed, through it, Latour has been able to account, distinguish and compare the ways in 
which entities circulate among different frames of reference. For instance, he has shown how 
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in fiction, figures tend to be shifted out within nested frames away from the original situ-
ation of enunciation, whereas in sciences, references tend not only to be shifted out within 
nested frames, like in fiction, but also to be shifted in, back towards the original situation of 
enunciation (Figure 9.4).
Despite the relevance the Greimassian enunciational model has had for Latour, it has been 
neglected by ANT scholars. Because of that, it is certainly a tool that ANT can learn again 
and, in a certain way, anew from semiotics.
As it should emerge from the references to frames, as well as from the examples provided 
here, the Greimassian enunciational model can contribute to provide tools to develop an 
ANT approach to media, which would be able to consider the relation between technology 
and what is displayed in and through technologies – what Latour ([2012] 2013) would call 
the intersection between fiction [FIC] and [TEC], or what media scholar Roger Silverstone 
called the ‘double articulation’ of media.
This is not such a novelty, given that enunciation, in general, and the Greimassian model 
more specifically have been widely used in the neo-Latin-speaking world to analyse various 
forms of communication, probing its efficacy especially for forms of visual communication 
(advertisements, paintings, cinema, television, etc.). These analyses have mainly focused on 
the dialogue images disposed with the recipient. The Greimassian model of enunciation 
could be further used, however, in order to account for the role of media technologies, and 
especially the role of interfaces, which dispose various shiftings in and out among frames of 
reference, as well as modes of existence.
Such an approach could lead to rearticulate the present debate around ANT and media. 
 Indeed, the enunciational model, by fully considering mediation (Hennion [1993] 2015), allows 
accounting for ‘the ways in which particular framings of entities are made to circulate,’ as asked 
by Marres and Rogers (2008, 276). However, at the same time, by being akin to a ‘diffusionist 
model[…], which conceive the dissemination of information as a movement from source to 
recipients,’ criticised by Marres and Rogers (2008, 276), it also allows to account for the framed 
entities and thus account for dynamics that are usually filed under the notion of ‘ interpretation’ – 
deemed key by Nick Couldry, but criticised by Marres and Rogers. However, such ‘interpre-
tation’ would take place through dynamics akin to those studied by Akrich (1992) for technical 
objects (see above), related to the passage between the actions a certain frame and what framed 
dispose, and the action a recipient unfolds. Using semiotic tools relative to both narrative and 
enunciational relations would make such approach possible and, I deem, productive.
Figure 9.4  Enunciational dynamics in fiction and in science (Latour 1988, 14)
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Conclusions: The conditions at which ANT can 
learn from semiotics still and again
From semiotics, and specifically from Greimassian semiotics, ANT has learned the use of 
various tools – terms, categories and models – enabling the description-analysis of relations. 
Through their use, ANT has learned the ‘insight of relationality.’ Furthermore, by unfolding 
these tools and this insight, ANT has turned out to be itself a semiotics.
Today, ANT can still learn new tools, as well as refined old ones. Indeed, since the 1990s, 
the exchange between ANT and Greimassian semiotics has faded and ANT has stopped 
being up-to-date about other semiotics. Given that the tools previously learned have been 
used only by a limited number of ANT scholars and, though with relevant exceptions, for a 
limited time, besides the new tools, ANT can also learn again the old ones – and actually this 
would be a necessary step in order to learn the new ones.
This chapter has then been less of a showcase of new Greimassian semiotic tools, than a 
refresher of old ones and of the grounds on which the previous learning has been possible.
At the end of this walkthrough, another question can thus be raised: ‘Why has ANT 
stopped learning from semiotics?’ Answering it would not only require another chapter, but 
a further research. 
As for now, I intend to conclude by only touching upon the conditions at which I consider 
ANT can learn still and again from semiotics. Given that the failing of these conditions can-
not but lead to a missed learning, their listing provides a first outline for a possible answer to 
the question emerged here in the conclusion.
ANT can learn from other semiotics still and again if 
1  it is interested in description – if it is actually ‘descriptive’ (Law 2008: 141). If ANT is 
mainly interested in other activities like developing concepts, theorising, speculating, 
providing empirical examples for specific concepts, then, there is not much to re/learn, 
since semiotic tools are not meant to enable these activities – at least not directly;
2  it is interested in describing in detail relations, or, in Latour’s terms, ‘associations,’ of any 
kind, included those ‘out of which [actors are] made’ (Latour 2005: 233);
3  it provides, within its architecture, relevant room and autonomy for the methodological 
level, a ‘middle ground’ (Latour 2000: 252), in between the theoretical-conceptual and 
the empirical ones, around which ANT, like other STS approaches, ‘continuous[ly] 
variat[e]’ ( Jensen 2014). Indeed, the methodological level is the one on which semiotics 
mainly operates and from which it addresses the other levels (Figure 9.5);
4  it considers, within the methodological level, not only data-gathering methods, sum-
marised by ‘follow the actors themselves’ and ‘generalized symmetry,’ which have al-
ways characterised ANT as more of a methodology than of a theory (Law 2008: 141; 
Mol 2010: 253; Sayes 2014: 144), but also the descriptive–analytical methods and tools. 
 Basically, what Latour calls the infralanguage.
Indeed, this methodological aspect of semiotics has been the one that led Latour to learn it at first:
the systematic study of texts in this French tradition became what was imported into an 
American context as ‘Theory.’ While on this side of the Atlantic, I took it as exactly the 
opposite of ‘theory’: as the chance to acquire an empirical method.
(Latour 2016: 468)




 1 But see Muniesa (2015) for an outline of ANT where semiotics is considered; Beetz (2017) and 
Høstaker (2005) for an account of the Greimassian semiotics in Latour’s work; Blok and Elgaard 
(2011) and Schmidgen ([2011] 2015) for a general account of Latour’s work, where semiotics is 
considered; Lenoir (1994) for a critique of Latour’s use of semiotics. 
 2 After Hjelmslev ([1943] 1961: 131), in semiotics, an analysis is considered a description of relations. 
In order to highlight such connection, I will use the two terms together.
 3 Actually, Greimassian semiotics has always tended to describe-analyse configurations beyond lan-
guage and literary texts, which also resulted in early forms of ANT (Greimas [1972] 1995: 73). Since 
the 1990s, such extended use of semiotics’ tools has been systematic (Floch [1995] 2000; Marrone 
2002).
 4 Denis and Pontille (2010) recover Akrich’s proposal.
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It is something that is often forgotten: ANT is partially born from an interest in written 
traces, and some of its main roots are deeply embedded in anthropology of writing, es-
pecially Jack Goody’s work (Goody, 1977, 1986; Goody & Watt, 1963). Indeed, mapping 
sociotechnical networks largely amounts to following small traces of paperwork, marks on 
sheets of paper, specific words in documents (e.g. authors names, citations), files, minutes, 
reports, etc. Beyond the scientific literacy as the starting point of ANT’s investigations, 
such a focus on written traces calls for unfolding the utterly graphic quality of modern 
societies.
Our world, namely writing societies (as anthropologists used to put it), is literally saturated 
with traces and written objects. Any human being is constantly defined with birth and death 
certificates, identity papers, school or professional degrees, employment contracts, finger-
prints, property acts, marriage agreement… and of course handwritten signatures. Watches, 
calendars and diaries, clocks, rules and yardsticks, scales… and of course money are also 
crucial in the coordination and synchronisation of actions. Similarly, a contemporary city 
would not exist without its architectural plans and drawings, street plaques, directory signs, 
road markings, shop signs… and of course its map, on both printed and online versions. The 
State itself would be little, if anything at all, without administrative lists, regular population 
census, archives of many kinds, a lot of maps of different scales, resource  inventories… and 
of course national statistics.
In this chapter, I want to acknowledge the basic place of writing in our world by going 
back to ANT’s roots in anthropology of writing. Such a move, I argue, is helpful in better 
understanding, at least, two crucial aspects of the contemporary life that are constantly 
performed and enacted by written traces: Forms of reasoning and modes of governing. 
These practices are commonplace in ANT studies, and the best-known vocabulary used 
by scholars to describe them is one of the ‘immutable mobiles’ (Latour, 1986) and their 
stabilising properties. However, following the developments in anthropology of writing is 
key in unfolding and (re)discovering how far the multiplicity of written traces goes beyond 
immutable mobiles, and gives access to hitherto neglected practices in producing knowledge 
and performing politics.
10
What did we forget about ANT’s 




The materials of writing and cognition
If the borrowings from the anthropology of writing may be various in ANT-inspired studies, 
one gesture is particularly significant: Departing from the usual conception of both writing 
and cognition as a solely intellectual activity. Such a plea for a more open, widened defini-
tion of reasoning oriented ANT’s early investigations towards unexpected and overlooked 
practices.
Inscribing, scribbling, tracing
Latour’s laboratory ethnography (Latour & Woolgar, 1986) shared with Goody’s early work 
(Goody, 1977, 1986; Goody & Watt, 1963) a very specific approach to writing. Driven by the 
will to withdraw from traditional ‘phonetic’ approaches that treat writing only as a linguistic 
phenomenon that mirrors orality, they apprehended writing and, more generally, any graphic 
operation ‘for themselves,’ especially foregrounding properties that are independent of speech. 
In a similar vein, Derrida (1967), another crucial inspiration for this analytical and empirical 
gesture (Lenoir, 1998), constantly argued that the forms and materiality of texts are active, fully 
fledged elements of meaning itself, which cannot be detached from written artefacts.
These assumptions lay foundations for a materialist approach that dramatically reorients 
investigations of writing. Not only could texts and documents be examined from a different 
angle, but writing practices themselves became a worthwhile object to be scrutinised more 
carefully. Among them, Goody famously insisted on the importance of studying the manu-
facture of lists and tables. Making a written list (of goods, of guests, of administrative entities, 
etc.) is both commonplace and a very distinct activity from enumerating items orally. First, 
the list ‘reduces oral complexity to graphic simplicity’ (Goody, 1977, p. 70). Second, as writ-
ing gives a relatively permanent form to words, the listed items are materialised (e.g. traces 
on clay tablets, pigments on papyrus, ink on paper, etc.) and, consequently, can ‘be inspected, 
manipulated and re-ordered in a variety of ways’ (Goody, 1977, p. 76). The shift from the 
auditory evanescence to the visual permanence significantly opens up the ways in which 
written words, and subsequently sentences, can be separated, aggregated and hierarchised. 
Unexpected combinations are thus made possible, sometimes giving rise to the production of 
new categories and distinct classification systems.
More generally, such a materialist approach to writing radically broadens the scope of 
components that can be explored. Beyond the numerous spatial arrangements of sentences 
and words on a scribbled or printed page, it also calls attention for the distinct surfaces and 
the multiple materials involved in writing practices. For instance, after some excursions 
into the bench space of a scientific laboratory at the Salk Institute, Latour and Woolgar in-
sist on the diversity: ‘a large leatherbound book… blank sheets with long lists of figures… 
writing on pieces of paper… numbers on the sides of hundreds of tubes… pencilling large 
numbers on the fur of rats… coloured papertape to mark beakers’ (Latour & Woolgar, 1986, 
p. 48). Taking the materials of writing into consideration brings the heterogeneity of written 
objects to the fore, even within an otherwise circumscribed space like a scientific laboratory.
In this regard, the radical ANT gesture, especially in laboratory studies, resided in break-
ing with the focus on the sole ‘content’ of scientific texts. The attention towards theoretical 
statements and discovery claims, cherished by the previous science studies tradition, was 
considerably redirected to a wide range of scribbling and writing practices. The main notion 
that drove this movement was that of ‘inscription,’ directly borrowed from Derrida. A very 
generic term, inscriptions can be written words, of course, but also ‘all traces, spots, points, 
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histograms, recorded numbers, spectra, peaks, and so on’ (Latour & Woolgar, 1986, p. 88). 
Comprising a multiplicity of graphic expression, the notion is ideally suited for describing 
the detailed process of fact production in science, from the very first inscriptions meticu-
lously traced at the workbench to articles published in scientific journals. More extensively, it 
is particularly fruitful to investigate how far a workplace – being a laboratory, a legal court or 
a department in any organisation – is itself ‘a hive of writing activity’ (1986, p. 51) in which 
numerous written objects proliferate.
The careful attention to inscriptions driven by a materialist approach calls for expanding the 
investigation of writing practices even further. As soon as the aim is to repopulate the manu-
facture of the written world, going beyond inscribed marks, traces and words becomes obvi-
ous. Therefore, machines and technologies naturally come into the picture. The printing press, 
and the reproduction of documents at a large scale it introduced, is one of the more manifest 
examples (Eisenstein, 1983). This is also the case of the various ‘inscription devices’ ( Latour & 
Woolgar, 1986, p. 51), such as a mass spectrometer or a bioassay that transforms pieces of mat-
ter into written traces of all kinds (dots, curves, figures, etc.). Likewise, staplers, paperclips, 
post-it notes, coloured folders with rubber band, computers, printers and other office furniture 
are the key in the daily production of written objects in many work settings (Gardey, 2008). 
Widening the inquiry to these literary technologies is an important gesture to get free from 
the usual image attributed to writing. Rather than a single, individualist act performed by a 
few exceptional minds, writing appears as a collective performance and an equipped practice.
The heterogeneous components of cognition
Notably inspired by developmental psychology, Goody’s central concern was cognition. 
Writing, Goody (1977, 1986) claimed, has facilitated the development of particular cognitive 
skills due to its different properties from orality, especially its fixity and sturdiness. Materially 
inscribed, signs are made durable and acquire more or less permanency over time. Simulta-
neously, writing goes with a spatial arrangement of information that spurs on diverse cogni-
tive activities such as memory, comparison, computation and ranking. This groundbreaking 
theoretical standpoint confronted a long tradition in social sciences: Instead of presupposing 
essentialist or naturalistic differences between populations’ minds, scholars should consider 
the ‘intellectual technologies’ these populations used.
The materialist exploration of writing as a peculiar ‘intellectual technology’ consider-
ably renewed our understanding of the institutionalisation of scientific objectivity. Shapin 
(1984) notably showed how what he called a ‘literary technology’ (the practice of enabling 
the reader to become a witness of the experimental scene) was designed as part of the early 
experimental programme so as to enlarge the public involved in the generation of authentic 
matters of fact. Similarly, Bazerman (1988) underlined the role of specific writing technol-
ogies (e.g. text formats, reference styles and specialised journals) in the shaping of scientific 
knowledge. This equipment appeared essential to secure some ways of reporting and record-
ing, but also to multiply memory practices and to stabilise modes of reasoning. Eisenstein 
(1983) has famously demonstrated the cognitive role of the printing press in what she called 
an ‘unacknowledged revolution’ in religion and in science. The identical reproduction of 
documents actually revealed the existence of simultaneous distinct versions of a text,  leading 
to comparison with extreme scrutiny for the sake of precision that sometimes resulted in the 
production of unexpected, new knowledge. In a similar vein, by drawing on both Goody’s 
and Eisentein’s contributions, Latour (1986) famously characterised inscriptions in these 
terms: the more immutable, the more powerful.
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Following scientists and technicians in the field and at the workbench, ethnographers also de-
scribed in minute detail the gestures at the core of fact production. Not only were written objects 
found diverse and numerous in workplaces, but they were also handled in many ways. Manip-
ulated, checked, compared, sorted out, compiled, assembled, partially copied from one another, 
such a dance of inscriptions and documents actually made manifest the manufacture of cognition 
with and through written objects. In this step-by-step process, modes of  visualisation – such 
as lists, images, field guides, tables, numbers and curves – proved to be particularly important 
(Lynch & Woolgar, 1990). Cognitive innovation in the realm of scientific reason was thus inves-
tigated as a collective and embodied activity, both deflating the central place of individual genius 
and exalting the significance of ‘thinking with eyes and hands’ (Latour, 1986).
The material aspects of cognition and the role of inscriptions in the concrete forms of 
reasoning are also at the centre of another stream of works that cultivated a constant con-
versation with ANT and anthropology of writing, and go by the labels of distributed cognition 
or situated action. The way Hutchins (1995), Kirsh (1995), Lave (1988) and Suchman (1987) 
accounted for inscriptions and their materials did not oppose to the structuralist linguistic 
view on writing, though, but to cognitive sciences and, more generally, experimental psy-
chology. Written artefacts here, among a larger set of ‘cognitive artifacts’ (Norman, 1991), 
are taken into consideration to demonstrate the externality and the diversity of cognition 
processes which, these authors claimed, should not be studied from a strictly mentalist per-
spective. When observed ‘in the wild’ (Hutchins, 1995), cognition appears to lie on complex 
and hybrid ‘systems’ in which different kinds of material representations are put into circula-
tion. Complementing the early laboratory studies, these works paid attention to the diverse 
material properties of these ‘external’ representations, their spatiality and the various ways 
they equip memory, calculation or computation. Doing so, they set the basis for an ecolog-
ical approach to workplaces in which cognition and knowledge are never fixed and internal 
phenomena, but heterogeneous and sociomaterial processes.
A case study: updating a biomedical database
Shadowing Kelly, I learned how far a hospital is a great setting to illustrate the role of the 
materials of writing and cognition. Kelly was a data management technician involved in the 
updating of a medical database dedicated to the predictive factors for a joint disease, based on 
the monitoring of a cohort of 880 individuals who were willing to be examined once a year 
over the period 1992–2002 (Pontille, 2010). This database assembled different kinds of traces: 
Annual health check X-rays of all painful joints, biological samples (blood serum itself and 
DNA) and a clinical examination conducted through a detailed questionnaire on patients’ 
physical state (e.g. feelings of fatigue, severe pain and ability to move around) and mental 
state (e.g. feelings of being a burden to others and insomnia), as well as their daily activities 
(e.g. work activity, social life, family support and nervous tension).
These various inscriptions had been stacked in a particular room of the hospital depart-
ment where the medical record of each patient was stored in some box files. Although these 
documents seemed well ordered at first sight, I discovered the mess resulting from their live-
liness. Every time a patient attended an annual health check, the nurses and doctors would 
fetch their respective files in order to fill them in. The files, thus, were in a daily circulation 
between the storage room and the rheumatology unit, and over the ten years of patient 
 follow-up, a growing disorder gradually set in.
The first thing Kelly did struck me: She did not carefully read the various written ma-
terials composing the database to be updated. Rather, she sorted each patient’s documents 
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in chronological order in box files, and arranged them in alphabetical order on the shelves. 
Carried around, moved, put in piles, sorted and arranged, the patients’ files were ordered in a 
systematic manner that performed the stabilisation of the working environment. By handling 
and manipulating these files and box, Kelly actually imposed a particular spatial organisation 
on the documents. In doing so, the shelves and the box files constituted a visual memory, 
enabling Kelly to prepare and anticipate future activities: The documents were spatially 
 arranged in a way that facilitates routines in perception and action (Kirsh, 1995).
Therefore, I understood that the handling of the written objects was not purely a manual 
task. Simultaneously, Kelly noticed the sort of files that are part of the database, the dates of the 
health checks or the patients’ names. As a consequence, she became increasingly familiar with 
the range of data that composed the material infrastructure of the medical database. In other 
words, Kelly acquired an intimate knowledge of the informational ecology she had to deal 
with in the next steps: Gradually updating the medical database mainly consisted in reading, 
cross-checking some data, copying a piece of information from one document to another, con-
verting some inscriptions into figures, storing specific documents in a cardboard folder and so 
on. Through such a processual work, Kelly verified the general validity of data and their medi-
cal coherence. In other words, she made sure that these data became reliable scientific informa-
tion, and could be taken as the starting point for articles to be published in specialised journals.
Governing with words and figures
Anthropologists and ANT scholars have not questioned the relationship between writing prac-
tices, written artefacts and cognition in isolation, however. In their accounts, the manipulation 
of lists, the circulation of inscriptions and the reproduction of texts are always tied to concrete 
modes of organising and governing. This is very clear in Logics of writing in which Goody 
(1986) associated specific writing practices with the emergence of modern institutions. It is also 
explicit in Science in Action where Latour (1987) recalled that in the 18th century, the French 
explorer Lapérouse and his team privileged the map in a notebook instead of a map drawn in 
the sand, because the King (Louis XIV) asked them to bring geographical knowledge back to 
Versailles in order to anticipate new commercial journeys. Numerous scholars have pursued 
these reflections, also following Michel Foucault’s invitation to investigate knowledge practices 
and the exercise of power altogether (Foucault, 1978). The role of writing in organisations, and 
notably within governments, has been discussed, essentially, in two apparently opposite direc-
tions. On the one hand, privileging a focus on sturdiness and immutability, scholars described 
the ordering powers of standardised writing. On the other, researchers insisted on the diversity 
and ambiguity of written objects that can be found in organisations and administrations, order-
ing devices and fragile components of lively sociomaterial ecologies. 
Standardisation
Numerous scholars studied organisations, and especially bureaucracies, through the lens of writ-
ing practices and their progressive standardisation. This is notably the case of Chandler (1977), 
who famously foregrounded the role of the emergence of innovative accounting and management 
devices in the dramatic growth of companies during the second half of the 19th century. In his 
view, the ‘managerial revolution’ that made possible such unprecedented development was mostly 
an ‘information revolution’ (Chandler & Cortada, 2003). Firms, especially railroads and telegraph 
companies, faced new challenges and grew new ‘needs’ for precision, notably in their internal 
processes of coordination. This led to a huge amount of innovation that considerably reorganised 
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the forms of communication in organisations, and especially writing. All functionalism left aside, 
a lot of subsequent studies, informed and inspired by ANT, confirmed and complemented this 
narrative, showing how, at the turn of the 20th century, companies and administrations progres-
sively adopted numerous normalised written artefacts (Yates, 1989) and invested in the standard-
isation of writing practices (Gardey, 1999; 2001), structuring in the same trend organisational 
forms, information flows and ordinary work (Agar, 2003; Beniger, 1986).
Scientific management crystallised this formalisation process (Thévenot, 1984). On the 
one side, it expanded the scope and reinforced the role of accounting devices, and more 
generally quantification, in the daily organisation of work (Miller & O’Leary, 1987). On the 
other, it reconfigured organisations as ‘systems,’ rationalising not only every physical gesture 
in factories, but also clerical work within offices, simultaneously drawing on a systematic 
struggle against idiosyncrasies and small talks, considered as ‘informal,’ and thus useless, 
communication ( Jelinek, 1980). Above all, the managerial control of written communica-
tion gave birth to an important movement of mechanisation. Once formalised, clerical work 
could be seen as a trivial matter that did not require real intellectual skills. Some of it (like 
copying) could be taken care of by devices, some other (like typing, or sorting files out) 
could be handled by unqualified employees, who happened to be almost exclusively women 
(Gardey, 2001). These projects of mechanisation were reinforced by the first attempts to 
build computers and the birth of digitisation, during which engineers identified writing and 
reading tasks they considered as already ‘mechanical’ (routines), in order to delegate them to 
machines (Agar, 2003).
In the vocabulary of ANT, these accounts show that writing practices and devices have 
become one of the most powerful ‘tools for managing complexity’ (Callon, 2002). Embody-
ing a ‘political economy of representations’ (Law, 1994, p. 27), they perform a variety of 
‘modes of ordering’ that is at the core of modernity. These studies highlight a general shift 
in this political economy: Since the end of the 19th century, the massive use of standardised 
representations and the circulation of a growing number of immutable mobiles have turned 
administrations and companies into huge centres of calculation, which have been governing 
more and more aspects of our lives. Modern societies have thrived on a pervasive normalised 
writing infrastructure that has grown steadily and yet remained largely unnoticed.
Beyond formality
Though their contributions to the understanding of the history of organisations and gov-
erning practices are decisive, these narratives may lead to a univocal and partial comprehen-
sion of writing practices in organisations. Inscriptions, indeed, are not limited to immutable 
mobiles, and writing practices go beyond formalisation and standardisation. Three aspects 
are particularly missing in the accounts which stick to the ordering properties of writing 
devices: The fragmentation of writing infrastructures, the dynamic and uncertain processes 
that concretely ensure the circulation of written artefacts and, more generally, the disorder 
that comes with writing, even when it is used as an ordering technology.
First of all, governing practices themselves never take the form of a perfect panopticon, the 
all-seeing surveillance device imagined by Bentham and discussed by Foucault. Far from being 
totalising enterprises that draw on manifold standardised inscriptions to build an exhaustive 
representation of the world, they are always situated, partial and selective. For instance, gov-
erning a city such as Paris on a daily basis goes through the multiplication of what Latour & 
Hermant (1998) called ‘oligopticons,’ that is, narrow windows giving an always fragmented and 
incomplete view of urban reality. Each view is fuelled with specialised inscriptions (concerning 
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water, electricity, telephony, traffic, meteorology, town planning, etc.) that are never fully in-
teroperable and do not mechanically allow to zoom in or zoom out the city as a whole.1
Beyond the usual discourses about the seamless and transparent circulation of informa-
tion, various studies emphasised the processual and dynamic nature of writing practices ded-
icated to organising and governing. The procedures shaping the information dissemination, 
as formalised and standardised as they may be, are never straightforward. Rather, a meticu-
lous work made of verification, control and validation is constantly performed. The case of 
law, as studied by Latour (2009) and other in ANT-inspired studies, is particularly telling in 
this regard: Far from a mere and fluid flow of documents from one step to another in a legal 
procedure, making a case goes with numerous minute writing acts that articulate, in practical 
terms, a personal situation into a petition to the judge, a claim into a file, an opinion into a 
legal decision. Following the dynamics of inscriptions actually revealed the crucial place they 
take in the concrete passage and adjustable constitution of law (Fraenkel et al., 2010; Latour, 
2009). Similarly, the daily performance of regulations goes through constant adjustments 
and realignments that concretely make possible the mobility of artefacts that are never as 
immutable as they may appear from farther away (Weller, 2008).
As soon as the activities are carefully described, writing practices no longer appear as op-
erations of formalisation mostly, if not exclusively, directed towards a univocal process of 
rationalisation. Their extreme variety comes to the fore, bringing to light the messy side of 
the writing production process and the disorder it unavoidably provokes (Hull, 2012; Kafka, 
2012). This is also the case with numbers, which are generally considered as intrinsic vehicles 
for accurate representations. Instead, the role of false numbers in diverse documents and pro-
fessional settings is the key, as temporary or conditional devices enabling to proceed by trial 
and errors, to give room to indecision for a little while, or to make forecasts (Lampland, 2010).
Surely, city landscapes are perfect sites for the appearance of unexpected urban in-
scriptions, alongside the official public lettering displayed to organise distinct places (e.g. 
street names plates and road markings) and to manage distinct flux (e.g. directory signs and 
 real-time information). Among these alternative graphic manifestations, the multiplicity of 
inscriptions and sometimes disruptive written objects (such as banners, stamps, posters and 
stickers) accompanying public demonstrations is commonplace (Artières & Rodak, 2008), 
even though these demonstrations may be, to some extent, authorised and supervised by mu-
nicipal officials. By contrast, graffiti is particularly interesting in that its sudden appearance, 
in terms of sites, size and frequency, cannot be anticipated and controlled. On the other hand, 
it simultaneously gives rise to graffiti removal policies and dedicated daily practices in large 
cities around the world (Austin, 2001; Shobe & Banis, 2014).
As Law (1994) showed early on, these two sides of writing, ordering technology and 
fragile and messy practices, are not as paradoxical as they may seem. The situated writing 
operations that take place in organisations and administrations show how much governing 
goes through the circulation of swarming inscriptions and draws on disordered workplaces.
A case study: verifying files in a bank
Observing as ordinary and arid, a process as files verification is a great way to apprehend the 
role of writing infrastructures in organisations, while steering clear of all formal reductionism. 
I had the opportunity to conduct an ethnography in a workplace dedicated to such activity in 
the banking sector (Denis, 2011). There, employees were mandated to scrupulously verify the 
absence and presence of pieces of information in documents that had been filled in by com-
mercial operators and their customers in order to open a bank account or activate new services. 
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Their offices were surprisingly messy, populated by all kinds of written artefacts: Sticky notes, 
loose sheets of all size, copies, folders, binders, corporate flyers and so on. This overwhelming 
presence of inscriptions (on desks, shelves and even the floor) was also manifest on the screens 
before which every employee was sitting: Various kinds of software were constantly running, 
and numerous ‘windows’ were open simultaneously. The movement that was constantly trans-
forming this bewildering landscape was itself particularly intriguing. Files were displaced every 
day, notes circulated from one desk to another before ending down in the trash bin, new ones 
were created every five minutes or so, binders were open, filled in or emptied out and so on.
What also struck me was the volatility of files themselves, which proved way less stable 
and rigid than I first imagined. In fact, once on the desk of an employee, the first thing a cus-
tomer file was subjected to was disassembly. Folders were open, paperclips and staples were 
removed, sheets were displaced and the pieces were reorganised all over the desk. Above all, 
after being verified, the pieces were reassembled in a new file that could sensibly differ from 
the previous one. Some documents might have been pulled out, whilst new ones (printed 
versions of screenshots, for instance) might have been added. Throughout its verification, the 
content and shape of the file changed more or less dramatically.
Parts of the verification process also consisted in providing graphical additions to some 
documents. For instance, when the employees discovered dubious blanks in files, instead of 
simply dismissing the guilty file, they would generally manage to fill in the form by themselves. 
Interestingly, the documents were also modified during the mere action of reading, which, I 
understood, was not a matter of eyes only, and implied the use of pencils and highlighting pens. 
During the verification process, the bank employees were adding marks in the margins, under-
lining or highlighting words and figures, progressively incorporating new inscriptions to every 
form, loose sheet or copy they handled. These transformations were not only ways of easing 
and securing the reading of the files. They changed the very intelligibility of every document, 
which would bear markers for their next reading and traces of their own verification.
Instead of going against data processing and files verification, I rapidly understood that 
such heterogeneous and volatile writings, overcrowded screens and desks drowned under 
papers were an essential part of the ecology from which data emerged and in which they 
circulated. So were the physical components of files, such as staples, folders, paperclips and 
tabs, as well as the colour of ink, the paper formats and weights, and so on. They seemed to be 
the very conditions under which files could pursue their journey through the company. Mess 
and labour are therefore crucial dimensions of the daily functioning of centres of calculation, 
preventing the circulation of immutable mobiles from seizing up.
Conclusion: writing infrastructures and the politics of accounts
From mundane traces to official documents, from marks on paper to data: By recalling the 
relationships between ANT and anthropology of writing, this chapter aimed at redirecting 
attention towards the manifold writing infrastructures that ground modern societies.  Several 
aspects call for this ‘rediscovery’ of writing practices, as we witness the so-called data revo-
lution and the neopositivism that seems to go with it. The invisiblisation of work is one of 
them. Openness and transparency put to the fore certain properties of data that neglect the 
frictions their circulation generates (Edwards et al., 2011), and deny the need for most of data 
work and workers (Denis & Goëta, 2017). Anthropology of writing invites us to pay atten-
tion to what this new era of information automatisation owes to what happened in firms and 
administrations at the turn of the 20th century. Identifying these continuities will help to 
question the moral economy of work contemporary centres of calculations carry.
109
Did we forget about anthropology of writing?
Another aspect concerns the politics of facts. Early on, Dorothy Smith called attention 
to the ‘documentary reality’ that characterises contemporary societies, and urged to ques-
tion the apparent neutrality of written accounts that populates our lives. While taking the 
appearance of universal facts, she explained, these formal accounts, as mundane as they may 
appear, are always the product of specific organisations and tailored for their specific needs 
(Smith, 1974). Since then, a lot of scholars raised these concerns, investigating, for instance, 
the politics of categories (Bowker & Star, 1999), highlighting the role of quantification and 
accounting devices in the construction of reality and its corollary: The silencing of certain 
entities and problems (Carruthers & Espeland, 1991; Espeland, 1993; Miller & O’Leary, 1987; 
Porter, 1996), or more recently discussing the generalisation of audit practices ( Strathern, 
2000). Thick descriptions of the situated production and circulation of written accounts of 
all kinds, including data, directly contribute to such a gesture of de-naturalisation, notably 
by surfacing the most mundane and processual dimensions of the documentary construc-
tion of reality. Such de-naturalisation should not be understood as an overall critique or 
deconstruction of that reality, though. As it has been witnessed in the case of the virulent 
debates around climate change, surfacing the concrete conditions though which written 
accounts are generated may aim at reinforcing trust in institutional procedures (Edwards, 
2010;  Latour, 2004, 2017).
To end this chapter and illustrate this last point, let us go back to the manufacture of scientific 
texts. Attribution technologies are crucial in the shaping of scholarly accounts, even though 
largely under-problematised. In academia, evaluation is firmly linked to authorship that is reg-
ularly referred to as the primary ‘currency’ for hiring and advancement (Biagioli, 1998; Pontille, 
2004, 2016). And the myth of individual excellence is mostly made effective by attaching one’s 
name to scientific publications. Furthermore, with the use of citation counts and author-level 
metrics in various research assessment exercises, scientific names have been progressively turned 
into ‘units’ to be counted. This trend considerably masks the institutional, economic and polit-
ical contexts in which research is actually performed, by totally disregarding and belittling the 
collective work done. Against the never-ending competition for the sake of individual excel-
lence, one could promote the systematic use of collective names in publishing. Alongside the 
shared custom in high-energy physics (Galison, 2003), some initiatives are already available in 
the literature (e.g. The SIGJ2 Writing Collective, 2012; Collectif Onze, 2016).
As part of this politics of accounts, the present chapter itself suggests another option. The 
author-in-the-text is ‘Jérôme D. Pontille’ whereas the author-in-the-flesh is twofold: Jérôme 
Denis and David Pontille.2 Since the end of the 1990s, we have used the attachment of our 
two civil names as a way ‘to diffract’ our own authorship, following Haraway (1996), and to 
disrupt the emphasis of single individuals performed by most of research assessment frame-
works. As the editors of the ANT Companion were concerned with two different chapters 
bearing the same name(s), we created a fictional author as a way to pursue the diffraction 
process. Such a gesture is perfectly in line with the semiotic foundation of anthropology 
of writing and ANT (see the second footnote in Latour, 1988), which both insisted on the 
generative process of writing practices that bring new entities to existence and participate 
in their maintenance. The different fieldworks mobilised in this chapter come from either 
Denis’ or Pontille’s, or Denis and Pontille’s investigations. 
Notes
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As ANT is getting undone, can 
Pragmatism help us re-do it?
Noortje Marres
Actor-network theory (ANT) has been a giver of many gifts. It has produced new analytic 
vocabulary, research protocols, many memorable slogans and dictums, and a distinctive intel-
lectual style. It has identified future directions of travel for thought. It has shown philosophers 
and ethnographers alike that there is a way of being in a field while not being of the field 
(Kelly, 2012). ANT has taken the famous British talent for self-depreciation a step further, 
by turning it into an embodied research practice, as in the case of the celebrated sociologist 
of technology describing his meeting with a company director in a deserted reception area 
while slouching uncomfortably in a chair that was too low (Law, 1994). However, as the 
 German social and media theorist Erhard Schuttpelz put it rather brutally, ‘all concepts are 
going downhill all the time.’ I’m afraid that this extends to methods, and that the concepts 
and methods of ANT are no exception, and in these notes, I would like to sketch out briefly 
why I think ANT is not escaping this harsh but possibly fair fate, and what we might do about 
the inevitably challenging repercussions. However, it is also appropriate to note here that, in a 
variation on ANT’s many slogans, there can be ‘no re-composition without de- composition!’ 
My charting of the undoing of ANT in this chapter is undertaken purposefully, with the 
express aim of identifying tasks for a redoing of ANT, which I will list in the conclusion.
Un- and redoing in ANT and Pragmatism
Indeed, one of the most generative, and possibly enduring, set of terms offered by ANT is 
that of ‘composition’ and ‘re-composition.’ The idea, briefly put, is that something must get 
undone in order for it to be done. This does not only extend to the associative coupling 
which today can surely be called Latour (2005) speak – to assemble is to reassemble – but 
also to specific modalities of enquiry – or knowledge practice: To research is to re-search 
 (Rogers, 2013), and to invent is to reinvent (Lury and Wakeford, 2012). Crucially, further-
more, the undoing of things in order for them to be redone, ANT style, does not only happen 
in spectacular moments, in periods of the so-called great transformations; composition and 
recomposition is the way of many practices, institutions and formations most of the time. 
The double movement of un- and redoing then does not only signal that an epoch-defining 
rupture may be unfolding but can equally indicate that a mundane process is underway. 
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This latter insight is central to the intellectual challenge that ANT poses to reifications and 
naturalisations of all sorts, to engrained habits of thought and action across the domains 
of science, politics, religion, economy and society, where it is still the default to presume 
the autonomous existence of entities (reality, the people, god, society, etc.), and that their 
 legitimacy – their right to endure – is predicated on a pregiven autonomous existence. (This, 
in turn, has the consequence that many institutions today continue to be heavily invested 
in bracketing or even denying the ways in which the aforementioned entities are marked 
or even informed by practices, technologies or environments.) For ANT, by contrast, the 
autonomy of any entity is best treated as an accomplishment, one likely to depend on sup-
porting arrangements and support acts, which are not just ‘social‘ but include environmental 
entities previously categorised as nature, and which, when they cease to be operative, herald 
the undoing of the autonomy of said entity, and possibly of said entity itself, which will then 
require a redoing of some sort.1
In insisting in this way on de- and recomposition as a formative process that occurs across 
domains, ANT places itself in direct continuity with Pragmatism, the American philosoph-
ical and sociological tradition2: Like ANT, early 20th-century philosophers like Charles 
Peirce, William James and John Dewey had as one of their principal objectives to challenge 
naturalism and reification, and it was to this end that they developed a relational  ontology – 
briefly put, the proposition that processes of association are critical to existence and the 
coming into existence of things. Like ANT, moreover, John Dewey (1938) identified ‘prob-
lematisation’ as a defining operator of these processes, not only in knowledge, but also in 
politics, morality and art. The undoing of entities – the loosening of associations – in order 
for them to be redone – for different associations to enter into the making of said entities – is 
not a mechanical process, but a profoundly risky one, one that puts entities and their relations 
at stake. As John Dewey (1908) put it, in the problematic situation, a ‘conflict of tendencies’ 
makes itself felt, one that can only be resolved by ‘changing conditions.’ To which ANT 
added: ...and by bringing different entities, and the possibility of their existence, into the 
mix. For both Pragmatism and ANT, problematisation is not some clean, authored process, 
in which to define or frame a problem is always already to render it solvable, but an unsettling 
occasion, on which the appearance on the scene of an entity that was previously disregarded 
unsettles the existing roles, relations, environments and capacities of agents and/or categories 
(they are not acting, not ‘in control,’ not having it covered), and necessitates their requalifica-
tion. While most of this was already contained in Dewey’s concept of the problematic situa-
tion, ANT added the multiplication of entities as a key dimension of this process. In studies 
of technoscience, the invention of biological, military and moral entities – the vaccine, the 
bomb and the pregnancy test – problematisation was shown to operate not only on roles, 
relations, environments and capacities of actors, but to enable the coming into being of new 
entities. 
Even if I got to know ANT before I started reading American Pragmatism, the former 
for me is in many ways a redoing of the latter, with some important twists. Much can be 
said at this point, but what makes ANT most decisively different from Pragmatism, in 
my view, above and beyond its aforementioned commitment to variable ontology – the 
possibility of new entities coming into existence – is its commitment to heterogeneity, 
to heterogeneous composition, and the heterogenisation of domains. This can be loosely 
summed up as the insight that most things that matter arise out of association of entities 
deriving from diverse domains – science and politics, medicine and religion, engineering 
and culture, the home and the street. Some of ANT’s most well-known slogans point in 
this direction: Science is politics by other means (Latour, 1993); engineering is sociology by 
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other means (Latour, 1996). In ANT, it becomes clear that an associationist ontology, one 
which posits ongoing de- and recomposition, if consistently pursued, does not only unsettle 
institutional investments in naturalism and reification within different domains, but equally 
challenges institutional boundaries between domains, such as between science and politics, 
society and technology. If we pursue processes of association, including dis- and reassoci-
ation, we end up, not only with recognition of the hybrid character of much that exists in 
this world, but also with an insight into the ongoing reality and generative capacities of 
boundary-crossings.
To be sure, the notion that adopting an associationist ontology means pursuing or even 
affirming boundary-crossing is not unfamiliar to Pragmatism: Dewey (1991/1927) famously 
wrote that industry gives rise to new types of associations ‘which break existing forms.’ 
Still, for Pragmatists like Dewey, situations are ultimately containable within bounded 
conditions, as problem-solving follows problematisation as surely as night follows day. The 
moment in which the endurance of things and relations are put at stake – the moment of 
 problematisation – in Pragmatism is a passing moment, and one, moreover, that can be as-
signed a designated place in a cycle of enquiry: It is at the beginning, as the problematicness 
of a problematic situation first becomes apparent, that ‘a conflict of tendencies’ makes itself 
felt, or ‘something seems to be missing’ (Dewey, 1908). In the Deweyian schema presented 
in the Logic of Enquiry, however, at the end of the cycle of enquiry – or mobilisation, 
or creation  – humpty dumpty will have been put back together again.3 Which is to say, 
 Dewey’s problematic situation had inscribed into it the expectation that decomposition will 
and should be followed by recomposition. ANT’s notion of hybridisation points towards a 
dynamic that is more complex, one where entanglement renders the imposition of boundar-
ies ever more challenging, and the ambivalence of some of ANT’s proponents about precisely 
this notion of hybridisation suggests that they do not have Dewey’s confidence on this point.
Even if ANT introduced the proposition of hybrid networks, and later, heterogeneous 
assemblages, much work conducted under this banner is very much like Pragmatism in its 
commitment to contain the moment of problematisation. ANT adopted from Dewey the 
idea of enquiry as cycle, and ANT, too, boxed in problematisation in a ‘first phase’ – the 
moment of the opening up of an existing proposition, say the combustion engine (Callon, 
1980) – to be superseded by a ‘next phase’ of translation and then stabilisation of the new 
network. It’s one reason why Latour’s ‘We’ve never been modern’ remains an important 
book. Here, problematisation is shown to exceed efforts to contain it, not just on the institu-
tional level – which Dewey recognised with his point noted earlier about the need to break 
existing forms – but also on the ontological level: In Latour’s account, problematisation is the 
operator of a process of entanglement, as connections between distributed entities turn out 
to proliferate from the moment of problematisation onwards (‘the climate is changing’; or in 
a contemporary example, ‘AI is changing how institutions think’), gaining the capacity to 
disrupt established categories (there is nature, here is society; here is technology; there is de-
mocracy and the rule of law, etc.). Hybrids prove ever harder to contain. The recomposition 
or renewal of categories will leave these very categories transformed, as they are undeniably 
and indelibly marked by the boundary-crossings of their constituent entities. 
However, it seems to me that here we reach a fork in the road and a path not taken, 
at least by ANT. Most of its proponents are not that interested in pursuing notions of 
 boundary-crossing, the unsettling of presumptions of agency or the renewal of categories as 
entailing their transformation. Some of the most well-known inheritors of ANT, today, are 
located in the social studies of markets, digital media studies and in urban and architectural 
research, and in each of these cases, ANT is arguably deployed in order to elucidate a bounded 
115
Can Pragmatism help us re-do ANT?
domain. More precisely, this inheritance of ANT – that its successful uptake takes the form 
of the renewal of sub-disciplines – suggests that domains and methodologies must be clearly 
bounded in order for them to receive the ANT treatment). The further elaboration of ANT as 
a methodology of heterogeneous mapping, and as an agenda of heterogenisation, seems des-
tined to be undertaken from a located, and to an extended ‘domain specific’ vantage point.4 
As the authors of the 1999s volume on the aftermath of ANT were clearly aware, ANT, as a 
more general approach or ‘logic of enquiry,’ is unlikely to escape the logic of de- and recom-
position. Without further ado, I therefore would like to briefly discuss how I think ANT is 
being undone today and how it could, perhaps, be redone. In doing so, I will also touch on 
the few points of similarity and difference between ANT and Pragmatism noted earlier. For 
the sake of convenience, I will concentrate on three specific undoings of ANT as a general 
approach, each of which has to do with the resurfacing of categories, both  empirically – in 
the world – and methodologically – as problems for research – that ANT claimed to have put 
to rest: (1) Interpretation is back. (2) Society is back. (3) Epistemology is back. 
ANT’s undoings: interpretation, society and epistemology
One of the legacies of ANT is its appetite for neologism, its commitment to replace familiar 
terms from the sociological and philosophical lexicon with new ones: Collective for society, 
trace for data, and actant for actor and object. These attempts at substitution entailed the ban-
ishment of certain key categories, including the three listed in this section title. I would like 
to propose here that these terms are ready to be reactivated, or have already been reactivated. 
This clearly puts me at risk of making a megalomaniac argument.5 If I think this is worth it, it 
is because I am strongly, and increasingly stubbornly, convinced that some core assumptions 
of ANT – not least the notion that it is possible for researchers to ‘follow traces,’ and that 
this does not involve or require buying into any given ‘theory,’ at least not initially – have 
lost some of their efficacy, and even, are ceasing to be tenable. And, more importantly, that 
facing this challenge – that our propositions are going downhill, to speak with Schuttpelz, 
today possibly even more so than yesterday – is critical if we, or others, are to get some-
where with the task of redoing ANT in the face of its undoings. The challenge or danger is 
as follows: Each of the three key words identified in my short but heavy list earlier has been 
shown, by ANT and Pragmatism, to lead away from associationist ontology into a split world 
( dualisms!), where it is all too easy to succumb to reification. Keeping this danger in the front 
of our minds should then also help us to keep what is to be gained from the redoing of ANT 
firmly on the horizon. 
Interpretation is back
Earlier, I defined ANT as an associationist ontology, but the approach is probably best known 
for its proposal to extend agency to non-humans, and its commitment to include objects, in-
frastructures and environments as active elements in social life. One important consequence 
of this, and one with which many anthropologists and some sociologists have taken issue, was 
the bracketing, in ANT, of the role of interpretation in social life, as well as in social research. 
ANT qualifies humans and non-humans as actants: They leave their trace in the world not 
through expression (‘what they say’), but by way of their actions (‘what they do’). And the 
role of ANT itself was not to offer interpretation, but to assemble traces into descriptions or 
accounts. However, one of the defining issues in the area of science, technology and society, 
today, precisely concerns interpretation, or more precisely, the reworking of the boundary 
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between interpretation and action. As computation has emerged as a defining element in 
technological and scientific infrastructures, issues of intelligibility are once again in the fore-
ground. Contemporary debates about bias are a case in point. In recent years, algorithms 
have been exposed as discriminatory, as they amplify the racist and sexist assumptions latent 
in the data from which they learn to detect patterns, such as databases recording police arrests 
(Eubanks, 2018), while in science the allegation of bias is treated by some as a ‘cheap’ trick 
deployed by subalterns who are trying to get in by policitising science, and in so doing debase 
the value of knowledge.6 
In some respects, today’s debates about bias seem highly susceptible to ANT treatment:
‘bias’ tends to be defined as an attribute of an actor (be it human or non-human), or an 
effect of an analytic operation, and both these conceptions of bias are highly reductive, as 
they tempt us to disregard the process by which bias emerges from relations between machines 
and humans, and many other legal, environmental, moral entities, besides. However, at the 
same time, an understanding of these relations in terms of ‘actants,’ as ANT would propose, 
does not enable us to grasp the problematic denoted as ‘bias’ either: It is rather the labelling 
of actors that is at issue here (Becker, 1963; Hacking, 1986). The deliberately thin categories 
of actant and trace are too ephemeral if the aim is to express the normative effect that comes 
with the negation of difference/the other.7 To get at the latter, we need to follow through the pro-
duction of bias as an interpretative process. 
In the wake of controversies about bias, a seemingly ANT-like challenge surfaces: Do we 
blame society, or science and technology for these discriminatory effects? Surely, these con-
troversies provide opportunities to point out that it must be both, that associations between 
humans and machines produce at least some of these discriminatory effects? ANT certainly 
has something important to contribute to these debates insofar as it compels us to widen the 
range of possible answers beyond the binary, to say either both or neither. It can show us the 
limits of an understanding of the politics of technology that treats bias as either subjective 
attribute or an objective effect. The problem is that the ANT manoeuvre of letting the hy-
brid emerge – it’s both! – does not appear sufficient to account for this type of problematic 
situation: It is not only on the level of association between humans and non-humans, but from a 
dynamic of interaction between entities and categories that problematic effects arise here. To say 
that bias emerges from hybrid networks doesn’t articulate the problem. Pointing to network formation 
between entities, or even, the situated enactment of entities, does not quite get us there. It 
does not really allow us to specify the process by which actors qualify their relations to others 
through the application of categories. To uncover that kind of operation on alterity – and by 
extension diversity – as something that is negated or affirmed, amplified or disavowed, we 
need to recover the qualities of interpretative process, the process by which a category gains 
a hold on an entity. This relative blind spot of ANT for interpretative effects has long been 
highlighted in feminist science studies (Leigh Star, 1990) but today’s digital forms of circula-
tion enable significantly more interactive and amplificatory interpretative circuits, requiring 
renewed engagement with this process and their effects.
The social is back
This brings us to the vexed but unescapable issue of the social. ANT is closely associated with 
what others with a taste for ceremonial declarations called the ‘Death of the Social’ (Rose, 
Baudrillard) and for which more constructively and/or creatively minded scholars minted 
other terms: the post-social (Knorr-Cetina), the more-than-human (Braun and Whatmore). 
In Latour’s provocative appropriation of Tatcher, ‘there is no such thing as society.’ Today, 
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however, at least from where I am writing in the UK, the social seems to be very much back 
on the agenda. As Will Davies (2015) noted, the last years have seen a proliferation of new 
‘socials,’ as the label social is being slapped onto a variety of technical or commercial sound-
ing propositions, from social media, to social innovation, social technology, social market-
ing, social bonds, social enterprise, social design, social listening and so on. To be sure, many 
of these new socials prove to be all too thin labels covering over a proposition that has much 
more to do with technology than with society: To add ‘social’ in practice often means to dis-
place services away from public institutions and into alternative and – oh irony – hybrid ar-
chitectures, realised with the aid of a mix of public and private funding, and more often than 
not involving digital platforms (for a more detailed discussion, see Marres and Gerlitz, 2018). 
In other words, the social in this vocabulary becomes an near-synonym of the displacement 
of the facilitation of ‘togetherness‘ from a public responsibility to a profit-making activity, 
and as such pretty much means the opposite of what social policy, social housing, etc., used to 
mean in the 1960s. However, if we probe deeper, it becomes clear that ‘sociality’ is not only 
a public-facing label but equally denotes a methodology. As Kieron Healy, Bernard Rieder 
and Wendy Chun have forcefully reminded us, sociological methodology – from Simmel’s 
triadic closure and Merton’s homofily – has crucially informed the methods materialised in 
the ‘new’ social innovation paradigm (for a discussion, see Marres, 2017).
What does this mean for ANT? At the very least, it means that rejection of the very term 
(‘social’) has become unviable as an empirical strategy: The rise to prominence of social tech-
nologies clearly falls within the domain of study that ANT was designed, lest we forget, to 
elucidate: Science, technology and innovation. However, arguably more challenging is that 
the proposition of social technology – whether or not we find it credible or acceptable – is 
threatening to undo some of the propositions of early ANT, not least the notion of the ‘lab-
oratization of society.’ In early work by Latour, Callon and Law, the extension of scientific 
infrastructures beyond the laboratory was assumed to make society more like science. How-
ever, when we consider how distinctively social methodologies are being operationalised 
in technological and analytical architectures across society today, it becomes clear that the 
opposite effects may equally arise. As platforms operate on the basis of liking and friending, 
social life becomes more like ‘society‘ as imagined by sociologists: Preoccupied with reputa-
tion, pursuing the accumulation of social capital. Laboratisation does not make social life re-
semble a laboratory, but is resulting in the reformatting of activities in social sciences’ image 
(reputation as currency, anyone?). However, at the point where we can see how the laborat-
isation thesis is being unsettled today, we can learn something important from Pragmatism: 
One of the lasting contributions of John Dewey has been to insist that experimentalism does 
not just denote a scientific paradigm, that it does not just belong to the sciences (Marres, 
and Stark, forthcoming). It is equally an approach in politics, morality and aesthetics. As the 
British novelist Joanna Kavenna puts it: ‘If you’re uncertain you will test all the parameters. 
If you’re certain you will protect the citadel. The former is where things can shift because 
you have tested all the possibilities.’8 The proliferation of experimental propositions across 
society and culture indicates not simply that the realm of science is being extended. They 
may equally denote the growing resonance of experimental traditions from literature, the 
arts and politics. 
Epistemology is back
ANT has been closely associated with the ontological turn, the move – very briefly put – of 
locating entities and processes first on the plane of existence, and only then on the plane 
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of knowledge. But clever readers and authors of ANT were quick to point out that it’s 
not that straightforward. ANT is not existentialism. When you try doing so in relation to 
an actual example, it turns out to be really hard to separate knowing from existing, and 
that, indeed, became ANT’s point (as indeed, it was Pragmatism’s before that). Never-
theless, ANT joined fellow travellers like the philosopher Richard Rorty in embracing 
a deflationary approach to theories of knowledge (Lynch, 2013). Actor-network theorists 
have been very unforgiving about epistemology; it was and long remained one of their 
primary targets, coming right after Durkheimian sociology, and for a younger generation 
of actor-network theorists seemed mostly irrelevant, as other settings, from parliament to 
architecture studios, took the place of research and development laboratories as favoured 
research sites. Early ANT had sought to undo epistemology by dissolving its foundational 
problems, according to the following recipe: (a) Identify a general problem of epistemology 
(how do we access reality?); (b) empiricise it – in other words, turn it into a research-eable 
problem – by translating it into a phenomenon that could be observed ethnographically, 
in a field site and then, (c) make the philosophical problem disappear by respecifying it in 
practical terms. Following this recipe, in its more adventurous moments, ANT sought to 
dissolve the great foundational problems of epistemology: There is no ‘gap between subject 
and object.’
I’m afraid this has reasons that would require a book of its own, but today it would be 
a mistake to attempt to make such foundational problems simply disappear. How do we 
know? How does the public know? Instead, these questions must be asked again and again, 
and can’t be asked often enough. The rise of fake news and growing evidence of attempts at 
opinion manipulation online has put the normative question of the validity of knowledge 
claims, above and beyond the empirici-sable question of relevance, back on the agenda: 
Deception and duplicity abound in today’s digital architectures, demonstrating the need for 
the identification not just of sources that are active, topical and engaged (the measurement 
of relevance in which search engines excelled), but the determination of validity conditions 
for knowledge claims (Bounegru, Marres and Gray, 2018). Campaigns against knowledge, in 
particular public knowledge, have too many allies today, and it seems unlikely that these can 
be satisfactorily dealt with by a strategy of deflation.
But here, too, Pragmatism can come to the rescue: For intellectuals like Dewey, the 
objective was never deflation. While his principal target was indeed epistemology, and 
most of all, the intolerance of doubt that epistemology was used to justify, his strategy was 
never to abandon the valuation of knowledge as a normative project: Pragmatisms’ project 
was to re-construct the problems of philosophy. They used methods of re-specification, and 
highlighted the relational and situational character of even the most seemingly abstract 
phenomena and processes, as a way not of collapsing but of requalifying problems of knowl-
edge, not in order to make epistemology disappear (deflate it), but in order to relocate them 
in relation to life, and, thus, to transform our understanding of the relation between the 
problems of knowledge and the problems of the world, and of society. They insisted that the 
distance between these different types of problems is often smaller than philosophers and 
sociologists, and scholars and ‘people’ – those committed to abstract knowledge and those 
committed to ‘keeping it real’ – like to believe. To re-specify problems of epistemology 
in field settings does not mean that empirical research can take the place of epistemology. 
Rather, the pragmatists were the precursors of empirical philosophy (Mol, 2000). Compo-
sition and recomposition, in Pragmatism, denote not only a process of recombinant asso-
ciation between humans and non-humans, but equally a methodology for the valuation of 
abstract entities, like truth.
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Conclusion
These notes are brief and sketchy, but the point I am edging towards is that of an experi-
mental approach to social and cultural enquiry.9 Both Pragmatism and ANT sensitised us to 
new ways in which representing and intervening (Hacking, 1983) are combined in societies 
‘marked by the invention of science and technology’ to use Isabelle Stengers’s helpful phrase. 
The process of getting to know the world and changes in existing conditions in the world 
are intimately connected, this is what the concept ‘the problematic situation‘ tells us, and 
is signalled by the twin notions of de- and recomposition. However, as Pragmatism rec-
ognised much earlier on, experimentality extends across domains, it operates not just in the 
domain of science, or innovation, but society too must be invented (Marres, Guggenheim 
and Wilkie, 2018), and so must democracy, and the arts, and culture. Commitment to these 
objectives does not necessarily mean that ‘the world must become more like science.’ The 
question rather is how different the recomposed collective is, can and is allowed to be from 
its previous iteration, and what tests can be organised and/or designed in order to establish 
whether and how this affirmation of diversity ‘holds,’ and can be made to hold, in empirical 
reality. Pursuing this question is likely to require engagement with experimental traditions 
beyond Pragmatism or ANT and indeed beyond the university narrowly defined, bound 
up as it must be with the diversification of the very collective we still like to label ‘research 
community.’ As Bruno Latour brought out his hammer and nails to set to work on ANT’s 
coffin 20 years ago, it may be tempting for the rest of us to leave the burial ritual to him and 
his close collaborators. However, as time passes, I’m more and more convinced that if we are 
to get somewhere in the redoing of ANT, then the job of its undoing must be taken up not 
just by its inventors, but by many more of us.
Notes
 1 In a conversation with Graham Harman (Latour, Harman and Erdélyi, 2011), keen to identify a 
feminist aspiration in early ANT, I referred to this as a ‘metaphysics of the crutch.’
 2 Several other contemporary approaches in the social sciences and humanities claim to be inspired 
by Pragmatism, and even use it to name their approach, like the French sociologists of the Epreuve, 
Boltanksi and Thevenot. Another case in point is post-Habermasian Frankfurter school. It is cer-
tainly striking that very different schools of thought claim this common ancestry, and I do think 
that, on this point at least, ANT is ‘different’ insofar as it is one of the few, perhaps the only ap-
proach that remained committed to the ontological register in which a pragmatist like Dewey 
wrote. I’m not sure, however, that there is that much to gain from debating the differences between 
the various versions of pragmatist sociology claimed today, at least not, if the aim is to evaluate 
ANT’s viability as a contemporary intellectual programme, as is my aim here.
 3 This is not to say that Dewey did not acknowledge the possibility of enduring failure. But his con-
ception of the problematic situation as an occasion for enquiry (knowledge formation) in the Logic 
of Enquiry supposes problem-solving as the horizon (in contrast to continuously and endlessly 
unfolding problematisations). With thanks to the editors for their comments.
 4 In other work, I have discussed how the concept of problem-solving of Pragmatism must be replaced 
with the concept of issue formation, a process marked not only by the formation of cross-boundary 
associations but the expression of antagonism – I would now call it diversity – throughout this 
process. This has various consequences, including for how we understand the relation between 
empiricism – which problem-solving prides itself on – and critique – which is a necessary ingre-
dient of issue formation. However, on this point too, I think we move away from ANT, insofar as 
ANTers themselves tend to avoid either critique or the discussion of it, putting their substantive 
commitments – be it their feminism, ecologism or postcolonialism – into the foreground instead.
 5 Even worse, I have a number of further possible undoings of ANT on my list, with which I will 
not bother the reader in further detail, but I include it here: 4. Border-crossings can no longer be 
contained in the sub-political domain if they ever could. 5. Engineering is not, in fact, sociology 
Noortje Marres
120
by other means. 6. The Internet is not a hybrid forum. 7. The experimental paradigms by which 
we’re increasingly governed today do not facilitate hybrid forums either.
 6 The latest attempt to pull a Sokal on ‘grievance studies’ is a relevant example here. https://en.wiki 
pedia.org/wiki/Grievance_Studies_affair. See also www.wired.com/story/why-men-dont-believe- 
the-data-on-gender-bias-in-science/.
 7 Some ANTs are very aware of this problem and one way they have addressed this is by claiming not 
traceability but storytelling as their register of choice. However, if we, the scholars, define our craft 
as storytelling, why can’t our actors? It seems to me that this proposed solution threatens to undo 
the ontological turn, or to render it less consequential insofar as it threatens to replace empiricist 
trace-following ANT with interpretation, without re-negotiating their relation.
 8 Joanna Kavenna, HowtheLightGetsIn 2018, Philosophy Festival, Hay-on-Wye, 26 May 2018.
 9 Whereas others proposed that addressing ANT’s shortcomings requires its transformation into a 
(object-oriented) metaphysics, I propose that  ANT’s radical empiricism– it’s insistence on on- 
going re-composition – must be translated into a experimentalist methodology (for a discussion, 
see Latour, Harman and Erdélyi, 2011).
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This chapter discusses three conceptual gifts that Donna Haraway has given to those of us 
who use theory to inform critiques of the present, to engage with and, hopefully, transform 
the world, as she may have put it (Haraway 1991: 23, 187; 1997: 269). These gifts have been 
inspiring to many of us who work with ANT, as we become snarled into material-discursive 
entanglements in our studies, in particular, with entanglements sometimes called ‘techno-
science.’ These include a critical understanding of the modest witness; imploding binaries, 
which troubles our relationship to gender and technology and gives us the cyborg; and the 
material-semiotic, with its apparatus of bodily production. Throughout, I will discuss how 
Haraway and ANT have been in conversation and many of the close affinities between them, 
in particular around these concepts. At the same time, I will reflect on how these three con-
ceptual gifts from Haraway have enriched ANT and challenged those working within ANT 
to address political concerns around power and identity – and how they may continue to do 
so further in the future. 
Much of this essay draws on the work that Haraway did in the 1980s and 1990s. I choose 
to focus on this period because it is here that many of the Haraway concepts most frequently 
used within ANT come from, and here one finds her connections to ANT most clearly. It 
is also the period in which she is most focused on the (human, gendered) body, though she 
problematises both of those categories fundamentally. Analytic concern with the body is a 
domain in which Haraway pushes ANT, and bodies as both subjects and objects of knowl-
edge production (a binary she implodes) are more integral to her intellectual project than 
they are to much of ANT (one can see a response to this push in Latour 2004). In the work 
from this period, Haraway both engages with ideas within ANT, acknowledging the agency 
of ‘objects’ (Haraway 1991: 198) by employing and expanding upon the semiotic (Haraway 
1997: 22, 135–138), and critiques ANT (especially in Haraway 1992), by emphasising the 
importance of both the critical theory (Haraway 1991: 23) and the science studies researcher’s 
situatedness (Haraway 1991: 191; 1997: 267, 270). She does so in a way that now, when one 
returns to it 20–30 years later, reminds one that ANT today is not what ANT was circa 1990.
Hence, in one of his essays reflecting on ANT, John Law writes about how early ANT 
caused a flood of responses from many different horizons, a flood in which Haraway’s re-
sponse can be included (cf. Star 1990; Amsterdamska 1990; Lee & Brown 1994). Haraway’s 
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critique, Law reflects, reminded ANT of its non-innocence, and forced those listening to 
become more explicitly political in their work, not least by her particular development of 
the powerful concept of the material-semiotic, but also through the trope of cyborg (Law 
2007: 16). But perhaps the first step Haraway forced ANT to take, both in its approach to 
bodies, and in its approach to everything besides, was the analysis of semantics1 as broad, 
power- infused patterns of cultural meaning-making, as ‘contents and meanings, tropes and 
topics’ (Haraway 1997: 22) of technoscience. This is in contrast to a more technical use of 
semiotics as methodology found in much of ANT (see Matozzi this volume and Lenoir 1994). 
Her use of semiotics in this way has garnered critique from within ANT but has also inspired 
many in the second generation of ANT to engage patterns of cultural meaning-making 
through analysis of the material-semiotic of technoscience, writ large.
Haraway’s work has been in conversations in ANT, but it has also been engaged in fields 
as diverse as science and technology studies (STS) and philosophy of science, feminist tech-
noscience studies, gender studies, cultural studies, somatechnics, environmental humanities 
and posthumanism. She has inspired analysis of technoscientific contingencies in many fields, 
and comes with ideas that inform researchers and others, including many artists.
Haraway’s ideas have impacted my own work, and inspired me to think with some of 
her theoretical terms and challenges. To show how, in this chapter, I will reflect on a study 
of medical simulators I did many years ago as part of a project that involved gynaecologists, 
cultural studies researchers, gender studies researchers and an ANT component – the latter 
brought to the table by me. We were all looking at the introduction of a pelvic simulator to 
a Swedish teaching hospital. The simulator – invented, validated, used and marketed in the 
USA – was a model of the ‘female’ reproductive tract. The ‘body’ was connected by pressure 
sensors to an external computer which measured if, and how hard, a student touched the 
‘right’ places during an internal gynaecological exam. It was a machine that would teach 
medical students how to know the gynaecological body; it was an artefact that could help the 
medical students ‘learn to be affected,’ to use a concept proposed for speaking about the body 
(Despret 2004; Latour 2004). The simulator was to be used to supplement or possibly replace 
an existing practice at the hospital which relied on live, volunteer, ‘professional’ patients who 
let the students examine them in a classroom-like situation.
The simulator and its move from the USA to Sweden offered up many ‘knots’ that could 
be untied, inspired by Haraway’s assertion that technoscience is ‘a knot of knowledge- making 
practices, industry and commerce, popular culture, social struggles, psychoanalytic forma-
tions, bodily histories, human and nonhuman actions, local and global flows, inherited nar-
ratives, new stories, syncretic technical/cultural processes, and more’ (Haraway 1997: 129). It 
had moved from one culture to another, was part of a global flow of medical knowledge and 
was going to be integrated into local practices. There were tangled commercial and medical 
interests in its production, validation, sale and usage. Its integration into the Swedish context 
was awakening concerns about the patient body and subjectivity which had been addressed in 
very local practices of professional patient programmes, programmes with activist histories.
But some of Haraway’s concepts, for example, her use of the material-semiotic and discus-
sion of the god-trick and situated knowledge, coloured even more the specific thoughts and 
questions I and my colleagues asked to the simulator body during the research project. Her 
interest in tropes and models (Haraway 1997) was with us from the first group meeting, even 
when we were writing the research proposal. The simulator modelled the reproductive tract 
but did not model a pregnant body. Most female simulators at the time were birthing simula-
tors, as have been models of the female body, historically (Sundén 2010; cf. Jordanova 1999; 
Waldby 2000). ‘Our’ simulator presented a model of the body which was not a reproducing 
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body, merely a ‘female’ body, and told an entirely different narrative than models of the preg-
nant body. It gave the impression of a female adult subject, even if rather disembodied, which 
was not merely a receptacle for reproduction. And yet, the simulator also hinted that a female 
body was the reproductive tract – we asked how this little silicon model was supposed to be 
‘female’ in contrast to the sea of unmarked male bodies that other simulators modelled? Why 
was the rest of the ‘female’ invisible, unmaterialised? Already in the planning stage, Haraway 
inspired us to ask about the tropes and narratives the model expressed. 
Additionally, her work encouraged us to look for the ‘god-tricks’ the medical experts, 
engineers and designers were playing as they created this model of the female body, how the 
knowledge they were making was situated, even if it wasn’t articulated as such. The simulator 
was supposed to help teach a particular exam and anatomical knowledge of a part of the body. 
We wanted to ask how the experts designing the simulator were mobilising knowledge that 
was first created and then reified in the models that were supposed to be inscriptions of that 
knowledge, inscriptions which could transfer or delegate the teaching of that knowledge to 
new doctors and medical students. ANT, and in particular laboratory studies that were be-
ing done within it, was and is also attuned to situating technoscience, particularly with the 
ethnomethodology-inspired approaches employed (see Latour & Woolgar 1979; Lynch 1985). 
Yet somehow, Haraway was bringing more to the table with her term ‘situated,’ reminding 
us of the sticky politics entangled in technoscience and the asymmetrical, non-innocent 
power of knowledge production practices. So, inspired by Haraway, we wanted to situate a 
simulator.
Modest witnesses and god-tricks
The concept of the god-trick and a reinterpretation of a modest witness are two gifts  Haraway 
has given to ANT. God-tricks are those views from nowhere and everywhere, seen by no 
one and everyone, articulated in the passive form and representing truth as discovered in 
nature. It’s a powerful concept that Haraway calls out, in the process giving science studies 
a politically charged term for the ‘credible, civil man of science.’ The ideas of witnessing 
and testifying were already in use, thanks to Robert Boyle and his air pumps, and thanks to 
Shapin and Schaffer (1985) and their history of how Boyle created the identity of a witness 
to science, of a disembodied, objective observer of public scientific experiments who could 
witness the production of knowledge. Thus, science studies already had a word for the man 
of the unmarked category who performs self-invisibility in the name of publicly witnessed 
science. But Haraway proposed a new, alternative, practice of witnessing, a new subject 
 position: the modest witness. For her: 
Witnessing is seeing; attesting, standing publically accountable for, and psychically vul-
nerable to, one’s visions and representations. Witnessing is a collective, limited practice 
that depends on the constructed and never finished credibility of those who do it, all of 
whom are mortal, fallible, and fraught with the consequences of the unconscious and 
disowned desires and fears.
(Haraway 1997: 267)
Haraway shows how the civil man of science’s voice can be identified, challenged and con-
tested. As she writes in her work on situated knowledges, the god-trick produces knowledge 
that is ‘unlocatable, and so irresponsible […] unable to be called into account’ (Haraway 1991 
(1988): 191). She writes of natural sciences like physics and biology and their god-tricks of 
Ericka Johnson
124
alleged clarity and referentiality, produced in the ‘culture of no culture’ (Traweek 1988), that 
is science, with the ‘language of no language, the trope of no trope, the one self-referential 
world’ (Haraway 1997: 138). ANT was also concerned with similar issues, as Latour writes, 
for example, on purification. Yet while Latour eloquently claims that the purification system 
is already clogged, the hybrids of nature and culture already overwhelming us (Latour 1993 
[1991]: 50), Haraway imperatively shows us the god-tricks and (im)modest witnessing still 
being done in the tropes of technoscience (and medicine) and demands we out them. Her 
observations are similar to those made by Latour, but her call to arms is more explicit.
Haraway’s concept of god-tricks is relevant for general science studies and the philosophy 
of science, even though she specifically articulates its theoretical inspirations and home in 
feminist theory, within a framework which avoids ‘metaphors of organic and technological 
vision in order to foreground specific positioning, multiple mediation, partial perspective, 
and therefore a possible allegory for feminist scientific and political knowledge’ (Haraway 
1991: 3).
But rather than arguing for an alternative, feminist science, an idea that had traction in 
the 1980s,2 Haraway called for ‘a doctrine of embodied objectivity that accommodates para-
doxical and critical feminist science projects: Feminist objectivity means quite simply situated 
knowledges’ (Haraway 1991 (1988): 188). She coined the term situated knowledges and put 
words to how we and others were making truth claims. The practice of situating ones’ (and 
others’) knowledges involved not relativism, but ‘a doctrine and practice of objectivity that 
privileges contestation, deconstruction, passionate construction, webbed connections, and 
hope for transformation of systems of knowledge and ways of seeing’ (Haraway 1991 (1988): 
191). Scholars in science studies, including within ANT, responded, contesting, deconstruct-
ing, articulating webs and hoping and caring for transformations as if – because – the shape 
of our lives depended on it (see Berg & Mol 1998; Clark & Montini 1993; Dugdale 2000a; 
2000b; Mol 2002; Moser 2006; 2009; Pols 2013; Puig de la Bellacasa 2017; Singleton 1998; 
Star 1990; Thompson 2005).3
Within a Haraway-enriched ANT, the job became one of describing how scientists per-
form their god-tricks and old-school modest witnessing, of attending to narratives of ‘ob-
jectivity,’ and using them as our material. But it also became one of reflecting over our own 
witnessing practices, our own god-tricks, of situating our partial perspectives and paying 
attention to the narratives and tropes we employ in the construction of knowledges. It also 
meant reflecting on how others, and how we, give voice to our material, and the distancing 
operations, relocating practices and political implications of representation. Haraway re-
minded us that, ‘the represented is reduced to the permanent status of the recipient of action, 
never to be a co-actor in an articulated practice among unlike, but joined, social partners’ 
(Haraway 1992: 311–12). This is, at first glance, somewhat at odds with the way some ANT 
has considered the material ‘objects’ of technoscience as active and the ANT challenge to 
conduct symmetrical analysis. ANT responded to her critique that such an approach flattens 
power structures, paying more attention to the relationship of politics, representation and 
science (Latour 2004; Star 1991).
Heeding her warning, we in the gynaecological simulator project were also trying to 
situate our own knowledge-making practices – to try to figure out how we were impli-
cated in what truths we were telling about the simulator and gynaecological practices. 
We all thought we knew that within a medical-professional setting, male patients have 
neutral bodies and female ones have (embodied) partial perspectives. Haraway, and other 
inspirational theorists working at the time, often in conversation with Haraway (Butler 
1990; Fausto-Sterling 1992; 2000; Moi 1985; Keller 1996; Sedgwick 1990), gave us terms 
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to make this more explicit in our empirical findings. We were six women in the project, 
bringing to it experiences of being feminist researchers and practitioners, but in very dif-
ferent professional contexts. We all had bodies that were identified as female by ourselves 
and others, and were looking at a simulator that was identified as female, too. For some of 
us in the project, especially those who daily practised gynaecology in the hospital, there 
was an ease with which they approached the modelled body and its understanding of bi-
ological sex, an ease which some of the others in the group did not share. The simulator 
contributed to this binary understanding of sex/gender – it was called female, sexed by 
having the internal organs to be touched during the exam, and gendered (given a social 
identity), materially. For example, the simulator was packaged together with a small blue 
blanket. In the US context, this blue blanket was an essential part of the gynaecological 
examination. It was placed over the abdomen to offer discretion to the patient, and when 
it slipped to the side during a simulated exam, the students were told immediately to pay 
attention to the blanket, to put it back over the woman’s body. When the blue blanket 
was pulled out of the box as the simulator was unpacked in Sweden, it was met with mild 
confusion and then put to the side. Small blankets are not used to cover one’s sex during 
a gynaecological exam in Sweden. The simulated body was given shame, embarrassment, 
discretion in the US, a gendered (social) identity that was articulated by the culturally 
expected nakedness in Sweden.
The difference between the anatomical sex of the simulator and the social aspects of its 
gender (the blanket) was a starting point of some conversations about the simulator within 
our group. However, those of us in the project who were inspired by Haraway were a little 
less comfortable with this easy distinction. This is because Haraway (and ANT) has suc-
ceeded in showing how binaries, and especially the sex/gender binary in Haraway’s work, 
implode.
Cyborgs and imploded binaries
There is a reason ‘(gender)’ is in parenthesis in the title of this chapter. I think Haraway would 
have been very keen to help us with the task of thinking about ‘gendered’ bodies sometime 
in the mid-1980s, but her work – and the flora of other theorists she was engaging with at the 
time – led to the demise of gender as a concept to denote the binary opposite of biological 
sex. As such, it also led to the demise of ‘gender’ as a legitimate category of difference. Ob-
viously, this isn’t true in every context. Gender is still a word used widely and even usefully, 
particularly outside of gender studies departments. But I’m going to let Haraway’s work 
explain why the sex/gender binary imploded and, more importantly, why the category of 
gender is fraught with problems. 
Much of this section draws from Haraway’s wonderfully fun discussion in ‘Gender for 
a Marxist Dictionary: The Sexual Politics of a Word,’ which can be most easily found in 
 Simians, Cyborgs and Women (1991). In this piece, she is asked to write about gender, but con-
tends that gender is a problem in itself. She posits that gender is not a word or a concept, it is 
a semiotic account of complicated struggles (Haraway 1991: 3): ‘“Gender” was developed as 
a category to explore what counts as a “woman,” to problematize the previously taken- for-
granted’ (Haraway 1991: 147).
At the time of her essay on sex/gender, the terms and their combination as a binary pair 
had been floating around as a way of differentiating the biological (sex) and the social (gen-
der) when categorising bodies and people as man or woman. Or, to be honest, at that time, 
one was mostly categorised as a woman. Men had still not really been allowed a sex or a 
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gender in much of the discourse. They were still the unmarked category. Haraway points this 
out later (1997), when she articulates gender as,
always a relationship, not a performed category of beings or a possession that one can 
have. Gender does not pertain more to women than to men. Gender is the relation be-
tween variously constituted categories of men and women (and variously arrayed tropes), 
differentiated by nation, generation, class, lineage, color and much else.
(Haraway 1997: 28)
One of the critiques of gender that Haraway makes is that gender fails to represent the com-
plexity of subject positions and the violence that categorisation can do. Echoing the begin-
nings of an intersectional discourse, she reminds her reader that
the positionings of African-American women are not the same as those of other women 
of colour; each condition of oppression requires specific analysis that refuses the separa-
tions but insists on the non-identities of race, sex, and class. These matters make starkly 
clear why an adequate feminist theory of gender must simultaneously be a theory of racial 
difference in specific historical conditions of production and reproduction.
(Haraway 1991: 146)
She was writing in California in the 1980s – her knowledges are situated there, but she and 
the academics and activists she was in conversation with were nurturing seedlings of a cri-
tique of social theory’s simplified categories that would spread around the world. In many 
places, this critique has cracked the foundations of analysis built on individual categories of 
the self like ‘gender’ but also ‘class,’ ‘race,’ ‘ethnicity’ and ‘age.’ Yet, interestingly, much of 
the foundational work within ANT rarely engaged with these categories at all, either indi-
vidually or intersectionally. This is a point at which ANT needs Haraway, and not just for 
thinking about bodies.
But even if many theorists today are reluctant to use the concept of gender, many of us 
live with gendered bodies in contexts which categorise us that way and treat us differentially 
because of that category. And, as Haraway notes, there was a strongly liberatory and political 
push to use these categories by feminists, too (Haraway 1991: 130). But, as she notes, the sex/
gender distinction was just as dependent on other categorising practices as on the distinction 
between a social and a biological that it claimed to articulate. Producing sex and gender was 
also producing (and produced by) equally dubious distinctions in other realms:
[T]he political and explanatory power of the ‘social’ category of gender depends upon 
historicizing the categories of sex, flesh, body, biology, race, and nature in such a way 
that the binary, universalizing opposition that spawned the concept of the sex/gender 
system at a particular time and place in feminist theory implodes into articulated, differ-
entiated, accountable, located, and consequential theories of embodiment, where nature 
is no longer imagined and enacted as a resource to culture or sex to gender.
(Haraway 1991: 148)
ANT engages with idea of imploding binaries, particular Latour’s ideas about hybrids and 
the nature/culture binary in We Have Never Been Modern (Latour 1993[1991]). But the nature/
culture–sex/gender binary is not the only imploded binary brought forth by Haraway which 
is relevant to how ANT can think about bodies. Haraway expands these binaries in what is 
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perhaps the most renowned of her early works, the Cyborg Manifesto. While she, in her work for 
the Marxist dictionary, notes that ‘The difference between sex and gender depends on a related 
system of meanings clustered around a family of binary pairs: nature/culture, nature/history, 
natural/human, resource/product’ (Haraway 1991: 130), in the Cyborg Manifesto, she attacks 
a plethora of binaries, jolting the reader out of the narrative and forcing one to grapple with 
the categories she is making and problematising. She names many pairs, but the most clearly 
discussed are the three binary categories that the figure of the cyborg implodes: The human/
animal; the animal/machine and the physical/non-physical (Haraway 1991 [1984]: 151–153).
This figure of the cyborg forces us to acknowledge our partial, impure identities as hu-
mans, in an early (remember, this is 1984) encouragement to embrace partial perspectives.
A cyborg world might be about lived social and bodily realities in which people are not 
afraid of their joint kinship with animals and machines, not afraid of permanently partial 
identities and contradictory standpoints. The political struggle is to see from both per-
spectives [of the animal and the machine] at once because each reveals both dominations 
and possibilities unimaginable from the other vantage point. Single vision produces 
worse illusions than double vision or many–headed monsters.
(Haraway 1991 (1984): 154)
Haraway’s more detailed work on modest witnessing and situated knowledges is yet to come, 
but already the cyborg is facilitating a new take on objectivity, scientific and otherwise. She 
pulls on discussions of the body and reproduction as a medical site of contention, and reminds 
the reader of body claiming politics of the (white, North American) movements to retake 
knowledge production about the body. The speculum shows up, and self-help, too (Haraway 
1991 (1984): 169). But her cyborg strides beyond the body as a site of reproductive politics, 
bringing the discussion to a matter of how to ‘find political direction in the 1980s in the face 
of the hybrids “we” seemed to have become world-wide’ (Haraway 1991: 3). This use of the 
term ‘hybrids’ indicates that she and ANT are in conversation. Latour, for example, uses the 
concept of hybrid to connote the way nature and culture are mixed and churned up together 
in ‘modern’ explanations of scientific phenomena (Latour 1993 [1991]). But her cyborg has 
a more aggressive and liberational character. It became a political figure behind which aca-
demics, artists and activists rallied, in a way the ANT hybrid never did.
Working with the gynaecological simulator, we, too, saw the political power of the cy-
borg and the analytical relevance of imploding binaries. One of the gynaecologists we were 
working with had come to the question of this simulator and professional patients after a 
career of trying to improve the teaching of the gynaecological exam. Many decades earlier, 
as a young medical student studying abroad in a different European country, she had been 
shocked to find out that they would be expected to learn and practise the gynaecological 
exam on non-consenting female bodies which had been anaesthetised and prepped for sur-
gery. When she protested, it was suggested that she, herself, could volunteer to let her fellow 
students train on her.
Carrying this experience back with her to Sweden (and suspecting that similar ‘teaching 
opportunities’ were employed in Sweden at the time, too), she eventually made her way into 
a professional position that allowed her to create a programme of volunteer bodies which 
allowed medical students to train the gynaecological exam on them in respectful ways, con-
sciously and with consent. This was the programme which the simulator was going to be 
introduced into, perhaps to replace the professional patients, perhaps to supplement them, 
depending on how it worked. (It didn’t work. It has been put back in its box.)
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Inspired by the cyborg, we could see the professional patient example and the simulator 
demonstrate two imploding binaries – unique human/representative human bodies and 
living bodies/silicon models: In her experiences of the anaesthetised bodies being used as 
teaching material for young medical students, the practices of the hospital were already 
erasing a distinction between what is a human patient and what is an anatomical model 
upon which one could be trained. But this shift occurred again, decades later, when the 
same gynaecologist considered replacing or at least supplementing the professional patients 
with the newly acquired simulator. The professional patients implode a distinction between 
an individual, human body and a generic model of the anatomy. They are both anatomical 
models and individual patients, standard bodies and subjects. Like the imploded machine/
human binary of the cyborg, the bodies of the professional patients are both representa-
tive, teaching models and individual patients. Then, years later, the distinction between the 
human body and the mechanical, silicon representation of that body was also erased. The 
simulator imploded the machine/human binary. These two examples show how binaries 
around bodies can implode in practice. Haraway gave us words for that and a theoretical 
concept, the cyborg, to articulate it.
The material-semiotic and an apparatus of bodily production
Haraway uses the term material-semiotic
to highlight the object of knowledge as an active part of the apparatus of bodily pro-
duction, without ever implying immediate presence of such objects or, what is the same 
thing, their final or unique determination of what can count as objective knowledge of 
a biological body at a particular historical juncture.
(Haraway 1992: 298)
To do the work of articulating the material-semiotic, she gives us the apparatus of bodily production, 
a concept to understand ‘the generation – the actual production and reproduction – of bodies 
and other objects of value in scientific knowledge projects’ (Haraway 1991 (1988): 200–201).
With the material-semiotic and the apparatus of bodily production,4 Haraway pointed those 
following her work5 down the path of thinking about how the material world and semi-
otics play together – or intra-act, to appropriate a term from Barad’s ontoepistemological 
agential realism (which Haraway does (1997: 116)) – with a concern for the subject, and the 
lived, embodied, emotional strength of subjectivities analytically inseparable from bodies 
and technologies. Mattozzi (this volume) notes that ANT shares similar concerns, espe-
cially with the material-semiotic, though Haraway is perhaps more attuned with bodies. 
The material-semiotic and an apparatus of bodily production are particularly tenable in thinking 
about bodies because they allow us to see how bodies and their ‘boundaries material-
ize in social interaction among humans and non-humans, including the machines and 
other instruments that mediate exchanges at crucial interfaces and that function as dele-
gates for other actors’ functions and purposes. ‘“Objects” like bodies do not pre-exist as 
such.  Similarly, “nature” cannot pre-exist as such, but neither is its existence ideological’ 
( Haraway 1992: 298).
Haraway’s concepts of the material-semiotic and the apparatus of bodily production speak 
to how the world – later spoken of in terms of materiality – pushes back at the knower, how it 
influences (or intra-acts with, Barad again) the way we make knowledge about it. This, too, I 
was able to see in the study of the simulator, particularly through the inclusion of its fat pad.
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The simulator had a removable fat pad, placed above the internal organs, under the ab-
dominal skin, to simulate an obese patient. It was the shape and thickness of one of those 
old mouse pads for computers back in the 1990s. I wondered how that centimetre of silicon 
was supposed to represent the very thick abdominal fat of an obese patient. When I asked 
the model designer about this, she explained to me that fat in the body is warm – body 
 temperature – and therefore not very solid. It is bound in small capsules, but these have a ten-
dency to move around almost (but not quite) like a liquid in parts of the body. Thus, when a 
patient is lying down on their back during the pelvic exam, the fat in their abdomen tends to 
slide downwards, off the peak of the stomach. During an exam, the fat is gently pushed out 
of the way. Not all of it, of course, but quite a bit of it. Therefore, the ‘thin’ fat pad gives the 
feeling that a doctor would have when examining a much ‘thicker’ patient.
Here, the ‘fat’ becomes a material-semiotic actor – it pushes back and produces an experience 
of ‘fat’ – and the production of knowledge about the fat becomes very specific, or contingent, as 
Haraway would say. It becomes through a practice (the bimanual examination) in a certain way 
(with the patient on their back) and under certain circumstances (at body temperature). The stu-
dents are learning to be affected by the fat, but that knowledge is situated, and the model made of 
it (the fat pad) is also specific and situated. It is not representing ‘obesity’ in general, but a very spe-
cific way of knowing obesity. Significantly, the fat pad simulates not the actual body of the patient 
but the material-semiotic ‘obese patient,’ as known through an apparatus of bodily production, as 
a phenomenon of knowledge (cf. Barad 2007, see also Johnson 2008).
Why was this relevant? It showed that the anatomy of the simulator was an anatomy of 
both medical practices and the materiality they encountered – the fat inside a living body 
being known through a specific examination. Haraway insists on the importance of tracing 
constructions of material-semiotic objects of knowledge (which she does with the foetus, 
gene and race in her 1997 book) while at the same time reminding us that ‘constructed’ does 
not mean ‘made up.’ Her work encourages researchers to show how objects of knowledge are 
knots of knowledge-making practices, with bodily histories (see above and Haraway 1997: 
129). In a way, the ANT idea of a circulatory model of science is related, but Haraway insists 
on the political imperative of tracing the sticky strings of the knot, articulating the politics 
stuck on them, as she does with the foetus, the gene and race. There is an affinity between 
ANT and Haraway here, but an insistence and activist undertone in Haraway’s work that is 
not (always) as clear in ANT. 
ANT and Haraway in conversation
The question posed in the title of this chapter is why ANT needs Haraway. Haraway was en-
gaging ANT in her early work, both indirectly (through the concept of situated knowledges, 
for example, and her insistence that the materiality of the world (including bodies) pushes 
back. There are many affinities between ANT and Haraway’s work, but she also troubles a 
couple of things that ANT was having some trouble with, at least in its early incarnations. 
As one of my colleagues has pointed out, with Haraway, we as researchers can never 
get away from the fact that everything we do, no matter how hard we try, is going to be at 
least a little ‘bad.’ No matter how ‘good’ we try to be, we are always excluding someone, 
something. There is always a backside to our political choices, and every choice we make is 
political. But we must continuously try to do our best, anyway.6
Objectivity is not about dis-engagement, but about mutual and usually unequal struc-
turing, about taking risks in a world where ‘we’ are permanently mortal, that is, not in 
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‘final’ control. […] Perhaps our hopes for accountability, for politics, for ecofeminism, 
turn on revisioning the world as coding trickster with whom we must learn to converse.
(Haraway 1991 (1988): 200–201)
This political conversation and imperative is a theme Haraway has emphasised even more 
in her later work (Haraway 2016). In the intervening years, her work has explored the (non) 
human relations and our ways of theoretically critiquing and engaging with these. It is pow-
erful, political and potent, as one would expect. Yet, it is not as interested in gender nor as 
engaged explicitly with ANT.
So, why does ANT need Haraway to think about the body? She points us to the semiotic, 
and allows us to approach bodies and tropes, science and semantics, in a way that conflates 
all our presumed binaries that stem from nature and culture. There is an affinity with ANT 
here, but there is a tendency for Haraway to engage with a wider set of actors, to engage with 
structures and systems beyond the laboratory and scientific discourse. Like ANT, Haraway 
conflates nature/culture, but in a way that breathes life into analytical work by accounting for 
the situatedness, the contingency of the material-discursive while contextualising it in the 
larger culture. Her gifts help one rethink some of the fundamental assumptions about science, 
technology, culture and specifically gender and other relations of categorising. Her work 
gives us permission, and more importantly the theoretical tools, to assert situated knowledges 
and pervert the god-tricks of self-invisible modest witnesses. She gave us the cyborg to think 
about how technoscientific bodies are powerful tools to write our way into futures we would 
want to inhabit. And, perhaps most importantly for thinking about the body, she gave us the 
material-semiotic and the apparatus of bodily production to think critically about how mean-
ings and bodies get made. Why is this important? Because, ‘we need the power of modern 
critical theories of how meanings and bodies get made, not in order to deny meaning and 
bodies, but in order to live in meanings and bodies that have a chance for a future’ (Haraway 
1991 (1988): 187).
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Notes
 1 For a discussion of the semiotic turn in science studies, particularly in the work of Latour, Akrich, 
Hayles and Haraway, see Lenoir (1994).
 2 See the special issue of Hypatia (2004).
 3 Haraway’s more recent work also stresses the urgency of engaging with the world and its inhabi-
tants of all life forms in these contested *cenes (Haraway 2016). 
 4 Haraway speaks of the apparatus of bodily production in conjunction with Katie King’s objects 
called ‘poems’ (Haraway 1991 (1988): 200–201; 1992: 289) and Barad’s agential Realism (Haraway 
1997: 116, 151–3).
 5 As I mentioned earlier, Haraway’s concept of the material-semiotic and an apparatus of bodily 
production spread widely outside of feminist science studies, catching fire in gender studies depart-
ments without strong science studies components and bringing Haraway’s concepts into other fields 
like cultural studies and philosophy (Rouse 2004).
 6 Thank you, Marianne Winther Jörgensen, 1966–2017.
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introducing ANT, the questionability of the social and dementia
Despite its non-cohesive character, it seems fairly safe to say that the research efforts of 
 Actor-Network Theory (ANT) gained considerable importance in sparking controversies 
about a variety of central ideas, concepts and methods of modern thought including the ques-
tions of agency, subject and object, society and nature, human and the non-human, science 
and technology, body and materiality, just to name a few. 
Since the early Laboratory Studies in the late 1970s, ANT scholars have been experi-
menting with the outrageous claim that all entities – human or not – are societies, thereby 
contributing to speculative thought that can be found in Gabriel Tarde (2012) and most 
vibrantly in Alfred North Whitehead’s ontology (Whitehead [1929]1978). Embracing a 
 process-oriented (ethno-) methodology, ANT has been interested in tracing how different 
actors, facts,  positions, perspectives or thoughts come into being as an emerging, collective 
and distributed accomplishment. The latter arise from controversies, issues, uncertainties, 
hesitations and ambiguities of what counts as a shared problem, who and what is involved in 
the questions that arise and how it is dealt with in the course of engagement (Callon 1986, 
Hassard & Law 1999, Latour 2005, Mol 2002, Passoth, Peuker & Schillmeier 2012).
Rather than granting explanatory power to ‘the social’ in understanding the formation of 
societal beings, for ANT, it is the very questionability of the social that leads to the complexities 
of mediating uncertainties and differences and thereby fabricating the emergence, mainte-
nance, alteration and perishing of actor-worlds (Latour 2005). These actor-worlds, in turn, 
provide the potentiality for novel social processes and related societal accomplishments. Im-
portantly, then, in ANT, societal variances of in/stability and agentic dis/abilities are due to 
the situated ways of how different bodies, thoughts, feelings and things are related.
What makes ANT a good ethnographic research heuristic is its well-known obligation to 
learn from the specificities of everyday life in order to redescribe existing accounts by ‘add-
ing a new agent to the description’ (Latour 2005: 147), which, in turn, may allow to rethink 
 taken-for-granted ideas about them (Callon & Latour 1981). In that sense, ANT does not 
only talk about ‘translation’ viz. ‘mediation’ as one of its core ideas (Callon 1981) but becomes 
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a technique of translation between the empirical and the conceptual and how both sides are 
made real, configured and reconfigured by the very process of relating itself (cf. Jensen 2014).
It was ANT’s insistence on the questionability and transformability of the social that 
made it attractive for my own research on cosmopolitical events in the context of health, illness 
and dis/ability (Schillmeier 2010, 2011, 2014). Like Latour’s controversies (Latour 2005), 
or Garfinkel’s idea of breaching (Garfinkel 1967), yet without the researchers’ directive, 
bodily events like Alzheimer’s disease, a stroke or bacterial/viral infections unbutton the 
 taken-for-granted social relations and societal accomplishments, thus unfolding what I have 
called the ‘cosmopolitics of illness’ (Schillmeier 2014). The latter refers to all embodied prac-
tices, processes and events that disrupt, question and alter, and thereby politicise, the ‘cosmos’ 
of the seemingly given and expected modes of ordering everyday life. 
ANT, I believe, offers a valuable research technique to engage with dementia’s cosmopo-
litical breach of conventions in everyday life. However, ANT turned out to be a limited con-
ceptual tool in understanding everyday realities, issues, concerns and problems of dementia. 
Writ large, ANT has not been very strong in addressing the temporal and immaterial aspects 
of experience as part of the material, embodied process of world-making, which nevertheless 
proved vital in understanding dementia. Conversely, this is precisely what ANT may learn 
from dementia: To open its concerns for the temporality and immateriality of experience 
as essential parts of embodied living, of actor-world making, of the worlding process of the 
 actor-worlds in place (Tsing 2010).
The inclusion of the temporality and immateriality also complexifies ANT’s conceptual re-
flections. Following Latour’s quest for an ‘empirical metaphysics’ of world-making (Latour 2005: 
51pp), ANT cannot abstain from philosophical questions and thought. More radically put, it is 
precisely the philosophical questions which become apparent in thinking with the lives of people 
with dementia that offer most important insights into speculating with the metaphysics of how 
actor-networks come into being, maintain and change. For this purpose, my thinking with de-
menting bodies is accompanied by ideas from Alfred North Whitehead, which have proven to 
be most helpful for a better understanding of (dementing) bodies as affected/ing societies in action. 
Thinking with Mrs M and A. N. Whitehead
For more than ten years, I have been researching the lives of people who are experiencing 
Alzheimer’s Disease (Schillmeier 2009, 2014, 2017). My readings of dementia are meant to 
contribute to accounts in the fields of care studies, sociology of health and illness and dis/ability 
studies that offer alternative readings to economic, individualistic, biomedical and deficit mod-
els of illness and disability (Kitwood 1997, Kohn & McKechnie 1999, Mol 2008, Moreira et al. 
2014). As a ‘matter of care’ (Puig de la Bellacasa 2017), it is essential to draw attention to how 
people with dementia live their everyday life, how they perceive and engage with the world 
and how it changes their relations with others and vice versa. This includes addressing the agency 
of people with dementia. To be sure, this does not mean to romanticise their experiences of 
dementia, but to free them from the stigma of passivity and/or negativity. Only then, we may 
grasp the requirements of what it could mean to live with dementia, to live well with it and to 
experiment with possibilities to improve people’s life with dementia (Moser 2008, 2010).
The brief data-events, which I analyse in this chapter, are part of a documentary film called 
The Day That Got Lost in a Handbag (2000) by Marion Kainz, in which Mrs M’s experiences of 
dementia and care are portrayed.1 Mrs M, diagnosed with Alzheimer’s disease, lives in a nursing 
home. The documentary begins with Mrs M in her nightgown, walking from the dark end of 
the corridor of the ward towards the filmmaker, Mrs Kainz. Mrs M is nervous, agitated. 
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MRS M: I am all over the place [Ich bin ganz ausser mir] – Good day! With whom do I have 
the pleasure? 
KAINZ: It’s me. Marion! 
MRS M: Marion, what is on hand (t)here [was liegt da vor]?
KAINZ: Whereabouts? 
MRS M: Here, with me and the surrounding [bei mir und der Umgebung]! 
KAINZ: You are here at the […] nursing home. It is a home for the elderly and a nursing home. 
MRS M: A home for the elderly and a nursing home? Why haven’t they told me anything 
about that? 
KAINZ: I am sure that you must have just forgotten it in this moment since you are nervous.
MRS M: And now [nun]? What is going to happen now [ jetzt]? 
KAINZ: You can continue to live here! 
MRS M: Continue to live here? What does this mean? 
KAINZ: You have already been here for a while.
MRS M: Already for a while? And nobody has told me so! How is this possible?
In the situation when bodies experience dementia, parts or the whole external environment 
turn into isolated givens, mere matters of facts and become matters of felt unknowns. In effect, 
the ensemble of embodied social relations, knowledge practices and orderings in place be-
comes unfamiliar, vague and messy, and they frequently lack meaning. Being trapped in the 
dementing event, Mrs M stumbles into the unknown and the questionable. In that moment, 
she herself and her environment turn alien. Her self, other people and things around her 
become important precisely because they are abstract, problematic and questionable. The 
uncanniness of the situation seems to force her to think about herself and the environment, 
and makes her enrol others to think with her and investigate about what is on hand. 
Undoubtedly though, Mrs M lucidly addresses her problem. She says that she is ausser sich, 
which not only articulates her negatively affected situation, but literally translates as being out-
side of herself. Mrs M does not know was da vorliegt, what lies in front of, of ‘what is on hand.’ We 
may speculate that to be ausser sich not only refers to being highly affected and agitated not 
knowing what the situation is all about, but also signifies that she is looking at herself from 
the outside. She looks at herself as she looks at her surrounding; both veil what is on hand. 
In short, and altogether, Mrs M expresses a fivefold problem: (1) Being negatively affected; 
(2) being ausser sich, and a threefold incomprehensibility of what is on hand; (3) with herself; 
(4) with the surrounding and (5) as the word ‘and’ suggests, with the relation between her and 
the environment. 
The scene unfolds a rather human endeavour that clearly defines and selects events, which 
are crucial for understanding the specific and individuated situation, a situation that never-
theless appears massively abstract, vague and terrifying. Mrs M seems to miss out on what 
might make a situation a ‘good’ experience. For Whitehead, ‘the good’ should not be con-
flated with morality as its sole aspect ([1938]1968: 76). Rather, if we follow Whitehead, it has 
to do with the human ability to ‘understand structure’ in the way we ‘abstract its dominating 
principle from the welter of concrete realized facts, confused and intermixed’ detail (ibid.). 
As Whitehead notes: 
This clarity of human vision both enhances the uniqueness of each individual occasion, 
and at the same time discloses its essential relationships to occasions other than itself. It 




Still, for Mrs M, the matters of fact are on hand as merely individual occurrences. Her body 
and the environment are intensively felt since they do not contribute to her gaining clarity 
of what is perceived and how they interrelate. Although clearly perceived, her body and her 
environment do not allow to abstract from the presence of mere matters of embodied and environ-
mental facts. Paradoxically speaking, these matters of fact are too abstract to enable Mrs M to 
abstract from their individual presence and understand how they relate to other matters of fact, 
and what makes these relations meaningful, familiar and traceable. 
We might thus say that Mrs M’s situation, and the different ways her and other bodies, 
things and practices are related in and through that situation, remain unspecified and lack 
structure – both in space and time. The dementing process veils their situated relevance oth-
erwise necessary to understand how she and her environment relate in that situation, how 
her situation came about and what can be anticipated or expected from it. Under the intense 
impression of highly abstract bodies, things and practices, Mrs M wishes to get answers from 
Mrs Kainz that might help her to reassemble a clarity of vision, which would, in turn, con-
tribute to decipher what is on hand. 
Having said this, Mrs M does indeed have a vague understanding of the structure of her 
situation: It is about herself and the environment. Both are important to pay attention to; 
both matter and are of concern to her. Mrs M forgets that she forgets and hence she is not 
familiar with such a situation. However, in looking at this, we must presume that she some-
how remembers – although consciously unaware of this – that she has been feeling good in 
the past, where situations were differently perceived, in which her body, her environment 
and how they relate had gained meaning. Why else should Mrs M be so distressed by the 
situation, if not for the way she felt differently with her body and her environment in past 
situations? 
Mrs M feels ausser sich. Being outside or beside herself, Mrs M seems to express her inability 
to abstract from her merely given body and environment. She can only look at her body and 
environment without being able to be with her body and her environment in ways that could 
offer traceable social relations and societal orderings to possibly enable her to see more than 
just negatively felt, given matters of fact. The question of what is on hand, of was liegt da vor, is 
a question about given, static facts. To be with herself would require to be part of a process of 
abstraction from matters of fact that would enable her to trace their concrete social relations 
and practices. This would then allow to get an understanding about what is going on, which 
would address a process rather than mere facts. Abstracting from the mere presence of things 
would help Mrs M to resituate her embodied life and how it has evolved in relation to others. 
Her questions in the scene address her longing to gain a feeling for the situation and how she 
belongs to it, partakes in it and becomes with it. 
We can speculate with Mrs M being ausser sich and argue that her body is protesting 
against the devastating effects of being outside of the social practices and processes that as-
semble societal accomplishments like bodies and things and how they relate in more or less 
ordered and meaningful ways (including, for instance, living in a nursing home setting). 
Mrs M’s feelings iterate one of ANT’s central claims: No actor becomes, is and acts in isolation 
to its environment and other actors. No actor just exists on its own; actors are in the ways they 
become with others. As societies, Whitehead already reminded us, bodies and things cannot 
be/come by themselves: ‘there is no society in isolation’ (Whitehead [1929]1978: 98). Every 
‘society must be set in a wider environment permissive of its continuance,’ as Whitehead 
wrote (ibid. 99). Mrs M’s body though, merely ‘lies in front of,’ is simply present, like the 
environment, which lacks a social background, exiled from its societal accomplishments and 
thus does not allow Mrs M to translate its importance into a ‘conceptual event,’ of grasping 
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an understanding of it. As societies, bodies and things are enduring, that is temporal, entities. 
Feeling of the mere presence of things, as Mrs M does, veils their trajectories and biographies, 
i.e. their social becoming and societal being. 
To be sure, Mrs M’s affective state shows clearly that what she experiences is not nothing. 
Mrs M is forced to feel and think with the mere presence of her body and environment and 
how these presences affect her being. Mrs M is confronted with the lure of matters of fact, 
with the unknown potentiality of ‘time-less’ or ‘eternal objects’ as Whitehead calls them 
(Whitehead [1929]1978). These objects have the potentiality to socialise Mrs M’s unsocial 
world into conceptual experiences of enduring and related bodies and things. However, with 
the dementing event, their potentialities remain to be discovered, traced or invented, and 
require others to help to do so. 
This is the paradoxical situation that Mrs M reveals to and for us: As ‘time-less’ objects 
of potentiality, the scene reminds us of our processual existence, and hence also that objects 
are more than mere matters of fact. Instead, they are actors of unrealised possibilities. They 
provoke Mrs M’s ‘appetite’ for translating their uncanny importance into canny relations she 
can live well with and in. Mrs M experiences a situation that has perceptual and affective life, 
is full of objects, full of intensities, but it remains – as purely affective relations do – ‘massive 
and vague’ (Whitehead [1929]1978). It is rather an unpleasant situation and Mrs M is longing 
for conceptual enjoyment to ease the suffering. 
In accordance with my speculative interpretation so far, Mrs M’s feeling of being ausser 
sich may allude to the experience of being outside of known and understand-able societal 
relations. Her existence is thrown into a cosmopolitical situation that disrupts, questions 
and alters the social processes that previously made the personal ordering of Mrs M both 
societally stable (enduring) and lively (changing and changeable). It is precisely ‘the social,’ 
understood as the productive processual relation between heterogeneous entities, between 
contrasting differences, between the past, present and future, the material and immaterial, 
the (purportedly) social and (purportedly) non-social, and so on, that seems to be missing 
in the dementing situation. In an uncanny way, Mrs M is experiencing the questionability of 
the social along the mere presence of bodies and things! 
Actor-networks of affective perception
This vital social complexity cannot be emphasised enough: Every entity is more than it-
self. Every actor-network unfolds temporalities of affective relations that relate subjects 
and objects. And every actor-network is experience affectively charged (cf. Whitehead 
[1933]1967: 176).2
Here, Mrs M’s situation brings to the fore a very specific relation between two differ-
ent modes of experience which Whitehead calls ‘causal efficacy’ and ‘presentational im-
mediacy.’ While the former is about bodily, non-sensuous, affective experiences, the latter 
is about sensory perception (cf. Whitehead [1929]1978). Presentational immediacy reveals 
the spatio-temporal coexistence of different beings of concern, i.e. perception as the ‘here, 
now, immediate, and discrete’ (Whitehead [1993]1967: 180) which assembles the relational 
potentialities (also) of Mrs M’s contemporary world. Mrs M’s contemporary world is objec-
tified ‘under the aspect of passive potentiality’ of sense-data ‘such as colours, sounds, bodily 
feelings, tastes, smells together with the perspectives introduced by extensive relationships’ 
(Whitehead [1929]1978: 61). These entities only endure in the now; they do not reveal if 
they had a past or what their future will look like. Thus, by themselves, the sense-data do 
not provide any material for interpretation. To be clear, with Mrs M, we become aware of a 
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general aspect of perception that we all share, given that we are creatures who perceive with 
our senses. It reveals our life with contemporaries, the present as a slice of the world, as mere 
potentiality. Sensory perception in such a reading is not the mind’s screening of an outer 
world, but the embodied practice and process which ‘provides the lively, changing aspect of 
such experience, the passing shapes, colours and clouds which punctuate our engagement 
with the world’ (Halewood 2011: 52).
Still, sensory perception appears as a rather limited mode of activity for interpreting the 
worlding of the world, if we consider it as the sole foundation of perception. Whitehead 
([1933]1967: 181p) stresses that every sense perception is fused with non-sensory percep-
tion, termed ‘causal efficacy,’ and hence cannot be understood without the latter. Following 
Whitehead, our embodied being can be considered crucially as a matter of memory, whereby 
non-sensuous perception is central to understand how this process of remembrance makes 
bodies endure and change: 
It [causal efficacy] is that portion of our past lying between a tenth of a second and a half 
second ago. It is gone, and yet it is here. It is our indubitable self, the foundation of our 
present existence. Yet the present occasion while claiming self-identity, while sharing 
the very nature of the bygone occasion in all its living activities, nevertheless is engaged 
in modifying it, in adjusting it to other purposes. The present moment is constituted by 
the influx of the other in that self-identity which is continued life of the immediate past 
within the immediacy of the present.
(Whitehead [1933]1967: 181)
Whitehead’s reading of perception brings to the fore what might be termed the ‘socialness’ of 
perception, which links sensory and non-sensuous experiences with objects and subjects, past, 
present and future. This social process enables the constitution and enduring of orderings, includ-
ing all sorts of bodies, which deserves in this precise sense to be called ‘societies’ (cf.  Debaise 2017, 
Halewood 2011). As such, Mrs M’s objects on hand (her body, the environment), her concerns for 
them and the affective tone which does arise from feeling them are important sources with which 
to rethink the very subject/object relation (Debaise 2017). Whitehead states
[t]hat an occasion is a subject in respect to its special activity concerning an object; 
and anything is an object in respect to its provocation of some special activity within a 
subject. Such a mode of activity is termed a ‘prehension’. (…) There is the occasion of 
experience within which the prehension is a detail of activity; there is the datum whose 
relevance provokes the origination of this prehension; this datum is the prehended ob-
ject; there is the subjective form, which is the affective tone determining the effective-
ness of that prehension in that occasion of experience. How the experience constitutes 
itself depends on its complex subjective forms.
(Whitehead [1933]1967: 176)
Such a reading of experience as a social process suggests that subject and object are ‘relative 
terms’ (Whitehead [1933]1967: 176). With the notion of prehension, Whitehead refers to a 
double-faced occasion of the becoming of subject and object. It is a complex interrelated 
‘mode of activity’ whereby objects provoke ‘special activity within a subject’ (ibid.) which 
reshapes the object(s) prehended. 
Following such a reading, we may conclude that Mrs M is clearly looking for clues to 
gain knowledge, in the sense of a conceptual feeling for and about the situation in which she 
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finds herself. Still, the prehension of the subject/object-relation should not be conflated with 
the knower/known relation of a modernist bifurcating conception of subject and object. As 
Whitehead (ibid. 177) stresses, knowledge is ‘nothing more than an additional [consciously 
discriminated, MS] factor in the subjective form of the interplay of subject with object.’ And 
he adds that ‘[t]his interplay is the stuff constituting those individual things, which make up 
the sole reality of the Universe. These individual things are the individual occasions of ex-
perience, the actual entities’ (ibid.). 
Speculating with Mrs M’s experience in this direction, I suggest that it assembles the prob-
lem of the dementing situation as a question of prehension that reveals subjective forms of 
perceptual concernedness with certain objects in place. Being objects of her concern, Mrs M 
is concerned about herself and the environment as givens that are received without knowing 
where they came from and how they will unfold. It unravels an actor-network of non- knowing, a 
mere relation of affect provoked by objects felt in a massive but vague sense, lacking specific 
assemblages of knowledge. One may say that Mrs M’s actor-networks are temporally too 
short to achieve the possibilities of knowledge formation. 
In fact, Whitehead has put it almost exactly as Mrs M did: An object ‘must be experienced 
in virtue of its antecedence’ (ibid.178), objects are ‘the “data”’ for the occasion for experience, 
they are ‘“lying in the way of”’ (ibid. 179). Entities as objects seem to be precisely of Mrs M’s 
concern, since she names their literal meaning by asking was liegt da vor, what is on hand, which 
literally translates as what is lying in the way of her. As objects, they are not passive, they affect 
Mrs M and she feels them rather negatively due to a lack of actor-networks of memories that 
extend the temporal span of causal efficacy so much so that different and more concrete and 
familiar actor-worlds of feelings, practices and knowledge could have emerged. 
While the prehension of herself and the environment as massive but vague objects makes 
her feel rather agitated, nervous and anxious, the encounter of Mrs M with the filmmaker 
is perceived in a welcoming and thus differently valued manner. With whom do I have the 
pleasure?, Mrs M asks, seeking for a positively valued mode of relation. Mrs M seems to spot 
a similarity between herself and the filmmaker; something they possibly share (e.g. outlook, 
language), or in short, a societal relation that links similar-looking bodies and that may be 
of benefit in her situation. She welcomes an association, which may help her to look out for 
more mediators, to expand her temporally sparse network. It is likely a way of gaining time 
in order to meet more objects, mediated with the help of Mrs Kainz, objects that may affect 
her differently, actor-networks she may come to enjoy. 
This seems to be Mrs M’s main concern: Look here, she implies, objects matter, my reality 
matters, my mode of being, my body and the environment matter in the way they incorpo-
rate valued facticity that happens to be present, massive and vague. But she also wishes to 
extend her actor-network into the one that gains knowledge about the situation, knowledge 
that may help to tame the experience of the vivid presence of rather abstract bodies and un-
canny things. Mrs M enacts and is enacted by the differences of value-laden relations that 
need to be cared for. Or, as Whitehead has put it: ‘Our enjoyment of actuality is a realization 
of worth, good or bad. It is a value-experience. Its basic expression – Have a care, here is 
something that matters!’ (Whitehead [1938]1968: 116).
Actor-networks of symbolic references
Sensory perception as presentational immediacy alone does not give Mrs M a secure hold; 
it does not give her a feeling of being in place, of being part of a personal order, since it 
only offers a rather partial and meaningless slice of existence that makes her body and the 
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environment contemporaries. As such, it does not allow Mrs M to trace their histories and 
connectedness, to specify their importance. Mrs M’s question‚ Was liegt da vor? Bei mir und 
der Umgebung? [What is on hand, with me and the environment], addresses very precisely her 
dilemma and invites us to speculate about it, to experiment with it and to care about it. In 
doing so, we get the sense that Mrs M relies too much on her sensory perception, situated in 
the presence and co-presence of objects. 
Mrs M’s worlding world, her being and becoming with and for others, has temporally 
petered out, since her embodied experience that unfolds the process of her existence by 
linking the past with the present and onwards to the future is troubled. With the dementing 
event, the presentational immediacy does not connect with the embodied experiences that 
link the different pasts with the present. In the dementing situation, Mrs M seems to be 
 affected by ‘temporally thin’ objects, which do neither reveal their past nor whether they 
have a future. Mrs M is caught in the present, and trapped in the now that is felt massive 
and vague. Furthermore, Mrs M seems to rely strongly on the very short-spanned embodied 
memories (‘causal efficacy’). We do not know how long the present, the ‘now,’ is for Mrs M. 
What we know is that these temporally thin objects affect her rather badly in the way she 
perceives them. 
Within the dementing situation, her world thins out so much so that the occasions of 
experience, and the actual entities of Mrs M’s world (including herself ) do not gain enough 
endurance to become part of a personal ordering. They just come and go and do not socialise 
in the way that they may allow societal relations of togetherness assembling the past, present 
and future, the material and immaterial, of Mrs M’s eventful personal order. In the dement-
ing moment, Mrs M is stuck in the event of existence, shackled within the no longer and not 
yet. And nobody has told me so… How is this possible?, she agonises and is eager to enlarge her 
networks and look for social possibilities in order to free herself from an impossible situation. 
Whitehead calls ‘symbolic reference’ the relation between causal efficacy and presenta-
tional immediacy. As a bodily event, this mixed mode of perception interprets experience 
(Whitehead [1929]1978). It seems that in the dementing moment, the interrelation between 
symbol and meaning is troubled and enacts her affective state as well as her eagerness to in-
terrogate the ‘massive and vague’ feeling to possibly enjoy the conceptual, imaginative and 
thus interpretive power that derives from how the felt present becomes actualised through 
the felt past. 
We can only speculate about it, but asking Mrs Kainz about the situation, Mrs M tries to 
enlarge her actor-network with words, which possibly turn into events and give meaning 
to symbols or vice versa. Through the use of spoken language, Mrs M tries to re-reference 
the embodied and materialised symbols and meanings that make up her situation. Mrs M’s 
effort is to find out how the spoken language may symbolise, i.e. translate bodies, people and 
things in a way that they provide possibilities of understanding the situation. Mrs M tries to 
multiply symbolic references, which may enable to trace meaningful references that may be/
come part of her personal ordering in space and time. In this sense, we may infer that she 
wishes to regain the pragmatic relevance of conceptual freedom that may justify her situation, to 
herself and to others, and might help to reduce her anxieties, insecurities and agitated state.3 
Conclusion: bodies, perceptions and affects
This all-too-brief thinking with Mrs M and aspects of Whitehead’s process philosophy high-
lighted the importance of different modes of embodied perception that make up the com-
plexity, specificities, limits and potentialities of different actor-networks. What we can learn 
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from dementia is how we may understand how good and/or bad things come into being. As 
we have seen, the good and bad as understood in processual philosophy is not just a moral 
question but extends to the ontological fabric of (human) experience and gains pragmatic 
value about what experience is in the different ways of how it is experienced (cf. Whitehead 
[1938]1968). To come closer in understanding the latter, people with dementia can be con-
sidered as essential partners to do so. People with dementia make us aware of the ontological 
importance of the affective in understanding the value-laden becoming of things – human and 
non-human alike. The dementing experience draws our attention not only to the entangle-
ments of the social and the societal, the material and the temporal, but also to the importance 
of affective relations. 
The discussion has allowed a deep understanding of one of ANT’s central but all-too-
abstract claim – that all things are societies – by addressing their variable ‘temporal thick-
ness’ (Debaise 2013: 104) and their variable affective/ing aspects. How things gain temporal 
thickness is a core question of the social. I have tried to show that within the dementing 
experience, the temporal thickness thins out and is experienced along the questionability of 
the social as a source for negatively felt situations governed by more or less meaningless things. 
This analysis arguably draws attention to the fragility of all actor-networks. However, my 
analysis also highlights how objects may offer potentials to turn bodies and environments 
into positively felt relations of good situations. We have seen that Mrs M plays a crucial role 
in tracing possible ways to do so and how people with dementia may contribute to the con-
duct of caring practices. 
Notes
 1 On documentary as a ‘cosmopolitical technique of affect/ion,’ see Schillmeier (2018).
 2 Actor-Networks as experience allude to a pragmatist reading of ‘experience’ shared by James, 
Dewey and Whitehead. As Dewey ([1929] 1971: 4) argues: ‘Things interacting in certain ways are 
experience; they are what is experienced.’ See also James ([1912]2003).
 3 See Whitehead ([1929]1978: 180pp) on the pragmatic justification of symbolism.
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Stengers and ANT: dramatising a divergent alliance
It is a difficult situation – that which the question posed to me by the editors of this  Companion 
puts me in – of pondering on the relevance of the philosophy of Isabelle Stengers to this 
other style of work, however we may wish to define it, that has become condensed under the 
name of Actor-Network Theory (ANT). This is because the question of relevance is always 
specific, belonging to an event of a coming to matter, and does not lend itself to whole-
sale judgements or categorical pronouncements. Without some careful consideration, then, 
the question might incite quick, uninspired reactions that betray one’s own trajectories and 
 predilections – either the relevance of her philosophy to ANT is a matter of course, and what 
follows needs not be written; or it is the product of a profound misunderstanding, and what 
follows requires the effort of a restorative critique.
Such reactions are nothing, however, if not the prolongation of what this eventful rela-
tionship, that which I insist – despite the relentless dishonouring of this word by capitalist 
knowledge economies – on calling relevance (Savransky, 2016), demands we refuse. The pro-
longation, that is, of the questionable Western philosophical tradition that will only set up 
infernal alternatives between what are divergent yet occasionally resonant paths. A tradition 
that will only admit distinctions between ‘for’ and ‘against,’ either/or, and will understand 
the battles and conflicts as symptoms of a more transcendent reason to be unveiled, one  finally 
capable of realising the modern dream of an ecumenical, perpetual peace–  ecumenical, that 
is, except for those that will be subsequently cast as irrational. 
Believing with William James (1956) that rationality is more of a sentiment than a faculty, 
this is a tradition I seek to refuse. As I see it, what is at stake instead is to explore some of the di-
vergent connections through which these two projects have woven a certain intellectual kinship. 
Indeed, because insights from ANT and Stengers’ philosophy, respectively, have been gaining 
reception in the Anglophone world at a somewhat uneven pace, scholars noting or drawing on 
the work of Stengers in relation to the former have so far tended to emphasise the resemblances 
and affinities that connect both oeuvres: some shared philosophical influences (Watson, 2014), 
some resonant materialist and empiricist attitudes (Nimmo, 2011), a shared distaste for critical 
operations ( Jensen, 2014) and some connected terminology (Blok & Farías, 2016).
14
What is the relevance of isabelle 




One cannot deny that partial connections do exist, that attention to them may be produc-
tive whenever –as with the sources cited earlier – what is at stake is not a mere exegesis but 
the retooling of diverse concepts and propositions to develop new questions and problems. 
And they are especially pertinent when entertained in direct relation to one of ANT’s most 
prominent figures – namely, Bruno Latour, whose work both founds and exceeds ANT.1 
For Latour and Stengers have confounded the philosophical tradition which dictates that 
one cannot become a worthy philosopher until one has succeeded in waging war on every 
other worthy philosopher. Instead, they have developed a fertile friendship as well as a very 
public alliance, generating many occasions for reciprocal learnings and borrowings across and 
between their respective paths. And like many alliances, this one is based not on a general 
convergence of purposes, but on a certain affinity at the level of the problematic itself. An 
affinity for the need to create words that would cease prolonging that Great Divide that sep-
arates ‘us,’ the moderns, who can distinguish facts from values, the natural from the cultural, 
the scientific from the political, the rational from the passionate; from all the others, who 
mess all those neat distinctions up.
But while stories of connection can be productive, stories of convergence are rather 
dangerous. For they confuse a problematic alliance with the question of relevance itself, of 
how their respective responses to this problematic come to matter to each other (Savransky, 
2016). Which is to say that, by pacifying their differences, other stories prevent readers 
from discerning the equally fertile borders through which these paths may be connected 
through difference. The result is that when the attempt is made not to craft creative con-
nections but to locate Stengers’ philosophy in relation to ANT, a curious articulation is 
formed: on the one hand, ANT is regarded as indebted to Stengers’ philosophy, even as 
being in certain respects ‘a methodological expression’ of it (Whatmore, 2003: 83). On 
the other, the latter is classed as a branch of an ANT tree, under what has been referred to 
as ‘post-ANT’ (Michael, 2016: 126). The making of partial connections becomes here a 
blurring of borders, and any reciprocal learning is turned into a form of convergence rather 
than an opportunity to learn how these projects diverge, that is, to appreciate the singularity of 
the respective dramas and trajectories that force each form of thought to be set in motion (on this, see 
Savransky, 2018).
The challenge in addressing the relevance of Stengers’ philosophy to ANT, of refusing 
the aspiration of a transcendent truth capable of accommodating everything and everyone, is 
therefore that of dramatising the fact that such an alliance neither requires, nor presupposes, 
a shared project or a general consensus. As Stengers (2015:16) wrote in acknowledgement of 
her alliance with Latour at the beginning of her In Catastrophic Times, the forging of alliances 
is a process that testifies to the fact ‘that agreements between sometimes diverging paths are 
created thanks to, and not in spite of, divergence.’ It is thus in response to the question of 
the relevance of Stengers’ philosophy to ANT that what I seek to do in what follows is not to 
emphasise affinities or to highlight differences, but to dramatise their divergence. 
Of course, a dramatisation is never a neutral operation, and the attempt made here cannot 
be reduced to a didactic ‘compare and contrast’– instead, it is always partial and pragmatic, 
responding to the insistence of a possibility. What follows is no exception. I seek to drama-
tise a divergence not least because it is this very concept, ‘divergence’ itself, and the crucial 
role it plays in Stengers’ speculative proposition of an ‘ecology of practices,’ that may per-
haps constitute one of the elements capable of interesting ANT allies who choose to engage 
her philosophy. And if it is of interest, it is because it is susceptible of asking questions that 
ANT scholars may consider relevant, even if they are not their own questions. The diver-
gence of an ecology of practices is liable, in other words, to situate one of ANT’s political 
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and methodological footholds: the principle of generalised symmetry (Callon, 1986; Latour, 
1993; Latour, 2005). As it becomes perceptible that the relationship between symmetry and 
asymmetry is not itself a symmetrical relationship, attending to divergences in an ecology of 
practices, I suggest, prompts us to experience a space of political relations irreducible either 
to modern asymmetries or to generalised symmetry – an inappropriable space where angels 
fear to tread. 
The angels’ demand: situating ANT
‘For fools rush in where angels fear to tread,’ wrote Alexander Pope (2013: 80, §625) in 
his famous poem from 1711, An Essay on Criticism, reminding the nascent literary critics 
of the time that bad critique is much more harmful than the possible going-astray of a 
literary adventure. This already seems like an apt refrain for what distinguishes an alliance 
from the infernal alternatives of the modern tradition. For it reminds us that the angels’ 
fear needs to be honoured, it demands that we slow down, and proceed with care; but it 
does not in itself constitute a divine prohibition. In this case, moreover, ‘where angels fear 
to tread’ has yet another, entangled, but more circumscribed sense. This is that, as an ally 
of ANT myself, it has for a long time seemed to me that what animates the concerns of 
the actor-network theorist, when imagined as a conceptual persona, is intimately related 
to a certain figure of the angel, in the sense in which this figure has been characterised by 
someone who is arguably one of the most direct philosophical influences of ANT, namely, 
Michel Serres. 
Serres’ (1995: 7) angels, heirs of Hermes – the God of communication, of circulations and 
of translations – are messengers, quasi-objects, mediators, bearers of heterogeneous signals 
and hybrid information: ‘Angels are messengers. […] They appear and then disappear. It is said 
that they move through space at the speed of their own thoughts.’ As Serres’ conversational 
character, Pia, goes on to suggest: 
In the oldest traditions, angels do not necessarily take on human appearance; they may 
also inhabit the universe of things, whether natural or artificial […] The light that comes 
from the sun brings messages, which are decoded by optical or astrophysical instru-
ments; a radio aerial emits, transmits and receives; humans do not need to intervene 
here. […] We exchange information with objects that appear more as relations, token, 
codes, and transmitters.
(Serres, 1995: 52)
Making angels (or what ANT scholars might call ‘hybrids’) and their networks visible – in 
travelling letters, in human migrations, in scientific labs, through airports, in storms and 
climate patterns, in DNA ribbons, in the rain and the wind, in material designs, in the art of 
moving bodies, human and nonhuman – is no doubt the aim of Serres’ rather swashbuckling 
book. But is this not also, less romantically, the aim of actor-network theorists – might we 
call them angel-network theorists? – as travellers following ancient and novel ‘angelic paths’ 
(or, hybrid networks) that the modern tradition of the Great Divide has insisted on keeping 
apart? Is ANT, in some sense, not an attempt to retrace those paths that the modern tradition 
centrifugally expels into all kinds of hierarchies and classifications, into little circumspections 
and confines subsequently baptised as ‘social,’ or ‘natural,’ or ‘political,’ or ‘technological,’ or 
‘scientific’ or what have you, continuously enthroning and dethroning God, yet banishing 
these hybrid angels at every turn? 
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The banishing of angels is indeed the effect of the ‘crisscrossed schema’ of the moderns 
wherein Latour (1993: 34), in his landmark We Have Never Been Modern, had located their 
power:
They have not made Nature; they make Society; they make Nature; they have not 
made Society; they have not made either, God has made everything; God has made 
nothing, they have made everything. There is no way we can understand the moderns 
if we do not see that the four guarantees serve as checks and balances for one another. 
The first two make possible to alternate the sources of power by moving directly from 
our natural force to pure political force, and vice versa. The third guarantee rules 
out any contamination between what belongs to Nature and what belongs to poli-
tics, even though the first two guarantees allow a rapid alternation between the two. 
Might the contradiction between the third, which separates, and the first two, which 
alternate, be too obvious? No, because the fourth constitutional guarantee establishes 
as arbiter an infinitely remote God who is simultaneously totally impotent and the 
sovereign judge.
This modern constitution, with its checks and balances, was powerful because it, in turn, 
located everyone – natural scientists, social scientists, philosophers, theologians, politi-
cians, technicians – in their own little contradictory confines, on their respective trenches 
of the Great Divide. From there, they would appeal to their own transcendences and pu-
rified causalities, and in so doing insist on the banishing of angles and their hybrid modes 
of  existence – neither natural nor social, neither scientific nor political, neither godly nor 
earthly, and yet at once real and meaningful, relational and collective, divine and mun-
dane, human and other-than-human. But this modern operation was not almighty either – 
as both Serres and ANT scholars argue, angels nevertheless persisted in their proliferation. 
What it created, instead, was a particular kind of asymmetry, where nothing relates to 
anything else, unless it is entirely explained (away) by, and thus reduced to, something else. 
Start with the modern concept of Nature, and everything else becomes but particles in 
motion. Start with the modern concept of Society, and everything else becomes but dis-
course and ideology. It is in response to this particularly modern kind of asymmetry that 
ANT is born – as a counter-modern, empirical angelology concerned with the retracing 
of the tehcnoscientific networks through which angels arise thanks to, and in spite of, the 
trenches put up by modernity. 
One can thus appreciate the very dear place that the so-called principle of generalised symme-
try holds in ANT’s development. The principle, that is, to inhabit the middle kingdom, not 
to deploy the categories of the moderns to explain (away) the world, ‘not to impose a priori 
some spurious asymmetry among human intentional action and a material world of causal 
relations’ (Latour, 2005: 76). The metaphor of ‘generalised symmetry’ originally alluded to 
the attempt to correct the ultimately asymmetrical operation of the sociology of scientific 
knowledge (Latour 1993: 94–96), but we might in retrospect say that it was not the happiest 
of metaphors. Whenever it has been taken as a theoretical prescription, an ontological claim 
that would assert that ‘nothing is natural or cultural, everything is a relation of forces,’ or 
worse, a global political project animated by a moral command demanding that we ‘make 
the world symmetrical again,’ the principle of generalised symmetry has suffered the same 
sad fate as those modern concepts that have all too often been used as weapons: it transforms 
ANT into a general doctrine, capable of quashing any practice that diverges from its path. 
This has, of course, been an early and enduring criticism, that as Nick Lee and Steve Brown 
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(1994: 774) have put it, ANT is ‘so liberal and so democratic that it has no Other […] it has 
made itself into a “final” final vocabulary.’ As they go on to expand:
Having converted the world into a play of forces, [ANT] has no way of circumvent-
ing the formulaic circle of expansion, domination, and collapse. ANT has achieved a 
metalinguistic formulation– inscribed as problematization, interessement, enrolment, 
mobilisation, and dissidence (Callon 1986)– into which any sequence of human or 
nonhuman actions can be encoded. This amounts to a foreclosure of all alternative 
descriptions of the world through the assertion of total democracy and complete onto-
logical monadism.
(Lee & Brown, 1994: 781)
One can hardly imagine a better description of what happens when a proposition, with its 
singular interests and constraints, is turned into a programme that abstracts and legislates at 
everyone else’s peril. And while this critique has been duly ‘noted’ (Law, 1999, Latour, 1999), 
the degree to which it has infected the habits of ANT scholars more generally remains in 
my view an open question. It is echoed, for instance, in Latour’s (2005: 76, n. 86) footnoted 
concern about the perils of taking symmetry as a theoretical principle, in a book that neverthe-
less presents ANT as a particular theory of associations, and thus as a peculiar approach to 
sociology. Namely, the concern
that readers concluded from it [the principle] that nature and society had to be ‘main-
tained together’ so as to study ‘symmetrically’ ‘objects’ and ‘subjects’, ‘non-humans’ 
and ‘humans’. But what I had in mind was not and, but neither: a joint dissolution of both 
collectors.
Central as it was, the principle of generalised symmetry appears to have fuelled consider-
able theoretical hubris when it was a very specific kind of operation that was sought, one 
defined primarily in negative terms, as a rejection of the particular vectors of asymmetry 
that characterise modernity. Alas, general principles are never especially apposite to the 
crafting of specific operations. Following Latour’s (2005) footnote, by contrast, I would 
thus propose to understand ‘symmetry’ as a technical constraint: rejecting modern asym-
metry is what the hybrid mode of existence of angels itself demands if one is to become 
sensitive to them, to follow their paths and networks, to translate their messages, to have 
them matter. Start from Nature, from Society, from Politics, from God, and you will miss 
them as they pass.
Understanding ANT’s rejection of modern vectors of asymmetry as a technical constraint 
perhaps allows us, in turn, to situate the dreams of this empirical angelology otherwise. For it 
makes present that ANT may be best described not as a theory of the social, or of science; not 
as a theory of ‘material-semiotics,’ or of performativity; and not even as an ontology of action. 
Indeed, we might even go as far as to suggest that, despite its best efforts, ANT may not be 
another way of doing ‘social science’ at all (and that may be one of its strengths)! By contrast, 
I would tentatively propose to characterise ANT (angel-network tracing?) as its own singular 
practice, not in the ordinary acceptation of the term, but in the speculative sense given to this 
notion by Isabelle Stengers – a singular vector of divergence, of value-creation, situated by 
constraints imposed by the requirements and uncertainties it introduces, by the mode of exis-
tence of what makes it think, hesitate and hope, and its corresponding obligations. Perhaps we 
can risk characterising ANT thus, as a singular practice animated by, and concerned with, the 
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existence of a multiplicity of angels and the associations they make relevant.2 One that requires 
that hybrid angels not be banished by modern asymmetries, and one that is, in turn, obligated 
to follow their paths and networks wherever they may lead. Perhaps that is ANT’s own mode 
of divergence – for it is angels that make ANT practitioners think, hesitate and hope.
To be sure, at a time when capitalism continues to expand the territory of its cemetery of 
practices, the invention of a new practice is no minor achievement. What is more, to char-
acterise and celebrate ANT as a practice rather than as a theory, an approach or an ontology 
allows us to shift our mode of attention. Indeed, I must agree with Latour (1999) that the 
‘T’ (‘theory’) in ANT deserves a nail in the coffin (see also Jensen, this volume). Because no 
matter how immanent, how democratic, how empiricist, how symmetrical it may claim to 
be, a theory (not to mention an ‘ontology’) can hardly resist the temptation to legislate for 
everyone and everything, just as a different approach to the social sciences can hardly resist 
the temptation to compete with other approaches for who might be best equipped to define 
the nature of the social. Yet as Latour (2013) has more recently suggested, the networks with 
which ANT operates do not designate a general theory of being, but correspond to one mode 
of existence among others.
What the characterisation of ANT as a practice makes present, therefore, is that the other 
side of modern asymmetrical relations is not ‘generalised symmetry’ but a manifold oth-
erwise of possible relations to be dramatised. Indeed, as mathematicians would tell us, the 
relationship between symmetry and asymmetry is not itself a symmetrical relationship. And 
unlike a theory, which strives for the Archimedean point – indeed, the symmetrical mean – 
between everything it lays claims to, a practice has no such privileged foothold: from its 
singular situation, it must proffer its divergence into the world, among a multiplicity of 
other practices characterised by different modes of divergence, and is thus unable to single- 
handedly determine how it may interest others, how it may matter to them. In other words, 
ANT’s rejection of modern asymmetry helps us address the problem of the ways in which the 
moderns present themselves in a manner that disqualifies others, but as Stengers (2011: 360) 
herself suggests, ‘[s]ymmetry is not itself a solution to this problem.’
It is by appreciating ANT as a singular practice that I propose to further explore the 
relevance of Stengers’ philosophy in relation to it. Not because the latter may provide the 
solutions to the problem that the rejection of modern asymmetry enables us to explore, 
but because what it may make felt among ANT practitioners is precisely the importance of 
allowing themselves to be situated by their own practice – of affirming that while the world is 
populated by angels, it is not thoroughly made of them; that beyond angels and their paths 
there are other beings and connections whose differences cannot be symmetrised; that what 
makes ANT practitioners think, hesitate and hope is what defines and conveys significance 
to their practice, one among others. 
our symmetry, and theirs? Divergences of an ecology of practices
If Isabelle Stengers’ philosophy can be regarded as a possible ally to ANT, it is doubtless 
because some of the problems that animate both of them enjoy a certain affinity and reso-
nance. But Stengers is no actor-network theorist. Her experimentation with this imperative 
not to continue ploughing the Great Divide does not, in and of itself, found a new prac-
tice. It is instead concerned with the radical mutation of what that ancient practice called 
‘ philosophy’ might become capable of were it to refuse participation in the anonymous game 
of proclaiming yet another transcendental truth, yet another promise of eternal salvation (see 
Savransky, 2018). Which is to say that it is animated by an exploration of the question of 
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what a philosophy of practices might become, when this ‘of ’ designates not simply an object 
of thought but an entire technique of habitation – of attending to those modes of thinking, 
doing and feeling amongst which philosophy is forced to think; with which it may forge alliances 
against their ongoing capitalist devastation; in the presence of which it may risk propositions that 
gently shift the ways in which they may be capable of presenting themselves (Savransky, 2016). 
This task must, from the outset, come to terms with a profoundly asymmetrical space, 
in the modern sense of the term. For indeed, one of the possibles to which it must invent 
a response, one of the risks it is required to take, is that of characterising the singularity of 
divergent practices so as to wrest the dreams, hopes and fears that animate them, from the 
powers to authorise and disqualify by which some practices have deservedly acquired their 
‘modern’ badge. Crucially, Stengers undertook this task in response to a specific event, that 
is, the poisonous wrath of the Science Wars, which had physicists and social scientists, re-
spectively, defending against each other the primacy of a ‘physical’ and a ‘social’ reality, 
angrily claiming for themselves an ‘exclusive position of judgement over and against all other 
“realities,” including those of all other sciences’ (Stengers 2005a: 183). And it is in response 
to the speculative possibility of learning to produce another mode of astonishment, another 
way of presenting what makes a practice diverge, that Stengers articulates her proposition of 
an ‘ecology of practices’: ‘How can we make it possible for a modern practitioner to present 
herself, justify her practice, draw attention to what interests her, without that interest coin-
ciding with a disqualification?’ (Stengers, 2010: 49). 
It might be tempting to address this question itself as a matter of orchestrating a symmetry 
between modern and non-modern practices. But the aforementioned discussion may have 
already made present that such a response will not do, for ‘[t]he “we” who symmetrizes 
doesn’t speak “for everyone,” using words that also apply to us and to those we will encoun-
ter.’ (Stengers 2011: 362). A profoundly political shift is at stake here. Symmetry may be a 
relevant requirement for some practitioners, but it is not for that reason a solution capable of 
becoming a general means, a tool susceptible of securing a perfect communication among 
practices. To extend symmetry as a general principle would amount to confronting other 
practices, situated by different constraints, with the need to abandon their hopes and doubts, 
their dreams and their fears, to leave behind what matters to them, what makes them hesitate, 
whether these be the detection of neutrinos, the understanding of human emotions or the 
immaterial reality of ghosts. As such, symmetry itself would become the tool that thwarts 
other adventures in divergence. By contrast, Stengers’ ecology of practices has no recourse 
to such general harmonisations, and it cannot hope to represent the dreams of others in ways 
that would gain overall consent:
We, who are not angels but think in political terms, must therefore create obstacles 
that prevent us from rushing toward others while requiring that they resemble what we 
might become, obstacles that prepare us to wonder about their conditions, the condi-
tions they might establish for eventual exchange. This is our problem. Its construction 
in no way ensures that the [other] will meet with us (any more than the construction of 
an experimental device ensures that the being we wish to mobilize will show up). Our 
words are relative to our practices and we now ask that they will tell us which obliga-
tions will guide us where angels fear to tread.
(Stengers, 2011: 362)
In contrast to the tendency to read Stengers’ philosophy via ANT, the proposition of an 
ecology of practices should make anyone tempted to carry ‘symmetrical anthropology’ as 
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a rallying flag hesitate. If in erecting itself as a vocabulary capacious enough to provide the 
‘uniquely adequate description of a given situation,’ where every actor would be assigned a 
‘part in the plot’ (Latour 2005: 130), ANT occasionally ran the risk of allowing nothing to 
escape from its symmetrical webs, the proposition of an ecology of practices means nothing 
if it does not actively affirm an outside, always relative to its specific wager, but always inap-
propriable and beyond its grasp.3 
As such, by reminding us that ‘our words are relative to our practices,’ the notion of an 
ecology of practices introduces the possibility of a political revaluation of non-symmetrical 
relationships. It introduces this possible revaluation by making present that ‘symmetry’ is rel-
ative to this practice called ANT – it is a constraint relevant to those who are made to think, 
hope and dream by the passing of angels. But their passing is not everyone’s problem, and it 
does not turn ‘symmetry’ into a general mean, relevant to every practice. Beyond it, where 
angels fear to tread, multiple and always singular forms of divergence insist and persist, bring-
ing a multiplicity of other practices to life. What the proposition of an ecology of practices 
seeks to create, thus, is not a dissolution of these borders, the achievement of a final arrange-
ment of relations among practices that could enable them to live together happily ever after. 
It  corresponds instead to the very challenge of approaching each practice
as it diverges, that is, feeling its borders, experimenting with questions which practi-
tioners may accept as relevant, even if they’re not their own questions, rather than posing 
insulting questions that would lead them to mobilise and transform the border into a 
defence against their outside.
(Stengers, 2005a: 184)
This requires a new mode of appreciation. An appreciation of practices that is concerned 
with the possibility of disentangling that which may function as a force, luring practitioners 
into their own risky adventures of learning, from the power with which modern practices 
may turn their own situated lessons into wide-ranging generalities, capable of judgements 
that thwart others’ trajectories of apprenticeship. For after all, ‘no unifying body of knowl-
edge will ever demonstrate that the neutrino of physics can coexist with the multiple worlds 
mobilized by ethnopsychiatry’ (Stengers 2011: vii). That, in fact, is the test of the speculative 
proposition of an ecology of practices: cultivating, on a case-by-case basis, the possibility of 
turning polemical contradictions into immanent contrasts, where practices can describe their 
singularity, the hopes, dreams and fears that animate them, the values they create, without 
at the same time turning those attachments into rights, their values into claims, their dreams 
into theories.
And if this proposition is speculative, this is not least because it offers no guarantees and 
no methodological prescriptions – a speculative proposition does not have the power to 
bring about that which it calls for (Savransky, 2017). Indeed, the proposition of an ecology 
of practices is not a programme that would have every practice consenting to a new way of 
describing what matters to it, and it excludes ‘the possibility that it might become a source 
of values everyone would be required to submit to, and in whose name everyone’s place and 
relationships could be determined’ (Stengers 2011: 367). It involves political transformations 
but not in the sense that it would create representatives of practices in a new Parliament of 
Things, which for its part requires practitioners interested in the challenge of collectively rein-
venting the dreams and fears that shape the territory of their practices, but in no way prepares 
them ‘to meet someone who refuses to cooperate, to play the game, to take an interest in the 
challenge associated with those values’ (ibid.: 366). 
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The ecology of practices involves political transformations in the sense that it estab-
lishes non-symmetrical relationships. Unlike the asymmetries of the Modern Constitution, 
which imply hierarchisation, infernal alternatives, judgements and disqualifications, these 
non- symmetrical passages authorise nothing – they belong to an experience of metamorphosis 
that, in the presence of those who nevertheless remain other, enables one to feel one’s own 
attachments in a different way. And metamorphoses, while they may be shared, are hardly 
ever symmetrical, for ‘[w]e can never fully understand another’s dreams, hopes, doubts and 
fears, in the sense that an exact translation could be provided, but we are still transformed as 
they pass into our experience’ (ibid.: 371). Indeed, the non-symmetrical metamorphoses on 
which an ecology of practices wagers open a host of other political relations belonging to a 
world without symmetrical mean yet crossed by tangential passages, infinitely close contacts 
along a curve of divergence, and oblique angles of exchange involving transductions and 
transitions across borders. Relations that establish no new settlement, no new agreed defi-
nition of the common world, but ‘an experience of deterritorialization,’ conferring on the 
singular manner in which a practice inhabits its situation the power to make it think. There 
is no achievement of symmetry here. What such deterritorialisation accomplishes, instead, is 
to make the practitioner brush against the borders of her practice – to provoke
an experience of “feeling” one’s own territory, and as result a practitioner, modern or not, 
may […] discover that her practice situates her, resulting in a nonequivalence that she is 
meant to actualize, that makes her hope, doubt, dream, and fear.
(Stengers, 2011: 372)
Where angels fear to tread: an experience of capture
To suggest that an ecology of practices involves a multiplicity of non-symmetrical deterri-
torialisations and metamorphic political relations means that it can be neither produced at 
will, nor by discursive argumentation. No single vocabulary or argumentation, however 
capacious, will be able to bring it about:
such an argumentation is ruled by the fiction of the everybody or the anyone –  ‘everybody 
should agree that …’. ‘anyone should accept this or that consequence …’ – a fiction 
which downgrades to good will and enlightenment the creation of the possibility of a 
conjunction, ‘this and that’ where the disjunction ‘this or that’, leading to war, ruled 
before.
(Stengers, 2005a: 194)
The possible actualisation of an ecology of practices, therefore, is never guaranteed – it 
may happen, but it is never deserved, and does not correspond to any right. There is thus 
no final answer to the question that animates Stengers’ philosophy: it postulates no ideal 
horizon, and no set of concepts that will give theorists the power to roam the world iden-
tifying and recognising their analytical pertinence in spite of specific and always singularly 
demanding situations.
As I have intimated earlier, between symmetry and non-symmetry lurks a marked politi-
cal option – a divergent path that concerns the question of what the always unstable possibility 
of a problematic coexistence may require before it itself becomes perceptible. And it is notably 
around more openly political, or ‘cosmopolitical,’ questions, that the divergences that par-
tially connect these two paths of thought and inquiry (Stengers’ and ANT’s) are conspicuously 
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expressed. While Latour (2004) would on occasion characterise ‘comsopolitics’ as the vector 
and collective achievement of a new distribution of powers, the provisional construction of 
a new, angel-inclusive, democratic assembly oriented towards progressive composition of a 
good common world, in Stengers the term is deeply aligned to the experience of reciprocal 
reterritorialisation that accompanies the ecology of practices. A profoundly non-symmetrical 
experience indeed, because the cosmopolitical corresponds precisely to the requirement ‘of 
imbuing political voices with the feeling that they do not master the situation they discuss.’ 
As such, it makes resonate the ongoing problematic of a political arena that is ‘peopled with 
shadows of that which does not have a political voice, cannot have or does not want to have one’ 
(Stengers 2005b: 996). Thus, cosmopolitics designates not the realisation of maximal dem-
ocratic inclusion, where an entire ‘cosmos’ may be assembled, but a generative ‘unknown’ 
constituted by what a multiplicity of divergent practices may eventually become capable of: 
Cosmopolitics introduces what is neither an activity, nor a practice, but the mode in which 
the problematic copresence of practices may be actualized: the experience, always in the present, 
of the one into whom the other’s dreams, doubts, hopes, and fears pass. It is a form of 
asymmetrical reciprocal capture that guarantees nothing, authorises nothing, and cannot be 
stabilized by any constraint, but through which the two poles of the exchange undergo 
a transformation that cannot be appropriated by any objective definition.
(Stengers 2011: 372. emphasis added) 
We thus come full circle – to discover that the circle is no longer perfect. It has broken loose. 
ANT, angel-network theory, angel-network tracing: the problem has changed. Neither a 
matter of course, nor a mere misunderstanding, addressing the relevance of Stengers’ philos-
ophy itself involves accepting a possible experience of capture, requiring a metamorphosis of 
one’s own. Unlike so many of the theories populating the contemporary academic landscape, 
Stengers’ concepts do not provide anyone with ready-made tools. They cannot be passed 
from hand to hand without transforming the habitual gestures of the hand that holds them. 
This is because these tools provoke thought to respond to a possible whose coming about 
will have the character of a pluralistic event – a response to a held out hand, by another hand 
stretched out from the other side, from an immanent but inappropriable beyond. For this rea-
son, when addressing her philosophy, one should move carefully, and remember: one might 
find oneself there, where angels fear to tread. 
Notes
 1 One of the ways by which ANT continues to recreate itself amongst its practitioners is no doubt 
through an ongoing interrogation about what ANT is. Relatedly, there is, of course, an equally 
open question about where it begins and where it ends vis-à-vis the work of its most prominent 
representatives. Because of the singular alliance between Stengers and Latour, I shall focus here 
exclusively on some of the latter’s direct contributions to ANT, while leaving for another occasion 
an examination of Latour’s (2013) most dramatic departure from it in his AIME project, where 
networks become one mode of existence among others.
 2 As mentioned in the previous footnote, it is in his Inquiry that Latour (2013) dramatises a movement 
beyond ANT that simultaneously situates the latter as concerned with only one mode of existence 
among others, with their own specific “felicity conditions.”
 3 And in this sense, while Latour’s (2013) AIME project constitutes a stepping out of ANT that, in 
turn, situates the latter, one would be forgiven from wondering whether, in some significant re-
spects, rather than an attempt to affirm an outside, AIME might not rather be an attempt to expand 
the power of our grasp. But this is a question for another exploration.
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Trading zones in science are frictional arenas for exchange processes among academic dis-
ciplines and traditions. Here, concepts, methods, questions and sensibilities come to be ap-
propriated, translated, transformed and repurposed in processes that are not exempt from 
problematisations and ambivalences concerning the things exchanged. Trading zones are 
thus open spaces, in the sense that they involve seeking inspiration and learning from a cer-
tain discipline, while at the same time posing critical questions, highlighting absences and 
adding supplements. The figure of the trading zone is thus particularly helpful to grasp the 
spirit of the contributions gathered in the following section, as they involve engagements 
with ANT aimed at both problematising specific absences and tensions generated by ANT 
intellectual practices and retooling existing versions of ANT for other projects and purposes. 
What unites all these contributions, and makes them good companions to think with, is that 
they involve friendly forms of critique and reinvention, in the sense that they are dedicated 
to making propositions on how to continue thinking and inquiring near or alongside ANT.
A first problematisation comes from Nigel Clark’s concern with what can go wrong when 
people get interested in the non-human. Clark makes a powerful argument about how the 
major strength of ANT, namely, the radically relational understanding of all existents, es-
pecially non-humans, can turn into its Achilles’ heel, if, and this is crucial, ANT scholars 
would stick to only one form of relationality epitomised by the notion of entanglement. Such 
term would entail the symmetrical co-production of parts entangled, thus overlooking what 
Clark describes as radically asymmetrical forms of relationality shaping how human collec-
tives unilaterally depend on and are exposed to non-human processes and forces. What can 
go wrong, Clark argues, is not just the knowledge that is thus produced, but most impor-
tantly the politics that derives from it. A proof for this may be found in the new vocabularies 
of asymmetry that Latour has recently developed, as he has turned to the problem of how to 
face Gaia in the current climate regime.
Something like a reversal of Clark’s problematisation can be found in Kane Race’s explo-
ration of the unfortunate and somewhat strange non-relationship between ANT and queer 
theory. The reversal of the problem might be formulated as what goes wrong when some 
versions of ANT overlook not just queer bodies, but bodily becomings and affectivities in 
Section 3
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Problematisations and ambivalences
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general. The problem Race suggests for ANT is at least double. On the one hand, ANT be-
comes unilaterally concerned with the emergence of ‘molar assemblages,’ that is, with large 
and stabilised sociotechnical arrangements or infrastructures, thus losing sight of twisted, 
rhizomatic and disruptive molecular encounters. On the other hand, ANT sticks to the 
problem of agency and actorhood, even if it is now relationally distributed, thus missing 
the eventfulness of the social – or what Race describes as a move from actor-networks to 
event-networks. But, instead of then dismissing ANT, what Race’s contribution does is to 
read queer theory as an actor-network theory of queer bodies and politics. We have always 
been actor-network theorists, Race implies, when demonstrating the central role played by 
human–non-human articulations in the work of the most influential queer theorists. 
Concerned with the extent to which ANT’s relational ontology is capable of tracing the 
virtual, affective and atmospheric capacities of both human and non-human bodies, Derek 
P. McCormack’s contribution points also to the problem of actualism in ANT’s conceptual 
languages. However, instead of just seconding Nigel Thrift, who once described ANT as 
‘champagne without the fizz,’ McCormack shows how various authors have attempted to 
perform an affective turn with the help of ANT, as it allows to pay attention to the objectual, 
technical and infrastructural arrangements of affective experiences and, more accurately, 
affective atmospheres. And, yet, McCormack argues, ANT accounts need to be careful not 
to treat the atmospheric as an object or an actor-network. The challenge, he observes, is to 
experiment more with affective modes of writing, producing accounts that are less about de-
scribing, as ANT scholars famously proclaimed, than about becoming attuned to unformed 
and moving objects. Interestingly, McCormack’s own contribution might offer an example 
of such writing, as it begins with a story of his own encounter with ANT, while at the same 
time refusing to produce a bounded version of ANT. 
How to care for our accounts is also the question that Sonja Jerak-Zuiderent explores in 
her conceptual-ethnographic piece on two very different sets of practices of prostate cancer 
screening and the affective and ethico-political implications of how medical doctors and 
medical researchers engage with patients. At stake, she argues, is the problem of agency and 
what human actors do with the agency that is gifted to them in such socio-medical assem-
blages. In two ethnographic vignettes, Jerak-Zuiderent contraposes her own disconcertment 
as an ethnographer with healthcare practices based on friendly, but solid and authoritative 
knowing from the side of the doctors vis-à-vis her own identification as a scholar with 
the more speculative and motile practices of researchers in a large cancer prostate study. 
Caring for others, while caring for our accounts, requires then a commitment to more-
than- knowing practices, that is, a commitment for speculation as a mode of engaging with 
otherwise neglected things. Caring also for ANT, Jerak-Zuiderent makes the effort of ex-
ploring the least mainstream ANT contributions that fit well with the feminist tradition in 
science and technology studies concerned with questions of care.
Probably, the most transformative reading of ANT at work in this sections’ companion-
ate trading zone can be found in Francis Halsall’s discussion of whether ANT is equivalent 
to contemporary artistic practices. In his reading, central tenets of ANT, especially those 
concerning the decentring of subjects and objects, are indeed shared with contemporary 
artistic practices and need to be understood as effects of late capitalism and the proliferation 
of multiple systems of communication and control. The consequences of such reading are 
significant and rather critical. The first one, Halsall observes, is that the claims to validity of 
ANT accounts cannot refer to epistemological criteria, but only to aesthetic choices. What 
does that mean for ANT, he asks. The second one, Halsall claims, is that ANT would be 
subject to the same criticism that many contemporary art practices are confronted with: That 
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by celebrating the dispersion and fractality of subjects and objects, it reproduces the cultural 
semantics and cultural figures of late capitalist regimes. 
Staying closer to the challenge of ANT to the sociologies of the social and with that to 
the constitution of Euro-American modernity, Marcelo C. Rosa explores the convergences 
between ANT and Southern sociologies. The article provides a detailed discussion of key 
mechanisms through which sociologists from the South have been historically participating 
in a global division of academic labour, whereby theory is developed in Euro-America and 
applied in the South, producing dynamics of internal colonialism and reproducing a liberal 
ontology of the social. In this context, Rosa sees in the ANT/Southern sociology encounter 
an opportunity to strengthen a knowledge politics that is not bounded to a fixed modern lib-
eral ontology, but committed to visibilising variable and emergent ontologies. More specifi-
cally, Rosa postulates that the work of Eduardo Viveiros de Castro and Marisol de la Cadena 
could be seen as exemplars of a crossing between ANT and Southern sociologies, a crossing 
that results in bringing ‘the geos’ into ANT’s preoccupation with ontological politics.
Finally, in yet another turn of the screw, Wen-Yuan Lin is concerned with the extent 
to which ANT’s infra-language to describe articulations of heterogeneous actors might be 
reproducing a specific Euro-American naturalistic ontology of differences in kind that result 
in a language of purification and hybridisation. The problem, he observes, is the extent to 
which ANT might end up concealing other ontologies by redescribing them in terms of its 
naturalistic infra-language. Inspired by Viveiros de Castro’s development of a perspectival 
anthropology resulting from its encounter with Amerindian ontologies, Lin discusses how 
researching with ANT into the ontology of Chinese medicine (CM) should have a recursive 
import for the articulation of a different, CM-inflected ANT. Based on CM philosophy 
and practices in Taiwan, Lin provides an empirical account of the ontological groundings 
of three key CM notions, those of correlativity, propensity and patterning. CM, Lin argues, 
involves different modes of doing difference in different locations according to different 
schools of practices. What would it mean for ANT to do difference this way, always open to 
subversions and equivocations? How to reinvent ANT as an intellectual practice not defined 
by a specific infra-language? And where in the process does ANT (need to) end? These are 
precisely the kind of questions that are posed in ANT’s trading zones.
158
My account of actor-network theory and its tussling with the non-human might surprise 
many of its adherents for I will be suggesting that ANT has significant limits precisely where 
others discern its greatest strengths.
ANT counsels us to challenge assumptions that scientific or technological specialists have 
the right to superscribe our conduct in the world based on their own privileged access to the 
workings of ‘nature.’ At the same time, by affording non-humans a vital role in the constitu-
tion of our collective existence, ANT resists the fallback of conventional social thought that 
the stuff of physical existence boils down to whatever sociocultural actors choose to make 
of it.
More than simply inducting the non-human into social thought, ANT foregrounds re-
lationality. Or rather, particular modes of relating. As the conceptual and titular centrality 
of the ‘network’ indicates, ANT prompts us to conceive of humans and non-humans as 
interconnected, consubstantial, co-constituted: Which is to say, not simply meeting in some 
middle ground as pregiven entities – but actually shaping each other in and through their 
encounters.
Social scientists are no strangers to this kind of relationality, especially in the era of glo-
balisation. Neither are natural scientists – in a time when studies of complex systems abound. 
What ANT has done so effectively, however, is to merge these two sets of concerns into a 
kind of meta-relationality. It has achieved this by generating forms of inquiry that permit us 
to track back and forth and through all manner of heterogeneous entities without their a priori 
placement in categories of the social or the natural.
But in its very success in elaborating upon a particular kind of relationship, I suggest, 
ANT has diverted attention away from other sorts of relating – and from the ways non- 
humans might be implicated in these other relational modes. This is a claim that I expect 
to be controversial, both because ANT scholars have good reason to be deeply invested in 
notions of entanglement or inter-implication, and because – if we look closely – it is not hard 
to find traces of other kinds of relating in ANT.
Keeping these reservations in mind, I make a case for supplementing the concern with re-
ticulated, co-constitutive relations with some of these other modes of relating – with no claim 
to being exhaustive. One alternative kind of relating I discuss is the situation in which some 
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things or processes serve as the condition of possibility of other things – what has been termed 
antecedent or subtending relations (Clark and Hird, 2014). In such cases, relationships – if we 
can still call them that – are not so much ‘mutual’ or ‘inter’ – but tend to be one-way or at least 
profoundly uneven (Clark, 2011: 46–50). Radically asymmetrical or subtending relations are 
especially important in the context of the non-human, I propose, if we take into account that 
the earth and cosmos came into existence long before our own species appeared.
Another kind of relating – perhaps even less ‘relational’ – characterises those situations 
where there are deep, constitutive rifts between or within entities. While ANT scholars tend 
to assume it is networking ‘all the way down,’ there are other thinkers who attest that frac-
turing or separation is every bit as ‘fundamental’ as connectivity or entwinement.
Finally, we might also consider a sort of relating/non-relating that occurs in the interior-
ity of things – human or non-human. That is to say, all the inner qualities or goings-on of an 
object that are at any moment not available to enter into interactions with other objects – for 
which some theorists dare to use the unfashionable term ‘essence.’
This is not a contest. I am not setting up these other forms of relating as superior to or 
more momentous than the relationalities favoured by ANT. So why make a fuss about dif-
ferent modes of relationing? Surely, at a time in which human imbrication with non-human 
world seems to reaching unprecedented degrees of intensity and extensiveness, when our 
entwinings stretch from the innermost recesses of the genetic code to the operating state of 
the entire planet, it is entanglement that is our most pressing concern? At a moment when 
the politicisation of nature is so urgent but so precarious – why flirt with relational modali-
ties that seem to come with dubious or risky political implications? And why pick on ANT 
when social thought is still populated by schools and approaches that barely attend to the 
non-human?
What my ‘other’ types of relating/non-relating bring into relief, in their various ways, is 
a kind of excess – a before, a beyond/beneath, a within – to the networking of human and 
non-human. This excess, in its different manifestations, is a reminder that there are limits to 
our capacity to collectively reshape our worlds. So while I emphatically agree that we ought 
to be constantly advancing ‘the political’ into new contexts, I also want to insist that not 
everything is open to negotiation, and that there is value in engaging with those domains or 
regions of existence that resist our overtures. If too much attention is focused on the inter of 
interconnectivity – or in some registers, the intra of intraconnectivity – there is a risk that we 
 underestimate the power of the non-human to take us by surprise, to undermine or over-
whelm our collective endeavours. To put it another way, privileging the mutuality of human–
non-humans relations will encourage us to direct our inquiries to objects, events and processes 
where ‘we’ and our non-human ‘others’ are discernibly co-present – in the process discour-
aging us from dwelling sufficiently on the more distant, withdrawn or obdurately inhuman.
And this is where things can go wrong, sometimes badly. For if non-human forces or 
phenomena can both give and take away the conditions we’ve come to depend upon, then we 
will be dangerously unprepared if our eyes are only on the knot or node of interconnectivity. 
By the time we have become entangled with the surging wave, the firefront, the predaceous 
organism, it may already be too late.
Focusing on the canonical work of Bruno Latour, and using two examples that already 
feature in ANT research – microbial life and climate change – I show how following things 
themselves to their logical conclusion draws us more deeply into the excess of the non- 
human than most ANT has been willing to venture.
There is, however, a twist to my tale. Just as I have suggested that ANT afficionados might 
be surprised by my critique, so too have I been taken by surprise. For in his recent work, 
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especially his encounters with Gaia, Latour has plunged into the very before, beneath, be-
yond that I have in the past insisted ANT would never take seriously. This ‘metamorphosis,’ 
I propose, potentially transforms the relationships between the political, the epistemological 
and the ontological that have until now set the contours of ANT – raising some intriguing 
possibilities of reimagining the inhuman.
Networking with non-humans
Let’s start with what goes right when ANT interests itself in the non-human. Thinking in 
terms of entangled, co-constituted humans and non-humans encourages us to see how cer-
tain kinds of problems emerge from treating these as distinct realms – even as we go about 
generating evermore dense and bristling mixtures.
Immersing themselves in the knots, nodes and networks that configure ordinary exis-
tence, ANT researchers remind us that heterogeneous gatherings are the rule not the ex-
ception, and that objects or identities do not precede the jostle of relationality. ‘Things are 
everywhere mixed with people, they always have been,’ insists Latour (2003: 37). Or in the 
words of John Law ‘Contra appearances, nature is always entangled with culture and society. 
To negotiate the structure of one is to negotiate the structure of the others’ (2004: 121).
A methodology and guide for living as much as a conceptual framework, ANT offers 
 procedures for spotting, tracking and grappling with a rich bestiary of significant actors. 
It seeks to make our worlds fairer, more livable, less crisis-prone by demonstrating how 
the arrangements we affirm as ‘modern’ too often entail things slung together crudely and 
 incautiously. Eschewing templates and decrees, ANT advocates a careful (re)ordering of our 
sociomaterial networks so they will be more likely to do the things we want, hold up under 
pressure and leave room for the emergence of the new. Networks will have a much bet-
ter chance of performing in these ways, it is claimed, if we all take responsibility for their 
composition and maintenance rather leaving the crucial decisions to a select contingent of 
experts. And so Latour calls on ‘all of us, scientists, activists, politicians alike, to compose the 
common world’ (2010: 12).
One of the great appeals of this vision is that it is at once political, epistemological and 
ontological. Classic ANT is political in the way that it multiplies and redistributes capacities 
to speak and act, epistemological in its meticulous attention to the processes through which 
knowledge is composed, ontological in that it shows how truth claims and political mobili-
sations transform the fabric of existence. It is onto-political-epistemological in that it sutures 
together these different aspects of world-building, and fuses them in a blazing ambition to 
democratise the very composition of the cosmos.
But what is perhaps ANT’s most beautiful aspiration, I propose, is also a source of tension 
and foreclosure. Tension because the core commitment to the question of how scientists 
and other knowledge claimants access reality does not necessarily sit comfortably with the 
idea that there are worlds of non-humans interacting amongst themselves. And foreclosure 
because the intent on demonstrating how material existence itself bears the imprint of our 
efforts to engage with it has meant that there is a preference in ANT to focus on those aspects 
of reality where these traces are most discernible – at the expense of other fields or domains 
where their significance is more questionable. In short, some modes of relating, types of ob-
ject and forms of experience are more conducive to the running together of the epistemolog-
ical, the ontological and the political than others. And indeed, as I will try to show using the 
examples of microbial life and climate change, some of ANT’s own most audacious claims 
about non-human ‘things-in-themselves’ tend to get sidelined in the process.
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Microbial underworlds, planetary climates
Latour’s (1988) account of the performances through which Louis Pasteur elevated microbes 
into active participants in 19th-century French society is justifiably regarded as an ANT clas-
sic. The story demonstrates how Pasteur and his allies enterprisingly assemble novel networks 
that render germs visible – in the process enabling both scientists and microbes to emerge as 
consequential actors. In this way, epistemology – Pasteur’s procedures for studying and disclos-
ing microbial worlds – is presented as inseparably bound up with the ontological positing of 
microorganisms as a specific category of being and with the political process of constructing 
effective sociotechnical networks.
But how does this sit alongside Latour’s equally celebrated assertion in the Irreductions 
section of the Pasteurization book that non-human things-in-themselves ‘lack nothing,’ that 
they ‘get by very well without any help from us’ (1988: 193), and consequent on this condi-
tion of autonomy, that ‘(e)very actant makes a whole world for itself ’? (1988: 192). It is this 
‘symmetrical’ treatment of non-humans and humans that helps us to see how microbes share 
the agency in Pasteur’s networks and to grasp why we cannot expect them to always bow to 
our will. But if we consider the centrality of epistemology in the Pasteur tale – what becomes 
of this symmetry? What’s going on in Latour’s canny but slippery assertion that ‘after 1864 
airborne germs were there all along’ (1999: 173).
By the time Latour had assembled the Pasteur narrative, evolutionary theorist Lynn 
 Margulis was already deep in conversation with chemist James Lovelock about the role of 
microbial life in the Gaia hypothesis – of which more later. Margulis, whose early accounts 
of the symbiotic composition of bacteria faced formidable disciplinary resistance, knows all 
about the work that needs to be done to build a scientific network. But at the same time she 
would also insist that she and fellow scientists are themselves one of the outcomes of bac-
terial interactivity. For as Margulis liked to remind us, not only did microbes generate the 
unthinkably complex web of interconnectivity scientists call the biosphere, they also serve as 
the building blocks and ongoing life support systems of all the composite beings that are ‘big 
like us’ (1998; see also Hird, 2009).
In the ‘later Latour’ and indeed in the ‘earlier Latour’ of Irreductions, one can imagine 
a deep fidelity to the world-building and body-building achievements of microbial life, a 
deference that might well run to acknowledging that vast associations of microbes helped 
bring Pasteur into being well before Pasteur brought microbes into modern social life. But it 
is the pre-eminence of epistemology in the Pasteurization story, I want to suggest, that holds 
these other more ‘ontological’ possibilities at bay, for it is the prioritisation of the apparatuses, 
procedures and performances through which Pasteur lends existence to the microbial under-
world that leaves the strongest legacy in ANT. To put it another way, what things do amongst 
themselves or how they might incidentally provide conditions of possibility for human life 
take a back seat, while the question of how ‘we’ reveal, translate and orchestrate these things 
moves firmly into the driver’s seat.
From our perspective, microbes are very small and climate change is very big, though as 
the Lovelock–Margulis Gaia thesis makes clear, climate and microorganismic life have been 
shaping each other throughout most of earth history (a reminder, as if you needed it, that 
interactivity or co-constitutive relations are indeed important!). Climate change isn’t con-
spicuous in We Have Never Been Modern, but Latour opens the book with the problem of the 
thinning ozone layer (1993: 1). At a time when natural science held a near monopoly over the 
presentation and interpretation of evidence about global environmental change, Latour offers 
a timely reminder that other kinds of inquiry and storytelling play a constitutive role in the 
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‘event’ of the ozone hole – a message that characteristically does not permit critical thought 
the consolation of old school social constructionism.
As climate change establishes itself as a vital theme of Latour’s work, it joins the ‘pro-
liferation of hybrids’ announced by We Have Never Been Modern. As one of the ‘collective 
experiments mixing humans and non-humans together’ (Latour, 2003: 5), global warming 
is a controversy that cannot be left to the authority of the natural sciences and their claim to 
speak of a single unified nature, but must instead be taken as an incitement for new political 
experiments in which the very constitution of the cosmos is opened to painstaking collective 
negotiation.
Much of the subsequent debate in and around successive UN climate change conferences 
would seem to bear this out. But what we also need to keep in mind is that human-triggered 
climate change only makes sense in the context of a planet upon which climate is changeable, 
in the bigger picture of an earth with a great many climatic transformations in its turbulent 
history. Global climate, in this regard, always involves a multitude of interacting compo-
nents. But only once out of an exceedingly long series of climatic fluctuations and shifts does 
it appear that anthropogenic ingredients have been a significant part of this mix.
Eloquent in its engagement with contemporary climate change, classic Latourian ANT, 
I am suggesting, offers few guidelines as to how we might account for the deep history of 
earthly climate, for the way climate shaped our species long before we shaped climate, or for 
how past climatic oscillations might have carved deep rifts in human experience –  including 
being implicated in the loss of whole branches of the hominid lineage. Though such ques-
tions do resonate with Michel Serres’ stunning evocation of an upheaving earth at the close of 
The Natural Contract: ‘A thousand useless ties come undone, liquidated, while out of the shad-
ows beneath unbalanced feet arises essential being, background noise, the rumbling world: 
the hull, the beam, the keel, the powerful skeleton…’ (1995: 124).
What Serres seems to be returning us to is not simply a planet that is indifferent to our 
entreaties, but an earth whose very indifference is also the condition of possibility of our 
existence. Which brings us back to the question of how the same non-humans who ANT 
credits with making whole worlds quite apart from any human summoning seem somehow 
to end up depending upon us to work them into a meaningful, well-constructed cosmos.
in excess of networking
In any consideration of ANT’s prevailing framing of the non-human, we should be mindful 
of the centrality of overhauling the ‘modern’ human/non-human or society/nature dualism. 
Nothing is more disparaged in ANT than a natural science that claims to speak for a ‘nature’ 
from which all traces of society have been evacuated, and its counterpart, social thought that 
conjures a human subject insulated from its physico-material context. In order to ‘combat the 
epistemologists who are trying to purify science of any contamination by the social’ (1999: 19), 
Latour takes aim at ‘the strange invention of an “outside world”’ while simultaneously swiping 
at the old school humanists’ equally phantasmic ‘brain in the vat’ (1999: 3–7).
Along these lines, any epistemology that does not acknowledge its own implication in the 
admixture of the human and non-human, any mode of inquiry that invests in a reality that is 
‘independent, prior, single and determinant’ (Law, 2004: 137) is charged with circumventing 
and undermining the due processes of the onto-political. ‘Nature’ purged of its social entan-
glements and co-constituents ‘appears as what it always was, namely, the most comprehensive 
political process ever to gather into one superpower everything that must escape the vagaries 
of the society “down there”’ (Latour, 1999: 297).
163
What can go wrong with the non-human?
Classic ANT prohibits direct access to the ‘out there’ on the grounds that all inquiry is a 
translation – and thus a transformation – rather than a mirroring of its object. Or rather, every 
epistemological intervention to some degree alters the expansive field or network through 
which ‘subjects’ and ‘objects’ are constituted. In accordance with this alternative ‘relational’ 
onto-epistemology, then, any non-naïve study of the non-human will likely home in on the 
knots of connectivity, the zones of mutual entanglement, the practices of co-constitutions 
of the human and non-human. And in this way, each carefully framed study, each cautious 
intervention or each well-constructed experiment makes its own modest addition to the 
democratisation of the cosmos.
But what happens in this scenario to those celebrated legions of non-humans who persist 
in making worlds of their own – impervious to our inquiries and imaginings? What is their 
fate if we cannot speak of them without immediately foregrounding our entanglement with 
them? In this regard, it is revealing that philosopher Graham Harman, one of Latour’s most 
outspoken fans, concedes that across the entire Latourian corpus, there are to be found ‘only 
flickering hints of networks devoid of human involvement’ (2009: 124). And the same might 
be said of ANT scholarship across the board.
If in theory ANT posits world upon world of resoundingly non-human actors, in practice, 
it would appear that the realm of the inhuman has shrunk to the point where it overlaps with 
‘our’ world with almost no remainder. By the time Latour asserts that ‘the very extension of 
science, technologies, markets, etc. has become almost coextensive with material existence’ 
(2007: 7), it seems the best non-humans can do is to periodically resist our enrolments or to 
subsist in the shadowy interstices of our own far-reaching sociotechnical networks.
What has happened here, I would suggest, has a lot to do with the quest to bring 
 ontology – our beliefs, however speculative and provisional, about what exists – into line 
with  epistemology – how we access the world, and politics – how we might compose our 
worlds otherwise. As Harman has it: ‘Latour conflates (the) issue of the knowability of the 
real with the entirely different question of whether the real exists beneath the current rela-
tional networks of actors’ (2014: 59). While Latour-as-ontologist (Harman would even say 
metaphysician) joyfully liberates the inhuman from our probing and scribing, Latour- as- 
epistemologist reframes the ‘out there’ in terms of how it is accessed, which almost always 
seems to mean human access. And in this way, the political task of democratisating the 
cosmos comes to rest ultimately on our entanglements with non-humans – at the expense 
of their entanglement with each other, or their asymmetrical relations, or our exposure to 
the fallout of their encounters.
While ANT most often couches its epistemological and onto-political advances in coun-
terpoint to the modern natural and social sciences, there is a telling contrast – in this regard – 
with post-war continental philosophy.
Like ANT, much recent philosophy has sought to make sense of the deep and momentous 
malfunctional streak in modern thought and practice – and especially with the events that 
punctuate ‘a century of unutterable suffering’ (Levinas, 1998: 80). What Michel Foucault – 
in conversation with Maurice Blanchot – refers to as ‘thought from the outside’ (1987,16) 
might be defined, amongst other things, by its positing, probing and speculating about those 
forms of ‘extremity’ that exceed our capacity for knowing or even imagining. The term of-
ten used for the experience of events that resist sense-making, resist scientific capture, resist 
any form of reappropriation, is ‘the impossible’ (Lynes, 2018: xxxviii).
The excess with which this enigmatic ‘impossibility’ or ‘experience of the outside’ grap-
ples has been construed in different ways: As a great roiling inhuman exteriority, as a bub-
bling over of potentiality from within, as an insurmountable rift gouged by catastrophe and 
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trauma. But where this mode of philosophical inquiry tends to diverge from the main thrust 
of ANT has been its willingness to unhinge ontology from epistemology. While ANT, I 
have been suggesting, tends to downsize the realm of existence until it is more-or-less con-
gruent with the reach of epistemology, philosophical ‘thought from the outside’ has tended 
to contract the domain of epistemology such that it nestles precariously amidst the vastness 
of being and becoming.
By no means am I proposing that these currents of continental philosophy do all the 
work we need to confront the inhuman. Far from it, they and their inheritors have much to 
learn from the rigour and meticulousness with which ANT approaches the non-human – 
 especially in its more mundane manifestations. But what philosophy’s tussling with exte-
riority and extremity does is to remind us of the range of modes of relating other than the 
interactions of reciprocity, entanglement and co-enactment.
Like Serres’ confrontation with the earthquake – which indeed channels philosophical 
‘thought from the outside’ – we are prompted to consider not only the abyssal reaches beneath 
human–non-human networking, but the inescapable exposure of every human endeavour to 
events that exceed our capacities to know or negotiate. And this tells us something about the 
fragility of the networks ‘we’ would assemble and maintain that goes far beyond the question 
of injudicious construction.
But here is the twist in the tale. Over recent years, sparked by increasingly profound 
concern with the planetary predicament, ANT has begun to take its own plunge into ex-
cess and extremity. In the process, things-in-themselves have started to break free of their 
epistemological holding pattern and reassert something of their brute and boisterous early 
promise.
ANT’s metamorphosis?
Not long ago, in keeping with my concerns about ANT’s predilection for a certain species 
of relationality, I grumbled: ‘It is difficult to imagine Bruno Latour, or those in his orbit, 
speaking of nature as ground’ (2011: 45). But as Latour’s engagement with climate change, 
Earth system science and the Gaia hypothesis has deepened, I’ve had to repeal this verdict 
(see Clark, 2015). In the paper ‘Agency at the Time of the Anthropocene,’ Latour announces: 
‘The prefix “geo” in geostory does not stand for the return to nature, but for the return of 
object and subject back to the ground —the “metamorphic zone”’ (2014a: 16, my italics; see 
also Latour, 2017: 57–58). In more detail:
Why does it seem so important to shift our attention away from the domains of nature 
and society toward the common source of agency, this “metamorphic zone” where we 
are able to detect actants before they become actors … where “metamorphosis” is taken 
as a phenomenon that is antecedent to all the shapes that will be given to agents?
(Latour, 2014a: 13)
The Modes of Existence project too, despite its explicit focus on ‘moderns,’ entails a delving 
into forms of relating that exceed human–non-human interaction. In the modes of ‘repro-
duction’ and ‘metamorphosis,’ we are introduced to a protean domain of beings that ‘precede 
the human infinitely,’ in what Latour goes on to describe as ‘a sort of matrix or kneading 
process from which the “human” can later take nourishment, perhaps, can in any case branch 
out, accelerate, be energized, but that it will never be able to replace, engender, or produce’ 
(Latour, 2013: 203; see also Clark, 2019; Conway 2016, 49– 50).
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With this move, I suggest, we have gone beyond non-humans lurking in the gaps of our 
networks or even knocking at the door of the collective. Not only does the realm of meta-
morphosis not depend upon us in any way, but as the condition of our own emergence and 
sustenance, it is also beyond our powers of reconstitution.
In order to embrace this notion of an abyssal and generative ground, Latour – like the 
philosophers ‘of the outside’ – must free himself of the obligation to show exactly how it is 
that we access or know about this ‘exteriority.’ To put it another way, he needs to unleash 
ontology from epistemology, to unhinge the question of ‘the knowability of the real’ from the 
issue of ‘whether the real exists beneath the current relational networks of actors.’
What does this mean for the political, which until now – I have been arguing – has 
also been bundled together with the ontological and the epistemological? In a generous and 
open exchange between Harman and Latour in 2008, both thinkers reconsidered their own 
previous conflation of the political and the ontological (Clark, 2013; Latour, Harman and 
Erdélyi, 2011). Harman conceded that he may have been ‘careless in the manuscript [of Prince 
of Networks] in equating ontological democracy with political democracy.’ Latour responded 
by agreeing ‘that there is actually no connection at all with the idea of the multiplicity of 
beings and any sort of democratic position,’ before graciously pondering whether it ‘might be 
the weakness of Politics of Nature that it gives this impression’ (Latour, Harman and Erdélyi, 
2011: 96–97).
In the same conversation, Latour also clarifies his more general position with regard to 
 relationality – attesting that his own philosophy does not simply privilege interactive rela-
tions but also affirms the ‘irreducible singularity’ of each participating object. For without 
this integrity, he insists, networking and communicative processes would have nothing tan-
gible to work with (2011, 43–44, 49, 63; Clark, 2013). With this acknowledgement of a kind 
of pre-relationality, we catch an echo of the thematic of withdrawnness and inaccessibility 
that concerns theorists of ‘extremity’ or ‘radical otherness.’ Here, it is worth recalling how, 
for Emmanuel Levinas and others in his wake, the incitement to ethical and political relating 
is not interconnectedness so much as a desire to reach out across a disconnect or a difference, 
this being the very summons for the coming-into-relation that is compassion, care or the 
quest for justice (Clark, 2011: 70–74; Levinas, 1969: 21–30). And in this regard, it might be 
said that the ‘irreducible singularity’ of the encounter with otherness is a kind of ‘metamor-
phic zone’ in which actants are lured or urged to become actors.
But as Latour likes to remind us, his own priority is the worldly problems or challenges 
he refers to as ‘empirical matters’ (Latour, Harman and Erdélyi, 2011: 41). In his own words:
When faced with vast philosophical concepts like mutations in space, time and agency, 
my research strategy has always been the same: let’s try to find a neat empirical site where 
it is possible through fieldwork to obtain precise answers to speculative questions.
(2016: 4)
We shouldn’t be surprised, then, to find that in his ongoing engagement with climate, Gaia 
and the Earth system, Latour’s prime concern is to find his way to a substantive, scaled-
down framing of the planetary predicament. Consequently, rather than engaging with the 
mass of the Earth or the cosmos to which our planet opens, his focus is increasingly on the 
‘tiny, fragile, slim’ region where living and nonliving processes are in ceaseless interchange 
(2016: 7; see also 2017: 140). Neither should we be surprised to see that such a circumscribing 




Latour’s currently favoured ‘neat empirical site’ is the ‘critical zone’ – a relatively recent 
scientific term for a parcelled cross section of the Earth system of varying sizes that runs from 
treetops, through the soil, and down as far as the rocky substrate (2014b, 2016, 2017: 93). For 
him, critical zone science – research done by interdisciplinary teams made up of soil scien-
tists, hydrologists, ecologists, biogeochemists and others – offers a localised point of entry to 
planetary challenges that does not sacrifice the complexity of the Earth system (2016: 4). As 
Latour explains: ‘critical zones define a set of interconnected entities in which the human 
multiform actions are everywhere intertwined’ (2014b: 3).
This decision to alight on a defined segment of the planetary body – as disclosed by crit-
ical zone science – enables the knowability of the real, what actually exists, and what can 
realistically be contested or renegotiated to once more coming into alignment. Rather like 
 Pasteurians of old, ‘critical zoners’ show us how it is possible to conjoin empirical inquiry 
with political process – as they assemble concepts, instruments and a slice of the ‘living 
planet’ in a way that brings Latour back to his preferential task – the ‘progressive composition of 
the common world’ (Latour, 2014b: 1; 2004).
But if much is to be gained from this circumscription of planetary issues, we might also 
detect a return to ANT’s familiar trade-off between the restricted realm of human–non- 
human co-enactment and the radical outsideness of the fully inhuman – and all the issues this 
raises. Meanwhile, contemporary thinkers of ‘extremity’ and the ‘experience of the outside’ 
are themselves engaging more explicitly with the planetary crisis. Literary theorist Gayatri 
Chakravorty Spivak draws our attention to ‘the necessary impossibility of a “grounding” in 
planetarity’ (2003: 82), while philosopher Philippe Lynes calls on us to ‘confront the cre-
ation, the rediscovery of the world in a restricted sense with the invention of the earth as the 
experience of the impossible’ (2018: xlvii). While Latour’s approach – in continuity with 
much of the tradition of ANT – sets out to render earthly problems thinkable, tangible, 
doable, the theorists of ‘planetary impossibility’ remind us that whatever sense we and our 
scientist colleagues can make of our terrestrial environment is inevitably provoked, contam-
inated and haunted by our inescapable vulnerability to the excesses of the Earth and cosmos. 
And that the unfolding crisis of the Earth involves losses that cannot ever be recuperated, 
suffering that is inconsolable, changes so overwhelming that they threaten the very logics 
through which we apprehend the world.
The ‘possible’ and the ‘impossible,’ however, are not opposed conditions or options. For 
as ‘thought from the outside’ would insist, it is the very confrontation with ‘impossible’ oth-
erness that ultimately inspires our attempts to make sense of the world, our ongoing efforts 
to cast bridges or networks across the rifts that open, from time to time, in the body of the 
Earth. The task of trying to compose common worlds, we might say, being the very necessity 
to which a sense of ‘necessary impossibility’ summons us.
In the broader and as-yet-unfinished story of ANT, what Latour’s moving between 
critical and metamorphic zones seems to acknowledge is that there is indeed an outside, 
a considerable remainder to ‘tiny, fragile, slim’ domain where humans and non-humans 
are intertwined. If the axiom of classic ANT seemed to be that it was human–non-human 
entanglement ‘all the way down,’ it now looks increasingly clear that prioritising the zone 
of co-enactment is a choice, a decision, a deliberate cut made in an infinitely vaster field of 
existence. While Latour insists upon the onto-epistemological-political necessity of carving 
out ‘critical zones,’ so too does he confront us with the unfathomable, immeasurable and 
impolitic ‘metamorphic zone.’ Just how these irreducible domains might play out will not 
only be a question of how people interest themselves in the non-human – but a matter of 
what the inhuman makes of us.
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16
What possibilities would a 
queer ANT generate?
Kane Race
Actor-network theory and queer theory might appear to be incommensurable pursuits. 
 Sexual bodies – their practices, pleasures, vulnerabilities and constraints – have never been 
an abiding interest or explicit focus within the branch of Science and Technology Studies 
most closely associated with ANT. And while both fields are thoroughly indebted to the 
work of Michel Foucault, the ethnographic approach to the making of science, technology, 
facts and realities that is a hallmark of ANT produces different emphases than those typi-
cally found within queer theory. Where ANT draws attention to the material associations 
and practical relations that transform contingent relations into durable, concrete realities, 
queer theorists tend to stress the overarching power of the ideological, normative, disci-
plinary, discursive and/or psychic structures that produce queer lives as abject, vulnerable 
and suspect within prevailing social worlds. ANT is distinguished by the precision with 
which it attends to the sociomaterial arrangements that Foucault called dispositifs and gives 
them consequential form. Queer theory has been characterised by its disciplinary fixation 
with ‘hidden patterns of violence and their exposure’ (Sedgwick 1997, p. 143) and the 
‘overdetermined relationalities’ of the normative, disciplinary structures it takes as objects 
of critical attention (Wiegman & Wilson 2015, p. 10). Indeed, queer theory’s favoured strat-
egies of dismantling, countering, subverting, exposing or otherwise disrupting hegemonic 
norms emerge from a sense (keenly shared among proponents) that established institutions, 
truths, norms and realities damage the social standing, material prospects and overall lives 
of those subject to regimes of gender and sexuality (among other social categories). Given 
these differences, the view from ANT that critique has ‘run out of steam’ (Latour 2004a) 
risks propelling queer theorists towards the chorus of voices that habitually (if reductively) 
dismiss ANT as a politics-free zone lacking any coherent analysis of systemic oppression 
and/or structural violence. 
These differences in motivation, orientation and approach can, however, obscure certain 
synergies between the two fields. Both fields reject essentialism and determinism; conceive 
identities and realities as enacted, practised or performed (Butler 1990; Butler 2010; Callon 
2010; Mol 1999; Mol & Law 2004); investigate experimental practices and publics (Marres 
2012; Michael 2002, 2018; Race 2018; Warner 2002); and adopt constructivism as a guiding 
premise and analytic approach. On this point, queer theory does not necessarily hold that the 
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things said to be constructed are ‘easily deconstructible’ (Latour 1999, p. 115) or can be done 
away with at a whim (a charge Latour has levelled at social constructionists). Indeed, at the 
first academic conference I ever attended, I distinctly recall one of queer theory’s founding 
figures, David Halperin, rejecting that idea, observing that the Sydney Harbour Bridge is as 
constructed as the truths and discourses queer critics find worrisome. This doesn’t mean it is 
an illusion or can be dismantled overnight. On the contrary, it is a massive edifice that has a 
materiality and significance we must acknowledge, account for and grapple with.1
This example is suggestive on a number of fronts: That bridges might be built to enable 
further traffic to flow between promontories conventionally assumed to harbour radically 
different ecologies of practice, inclination and thought, and that the tenders such a proposal 
calls forth might well enrich each of these terrains rather than operate as a presumed source 
of environmental damage and critical havoc. Since queer theory first hit its stride in North 
American literature departments during the heyday of post-structuralist theory, it would be 
easy to reduce its critical scope to language, representations, texts and discourses. But the 
field’s concern with the arrangement and experience of sexual and gendered life has given it a 
sensitivity to certain non-human actants, the material significance of which ANT has helped 
many fields bring more sharply into view. 
In this chapter, I will argue that ANT’s insistence on the contingency of relations among 
human and non-human actants might help break the stranglehold of totalisation sometimes 
said to characterise queer theorists’ take on the ‘ideologies and institutions of intimacy’ 
they dub heteronormativity (Berlant & Warner, 1998). This could generate more construc-
tive forms of attention to projects of ‘queer world-making’ as well as the publics (or ‘coun-
terpublics’) such projects call forth and/or are deemed to depend upon. In the first part of 
this chapter, I conduct a close reading of Lauren Berlant and Michael Warner’s influential 
(1998) essay ‘Sex in Public’ – perhaps the most robust and compelling early attempt to bring 
queer theory into articulation with key traditions of social theory – alongside congruent 
work by Sara Ahmed (2014). My reading aims to bring out the activity of non-human 
 actants in the ‘buffer zones’ and ‘elaborate support systems’ (Ahmed 2014) these essays rally 
against, asking whether they might be understood more constructively, following ANT, 
as infrastructures. 
Worlds capable of sustaining queer lives are commonly considered to be composed of 
cultures, communities, arrangements and/or publics that this literature characterises as 
‘fragile and ephemeral’ (Berlant & Warner 1998, p. 561; cf. Ahmed 2014). Arguably, ANT 
could help remedy such fragility by providing insights into how stronger worlds or realities 
are built and sustained. But in the second part of this chapter, I suggest that ANT could 
benefit just as significantly from a better appreciation of the critical necessity and/or disrup-
tive effects of these worlds ‘assembled out of the experience of being shattered,’ as Ahmed 
puts it (2014), the ‘alter-ontologies’ (Papadopoulos 2018) wrought from queer experiments 
in intimacy.
intimacy, institutions and infrastructures
More than any other, the concept of heteronormativity makes queer theory cohere as a field 
today, providing a theoretical basis for the field’s extension beyond sexuality studies (and 
attempts to ‘carve out a buffer zone for a minoritized and protected subculture’ (Warner 
1993, p. 3) to devote critical attention to ‘any consequential social difference that contrib-
utes to regimes of sexual normalization’ (Hall & Jagose 2012, p. xvi). The concept is most 
rigorously theorised in Berlant and Warner’s (1998) essay ‘Sex in Public,’ which sets out to 
Kane Race
170
promote ‘the radical aspirations of queer culture building’ and ‘unsettle the garbled but pow-
erful norms…implicated in the hierarchies of property and propriety that we will describe as 
heteronormative’ (p. 548). They define the latter term in a lengthy footnote:
By heteronormative we mean the institutions, structures of understanding and practical 
orientations that make heterosexuality seem not only coherent – that is, organized as a 
sexuality – but also privileged. Its coherence is always provisional, and its privilege can 
take several (sometimes contradictory) forms…[consisting] less of norms that could be 
summarized as a body of doctrine than a sense of rightness produced in contradictory 
manifestations – often unconscious, immanent to practice or to institutions.
(p. 548)
As this excerpt suggests, heteronormativity does not refer to ‘anything like a simple mono-
culture’ for the authors. Rather, it achieves ‘much of its metacultural intelligibility through 
the ideologies and institutions of intimacy’ (p. 553).2 ‘Heterosexuality is not a thing,’ they 
claim, because heterosexual culture ‘never has more than a provisional unity’ (p. 552). In 
this respect, they are closer to some of the central premises of ANT here than anyone has yet 
cared to admit. For example, Latour has linked the process of substantiation to the ‘stability 
of the assemblages’ that subtend it, claiming ‘the best word to designate a substance is “insti-
tution”’ (1999, p. 151; see also p. 307). For all of these theorists, ‘thingness’ (or substantiality) 
rests on the stability (or otherwise) of the institutions (or assemblages) that make a given 
proposition durable and sustainable.
At first glance, the terminology of ‘ideologies and institutions’ evokes traditional sociolo-
gy’s preoccupation with ideas, beliefs and customs. But when we dig down into the arrange-
ments that give heterosexual culture its ‘metacultural intelligibility,’ we begin to encounter 
things of a much more material texture. The ‘sense of rightness’ heteronormativity confers is 
‘more than ideology, or prejudice, or phobia against gays and lesbians,’ the authors explain; it 
is ‘embedded in things and not just in sex’ and ‘produced in almost every aspect of the forms 
and arrangements of social life’ (p. 554). Alongside the domains of the state, law, medicine, 
commerce, nationality and the ‘conventions and affects of narrativity,’ a host of acts and mun-
dane objects are said to ‘support and extend’ heterosexual culture even if they are ‘less com-
monly recognised as part of sexual culture’ (p. 555) to produce a ‘constellation of practices 
that everywhere disperse heterosexual privilege as a tacit but central organising principle 
of social membership’ (p. 555). These include ‘paying taxes, being disgusted, philandering, 
bequeathing, celebrating a holiday, investing for the future, teaching, disposing of a corpse, 
carrying wallet photos, buying economy size, being nepotistic, running for president, di-
vorcing, or owning anything “His” and “Hers”’ – a list whose elaboration is marked as ‘a 
project for further study’ (p. 555). That is to say, Berlant and Warner’s analysis encompasses 
more than ‘garbled but powerful norms’ (p. 548): It extends to ‘those material practices that, 
though not explicitly sexual, are implicated in the hierarchies of property and propriety’ that 
appear in their description of heteronormativity (p. 548). These practices include mundane 
objects such as wallet photos, burial procedures, joint checking and packaged commodities; 
the regimes of ‘normal life’ the authors rail against are far less monolithic than some critics 
have asserted (Wiegman & Wilson 2015, p. 10).
In her blogpost ‘Selfcare as Warfare’ (2014), Sara Ahmed similarly considers how the 
object world is arranged to promote the care and survival of some bodies and not others. 
Riffing on a sentence penned by black lesbian feminist Audre Lorde when diagnosed with 
liver  cancer (1980), Ahmed conveys the materiality of the forms of racial and heterosexual 
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privileges that turn self-care into a war for certain subjects: ‘caring for myself is not self- 
indulgence, it is self-preservation, and that is an act of political warfare’ (Lorde 1988). ‘Priv-
ilege is a buffer zone, how much you have to fall back on when you lose something,’ Ahmed 
writes in a passage that recalls Berlant and Warner’s conceptualisation of heteronormativity:
I have in my own work been thinking of social privilege as a support system: compul-
sory heterosexuality, for instance, is an elaborate support system. It is how some rela-
tionships are valued and nurtured… Racial capitalism is a health system: a drastically 
unequal distribution of bodily vulnerabilities
Her illustration of this point is populated with human and non-human assemblages that make 
some lives easier to sustain than others:
When a whole world is organised to promote your survival, from health to educa-
tion, from the walls designed to keep your residence safe, from the paths that ease your 
travel, you do not have become so inventive to survive. You do not have to be seen as 
the recipient of welfare because the world has promoted your welfare …Racial capital-
ism is a health system: a drastically unequal distribution of bodily vulnerabilities
While Ahmed frequently invokes ‘macro’ structures such as ‘structural inequalities’ and ‘sys-
temic’ factors (a practice avoided within ANT), these references can be taken to denote the 
very real obduracy and material effects of those monumental assemblages that promote the 
health and welfare of white heterosexual men and their families at the expense of so many 
others. 
Ahmed closes ‘Selfcare as Warfare’ by underlining the inventiveness she associates with 
queer (self-)care and connecting it to a collective politics of mattering:
In directing our care towards ourselves we are redirecting care away from its proper 
objects […] we are not caring for the bodies deemed worth caring about. And that is 
why in queer, feminist and anti-racist work self-care is about the creation of community, 
fragile communities, assembled out of the experiences of being shattered. We reassemble 
ourselves through the ordinary, everyday and often painstaking work of looking after 
ourselves; looking after each other.
Ahmed refers to ‘communities’ in this passage (a term steeped in sentimental humanism), but 
her use of terms such as assembling and reassembling is suggestive: Building effective systems 
of support across diverse constituencies is difficult: It requires a lot of labour and construction 
work. Actor-network theorists understand assemblages to be composed of heterogeneous 
elements that enter into relations with one another. The project Latour sets out in his well-
known (2005) introduction to ANT, Reassembling the Social, involves tracing how heteroge-
neous elements become associated in more or less durable formations to produce particular 
kinds of agency, for example. From this perspective, the resonance of the term assemblage 
makes sense when one considers that the French term agencement can mean both arrangements 
and/or a kind of acting or doing (i.e. agenc-ement). Following ANT, one could ask, does the 
process of ‘reassembling ourselves’ encompass more than humans? 
Elsewhere, Ahmed attends to how the arrangement of mundane objects directs attention 
towards heteronormative imperatives – or tacitly ‘configures it users’ (Woolgar 1992), to 
use the terminology of ANT (which Ahmed does not). In a memorable passage of Queer 
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Phenomenology (2006), she considers how the arrangement of her family’s dining room puts 
certain objects on display (tables, seats, photographs, a fondue set, etc.) in a manner that 
directs attention towards the family line and the purported gift of heterosexual sociality 
(pp. 88–92). Ahmed emphasises throughout the disorienting and destabilising effects such 
arrangements can have for queer bodies, discussing the difficulty of making queer objects 
‘come into view’ as possible objects to be directed towards (p. 91). While Ahmed raises the 
question of queer furnishings – i.e. what object-arrangements might furnish and support 
queer lives – she hesitates to offer concrete advice for queer interior design, posing instead 
another question: ‘how we are orientated towards queer moments when objects slip. Do we 
retain our hold of those objects by bringing them back “in line”? Or do we let them go, 
allowing them to acquire new shapes and directions?’ (pp. 171–172).
Queer tables are not simply tables around which, or on which we [queers] gather. Rather, 
queer tables and other queer objects support proximity between those who are supposed 
to live on parallel lines, as points that should not meet. A queer object hence makes contact 
possible. The contact is bodily, and it unsettles the lines that divides spaces as worlds, 
thereby creating other kinds of connections where unexpected things can happen.
(p. 169)
Queer furnishings and object-arrangements involve something more or other than assem-
bling a more stable and durable world for certain minoritised subjects, in other words. They 
make connections ‘where unexpected things can happen’ (see Race 2018, pp. 171–187). This 
may involve disassembling or interfering with certain established protocols, arrangements, 
functions and designs: Those techniques devised to keep people (and the non-humans they 
are connected to) ‘in line.’ Ahmed does not deny that the identity and function of mate-
rial entities may change in different settings, but wants to keep ‘queer’ open as a verb or 
 doing-word rather than converge and settle down on any particular positive identity.
If we turn to the practices of queer world-making theorised in ‘Sex in Public,’ we find 
‘Berlant and Warner at their most Deleuzean’ as Lee Wallace remarks (2011, p. 127):
The queer world is a space of entrances, exits, unsystematised lines of acquaintance, 
projected horizons, typifying examples, alternate routes, blockages, incommensurate 
geographies (p. 558) – sites whose mobility makes them possible but also renders than 
hard to recognise as world making because they are so fragile and ephemeral.
(1998, p. 561)
Queer world-making depends here on makeshift arrangements, perverse architectures and 
inventive tactics, and on ‘parasitic and fugitive elaboration’ in unlikely settings such as ‘gos-
sip, dance clubs, softball leagues and phone-sex ads’ (p. 561) The authors argue that the 
culture developed within these spaces has ‘almost no institutional matrix for its counterin-
timacies’ (p. 562). The fragility and ephemerality of queer worlds are said to flow from the 
instability of the assemblages that make them possible: The tactical (rather than strategic) use 
of objects and inhabitations of settings that support it (see de Certeau 1984). A key example 
is the once-vibrant queer subculture of Manhattan’s Greenwich Village:
The gay bars on Christopher Street draw customers from people who come there be-
cause of its sex trade. The street is cruisier because of the sex shops. The boutiques that 
sell freedom rings and ‘Don’t Panic’ T-shirts do more business for the same reasons. Not 
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all of the thousands who migrate or make pilgrimages to Christopher Street use the porn 
shops, but all benefit from the fact that some do. After a certain point, a quantitative 
change is a qualitative change. A critical mass develops. The street becomes queer.
(p. 562)
The reference to material practices and urban spaces in this passage resonates with Deleuze’s 
theorisation of assemblages which maintains that extensive relations give rise to particu-
lar intensive qualities. But Deleuze and Guattari make a distinction between different 
kinds of assemblages that may help specify what is distinctive about queer ANT. Specifi-
cally, they distinguish between molar (or arborescent) assemblages which they conceive as 
organised,  hierarchised, consolidated, unified, binarised and divisible (i.e. more or less stable 
 institutions)  – and rhizomatic (or molecular) assemblages which are, by contrast, unpredict-
able, unsystematic, flexible, flighty, horizontal, non-binary and indivisible without changing 
their nature (i.e. ephemeral). Where molar assemblages stratify, territorialise, hierarchise, 
binarise and subjectify, molecular assemblages involve processes of de-stratification, de- 
territorialisation, de-subjectification, molecularisation and scrambling. Furthermore, these 
rhizomatic structures are characterised by unpredictable ‘lines of flight’ that can be genera-
tive or perilous depending on what they connect up with in the course of such trajectories 
(Deleuze & Guattari 1987). Given the radical, anti-establishment commitments of Deleuze 
and Guattari’s politics, readers tend to invest rhizomatic and molecular processes with greater 
critical value, though on closer inspection all assemblages have stratifying and de-stratifying 
tendencies. I would contend at any rate that ANT has largely focused on the emergence of 
molar assemblages: The construction and elaboration of actor-networks that become stable 
enough to produce durable technologies, effective mediations and scientific ‘facts’ – or else 
fail to do so, with this failure emerging as a missed opportunity or instructive example of 
how things go wrong (see Callon 1984; Latour 1996).
Queer theory has a more conflictual and contradictory set of critical investments. It’s 
hankering for sociomaterial arrangements that better support queer lives is complicated by 
its sensitivity to the fact that any process of stratification or stabilisation (any molar assem-
blage) runs the risk of producing its own misfits and shutting them out – i.e. other queers 
whose needs and lives are not serviced by what is set up. Queer theory’s critical relation to 
institutions and established structures that embattle queer forms of life means that it is just as 
interested in disassembling the social (as it is currently constituted) as reassembling it or tracing 
the associations that make, reproduce and sustain it.3 Disruption, deviation, destabilisation 
and failure tend to be invested with some political value in this literature, rather than being 
framed as problems or missed opportunities as we see in ANT. 
Some queer critics object to what they regard as the territorial nature of Berlant and 
 Warner’s defence of queer counterpublics (Castiglia 2000). But I think it is just as plausi-
ble to focus on the de-territorialising tendencies and ephemeral qualities of the counter- 
realities they discuss, and the processes of de-stratification and lines of flight they entail. 
Queer worlds have a rhizomatic character that is characteristic of much queer theory – hence 
its sensitivity to disorientation (Ahmed 2006), unexpected associations (Ahmed 2014; Delany 
1999; Race 2018), ‘alternate routes, incommensurate geographies’ and ‘unsystematized lines 
of acquaintance’ (Berlant & Warner 1998, p. 561). The ‘unlikely proximities’ and unexpected 
encounters queer theorists care for are valued precisely for their ‘unsystematized’ character, 
the ‘diagonal lines’ they lay out in the social fabric, the ‘slantwise’ positions their constituent 
elements normally occupy in relation to each other (Foucault 1997, p. 137). In other words, 
it is the disruption of those lines that demarcate territories, hierarchise and stratify worlds, and 
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hold things in place generally that confers them with their critical value and performative 
appeal. What would an ANT that explores such twisted, rhizomatic, disruptive encoun-
ters look like? How would it feel to become sensitised to what is serendipitous about their 
outcomes? 
A second point is that the heterogeneous and elastic nature of the hegemonic structures 
queer theorists describe might be underlined with the kind of attentiveness to relational 
contingency found in ANT (Berlant & Warner 1998, p. 553). Ara Wilson discusses the emer-
gence of what she calls a ‘baggy notion of infrastructure’ in this literature, often drawing on 
ANT, that ‘combines material and symbolic domains, eschews technological determinism, 
and recognizes both systematicity and failure’ (2016, p. 249). Brian Larkin defines infra-
structures as ‘objects that create the grounds on which other objects operate’ before making 
the suggestive claim, ‘their peculiar ontology lies in the fact that they are things and also the 
relation between things’ (2013, p. 329). Could the material arrangements, mundane objects 
and stubborn technologies that prop up Berlant and Warner’s ‘ideologies and institutions of 
intimacy’ be conceived more constructively as infrastructures?4 At once social and material 
in composition and effects, infrastructures are said to disappear into the background when 
working properly or fade from view, much like the ‘conventional furniture’ Ahmed discusses 
in Queer Phenomenology:
a queer furnishing might be about making what is in the background, what is behind us, 
more available as “things” to “do” things with. Is the queer table simply one we notice, 
rather than simply the table that we do things “on”? … As soon as we notice the back-
ground, objects come to life, which already makes things rather queer.
(2006, p. 168)
Ahmed situates her discussion within phenomenology (a very different tradition of thought 
from ANT) and I do not want to draw too long a bow. But this passage evokes the unsettling 
insights and odd (queer?) effects that ANT occasionally generates in its accounts of the (nor-
mally tacit) sociomaterial arrangements that organise relational life. 
Queer theory’s emergent interest in infrastructures and relational ontologies seems to me 
a highly promising development for the field. It will surely help dispel the charge of  ‘overde-
termined relationalities’ that recent critiques of queer antinormativity hinge upon and assert 
(Wiegman & Wilson 2015). In my own work, I have found the concept of infrastructures 
indispensable for exploring transformations in sexual and drug-taking practices associated 
with the widespread use of digital devices to arrange sex (Race 2015a; 2015b). In more recent 
work, I have conceived these practices as intimate experiments (2017, 2018).
Bodies/pleasures/publics: experimentality and play
STS have produced an extensive literature on the conduct of experiments: Indeed, exper-
imentation might be regarded as a key theme in the emergence of the field. Historical and 
ethnographic studies of scientific practices in laboratories and beyond have investigated 
the trials scientists engage in and the technical arrangements, practices and publics that 
are collectively assembled to produce knowledge regarded as legitimate, authoritative and 
valid (Latour & Woolgar, 1979; Lynch, 1985). One of its key contributions has been to 
situate scientific experiments (Haraway 1991), revealing the practical negotiations, forms 
of mediation and techniques of reduction involved in diverse instances of putting ‘nature’ 
to the test. By drawing attention to the contingencies entailed in the making of scientific 
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facts, this literature has challenged the formalised claims of traditional epistemology while 
distancing itself from social constructionism in certain respects, as I have mentioned. 
Not only has ANT demonstrated how non-human actants play a far more active role in 
the making of scientific knowledge than theorists of discourse and deconstruction allow: 
Leading proponents characteristically refuse to debunk what is said to be constructed and 
express their commitment to taking seriously the procedures, criteria and arrangements 
used to conduct trials and evaluate and substantiate their findings (see Latour, 1999, 2004b: 
Stengers 2000, 2010). This position gives rise to notions such as ‘ontological multiplicity’ 
(Mol 2002), ‘the multiverse’ (Latour 2004b) and ‘cosmopolitics’ (Stengers 2010) – terms 
that affirm the immense diversity of experimental procedures while underlining the pro-
visional nature of the realities they produce. It is not a matter of legitimating or delegit-
imating these procedures but defining and negotiating their parameters, while tracing 
the arrangements and associations that hold the realities they enact in place (Callon & 
Rabeharisoa 2004).
Given this extensive literature on experimentation, one might consider what sort of con-
tribution greater attention to sexual bodies – their habits, pleasures, transformations and 
failures – could make to this field of scholarship. Queer theorists generally understand queer 
world-making to involve forms of inventiveness and experimentation with bodies, pleasures 
and intimate relations that recall Foucault’s proposal in the History of Sexuality that ‘bodies, 
pleasures and knowledges, in their multiplicity and their possibility of resistance’ ought to 
form the ‘rallying point against the regime of sexuality’ (1978, p. 157). Foucault conceived 
these activities as both creative and destabilising, capable at once of dismantling certain 
relations while creating and assembling new ones. These are relations of ‘differentiation, of 
creation, of innovation’ rather than self-same identity. This is what interests Foucault and 
why they matter, as one gathers from the offhand remark he uses to round off this claim ‘To 
be the same is really boring’ (1997, p. 166; see Halperin 1995; Race 2018).
In recent years, ANT has extended its consideration of experimental practices and their 
publics well beyond the realm of scientific practices, to encompass aesthetic, political and 
ethical forms of experimentation and demonstration (Latour 2011; Latour & Weibel 2005; 
Marres 2012; Michael 2018; Papadopoulos 2018) But with the exception of an important 
body of feminist scholarship, sexual bodies rarely (if ever) make an appearance in the canoni-
cal pages of ANT, except perhaps as an object of various branches of the biomedical sciences.5 
Indeed, Latour’s first foray into bodily matters seems rare enough within his field that he 
sees no problem naming it ‘How to talk about the body’ (2004b). ‘Biopower should have a 
bio-counterpower,’ he proclaims here somewhat grandly (p. 237) – an unusual moment of 
convergence with some of queer theory’s express objectives.
A small but intriguing body of work within ANT does explore certain embodied pas-
sions: For music (Hennion 2007), drugs (Gomart & Hennion 1999) and consumer goods 
(Cochoy 2007). Though they have little to say about sex, these studies develop highly orig-
inal pragmatist approaches to the dispositifs or ‘event-networks’ (Gomart & Hennion 1999) 
that amateurs among others establish to captivate subjects and/or enable their passions to be 
exercised and/or transformed. Hennion approaches taste as an experimental and ‘pragmatic 
activity involving amateurs turned towards their object in a perplexed mode’ (2007, p. 104), 
a ‘concrete activity whose modes, practices and dispositifs can be described …[an event] 
in which the relevant subjects, objects and social groupings are co-produced’ (Gomart & 
Hennion 1999, p. 228). Frank Cochoy (2007) investigates the material arrangements and 
forms of publicity that market actors devise to captivate shoppers in their capacity as sen-
sory, embodied beings. Though drawing extensively on ANT, these scholars supplement 
Kane Race
176
the term actor with the term event. Where actor connotes heroic activity, sovereign mastery 
and control of a situation, event is neither active nor passive but refers to a provisional ar-
rangement that enables something new or stimulating to happen – hence event-networks. 
The pragmatist approach elaborated here might sharpen queer theorists’ attention to the 
sociotechnical settings and material arrangements that condition and effectuate bodily pas-
sions and enable certain transformations to occur (Race 2017, 2018). This would extend 
to the material components and pragmatic dimensions of the publics such passions enlist, 
engage or otherwise depend upon and the concrete effects of these mediations (see Marres 
2012, pp. 82–105).
A considerable body of work has, in fact, emerged within queer theory that considers 
how experiments in sex, pleasure and intimacy give rise to genres of publicity. Significantly, 
this work includes experiments that engage and/or are said to depend upon contexts of 
public elaboration to produce their transformations. Michael Warner provides the most 
comprehensive and influential theorisation of publics within the field in his book Publics 
and Counterpublics (2002). He discusses how queer and feminist counterpublics ‘can work to 
elaborate new worlds of culture and social relations in which gender and sexuality can be 
lived, including forms of intimate association, vocabularies of affect, styles of embodiment, 
erotic practices, and relations of care and pedagogy’ (2002, p. 57). ‘Sex in Public’ makes a 
case for erotic experiments that make sex ‘the consequence of public mediations and col-
lective self-activity in a way that [makes] for unpredicted pleasures’ (1998, p. 565). Both 
Warner and Berlant conceive the public and collective dimensions of such experiments to 
be critical for the effectiveness of broader projects of queer world-making (see also Berlant 
2008; Warner 2000).
Much of the queer scholarship on publics is embroiled in a dialectics of oppositionality 
that actor-network theorists may query, complicate or refuse. Indeed, it is difficult to imag-
ine how the oppositional conception of power/resistance evoked by this binary (publics/
counterpublics) can be reconciled with the ontological multiplicity and heterogeneity actor- 
network theorists have trained themselves to find in public worlds (see Latour 2004b; Marres 
2012; Mol 2002; Michael 2009). But attention to the discursive–pragmatic characteristics of 
counter/publics and the different forms of mediation they entail can be found within queer 
scholarship, not to mention the different forms of agency they engender. Michael Warner 
(2002, p. 118) underlines the ‘variegated array’ of spaces and venues Nancy Fraser associates 
with the emergence of feminist counterpublics before discussing how the forms of agency 
usually attributed to publics usually involve a ‘direct transposition from private reading acts 
to the sovereignty of public opinion’ (publics scrutinise, ask, reject, decide, etc.). Observing 
that the ‘ideology of reading does not have the same privilege’ in queer counterpublics, 
Warner writes: 
It might be that embodied sociability is too important to them; [or they are not] organ-
ised by the hierarchy of faculties that elevates rational-critical reflection …[or that they] 
depend more heavily on performance spaces than print; [or their] creative-expressive 
function. How then will we imagine their agency? …A queer public might be one that 
throws shade, prances, disses, acts up, carries on, longs, fantasizes, throws fits, mourns, 
“reads”….
(pp. 123–124)
This delightful passage attends not only to the mediating devices implicated in the practice of 
‘making things public’ familiar within ANT (see Latour & Weibel 2005), but also the diverse 
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manners and modes of embodied agency, the possibilities of which queers are carefully at-
tuned and sensitive to (perhaps especially so).
Meanwhile, the experimental activities of sexual bodies are emerging as a central focus of 
recent work in sexuality studies. Susanna Paasonen argues that constituting sex as play makes 
it possible to ‘highlight improvisation driven by curiosity, desire for variation and openness 
towards surprise’ as ‘things that greatly matter in sexual lives and scholarly attentions’ (2018, 
p. 3). For Paasonen, playfulness ‘intermeshes and overlaps with those of improvisation, ex-
ploration, curiosity and experimentation, yet it also stands apart from them in foregrounding 
pleasure and bodily intensity as key motivations for sexual activity’ (p. 2). As sexual bodies 
‘move towards different scenes, fantasies, bodies and objects, and become attached to them,’ 
the forms, identities and subjectivities of participants are reorganised (p. 3). In my work on 
emergent sex and drug practices commonly referred to as chemsex, or Party ‘n’ Play, I draw 
on Simmel and Hughes’ (1949) discussion of the play-form in ‘The Sociology of Sociability’ 
to explore the generativity of this framing (Race 2015a, 2018). Play is conceived here as a 
non-instrumental form of social activity governed by the exchange of stimuli that generates 
new connections through its exploration of the pleasures of association. Such connections 
frequently extend to non-human entities, as new uses, attachments, relations and forms of 
intimacy develop among the various human and non-human participants that get drawn 
into and reconfigured by the play-assemblage. Among these are domestic objects, consum-
able substances, a range of communication devices and home media, music, sex and drug 
equipment, furnishings, decorations, medications, clothes or costumes, lighting rigs, carpets, 
neighbours, friends, strangers and other odds and ends. 
Latour (2005) proposes the term ‘associology’ to describe the project of tracing how 
different elements get associated in specific circumstances to produce what traditional so-
ciologists take to be pre-existing, self-explanatory facts or entities. Erotic experimentation 
and sexual play might be regarded as particularly prolific scenes of associative events and 
activity, not only because of their promiscuous and labile nature and the sheer multiplicity 
of the associations they are capable of generating, but also their capacity to disorganise and 
reconfigure attachments, identities, relations and ontologies (‘their bodies have become dis-
organised and exciting to them,’ Berlant & Warner 1998, p. 564). This unsettling capacity 
of erotic bodies is of critical relevance – not only for private individuals, but for intervening 
in the social, political, aesthetic, material, semiotic, technical, mediating and institutional 
arrangements participants find themselves in, which privilege some forms of life while 
making others difficult or impossible, as queer theorists have demonstrated. It is time for 
ANT to get a grip on (or at least take seriously) those playful experiments in bodies and 
pleasures whose multiplicity, material relevance and critical significance Foucault makes 
such a compelling case for. 
In his work on odiferous bodies, Latour concedes that biopower is ‘the great question of this 
century’ (2004b, p. 237) – if mainly to frame his intervention as the way to break science’s 
‘imperial’ grip on the body and the definition of its primary qualities. Conceiving the body 
as a dynamic interface that is always entangled with and articulated by various prostheses, 
mediators and sociotechnical arrangements through which ‘we learn to register and become 
sensitive to what the world is made of,’ he writes: 
to have a body is to learn to be affected, meaning ‘effectuated’, moved, put into motion 
by other entities, humans or non-humans. If you are not engaged in this learning you 




Not only does this prevent easy recourse to ‘authentic’ or unmediated experience, it also 
generates and sustains critical interest in the diverse sociotechnical arrangements that articu-
late the worlds we are in: how they matter, the dynamics of their construction, their associative power. 
Most sensitive queers will have me leave the last word with Foucault but in the end, their 
points are similar: To be the same is really boring.
Notes
 1 This remark occurred, from memory, during an energetic discussion among participants in the 
Regimes of Sexuality conference at the Australian National University, 1993.
 2 They state early on ‘[h]egemonies are nothing if not elastic alliances, involving dispersed and con-
tradictory strategies for self-maintenance and reproduction’ (1998, p. 553).
 3 Some take queer critiques of the future (Edelman 2004) – and it’s ‘antisocial thesis’ more  generally – 
to be the most radical and effective way of doing this (See Caserio et al. 2006). I am less convinced 
you can have one without the other (disassembling/reassembling) – as the wide-ranging impacts of 
Foucault’s genealogies bear out.
 4 Infrastructures constitute an explicit focus of recent work by Berlant, who highlights their ‘move-
ment or patterning of social form … the living mediation of what organizes life’ (2016, p. 393). 
Referring to the world-sustaining relations of roads, bridges, schools, food chains, etc., she remarks 
‘even ordinary failure opens up the potential for new organisations of life’ (p. 393).
 5 An obvious exception is the extraordinary work of Donna Haraway, which positively teems with 
queer fabulations and attachments (Haraway 1991). For other critically important works that address 
sexual bodies using ANT, see de la Bellacasa 2017; Dugdale 1995; Keane 2004; Keane & Rosengar-
ten 2002; Pienaar 2016; Roberts 2007; Rosengarten 2008; Sofia 1984; Stengers 1997; Waldby 1996.
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ANT is often presented as deliberately and definitely anti-autobiographical, concerned as it is 
with tracing agencies and arrangements beyond human life. While I am drawn towards ANT 
as a cluster of invitations for becoming oriented to the object world, I confess, however, that 
I have never warmed to its antipathy towards autobiography. In some respects, this is because 
it seems to me to miss the point. Rather than becoming more or less than human, it is just as 
interesting to think about the human as a fragile achievement sustained by all kinds of cir-
cumstantial encounters, relations and forces. To think biographically and/or autobiographi-
cally is not therefore to reaffirm the sovereignty of the subject; it is about tracing some of the 
ways in which human life is, in some sense, shaped by circumstantial encounters, relations 
and forces. Ideas, concepts or propositions are no less part of this process than anything else. 
To trace their impact is to trace the conditions under which certain capacities to affect and be 
affected emerge. It is also, perhaps, to think about how these ideas, concepts or propositions 
become part of a wider ‘structure of feeling’ (Williams, 1977) and the spaces of affect through 
which this structure of feeling is sensed.
The sites in which concepts and propositions circulate are spaces of affect. For me, then, 
it began during a graduate seminar on alternative political theory taught by Timothy Luke 
at Virginia Tech. Over the course of that term, we read many books, including Haraway’s 
Simians, Cyborgs, and Women (1991), Guattari’s Chaosmosis (1995) and Latour’s We have Never 
Been Modern (1993). Informed by Tim’s own emerging interests in cyborg environments and 
liberal subjectivity (1996; 1997), running through these books was the now familiar idea 
that agency, politics, ethics, etc., might in some way be more-than-human. However, what 
I recall about my first encounter with this cloud of ideas is that they baffled me: I found 
them absolutely foreign. But they were still alluring: They seemed to point not so much to 
a heightened role for the technical capacity of objects but to the possibility of re-enchanting 
the world with a sense that there were more things animating it than the modern constitution 
allowed. This is a reminder that an encounter with ANT, as with other sets of ideas, is al-
ways an affective encounter. Always as much about something sensed rather than something 
recognised. It shows up as an unsettling feeling before it ever resolves itself conceptually or 
empirically. The affective qualities of its propositions are part of the circumstances of the 
world impacting upon bodies in ways that can show up as feeling or emotion. 
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And yet, such attention to the differentiated dimensions of affect was absent from much 
earlier work associated with ANT, even if this work obviously went far beyond the writing of 
Latour. Nigel Thrift made this point in an important early articulation of non- representational 
theory (2000; see also Thrift 2008). Describing ANT as ‘Champagne without fizz,’ Thrift 
welcomed ANT’s treatment of agency, its emphasis on invention and how it conceives of 
personhood as distributed performance. Conversely, it was more attentive to the slow and 
often drawn-out process of assembly than the ‘flash of the unexpected’ (2008: 214). It had 
too little sense of the intensity of the event. And, most importantly, it had an impoverished 
sense of the human, its capacities and powers. As a staging post on the way to developing 
a non-representational style of work, ANT had its place, but offered little when it came to 
tracing the affective aspects of the world.
There were exceptions, of course. Emilie Gomart and Antoine Hennion’s remarkable 
discussion of the sociology of attachment (1999) was exemplary here. It was one of the few 
ANT-inspired pieces that attended to the affective dimensions of relations between humans 
and non-humans and also to the forms of embodied conduct conditioned by capacities to 
affect and be affected. As Hennion remarks in a recent reflection upon ANT at the time:
The surprise that peels away from the flux of things is the most ordinary of experiences, 
for an audience member, a painter, a footballer, a drinker. It is an experience shared by 
professionals and amateurs alike. Out of the fabric of familiar things, a small but decisive 
deviation has effects that can be enormous, but they arise from the things themselves 
as they present themselves. It is the jazz improviser who plays the same piece a hundred 
times, and yet… wait, this time it’s going this way, insisting on a quite new pathway. He 
follows it, tries it again… comes back, it has opened up a space.
(Hennion and Muecke, 2016: 296)
Such work had the potential to allow for the tracing of spaces of affect: This potential was not 
realised, however, beyond a few studies. The forensic attention paid by ANT-inspired work 
to the tracing of objects and their capacities tended not to be accompanied by a tracing of 
the affective capacities of objects, spaces or bodies. Indeed, its style and emphasis have often 
mirrored that of the areas of expertise it has sought to understand, through the production of 
accounts that are descriptively and analytically dazzling but which give little attention to the 
role of affective, emotion and feeling in the engineering and experience of a range of devices, 
contexts and arrangements.
*****
In some sense then, some of the concerns of  ANT diverged from those of the ‘affective turn’ 
(Clough and Halley, 2007). This turn is, of course, characterised by different approaches in 
(sometimes) generative tension (Anderson, 2014). These differences matter because the more 
affect is grasped as a force irreducible to a quality of human experience then the closer some 
versions of affect theory seem to be aligned, at least potentially, with elements of ANT. In 
some ways, the focus of ANT on the capacities of objects to affect and be affected by each 
other resonates with a Spinozist-inspired account of affect in which bodies are also defined 
in terms of those capacities (Deleuze, 1988). Both seem to be about foregrounding the af-
fective capacities of non-humans. But there are important qualifications. Spinozist accounts 
of affect tend to be allied with the philosophies of becoming and process found in Bergson 
and Deleuze (See Massumi, 2002). This emphasis tends to be less evident in ANT-inspired 
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accounts of objects: The focus on scientific and technical objects means that for the most part, 
ANT is silent about the sensible excess of objects, although there are some exceptions (see 
Lee and Brown, 2002). There is little about how the force of things, excessive of any individ-
ual entity, has the capacity to enchant, perturb and perplex (Bennett, 2010). Equally, ANT 
places more emphasis on the actual than the virtual. As Martin Müller and Caroline Schurr 
put it in relation to the sociology of attachment developed by Gomart and Hennion, ‘this 
notion of attachment exhibits more than a touch of residual actualism, for it takes attachment 
to arise out of networks as a mediated effect’ (2016: 224). Müller and Schurr also observe 
this actualism in Latour (2004) in whose work the body is theorised in ways that ‘mean it is 
circumscribed by and never exceeds the relations that describe it’ (2016: 224). Moreover, in 
some versions of the kind of speculative realism that emerges in part from readings of ANT, 
the emphasis on process is taken as a symptom of the undermining of the distinctive existence 
of entities and objects (Harman, 2010).
While versions of affect theory and ANT foreground the affective capacities of the 
non-human, they do so with very different ontological emphases. It might be more accurate 
to suggest that ANT has the potential to help us think about how non-humans have affec-
tive capacities, while particular versions of affect theory, conceive of affect in terms of the 
non-human forces from which forms of human experience emerge. Both are open to the 
ongoing surprise of the world that always exceeds human agency, but the latter is perhaps 
more attuned to how this surprise can be sensed through the capacities of different bodies to 
affect and be affected by other bodies (Bennett, 2010; Thrift, 2008). Equally, certain versions 
of affect theory are much more attentive to how affective orientations around objects are 
implicated in the politics and experience of different kinds of bodies (Ahmed, 2010). This 
would suggest, however, that ANT and affect theory are separate and distinct. It might be 
better to think of both as providing different sets of object-orientations towards and within 
spaces of affect. Taken together they offer different ways of foregrounding the role of objects 
in generating attachments to worlds while also examining the conditions that produce the 
affective backgrounds of these worlds. Such backgrounds are always excessive of efforts to 
capture them while also being the target of a range of technologies for engineering and mod-
ulating the affective capacities of objects and bodies. 
These capacities are increasingly distributed across devices, technologies and practices of 
different kinds. They are also engineered to generate particular forms of value. There are 
openings here for various forms of association between ANT and theories of affect. For in-
stance, Müller and Schurr (2016: 224) have argued recently that ANT has much to gain from 
a closer engagement with assemblage thinking, not least because the latter can encourage the 
former to do more to conceptualise ‘the capacities of bodies, both human and non-human, 
to affect and be affected.’ They also suggest that thinking in terms of assemblage not only 
encourages attention to affect, but can also temper the tendency to think of affect as the 
outcome of relations through focusing attention instead on how desire becomes part of the 
generative processuality of relations.
It might be worth noting here that ANT is sometimes invoked in work about affect on 
the basis that the former is more empirical in orientation. For instance, Ratner and Pors 
(2013: 212) note that ‘whereas affect theory is difficult to operationalise for empirical analysis, 
given how affect is always-already outside of conscious perception, actor-network theory (…), 
or ANT, lends itself rather generously to such endeavour’ (see also Deville, 2015; Grossberg, 
2010). And yet, this critique ignores how attention to the affective expands and multiplies the 
sense and scope of the empirical. If, as Lauren Berlant (2011) has noted, affect theory in all its 
manifestations is just another way of thinking about how the world impacts bodies, then the 
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many forms this takes are only beginning to be understood. The important question should 
not be how ANT might allow affect theory to become more empirical, but how affect theory 
might complicate the senses of the empirical enacted through versions of ANT.
This expanded affective sense of the empirical might allow us to mobilise ANT to trace 
spaces of affect. For instance, Yael Navaro-Yashin (2009) combines ANT and theories of 
affect in an ethnography of conflict in Cyprus. She welcomes the attention paid by ANT 
to objects but qualifies this with the claim that ‘if we were to limit ourselves to an ANT 
framework or methodology, we would have to call off any query into “affect” as referring to 
“human” factors too’ (ibid: 10). At the same time, she draws support from Deleuze, Guattari, 
Massumi and Thrift to grasp affect as the ‘non-discursive sensation which a space or environ-
ment generates’ (ibid: 13). This allows Navaro-Yashin to (a) temper the horizontality of the 
rhizome with what she suggests is the multiple temporality of ruination, and (b) hold onto 
the expressive quality of language. 
Attention to affect might also allow ANT-inspired work to revisit some of the technosci-
entific spaces and practices through which different entities become visible and stable. Such 
attention amplifies the ethnographies of laboratory life that were so central to the emergence 
of ANT through foregrounding the sensible and felt arrangements of bodies and technolo-
gies at these sites. For instance, Natasha Myers has explored the ‘affective entanglements of 
inquiry in the laborator[ies]’ where protein modellers render explicit different forms of mo-
lecular life by becoming affectively and kinaesthetically involved in their work (2015: xi). In 
the process, Myers argues that these models are more than immutable mobiles but are part of 
animated styles of affective labour that investigate forms of ‘excitable matter.’ Such work does 
not need to be restricted to the lab but can be extended to a range of sites at which science 
learns to be affected by the world (Lorimer, 2008).
As Myers’ own work suggests, theories of affect can make ANT more attentive to how 
difference shapes and is shaped by spaces of affect. This is important in a couple of senses. 
On one level, it makes ANT more attentive to how affective arrangements and encoun-
ters are differentiated via objects through the lived experiences of gender, class and race 
(Ahmed, 2010). On another level, it can also complicate the affective ontologies of ANT 
and post-ANT works, not least through foregrounding the way in which diverse indige-
nous ontologies mobilise a range of affective capacities around objects and entities (De la 
Cadena, 2010).
A further set of interesting working arrangements between ANT and affect is via research 
into increasingly networked space-times of affective experience. To some extent, this in-
volves examining how different forms of media technology and infrastructures participate 
in contemporary affective life. Paasonen, Hillis and Petit (2015) reflect upon the generation 
and circulation of ‘networked affects’ through a myriad of screens, devices and channels 
(see also Lindgren, 2017). Noting that ‘ANT is not always included in the genealogies of 
the affective turn,’ they point to the possibility of drawing on ANT-inspired theorisations 
of distributed, networked and emergent agency in order to examine how affects emerge 
through ‘networked exchanges and encounters’ (2015: 10). In their view, ‘networked affect’ 
refers to the work of generating affect across infrastructures, devices and bodies. Through 
such networks, the very materiality of media is being questioned (Peters, 2015). Recent work 
by Mark  Hansen (2014), for instance, also draws attention to the fact that the temporality 
of contemporary media means that the operational present of affective life takes place prior 
to consciousness. As a consequence, the question of what counts as a media object is up for 
grabs. As work by James Ash (2017) illustrates, there is significant scope here for developing 
new conceptual vocabularies for rethinking the affective ontologies of contemporary media 
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in ways that go beyond the kinds of objects that were the study of earlier versions of ANT. 
In the process, argues Ash, it might be possible to rethink the affective life of objects by de-
veloping a sophisticated grasp of their ‘phased’ space-times.
*****
One way of grasping these spaces is via the concept of atmospheres. Atmospheres have re-
cently become an important focus of efforts within the social sciences and humanities to 
grasp the affective materiality of space-times (see, for example, Adey, 2014; Anderson, 2009; 
Blok and Farias, 2016; Böhme, 1993; Ingold, 2012; Stephens, 2016; Stewart, 2011). Atmo-
sphere is alluring because it is vague, and resists easy specification. It suggests something 
that, while potentially palpable in bodies, always subsists beyond, across and between those 
bodies. It provides a way of thinking between the materiality of physical processes and the 
sensory capacities and, yes, experiences, of different forms of life. And while they become 
what Ben Anderson (2014) calls an ‘object-target’ of various forms of intervention and exper-
iment operating at a range of scales, atmospheres have a processual materiality that exceeds 
such efforts. 
An interesting question that emerges from this work concerns whether atmosphere can 
be grasped as an object or entity. This might seem like a minor question but it has important 
implications. If atmosphere is grasped as an object, then it means that the relation between 
atmospheres and anything else is a relation between objects. It also means, perhaps more 
controversially, that nothing is excessive of the category of object, including whatever we 
might understand as experience. ANT is arguably helpful for thinking about the technical 
apparatus and practices via which atmospheres (as space-times that are simultaneously mete-
orological and affective) are measured, generated, targeted and modified as objects. It offers 
less, however, when it comes to apprehending the vague yet palpable force of atmospheres in 
different human and non-human bodies.
Indeed, in some important strands of post-ANT thinking, the notion of affective and 
atmospheric experience is dismissed rather too easily as the residue of a nostalgic humanism. 
For Timothy Morton (2013), notably, any appeal to atmosphere marks a return to a form of 
phenomenological romanticism. Clearly, the atmosphere around the earth can be grasped in 
terms of what Morton calls a hyper-object. It seems more problematic, however, to think 
of all the differentiations that take place in this atmosphere, and all the ways in which these 
differentiations are sensed by bodies of different kinds, also as objects. One of the questions 
that shapes efforts to think about and with affective atmospheres in the wake of the influence 
of ANT therefore concerns the degree to which they can be understood in terms of objects 
without losing the excessive qualities that define them. Or, indeed, if any affective account 
of objects can take excess seriously. 
In some ways, this question has informed some of my recent thinking and writing about 
a particular device – the balloon (see McCormack, 2018). In many ways, the emergence of 
this object as a technoscientific device in the late 18th century was a key moment in the pro-
cess through which the composition, properties and behaviours of the atmosphere became 
explicit as the focus of a range of scientific and philosophical concerns. While no longer so 
novel, this device remains central to the ways in which the dynamics of atmospheres are 
sounded and made explicit at a range of scales. A story about the balloon might be told in 
ways that are parallel to accounts of the air pump (Shapin and Schaffer, 1985). But those early 
experiments with the balloon were also important as affective events: They attracted enor-
mous crowds in anticipation of witnessing the spectacle of a launch. And yet, it would be too 
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easy to imagine a distinction here between an object (the balloon) and something excessive of 
an object (atmosphere). This is where ANT-inspired approaches can help: They can sensitise 
us to the ways in which a simple device such as the balloon begins to take shape as a set of 
processes that are given a degree of intensive and extensive stability.
In a rather different vein, thinking about atmosphere can also help us reflect upon how 
much of the ANT-inspired work on economic life can be supplemented. Unsurprisingly, 
much of this work has focused on the practices and technologies of calculation through 
which different forms of economic life, particularly markets, are organised and reproduced 
(Calıskan and Callon 2010; Callon et al. 2002; Callon and Muniesa 2005). The emphasis 
here is on how practices and devices actively contribute to the historically specific genera-
tion of the economies they purport to study from a distance. To be sure, some of the works 
emerging in the wake of ANT do focus on the economy as passionate interests, particularly 
following the work of Gabriel Tarde on imitation and invention (see Barry and Thrift, 2007; 
Latour and Lépinay 2009; McFall, 2014). Equally, in more recent work, Joe Deville (2012; 
2015) has argued that attention to the affective relations through which debt obligations and 
attachments are sustained provides an important bridge between the pragmatist orientations 
of ANT and affective turn. 
Attention to atmospheres can be extended further in a way that makes such approaches 
to the economic more attentive to the affective structures of forms of economic life. 
In   recent work, for instance, Ben Anderson (2016) has analysed the affective dimensions 
of neo- liberalism in part through thinking about the conditions of their emergence. For 
Anderson, atmospheres ‘are part of the conditions of emergence of formation for particular 
 neoliberalisms’ (734). By this he means that the tone and style of particular meetings and 
gatherings were part of the milieu from which specific articulations of and investments in 
shared sets of ideas emerged, stabilised to some degree and travelled across and between dif-
ferent sites. This is not specific to the formation of neo-liberalism, of course. In some ways, 
we might say that what Anderson is writing about is characteristic of any process by which 
gatherings of particular groups at particular spaces generate atmospheres that may be articu-
lated through wider structures of feeling. In that sense, scientific laboratories, financial insti-
tutions and educational establishments – including graduate seminars – are also characterised 
by such atmospheres and can become spaces through which different forms of attachment 
and association can emerge. 
****
My answer to the question posed by the chapter is a qualified yes. ANT can trace spaces 
of affect in useful ways by helping us think about the devices and practices through which 
these spaces are constituted, through which they become visible and through which they 
are governed. In this sense its emphasis on the technical is an advantage. Indeed, the tech-
nical capacity to trace affective space-times has been central to contemporary forms of 
life: Stock markets, for instance, can be understood at least in part as ongoing tracings of 
the affective intensity of this life that modulate that intensity as soon as they are rendered 
visible. A range of other economic measurements performs the same function. Equally, 
there are an increasingly complex array of technologies and devices for tracking the various 
forms of behaviour exhibited by consumers as they respond to commodities and prices. In 
that sense, then, it is possible to trace affective space-times in a manner analogous to how 
various web-based technologies have been used by those influenced by ANT in order to 
map online controversies.
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However, the risk here is that by tracing things in this way we turn processes and vari-
ations into particular kinds of stable objects when they are badly served by that move. Any 
attempt to trace spaces of affect with ANT is less about translation as it is about a certain kind 
of working arrangement that never stabilises as an object or entity or approach. This is par-
ticularly important if we understand the act of tracing in terms of the ‘productive intersection 
of a form of content (actions, bodies, things) and a form of expression (affects, words, ideas) 
(Buchanan, 2014: 132–133).’ Tracing, therefore, becomes a process through which the style 
in which an account is produced is affected by an encounter with an object, event or form of 
life. To trace is to be affected by the circumstances of that tracing.
This has implications for how spaces of affect are traced in writing. We might say that 
such writing begins in a certain capacity to become affected by the world. This is the kind 
of capacity exemplified, for instance, in the work of anthropologist Kathleen Stewart (2014a, 
2014b). In this work, attention to the slow accretion of things is coupled with a sense of 
the unexpected whose relative neglect within ANT was lamented by Thrift. To be fair, of 
course, ANT, as a methodological approach, has tended to emphasise the importance of ca-
pacities to describe, and has valued writing in ways that capture the details of arrangements 
in practice. However, with some exceptions, such accounts have not tended to be character-
ised by what we might call an affective poetics. For Stewart, the challenge of writing affec-
tively involves the task of finding ways of becoming attuned to always unformed objects: To 
ways of sensing, being moved, being arrested, etc.
As an exemplar of work that traces spaces of affect, Stewart’s work resonates in one final 
way with the work of some proponents of ANT: This involves tiredness with critique as 
the dominant mode of engagement with and expression of the world. More generally, the 
emphasis on composition (2014b), albeit different, found in thinkers as diverse as Latour and 
Stewart points to the value of tracing affect as a generative, if not quite post-critical enter-
prise. Here, the point is not just to describe things better, but to think of description in terms 
of how it might contribute to the generation of space-times, however modest, in which dif-
ferent forms of association might be gathered, sensed and modulated.
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How to care for our accounts?
Sonja Jerak-Zuiderent
What does the figure of the knower do with the gift of agency?
This chapter explores the question of how to care for our scholarly accounts by paying atten-
tion to the ‘figure of the knower.’ Attending to the figure of the knower provides a nuanced 
complication of where and how we want to study agency and how this relates to knowledge 
politics – one of the central concerns that shaped ANT as an intellectual practice. Starting 
from the radicalisation of situated action by Gomart and Hennion (1999) that blurs dichoto-
mies between humans and non-humans and between activity and passivity, attending to the 
figure of the knower once again moves the question centre stage how those endowed with 
‘action [as] an unanticipated gift from the “dispositif ”’ (ibid.: 222) are equally ‘involved in 
the making of the world’ (Puig de la Bellacasa, 2017: 39). One way of addressing agency 
as an unanticipated gift from the dispositif is to keep on asking ‘how to care.’ And this, as 
María Puig de la Bellacasa argues, implies a reorientation to something that mainly humans 
do. ‘Care is a human trouble’ (ibid.: 2), she states; a ‘condition that circulates through the 
stuff and substance of the world as agencies without which nothing that has any relation to 
humans would live well’ (ibid.: 122), and at the same time it is something that is only pos-
sible in ‘more than human worlds’ (Puig de la Bellacasa, 2017). ‘Affirming the absurdity of 
disentangling human and nonhuman relations of care and the ethicalities involved requires 
decentring human agencies, as well as remaining close to the predicaments and inheritances 
of situated human doings’ (ibid.: 2). Attending to the figure of the knower when asking the 
question ‘how to care’ (ibid.) is therefore indebted to both: ANT concerns about decentring 
human agency, while also focussing on what human people do, once agency has become a 
gift from the dispositif. Or, as Lucy Suchman put it, ‘the price in recognizing the agency of 
artefacts need not be at the denial of our own’ (Suchman, 2007: 285).1
Attending to agency as a gift from the dispositif and to the question of what is done with 
it once given, I explore how the figure of the knower can be rendered differently based on 
different ways of figuring (not) knowing and (not) moving/being moved by an ‘other’ and 
how this matters for the question of ‘how to care’ for scholarly accounts. In the following, 
I elaborate on two such figurings: ‘solid knowing’ and ‘motile not-knowing.’2 ‘Solid’ refers 
to ‘clear or fixed’ entities, firm boundaries, imposing themselves (de Laet and Mol, 2000) and 
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shaping knowing as something that constantly tries to divide, fix and abstract by predicting, 
rationalising and ordering. ‘Motile’ instead refers to moving/being moved by an ‘other’ 
(Munro, 2012); not like mobile in the sense of crossing boundaries. It rather refers to a flick-
ering, a shifting back and forth “between definition and deferral: between processes of ob-
jectifications and processes of personification, between material evidence (…) and processes 
of interpretation and judgement in which everything becomes tentative again” (Latimer 
2013: 169). And I propose that for continuing to ask the question on how to extend ANT as 
an intellectual practice, attending to the figurings of (not) knowing and (not) moving/being 
moved by an ‘other’ matters.
To explore the importance of attending to how the figure of the knower is rendered, 
I introduce observations from my fieldwork on prostate cancer screening practices. During 
one observation, where Peter, a urologist, carries out a biopsy, I focus on the practice of solid 
knowing that is not moved by a frustrated and angry man. During a second observation, I fo-
cus on how Carol, a project back-office research nurse on a prostate screening study, does not 
know why she does certain things that allow her to be moved by the men in the study. To be 
clear, both of them care. Peter and Carol seem extremely polite, friendly, kind and attentive 
in what they do. But these elements of apparent care are not the conceptual repertoire of care 
I wish to mobilise in this chapter. To address the question of how to care, I attend to figur-
ings of knowing as ‘embedded in the ongoing remaking of the world’ (Puig de la Bellacasa 
2017: 28) and as ‘fostering (…) speculative commitment to think how things could be dif-
ferent’ (Puig de la Bellacasa 2017: 17) or not. In the following vignettes, I focus on how fig-
urings of knowing relate to such speculative commitment and what I keep on learning from 
attending to the figure of the knower for the question of how to care for scholarly accounts. 
This attempt at ‘thinking from the field’ does not mean I am trying to address an issue 
de novo. On the one hand, preoccupations about speculative commitment fit feminist con-
tributions to ANT-oriented scholarship ‘for which this mode of thought about the possible 
is about provoking political and ethical imagination in the present’ (Puig de la Bellacasa, 
2017: 7); such contributions range from provoking the ‘interplay between Scientific Fact, 
Science Fiction, and Speculative Fabulation’ (ibid.: 7) to contributions on a non-idealised 
notion of care (Martin, Myers and Viseu, 2015) and a commitment to the neglected, the 
invisible, marginalised and maintenance work (Star, 1991, 2015a; Zuiderent-Jerak, 2016; 
Denis, this volume). On the other hand, an increasing body of scholarship expands on femi-
nist commitments, complicating notions such as normativity, difference and marginalisation 
through ‘risky accounts’ as fragile interventions (Latour, 2015). After analysing the vignettes, 
I touch upon such examples of ANT-inspired intellectual practices accentuating figurings of 
the knower in their work to expand the argument suggested here.
Why i do it, i don’t know: prioritising speculative 
commitments to neglected things
During my research on prostate cancer screening practices, I thought that it might be inter-
esting to work with the notion of care to complicate the split between the healthcare prac-
tices provided to men with possible prostate cancer and the research done on screening for 
prostate cancer study. In line with broadening up of what the notion of care might mean for 
other domains than healthcare (Eidenskog, 2015), with complicating an unproblematic (feel) 
goodness of the notion of care (d’Hoop, 2018; Driessen et al., 2017; Latimer, 2000; Lindén, 
2016; Lotherington et al., 2017; Martin et al., 2015; Mol, 2008; Mol et al., 2010; Pols, 2004) 
and embracing such ambivalence of care (Pols, 2015; Puig de la Bellacasa, 2017), my focus on 
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prostate cancer research began with an interest in affective and ethico-political dimensions 
in scientific work (Fox Keller, 2003). In my research I wanted to explore ‘neglected things’ 
(Puig de la Bellacasa, 2011) and ‘invisible work’ (Bowker and Star, 1999; Star and Strauss, 
1999) in prostate cancer screening research practices and scrutinise how such practices are 
entangled with knowing cancer. This endeavour got complicated and affected me and my 
questions through the ethnographic explorations.
Let me take you along in how this happened by analysing two vignettes; and let me 
focus on what figurings of (not) knowing and (not) moving/being moved emerge in the 
first vignette describing observations of biopsies of men during magnetic resonance imaging 
(MRI)-guided targeted prostate biopsies. 
Peter, a urologist, is fully immersed in the pictures on the screen. He tries to get a 
sense of what the prostate of the old man who participates in the study looks like. With 
the new visualising application of combining the ultrasonic pictures with previous 
MRI scans made, he can map a digital landscape of the prostate, while the old man is 
lying on the examination bench, turned with the back towards us. I am struck by the 
friendliness and thoroughness of Peter in his work, but also towards me. Peter is not 
only extremely friendly and attentive to his patients and me, but also to the cleaning 
lady that we have met just before on our way to the examination room; to the assisting 
nurse and the trainee; actually, to everyone and at all time – at least while I am around. 
He also stays sincerely friendly with a rather unfriendly and almost aggressive man who 
comes with his partner to get a biopsy done.
This man interrupts Peter’s explanations of how the biopsy will be done with ‘use-
less stuff.’ ‘What do you mean? Let me explain you how it works.’ Peter stands up and 
walks around the examination table on the side of where the man and his partner sit 
on two black-leather chairs. Peter has to squeeze himself behind the couple, along the 
window-wall, towards the left side wall with one of the various posters in the small ex-
amination room. Pointing at the poster, Peter explains the physiology of the enlarged 
prostate and what such a follow-up examination like the current one does. ‘Useless 
stuff these biopsies,’ the man repeats and turns away from Peter not paying attention to 
Peter’s still friendly explanations.
I decide to leave the examination room. It is obvious that the man feels awkward 
and literally put in a corner, considering that there are five persons attending his biopsy 
in this tiny room. I hope that me leaving will take off some awkwardness from this 
situation.
I re-enter the room when the door opens, and the man and his partner leave. ‘This 
patient was … let’s say not so friendly,’ Peter says and sits down behind the computer 
on which he can access the hospital patient records and MRI files. Peter continues 
typing while talking. ‘Although the biopsy was much less complicated in comparison 
to the previous ones [he has done today]; which means that the suspected area was at 
a more convenient location to be targeted.’ The assisting nurse Martha adds:He was 
very unpleasant and did not understand the importance and value of the examination. 
It is a very awkward and unpleasant examination; for everyone. But we do our best to 
ease the awkwardness. He does not understand that this very understandably awkward 
and uncomfortable examination is only for his good; and behaved as if we are against 
him.” Martha looks puzzled while Peter continues to focus on one of the four screens 
to update the hospital information system with his notes. I later come to understand 
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that this man had already had three biopsies before where nothing had been found, 
although his PSA-value keeps on being high and his prostate enlarged; findings that 
make urologists advise to do a biopsy analysing the prostate and the tissue around it.
This all seems pretty straight forward; only the frustrated man looks like ‘ just not  getting it’; 
and as I will explain, I don’t either – although in a different way than the frustrated man. 
Peter seems to know what he does when providing care and why he does so: An inva-
sive examination of the (surrounding) tissue of the enlarged prostate given the higher 
PSA-value in the blood guided by a digitally visualising technique. There may be scientific 
controversies around the relation between an increased PSA-value and the risk of cancer 
 (McNaughton-Collins and Barry, 2011), but such uncertainty does not feature in the care 
he provides. He is focussed on doing the biopsy. I am impressed by how much thoughtful 
attention the screens get from Peter. Based on the images, he develops a sense of where to 
position the needle while minutely manipulating the images. It is important that this delicate 
manoeuvring on the screen gets his full attention. However, when the man questions the use 
of biopsies, Peter does not waver and turns all his attention toward the questioning man and 
explains the benefits of such biopsies. But how come that I feel rather troubled about someone 
being so caring? 
Before exploring this question further, let me first contrast these observations of healthcare 
practices around biopsies for screening for prostate cancer with some observations on research 
practices done on screening for prostate cancer.
We stand in the office of Patricia, the principle investigator of a large prostate cancer 
screening study. Carol, one of the two project members responsible for entering the 
study data, browses the folders standing in metal office cupboards, searching for the 
records of the men she needs to follow up.
Carol explains to me: ‘C means the control men [as opposed to the screener men].3 
So, these are all the control men that have gotten prostate cancer. Now I have all the 
men on this list that I want to take with me [to the hospitals where she needs to com-
plete their research data with follow-up details]. I have them ready. After that I run 
them always all still through the computer for myself. […] I go through them. To see 
if they are still alive. […] Why I do it, I don’t know. But I find it always important to 
do so. Maybe just my curiosity. […] Look,” she says, pointing towards a small photo 
displayed in the upper left corner on her computer screen next to other textual entries, 
‘he has been here at the cardiology department in October last year still. […] This run-
ning all the men through the computer, I really do not know why I do this.’
Petra who, together with Carol, is responsible to feed the database looks up from her 
work from her desk opposite Carol’s: ‘What are you doing?’
Carol: ‘I run all my participants through [the digital patient record system of the 
hospital]. To see if they are still alive. […] Yes, and this man […],’ she continues point-
ing towards a record with a photo on her screen, ‘I am curious… And now I can have a 
look. Just last year he was still undergoing radiation treatment with the oncologist. He 
has a really annoying metastasis. […] I hope he is doing well.’
Sonja: ‘How old is he?’
Carol: ‘He is 74 […].’ She points to a link on the screen, ‘He must have immense 
pain in his back, I think,’ she states while she clicks from one link to another in the 
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digital record reading the scanned letters. When screening the next man Carols says, 
‘This is also a whole story. He has gone through an awful lot. He has diabetes, had a 
cerebral haemorrhage, is 81 already and had an operation of the stomach and an anomic 
adrenal gland. [She sighs] And his aortic valves don’t work anymore. God! Oh God! 
How much pain! It is great that you get so old these days, but if you see how people 
decay. Not sure if it is so much of a progress that you get 100 years these days. Don’t 
you think so? Gosh, also when you see what a battery full of medicine these people 
swallow.
Why Carol does what she does, she does not know, but she always considers it important and 
insists on doing so. This ‘not knowing’, but still ‘insisting on doing so’, catches my ethno-
graphic attention. Let’s peruse what is happening here and contrast it with the first vignette: 
Carol does something, although she does not know why. Running the men through the 
hospital information system and searching for whatever bits of their stories she can trace is 
not necessary to do the work she needs to do for the screening study. She herself wonders 
why she does it. Wondering herself does, however, neither stop her from doing it, nor even 
sharing with and showing to me how she does it. Does it make any sense at all? Other than just 
doing it out of curiosity? Carol switches from the routine database entering tasks actively to 
searching for more details about these men – photos and bits of stories of the men – that are 
not necessary for the screening study; she is moved by what she finds out about the lives of 
the men and prioritises all that over knowing why she does it; only later this makes me realise 
that this could have caused ethical concerns about sharing such information with me. Em-
phasising mere curiosity or potential issues of privacy breaching would neglect the moving/
being moved by an ‘other’ although not knowing why, and always still doing it. What I rather 
want to accentuate is the practice of prioritising motile not-knowing versus solid knowing, 
that is, prioritising still doing so versus knowing why and facing the normative ambiguity – is 
this empathy or mere curiosity?4
Carol deviates actively from what she is supposed to do. She makes time for it before 
continuing with what her usual tasks are. She takes the time and space to being moved by 
an ‘other,’ changes her practice and the men at the same time by details that hint at what the 
men go through – at least as far as she is able to trace that. Why she does so, she does not 
know. She also does not gain anything else than a sense for a few painful moments of the 
lives of these men. Her being moved is tightly interwoven with and would not be possible 
without the databases, the devices, codes, lists, metal cupboards, handwritten lists, digital 
records, etc., and all the ‘invisible work’ (Star and Strauss, 1999) for and with such databases. 
Carol’s being moved, I understand later, also extends to literally driving with a suitcase full 
of  blue folders to hospitals and running codes through a database. She moves/is moved by an 
‘other’ through these very materialities and doing something that she is not asked to do, which 
is to research the men in her way. This moving/being moved by an ‘other’ changes all and 
everything involved irreversibly: Research practice, Carol in her doing, the men as they are 
known, the devices, etc., by going ‘“along with things to see where they lead”’ (Garfinkel, 
1967 – quoted in Munro, 2012: 71).
In the vignette with Peter and Martha instead, the care practices I point out seem to order 
the situation with the frustrated man by shaping ‘clear or fixed’ entities of what the issue is 
(high PSA values and enlarged prostate), whom or what it concerns (the frustrated man) and 
in which way and how to deal with it (more biopsies); imposing such care practices on the an-
ger or rather separating them from it as someone or something that ‘ just does not understand.’ 
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When frictions emerge, for example, explicit frustration, or questions, or doubts towards 
such care practices, Peter and Martha seem to face such pushbacks with an almost stoic and 
calm friendliness grounded in firmly knowing how to care. The friendliness seems to make 
it harder for the frustrated man of the first vignette or even for Peter and Martha to attend to 
neglected things that move and change all and everything involved without knowing quite 
yet why that would matter – but still doing so. Such solid knowing excludes ‘useless biopsies’ 
protected by knowing how to care. How come this made me feel so uncomfortable despite 
the friendly care displayed? Did I really just leave the examination room to take off the pres-
sure for the man in this tiny room, or was there something else that moved me? 
Why I left the room I don’t know, but it felt important to do so. Perhaps I left because I am 
just less able to keep the balance Peter displayed in the face of anger. But attending to figur-
ings of knowing and (not) moving/being moved in the aforementioned vignettes, it seems 
I might have left because the figure of the knower that emerged through Peter’s healthcare 
practice made the ‘how to care’ question unaskable. So, although I don’t know why I left the 
room, attending to such easily neglected unease in the analysis of scholarly accounts might 
avoid ‘the loss which comes upon us when we overlook other possible worlds hidden or 
silenced in marginalized spaces – including the fun of them! (…) spaces (…) not only about 
pain, violence, and survival (…) [but] also about possibility’ (Puig de la Bellacasa, 2015: 49). 
Bringing such uncomfortable moments into the analysis while navigating the delicate bal-
ance of not sacrificing ‘the love for stringent analysis’ for a ‘touchy-feely’ kind of scholarship 
might also help to avoid ‘divorc[ing] me from my life experience, feelings, and feminist com-
mitments’ (Star, 2015b: 122). Just to clarify: I am neither interested in essentialising Peter or 
Carol’s practice of care nor am I interested in polarising solid (not) knowing and motile (not) 
knowing. I rather suggest that attending to figurings of knowing and (not) moving/being 
moved helps to understand the difference speculative commitment to neglected things might 
make for the question of how to care for scholarly accounts.
The figure of the knower and the intellectual project of ANT
Attending to the figure of the knower in scholarly accounts resonates with other work within 
the intellectual project of ANT in different ways. This can be done through reflexively in-
cluding the analyst, for example by drawing on established literary figures (i.e. dialogue), the 
first, third, etc., voice and presence of the narrator in a scientific contribution. A well-known 
example is Bruno Latour’s dialogue between a professor and a PhD student in Reassembling 
the Social: An Introduction to Actor-Network Theory (2005), where, in a fictional and humorous 
conversation, Latour creates space for counterarguments to ANT, critique and frustration, 
through a PhD student who leaves the conversation wondering why he ever visited this ANT 
professor. Another strategy in the same volume is Bruno Latour’s plea for ‘writing down risky 
accounts’ by bringing the very practice of writing scholarly accounts into the foreground 
(2005: 121–140). In both examples, the figure of the knower instantiated through the (writ-
ing of risky) accounts differs from Carol’s practice in that it excludes moving/being moved 
by an ‘other’ through, for example, unease, disconcertment, joy or (speculative) commit-
ments; in Carol’s example, this means doing something because one considers it important 
to do so without knowing why.5
The Zimbabwe Bush Pump: Mechanics of a Fluid Technology attends in another way to the 
figure of the knower. Annemarie Mol and Marianne de Laet show that the success and dis-
tribution of the Bush Pump they study do not require an engineer that ‘masters the situation 
and subtly subdues everyone and everything involved’ (2000: 227). The figure of the knower 
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that gets foregrounded is a ‘serviceable inventor’ moved by surprises, one that prioritises 
serving and listening to people before standing out as a ‘solid statute’ (ibid.) of knowing. In 
a symmetrical move, the figure of the knower instantiated through the authors themselves 
allows them ‘to be moved by’ (ibid. 253, italics in original) this Bush Pump. Moreover, in 
doing so, their article is ‘an attempt to move you, reader, too’ (ibid.). This seems much closer 
to Carol’s practice of motile not-knowing.
Another example problematising the priority given to knowing versus not knowing is the 
article Gino’s Lesson on Humanity: Genetics, Mutual Entanglements and the Sociologist’s Role by 
Michel Callon and Vololona Rabeharisoa (2004). They pause at the unconventional refusal 
by Gino, a man suffering of limb-girdle muscular dystrophy, to comprehend the disease 
through their interview questions on genetics, thereby also rejecting a version of agency and 
subjectivity ‘in which the individual is considered as an autonomous subject forced to choose 
between a number of pre-established options and responsible for the consequences of his 
choices’ (ibid.: 1). While this conventionally understood ‘failed’ interview could have easily 
ended up on the graveyard of research mishaps or at best be turned into an undertheorised 
anecdote (Michael, 2012), Callon and Rabeharisoa pause at this ‘failure’ to speculatively 
explore the possible commitments Gino holds. Inspired by Gino’s unconventional refusal to 
know, Callon and Rabeharisoa proceed to problematise a conventional, scholarly device to 
know – the interview – and argue that ‘the interview situation constructs a situation that 
reduces the patient to silence’ (2004: 1). By foregrounding the refusal to know as an insightful 
part of the figure of the knower, Callon and Rabehoarisoa point towards the possibility of 
different forms of humanity and morality.
Attending to what Helen Verran calls ‘ontological disconcertment’ (1999, 2001) and the 
practice of  ‘canny deferral’ (2018) seems to offer both and resists disentangling (not) knowing 
from (not) moving/being moved by an ‘other’ including disconcertment into the analysis. 
Disconcerting moments refer to fleetingly subtle moments of immediate uncomfortableness, 
often physically experienced, that manifest during fieldwork. It occurs at moments when you 
stumble across empirical moments that do not fit your analysis because of a different ontology 
being invoked in that very moment. 
These references show that pausing at the figure of the knower is by no means a novel 
idea within the intellectual project of ANT. The approaches, however, differ in how (not) 
knowing and (not) moving/being moved by an ‘other’ are entangled and whether the (not) 
moving/being moved extends the figure of the knower also through something like discon-
certment or wonder that are fleetingly subtle and easily neglected. Expanding on such an 
intellectual practice, let me conclude by specifying what difference speculative commitment 
to neglected things can make for keeping on asking how to care for scholarly accounts.
Cultivating ‘how to care’ for scholarly accounts as an open question
The aforementioned vignettes offer perhaps a generative explosion of multiple ways to care 
for scholarly accounts. Where I was disconcerted about Peter and about the disconcertment I 
experienced when he was so attentive and friendly, disconcertment was far from what I ex-
perienced when Carol showed me what she did and how she did not know why she did it, 
while still doing it. Perhaps I was intrigued. Or rather moved by her apparent commitment 
to moving/being moved by an ‘other’ without knowing why. Perhaps that was because, 
while Carol was not talking about her ‘moral intention’ or what she ‘cared about,’ she was 
all the more able to do the ‘maintenance work’ (Puig de la Bellacasa, 2017: 5 drawing on 
Tronto, 1993) that turns her commitment into caring for the details of the men. Accentuating 
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Carol’s commitment to move/being moved by the details of the men precludes a ‘bifurcated 
consciousness’ (Smith, 1987) in the analysis. In the same line, caring for unease or wonder 
in the analytical work prevents ‘the splitting of affective involvements from the researcher’s 
experience’ (Puig de la Bellacasa, 2017: 62) in scholarly accounts and might help keeping the 
question of how to care open. This might not be possible without challenging what Susan 
Leigh Star calls ‘The Wall of Transcendental Shame’ one runs into when ‘we are silently 
shamed – either within academia or within the swamps of convention’ (Star, 2007: 229) as 
one exposes what one cares for in her everyday technological (research) lives (Star, 2007: 228) 
and what gets otherwise easily neglected in scholarly accounts. 
Although there is no guarantee that this specific attentiveness to the neglected will be 
reciprocated (Puig de la Bellacasa, 2017: 120), this is by no means ‘useless.’ Such speculative 
commitment seems to be rather entangled with a ‘thinking [of ] reciprocity through a col-
lective web of obligations’ cultivating a ‘multilateral circulation of agencies of care’ (Puig de 
la Bellacasa, 2017: 120) and going along with ‘neglected things’ and seeing where such going 
along leads. It therefore rather instantiates a practice of what Puig de la Bellacasa calls ‘caring 
obligations’ (Puig de la Bellacasa, 2017): Commitment to ‘motile not-knowing an “other”’ in 
scholarly accounts seems to instantiate an ‘obligation to reciprocate attentiveness to others, but 
one that is quite different from that of a moral contract or the enactment of norms’ (Puig de la 
Bellacasa, 2017: 120); it also ‘happens asymmetrical (…). Because people who care, caregivers, 
cannot give with the expectation for it to be symmetrically reciprocated’ (Puig de la Bellacasa, 
2017: 121). Such speculative commitment to motile not-knowing in scholarly accounts may 
not offer an answer in the form of solid knowing to the opening question of this chapter of 
how to care for our scholarly accounts. But that does not imply that speculative commitment 
is about ‘abandoning oneself ’ (Gomart and Hennion, 1999) and being left to the agency given 
by the dispositif either. It rather accentuates the difference a commitment to the work of 
motile not-knowing an ‘other’ can make in the making of the world, embracing ‘the gift of 
agency from the dispositif ’ through attending to the involvement in one’s scholarly accounts.
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Notes
 1 Quoted in (Puig de la Bellacasa 2017: 16).
 2 Inspired by the contrast of solid and fluid (De Laet and Mol, 2000), I contrast solid and ‘motile’ 
(Latimer, 2013; Munro, 1996; 2012). 
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 3 Carol and Petra refer to the men participating in a randomised study of screening for prostate can-
cer as the ‘screen man’ as opposed to the ‘control men,’ that is, the men that are either part of the 
screening or control-arm of the study.
 4 Interestingly, curiosity is etymological related to care; in the 14th century, it seems to mean ‘careful 
attention to detail’ – that sense is now obsolete. See www.etymonline.com/word/curiosity (ac-
cessed 4 July 2018). Many thanks to Ignacio Farías for pointing out the possibility of such a link.
 5 For a thrilling intervention drawing on literary technologies foregrounding (not) moving/being 
moved, see Mann and Watts 2016.
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is ANT an artistic practice?1
Francis Halsall
ANT might have actually been called ART, if its original name ‘Acteur-Reseau Théorie,’ 
where Reseau means network, had remained untranslated.2 The acronym would have been 
quite fortunate, for ANT resembles more an artistic practice rather than a specific theory. 
More specifically, I argue that this equivalence has four dimensions. Firstly, both practices 
are a consequence of the conditions of contemporaneity. Secondly, as a result of this conse-
quence, both describe and exemplify those conditions which are characterised by the logic 
of information as it is distributed over systems of communication and control. Thirdly, these 
conditions are underwritten by a particular understanding of what the human subject is, that 
is, as one distributed and dispersed over those social systems. So, finally, ANT is as much an 
aesthetic as it is an epistemic practice.
In this chapter, I explore ANT as a practice, claiming that this practice both describes and 
manifests the conditions of contemporaneity which, for the purposes of this discussion, are 
identified as the conditions of late capitalism named by Castells as The Network Society (2000). 
These contemporary conditions are evident in forms of subjectivity that are distributed and 
dispersed (to use a term from the artist Seth Price (2002)) across systems of communication and 
control. I argue that models of art are underwritten by a particular understanding of what 
the human subject is. Contrary to the Humanist or Expressive model of art and humanity, 
the subject of the Network Society is expressed through cultural forms that are distributed 
and dispersed across mediums, platforms and networks. My discussion concludes with some 
specific case studies from contemporary art and John Law’s version of ANT in Aircraft Stories. 
In all cases, a model of practice is presented in which a ‘fractionally coherent subject’ (Law 
2002: 3) is in play and dispersed across the systems of communication constituting the con-
temporary world. 
Like the broad and eclectic field of contemporary art, ANT is fluid and diverse, reflecting 
the different positions, sensibilities, commitments, subjects and objects produced by its prac-
tices. This equivalence relies on a model of the dispersed and distributed human subject of 
contemporaneity. In both fields, there is a blurring of the historical and discursive distinctions 
between artistic and philosophical methods. That is, both ANT and contemporary art are 
predicated on practices of eclecticism in choice of means, methods and mediums; promiscu-
ity in collaborative partnerships and a decentring of existing subject and object relationships. 
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In other words, the strategy of both much ANT and contemporary art is to use aesthetic 
practices to complicate the world and reconsider its structures, relations and subjects. 
The practices of ANT and art
Despite their myriad disagreements, the practitioners associated with ANT might agree that 
there are no fixed theoretical methods or coordinates shared by them all. ANT is a sensibility 
or way of looking at the world. It is a practice where no particular outcomes are guaranteed, 
and that its practitioners seem to acknowledge is fluid and dispersed. 
Compare, for example, Mol:
ANT is not a theory: there is no coherence to it. No overall scheme, no stable grid, 
that becomes more and more solid as it gets more and more refined. The art is rather to 
move – to generate, to transform, to translate. To enrich. And to betray.
(Mol 2010: 257)
Or Law:
The actor-network approach is not a theory. Theories usually try to explain why some-
thing happens, but actor-network theory is descriptive rather than foundational in 
explanatory terms […] it is a sensibility to the messy practices of relationality and mate-
riality of the world. Along with this sensibility comes a wariness of the large-scale claims 
common in social theory: these usually seem too simple.
(Law 2008: 141)
This methodological sensibility is comparable to the spirit of invention of contemporary 
artistic enterprise, which gives licence to work without the constraints of discipline or me-
dium. The dispersion of ANT is very similar to the condition of contemporary art which 
is also characterised by an eclecticism of methods, mediums and outcomes. From the 1950s 
onwards, in the historical move from modernism, there was a shift in artistic sensibility from 
medium specificity to medium agnosticism. As a result, contemporary art can take anything 
as its medium and subject matter and the means of production available to practitioners are 
similarly multiple and open-ended. For philosopher Arthur Danto, there is no ‘particular 
way that contemporary art has to be.’ It is the ‘paradigm of no paradigm’ (Foster 2010: 128).
This equivalence between ANT and art prompts the question of how to judge the validity 
of their practices. If ANT is like contemporary art, then must the validity of its ontological 
and epistemological claims be evaluated in the same way? This requires, pace Habermas, 
recognising aesthetics as a sphere of validity that is distinct from the two other spheres of va-
lidity in modernity, namely scientific truths underwritten by empirical observation and the 
normative values of judicial and ethical claims. This raises a further question about the claims 
arising from ANT practices which will be posed but ultimately not answered here. If these 
claims are the result of an aesthetic practice, then they will not be verifiable in terms of other 
modes of philosophical, sociological, epistemological or empirical discourses. This does not 
mean to negate the claims that ANT might make. It does, however, require accepting that 
the way in which their meaning is achieved is not through conceptual or empirical verifica-
tion or even by conforming to normative principles. Instead, it will be via aesthetic criteria 
in which an objective truth is not guaranteed and, like art, ANTs claims to validity will be 




The conditions of contemporaneity have been called: ‘The Network Society’ by Manuel 
 Castells (2000); the ‘age of the world system’ by Frederic Jameson (1992) and ‘The Postmodern 
Condition’ by many others, including JF Lyotard (1984). These phrases refer to the economic, 
social and technological circumstances of late capitalism and the forms of knowledge and 
subjectivity that they produce. These circumstances, it is argued, arise from social conditions 
developing in the second half of the 20th century coupled with the cultural and historical in-
fluences of electronic technologies such as computing and telecommunication systems. These 
lead to both the subsequent dominance of information as a metaphor for communication and 
organisation and particular configurations of those social systems that were established in mo-
dernity including: Economy; law; education and forms of modern liberal democracy.
The post-Fordist and post-industrial practices that emerged in the aftermath of the  Second 
World War are inseparable from a global system of the transfer of materials, services and 
data. Consider, for instance, the phenomena of containerisation following the invention of 
the modern container (1956). This standardised shipping according to a module that could 
be easily transferred between ships, trains and trucks. This offered greater flexibility as to 
where manufacturing took place, allowing site of production to be located close to cheaper 
resources. Containers rendered everything transferable in a global system – raw materials, 
products and people – and made capital migratory on a global scale. This radically changed 
the nature of trade in a global network that transcended nation states. Dramatic changes 
in labour and employment were brought about by new technologies including mechanised 
production and computing. In the early 1970s, the United States abandoned the gold stan-
dard which, along with the collapse of the Bretton Woods System of international eco-
nomic management, presaged the subsequent market fundamentalism of neo-liberalism and 
its logic of deregulation and privatisation in a system of economic trading supported by the 
logic of speculation. It is no coincidence that this occurred simultaneously to the military–
industrial–cultural complex’s development of telecommunication and computing networks 
including the Internet (and its predecessor Arpanet) and the World Wide Web (in the early 
1990s), which facilitated the rapid and massive exchange of information across global systems 
of communication and surveillance.
These effects of production and power create new experiences of subjectivity which, 
like information, is distributed and dispersed across different communicative networks and 
also produced and mediated by them. Hence, in the Network Society, human identity does 
not exist a priori to the processes of its production but rather emerges from the ecology of 
social, historical and material conditions within which it is positioned (such as economic 
transactions, communication systems and social media). In other words, subjectivity does not 
pre-exist processes of power and production but is instead constituted by them. It is dispersed.
Practices of the subject
So far, following a broadly Marxian model, my argument is that the historically contingent 
conditions of subjectivity in the Network Society can be mapped in cultural forms including 
creative practices such as art and ANT. That is, both practices provide ways of finding equiv-
alences between models of practice and models of subjectivity.
This equivalence is most clearly evident in art practices. For example in the humanist 
model of art, exemplified in the Western European Renaissance, the artwork is understood 
as an expression of transhistorical values predicated on the universality of human reason. For 
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Erwin Panofsky, for example, the history of art was a ‘Humanistic Discipline’ (1940) enacted 
though the method of Iconology (the meticulous decoding of the original meaning of sym-
bols in art). Thus, Panofsky’s Iconology is illustrative of his own humanism, a humanism he 
saw as being paralleled in Renaissance values and worldview. On the one hand, this view 
understands works of art as being meaningful historical documents that can be meaningfully 
interpreted precisely because they are the product of a process of human rationality. And on 
the other hand, it understands human subjects as also participating in a process of human 
rationality that is not culturally or historically specific, hence their ability to understand the 
meanings of objects that are not culturally or historically specific to their own milieu.
Conversely in the Expressionist model, art is understood not as the product of shared 
human values but the index of a unique and individual expressive act. The primacy of 
self-expression is a dominant trend within artistic modernism, exemplified by German 
 Expressionism such as the art of Die Brücke of the early 20th century. In contrast to the 
humanist subject who participates in some collective project, the modern subject here is 
the autonomous and expressive agent who is also offered the articulation of their identity in 
the systems of modernity including politics, law, education and the economy.3
The art and the human subject that exemplifies the Network Society is neither the 
 expression of a set of universal human values, nor an autonomous instance of individual ex-
pression. Instead, both subjects and objects are radically distributed and dispersed across net-
works of communication and control. Furthermore, just as ANT challenges the primacy of 
humanity as actors in social networks, so too contemporary art is characterised by a lack 
of confidence in the autonomy of art as a special focus of human attention. The condition 
of contemporary art is the one framed by the legacy of Duchamp and the Readymade. Art 
is now in a condition of ontological instability that is performed through the move to eclec-
ticism in uses of medium and techniques. Just as anything can now be art and as a result, its 
status as art is entirely dependent upon it being recognised as being positioned and observed 
within a network of relations. In ANT, I suggest, one also finds the same understanding of 
the human subject as a contingent one. That is, in ANT, one also finds a model of the human 
subject that is dispersed. 
The subject of art
Right now, anything can be (and probably is) art. In the following examples, the limits of 
the art object are demonstrated to be porous and ambiguous. Where the specific art object 
is located is unclear and so too, as a result, is the specific labour of the artist or their role as 
subject of the work. 
Consider the ongoing E-Flux project created by Anton Vidokle as a:
publishing platform and archive, artist project, curatorial platform, and enterprise which 
was founded in 1998. Its news digest, events, exhibitions, schools, journal, books, and 
the art projects produced and/or disseminated by e-flux describe strains of critical dis-
course surrounding contemporary art, culture, and theory internationally. Its monthly 
publication e-flux journal has produced essays commissioned since 2008 about cul-
tural, political, and structural paradigms that inform contemporary artistic production 
(E-flux).
E-Flux began as a means of using a relatively new means of communication – email – to 
disseminate information about forthcoming art events. It grew from this into a system of 
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information exchange involving over 90,000 subscribers who receive the information about 
activities in the artworld (exhibitions, events, launches and so on) which is subsequently ar-
chived and made available for reference. Receiving the information is free and the agencies, 
such as art institutions, wanting to make an announcement pay a fee. This network has now 
grown to include a variety of different stake holders including public institutions as well as 
commercial galleries (through Art-Agenda) and educational institutions (through Art and 
Education, which is run in collaboration with Artforum International).
Vidokle insists that E-Flux is an art practice stating:
Everything can be a work of art, including a company: in its totality, e-flux is a work of 
art that uses circulation both as form and content. I would not claim sole authorship. … 
It has always been a collaboration, a series of collaborations with a very large group of 
people… So it’s not some object you can display in a museum alongside a wall label with 
my name and date – it’s a very different model of an artwork.
(Vidokle 2009)
Such a practice relies on the systems of distribution throughout which it is dispersed. Like-
wise, Vidokle, as an artist, becomes a subject who is similarly dispersed through the same 
systems.
dOCUMENTA (13) (2012) was directed by Carolyn Christov-Bakargiev, as the 13th iter-
ation of a large-scale international exhibition of contemporary art held in Kassel, Germany, 
every five years since 1955. Ryan Gander’s work I need some meaning I can Memorise (The 
Invisible Pull) (2012) was exhibited in the ground floor of the central space, the Kunsthalle 
Fridericianum. It was nothing more than a soft breeze which wafted through the space. It 
was barely perceptible, not so strong as to be immediately obvious and artificially created, 
yet not weak enough to be ignored. Within this same space was a horizontal vitrine con-
taining several pages of a handwritten letter and the title label reading: ‘A letter to Carolyn 
Christov-Bakargiev by Kai Althoff, May 24, 2011. Exhibited on the initiative of Carolyn 
Christov-Bakargiev and with the permission of the artist.’ This gesture was a statement of 
aesthetic withdrawal in which the painter explains how, after a process of deliberation, they 
were not able to participate in the exhibition giving, amongst the reasons, the explanation 
that “‘life’ was more important.’”
Outside of this central exhibition space, in Karlsaue Park was Pierre Huyghe’s Untilled. 
Huyghe claimed that the medium for his work was ‘live things and inanimate things, made 
and not made.’ It included a compost heap and the replanting of many plants, including 
marijuana and poisonous fruits providing an environment for: A lifelike stone sculpture 
of a nude woman with a live beehive for a head; an emaciated, white Podenco Canario 
dog with a pink leg that seemed to live at the site and all the curious human visitors to the 
installation.
Christov-Bakargiev explained how the whole exhibition was:
driven by a holistic and non-logocentric vision that is shared with, and recognises, the 
knowledges of animate and inanimate makers of the world. The attempt is to not put 
human thought hierarchically above the ability of other species and things to think or 
produce knowledge… What these participants do, and what they exhibit, in dOCU-
MENTA (13), may or may not be art… The boundary between what is art and what is 
not becomes less important.
(Christov-Bakargiev 2012: 31)
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My final case study is the practice of Seth Price, which takes as its primary concern the 
interrogation of the various mediums, platforms, networks and systems through which the 
work becomes distributed and dispersed. Dispersion (2002 – ongoing) began as an academic 
essay drawing on art historical and theoretical sources to discuss conditions of dispersion 
against the horizon of the emerging predominance of the Internet. It was initially available 
in printed form but has since become widely available in digital form as a PDF and via online 
sources. It has also formed the basis for sculptural work such as Essay with Knots (2008) in 
which the essay is represented across nine wall-mounted panels of vacuum-formed plastic 
incorporating knotted cord. In each iteration, Dispersion performs its distributed nature as it 
declares its distribution over the numerous platforms by which it is presented. In the essay, 
Price poses: 
Suppose an artist were to release the work directly into a system that depends on re-
production and distribution for its sustenance, a model that encourages contamination, 
borrowing, stealing, and horizontal blur?
(Price 2002)
Redistribution (2007–present) is an audiovisual recording of a typical artist’s talk. How-
ever, any singular meaning of the talk is undermined by the use of jarring graphics, 
background music, voice-overs and repetition which sometimes make it hard to follow. 
Furthermore, the piece remains in a process of adaptation as Price edits, adds and removes 
parts for different manifestations (public talks, video recordings, etc.). In Redistribution, 
the form and content of the artwork become indistinguishable from one another, that is, 
the means by which the work is recorded and subsequently distributed is also its primary 
subject matter.
In Hostage Video Still with Time Stamp (2005–08), Price uses images taken from the Inter-
net of the head of Nicholas Berg, the American Jewish freelance radio-tower repairman who 
was captured and then beheaded by Islamic militants in 2004. This was a notorious example 
of how images are circulated through online sources, in this case via a five and a half minute 
video which showed Berg first addressing the camera before being decapitated. Price used a 
low-resolution image of Berg’s head which was then printed on Mylar (a clear polyester film). 
David Joselit identifies three modes in which the piece is dispersed:
First, a computer file – the germ of an artwork, as in many of Price’s pieces – is rendered 
nearly illegible, the result of several generations of reproduction, as Price digitalizes, 
compresses, downloads, blows-up, and then screen-prints original footage. Second, 
while bolts of the printed Mylar are sometimes unrolled flush to the wall, at some point 
in its installation the material is twisted or tied into crumpled configurations that serve 
as a spatial metaphor for the ostensibly ‘immaterial’ traffic of images online – as though 
successive screen views on a monitor had piled up continuously lie a disorderly comic 
strip rather than being constantly ‘refreshed.’ Finally, third, the grisly and horrible phys-
ical violation of Berg is an explicitly biological form of ‘dispersion,’ in which a head is 
parted from its torso.
( Joselit, 2011: 84–85)
Such contemporary practices are undergirded by a particular model of the human subject as 
dispersed. Price has acknowledged this in discussing his work http://organic.software (2015), 
which is an online database that he had originally produced anonymously. It contained a 
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data set of over 4,000 high-profile art collectors including images of faces, addresses, political 
donations, net worth and other information available online. When asked about the act of 
using data as art, and whether this constituted a form of Institutional Critique of the systems 
related to art practices, Price replied:
The hypocrisy would come from someone who thought I am condemning a system, or 
individuals, while benefiting from it, and I recognize that’s a risk in making something 
like this. But I don’t think of myself as a critical voice, in doing this. This is more like a 
self portrait.
(Price 2018, emphasis added)
The subject of ANT (Aircraft Stories)
One of ANT’s foundational tenets is that there is no observable reality or phenomena ex-
ternal to the relations of elements. It thus considers social, cultural, historical and natural 
entities, or actors, as constituted through networks of interrelations. Law describes his own 
version of ANT as assuming:
that nothing has reality or form outside the enactment of those relations… [it] thus 
describes the enactment of materially and discursively heterogeneous relations that 
produce and reshuffle all kinds of actors including objects, subjects, human beings, 
machines, animals, ‘nature’, ideas, organisations, inequalities, scale and sizes, and geo-
graphical arrangements.
(Law 2008: 141)
In Aircraft Stories, Law gives an account of the British military aircraft TSR2 to think ‘about 
modernism and its child, postmodernism – and about how we might think past the limits that 
these set to our ways of thinking’ (Law 2002: 1).
The TSR2 (or Tactical Strike and Reconnaissance, Mach 2) was a military jet-powered 
aeroplane developed by the British Aircraft Corporation (BAC) for the British Royal Air 
Force (RAF) from the late 1950s to the early 1960s. It was intended for both attack and 
reconnaissance duties in the context of the Cold War and also, potentially, available for 
sale to allied and ‘friendly’ countries (the RAF having committed to buying). It was to be 
the product of the most advanced developments in aviation technology of the time and be 
the very best aircraft of its type in the world. In particular, it was intended to be able to fly 
especially low and fast in order to evade hostile radar and, this, mitigate potential enemy 
counter-attacks.
Yet, despite the military and technology aspirations for the plane, the TSR2 was a failure 
and was scrapped in 1965 when it was, as Law says, subject to crucial ‘Decisions’ (Chapter 7): 
‘behind schedule and much more expensive than anticipated, cancellation, long debated, be-
came a real possibility with the election of a Labour government in late 1964 – a government 
that replaced thirteen years of Conservative administration’ (Law 2002: 143). 
In Law’s account, the jet plane becomes both subject to the conditions of globalisation 
in the Age of the World System and an object through which to trace the nature of some of 
the conditions of that system. The TSR2 is a complex object that is situated within a variety 
of different networks that are particular to late capitalism. For example, it has identities as a 
product of the post-war military and industrial complex in the United Kingdom and all of 
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the various systems implicated in that network including: Weapon systems (being capable 
of carrying a nuclear warhead); communications systems; fuel delivery systems and so on. 
But it was also an agent and actor in other networks including those of strategic deployment 
in the post-war system of global power relations and political relations, both globally in 
the context of the Cold War and domestic politics in the UK (such as Harold MacMillan’s 
Tory government). It was a commodity within market systems and hence occupied a very 
particular position within networks of industrial and economic production. For example, 
as Law describes, the aircraft would be constructed through a collaboration between the 
companies Vickers and English Electric with Vickers building the front half, EE the rear 
(Law 2002: 80).
Law’s account moves beyond a direct description of military technology to a more com-
prehensive description of the networks comprising the social system of the ‘Euro-American 
World’ after the Second World War. For Law, the TSR2 is not merely a plane but rather an 
object best understood as an actor positioned within, and constituted by, a complex set of net-
work relationships (involving technology, culture, economics, weapons, telecommunications 
and so on). It is ‘a fractionally coherent subject or object […] that balances between plurality 
and singularity. It is more than one, but less than many’ (2002: 3).
This balance ‘between plurality and singularity’ is nicely reflected in the chapter headings 
which demonstrate how the narrative is constructed using a decentred set of coordinates 









9  Pinboards (2002)
But what unfolds during the text is that there is not one but actually three things being 
described in Law’s project: The TSR2; the social, historical and economic networks from 
which it emerged; and, perhaps most importantly, the aesthetic conditions of Law’s own 
method. The book, he says, is:
written in a way that has much to so with the logic of the pinboard. Though individual 
chapters are not primarily visual in form, in the narrations I have often tried remake 
a version of this visual logic by working in a more or less broken or juxtapositionary 
mode. Or in some cases in a more linear manner, by describing the effects of juxtapo-
sition as something other than a loss. And the book as a whole is no different. A set of 
partially connected narrations, it is also in some measure a pastiche.
(Law 2002: 192)
For Law, the subject of his inquiry is dispersed. On the one hand, this dispersion refers to 
the TSR2, which is presented as a: ‘fractionally coherent subject or object […] that bal-
ances between plurality and singularity. It is more than one, but less than many’ (2002: 3). 
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But on the other hand, this dispersion mimics the decentred human subject of the Network 
Society which is, just like the TSR2, distributed across a variety of systems of communica-
tion and control. As Law says of his project, in terms which leave it tellingly ambiguous as 
to which subject he is explicitly referring:
So the idea of the decentered subject is scarcely new […] But if the idea of the decentred 
subject is not new, then what of the decentred object? What of the object that does not 
hang together? Or holds together only partially?
(Law 2002: 32)
Dispersed subjects
Both art and ANT are contemporary practices that emerge from the particular network 
 effects of late capitalism. They not only describe but also exemplify the effects those con-
ditions have on the subjects they create. So, the subjects constituted through the Network 
Society, contemporary art and ANT are distributed throughout various systems of commu-
nication and control. They are dispersed subjects. 
One problem this raises has already been briefly mentioned although not tackled directly. 
If ANT is a practice regulated by judgements of taste, then what claim to validity does it 
have beyond appealing to aesthetic choices? What, for example, if it’s just not very good or 
to our taste? The same problem stands for contemporary art, of course, and my hunch there 
is that a great deal of it is not very good at all either as spectacle or critique. But perhaps this 
is the necessary consequence of the position of art in the aesthetic milieu of the age of the 
world system.
More significant is the question of the role of practice in acts of critique. If, through acts 
of dispersion, cultural practices exemplify contemporary conditions of subjectivity, then in 
what sense can this exemplification be seen as anything more than mere passive reflection 
in lieu of critique? Or, in what ways can the practitioners of both art and ANT respond to 
accusation that in celebrating dispersion they are complicit in the logic of neo-liberal market 
fundamentalism? Art can, all too often, seem to be performing as the R&D department for 
late capitalism. Without lapsing into nostalgia for past forms of aesthetic identification and 
expression, contemporary practices face the challenge of how they can offer meaningful and 
effective critical engagement. Without this ability to facilitate critique, they risk appearing 
as mere compensatory or deflationary gestures in the face of the dispersion of subjectivity in 
contemporary society.
Notes
 1 This paper explores themes first outlined in Halsall (2016).
 2 Mol explains: ‘In the early eighties, in an article in French, he [Michel Callon] was the first to speak 
of acteur-reseau. A short while later this term was translated and transformed to become actor- 
network in English’ (Mol 2010: 253).
 3 These two different understandings of art and the human subject may not be mutually exclusive. 
The act of individual expression, for example, might be related to a general human impulse shared 
by all, just as the participation in a universal human rationality can be understood as a means of 
moving from the individual to the general which is a mainstay of Kantian aesthetics. However, they 
do represent how different ways of understanding what a human is become manifest in different 
aesthetic practices that are specific to the historical and cultural contexts within which they are 
situated.
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How to stage a  convergence 
between ANT and 
 Southern sociologies?
Marcelo C. Rosa
The narrow scope of subjects and ontologies considered legitimate topics in the field of 
sociology is a trait that is not limited to national borders and aims to secure a certain uni-
formity, as noted by former presidents of the International Sociological Association (Archer, 
1991; Sztompka, 2009, 2011). Intentionally or otherwise, sociologies from the South, though 
they may be pluralistic, are bound by social limitations in their quest to narrate collective 
lives (Latour, 2005). While hegemonic intellectual practices have acknowledged the effects 
of colonialism and colonisation in a perfunctory way, these remain deeply ingrained in their 
readings, writings and presentations of theoretical concerns, preventing reflections on the 
possible disconcertments provoked. Therefore, what is here referred to as ‘Southern effects’ 
do not therefore necessarily differ from the limitations of sociological knowledge and prac-
tice faced elsewhere as suggested by Law (2004) and Latour (2005). Nevertheless, as I will 
show, these Southern obliterations lead to specific ontological outcomes.
It is precisely when criticising the effects of this restrictive homogeneity that Actor- 
Network Theories (ANT) converge with several Southern social theories to challenge cur-
rent trends in the discipline, as suggested by Yehia (2007). In order to strengthen these 
convergences, I would like to suggest understanding sociology as a form of ‘internal colo-
nialism’ (Casanova, 1965) that has imposed a defined set of subjects as the only true realms 
of the social in the South. A central issue that both ANT and Southern social theories face is 
the ontological constraints of the hegemonic modern sociological approaches in assembling 
non-Euro-American collectives. 
This chapter outlines the connections between the goals of the two set of theories, fo-
cusing on work identified with ANT by Law (2004, 2015), Law and Benschop (1997), 
Mol (1999) and Verran (2001, 2002) and those collected by Connell (2007) and Santos and 
 Meneses (2009) in their anthologies of Southern theories. Following this discussion, I turn to 
the works of two authors not usually included in the literature on Southern theories, Viveiros 
de Castro (2004) and De La Cadena (2015), as examples of an effective ontoformative con-
vergence between ANT and Southern theories.The term ‘ontoformative’ is borrowed from 
the works of Connell (2011; 2012) and describes the necessary sociological construction of 
expanded ontologies after what she characterises as the colonial encounter. Finally, I propose 
two possible outcomes for this convergence: (a) the building of Southern sociologies as an 
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ontoformative theory-methodology within the discipline; and (b) the recognition of geo- 
ontological-politics in shaping contemporary sociology.
Southern sociologies
As noted in Rosa (2014, 2016), the term ‘South’ has no easy definition. Its use as a category 
to analyse social theory – and especially sociology – is, in many senses, problematic. In 
principle, the ‘South’ lacks both clear borders and a single encompassing intellectual agenda. 
Nonetheless, a group of works has recently invoked the ‘South’ to refer to a limited and stra-
tegic (and thus self-consciously ‘temporary’) project within debates on the prospects of the 
discipline for achieving a more symmetrical academic labour division (Connell, 2007; Santos 
and Meneses, 2009; Comaroff and Comaroff, 2011; Rosa, 2014).
Within sociology, ‘the South’ has not been used to describe a self-contained platform but 
instead a complex positionality. According to this perspective, Southern sociologists have 
made important contributions to a global mode of knowledge despite the daunting material 
conditions for research they sometimes face. In terms of theory and methods, however, the 
research produced and assembled in the South has been unable to expand its reach in the face 
of Northern scholarship. In my view, these efforts have not resulted in the reconsideration of 
any major sociological theory in Euro-America.
No one can deny that sociology today is understood as a mode of knowledge conse-
crated by the Euro-Americans and their institutions. If we accept Latour’s description of 
this process (2005), it is a knowledge built on a hegemonic and linear account of modernity 
as the facilitator of our theories, research and subjects.1 A purified modernity became the 
universal nomothetic narrative, while others were relegated to provincial and ideographic 
peripheries (Hountondji, 1997; Mafeje, 2000). This is one of the possible explanations of the 
non- theoretical effects of Southern research in hegemonic narratives. Since modernity and 
its ‘derivatives’ (late modernity and postmodernity) are the only metanarrative tolerated in 
academic debates, Southern realities work by adding components to an existing exemplary 
model, as in, for example, the work of Domingues (2011) on the phases of modernity in Latin 
America, South Asia and China.
In recognising their peripheral and non-hegemonic positions in the academic world, 
certain authors have addressed challenging questions. Maia (2011) has analysed how some 
authors use their peripheral position to advance and challenge the discipline of sociology. Re-
search on modernity-and-coloniality (Quijano, 2002), post-coloniality (Go, 2016),  subaltern 
studies (Chakrabarty, 1995) and indigenous sociologies (Adesina, 2002, Akiwowo, 1999) are 
examples of these intellectual agendas. These works have all incorporated agencies, actors, 
processes and histories that are conventionally classified as idiosyncrasies and backwardness 
in modernist sociology (Latour, 2005). In this perspective, the Southern intellectual project 
shares the theoretical exploration of objects often considered local eccentricities in order 
to challenge the simplistic employment and narrow reach of hegemonic categories. In this 
regard, a proactive South draws attention to geopolitical differences that cannot be absorbed 
by the hegemonic disciplinary agenda. 
But what would be distinctively Southern in such theories? History is a central issue as 
noted by subaltern studies and the modernity/coloniality project in India, Latin America and 
Africa. The crucial turning point in most of these works is the inclusion of colonialism as a 
central and problematic fact of modernity as a theory (Connell, 2007). This chapter posits 
that connections with ANT can be found in Southern theorists’ efforts to expand the agen-
cies considered relevant to our analyses (Latour, 2005). When we look at challenges posed 
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by the Yoruba indigenous sociologies (Akiwowo, 1999) or by Muslim influences in Asian 
social sciences (Alatas, 2010), we encounter narratives that introduce new ontologies into 
sociological debates by demonstrating their effects in the everyday lives of various ‘Southern-
ers.’ Along the same vein, in a shared quest to increase the understanding and the universe 
of accountable agencies, a group of  STS researchers (Latour, 2005; Law, 2004; Mol, 1999; 
Verran, 2001) have begun to think about the ontological dimension of the problem. In both 
sets of work, the colonial dimension of analytical scope is at the centre.
By placing geopolitical differences and inequalities in knowledge production at the fore-
front of their analysis, some of these sociological texts are often interpreted through the clas-
sical dualism of  local (difference) versus universal (commonalities) as in the works of  Keim 
(2008), Patel (2010), Reed (2013) and Albrow and King (1990). Even in works that aim to in-
crease the circulation and distribution of Southern perspectives, we can observe certain scep-
ticism with regard to the possibility of generalising and universalising Southern initiatives 
like the Yoruba indigenous sociologies (Akiwowo, 1986, 1999). Connell (2007) is focused on 
the possibility of directly applying the concepts introduced by Akiwowo (1999) to Australia 
and other countries, while other authors such as Adesina (2002) have instead opted to stress 
the instability of the ontological categories present in the Yoruba project.2 Beyond the limits 
of any general concept, the methodological procedure for treating ontologies as unstable and 
performative should lead such local approaches to eventually challenge a major trend in the 
discipline, allowing the multiplicity of existences to emerge.
Division of academic labour, theoretical colonisation 
and internal ontological colonisation
The challenges presented in recent literature invoking the notion of the South suggest po-
tential commonalities with at least certain aspects of ANT. As mentioned earlier, one crucial 
issue that both projects have addressed is the ontological constraint of the hegemonic modern 
sociological approaches in assembling non-Euro-American collectives. The Southern liter-
ature cited earlier has described this hegemony and challenged it geopolitically in several 
ways. Here, I particularly focus on two approaches: The notions of internal ‘colonialism’ and 
the ‘potted plants in greenhouses’ metaphor of positionality.
A vociferous critique of the limited ontological scope of merely applying sociological 
theories in many countries in the South can be read from the perspective of ‘internal colo-
nialism.’ Casanova (1965) used this term to describe how the political and economic control 
of the colonies by European metropoles later morphed into internal practices of exploitation 
and expansionism by a group of settlers at the forefront of the independent states. The trans-
mutation and transplantation of the modern state’s hegemonic notion of governing from a 
distance have been replicated through administrative principles of racialising the nation and 
dismissing native or indigenous roles and existential perspectives. Limiting its application to 
the context of this chapter, we cannot overlook the fact that sociology was – and still is – a 
kind of national project in many countries (Alatas, 1977; Peirano, 1981).3 A central motive for 
these schemes is the nation state’s inability to deal with the irreconcilable internal differences 
that could dismantle the project of sociology itself.
In the colonised regions where sociology was established as a legitimate form of public 
and academic narratives, the discipline replicates the domination of certain ‘cultural hetero-
geneous groups,’ to use the 1960s term (Casanova, 1965:167). National academic discourse is 
therefore shaped by a racial–cultural perspective (Rodney, 1981). The limited set of agencies, 
subjects and relations deployed in academic analysis (such as the use of the farm and slavery/
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rural waged labour as the only legitimate forms of existence) has also been fundamental to 
pigeonholing national contexts in the Euro-American hegemonic scopes of interpretation. 
This is about more than a lack of alternatives or bad faith; most of the researchers are certain 
that intellectually, they belong to the world of these white-Western moderns’ categories.
In the African context, Nyamnjoh (2012) has referred to local academics who view 
 Euro-American theories and methods as their only possible toolboxes as ‘potted plants in 
greenhouses.’ The greenhouse is an interesting allegory to describe the artificial modern 
scenario of global sociology where the production and reproduction of a globalised agenda 
oblige academics to ignore empirical, political and theoretical processes occurring at the lo-
cal level. Somewhat ironically, for Nyamnjoh (2012), ‘potted’ academics would benefit from 
local research funds to develop their countries into the dominant and ideal Euro-American 
types of (supposed) backwardness and commiseration. 
From my perspective, most of the sociologists of white-European descent working in the 
South  – but others as well – have replicated the aims and desires of local liberal academic 
elites. They have played the role of intellectual colonisers of local existences while adopting 
and adapting categories that resemble those available in the theoretical agendas established 
within the sociological knowledge controlled by North Atlantic institutions such as religion 
and politics. Alatas (2000) has described this condition as the ‘captive mind.’
Even critical studies aimed at understanding how Southern lives have been politically 
emancipated tend to seek out processes that replicate specific forms of social transformation 
already trialled in the academic centres (i.e. social movements, industrial sociology and sociol-
ogy of labour). Important sociological works in the South are thus often dedicated to develop-
ment, revolution, rationalisation, secularisation and modernisation, as if  these were not merely 
transversal but unquestionably the most important themes in any experience worldwide. 
It is not surprising, then, that many exemplary intellectual tools taken from the South 
emulate and rely on dualisms such as centre–periphery or modern–traditional practices. In 
short, peering at local research problems through ‘civilized’ methodological and theoreti-
cal glasses is akin to considering reality a disputed field between what is (still) traditional 
(processes predominately lived by non-whites and indigenous groups) and its desired and 
desirable modern dimension (reserved for certain former colonial elites and urban groups).
Convergence with ANT: the quest for ontological 
autonomy and an ontoformative agenda
The effects of hegemonic theories and methods in sociology lead me to consider the dis-
concertment that serious empirical research often provokes. Scholars typically connect their 
research findings with some established theoretical perspective. When such connections are 
not obvious, such processing tends to focus on the empirical material and not on the the-
ories, which are assumed to be stable or permanent. According to Law, this is the ‘general 
way of moving effortlessly from place to place without attending to specificities’ (2004: 155), 
required by the Euro-American social-science tradition. In the South, it has led to a main-
stream methodological trend of only researching objects that already fall within the scope of 
available Euro-American theories.
This trend of standardising subject matters can also be read as an ontological constraint 
connected to the politics of knowledge production in sociology. Under an arrangement 
where precision and stability are regarded as values, the inability of established categories and 
concepts (with their logical requirements) to adequately describe Southern and non-Western 
ontologies is interpreted as both empirical and (local) theoretical failures from the South. An 
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important example is the reluctance on the part of Sztompka (2009) and Connell (2007) to 
accept the indigenous sociologies’ initiative developed by Akisola Akiwowo for the Interna-
tional Sociological Association.
Moving away from the North Atlantic in a more symmetrical approach would mean 
making an effort to establish ontological politics that ponder the conceptual ‘incompleteness’ 
of the South as a legitimate and qualified subject (Law, 2004; Mol, 1999). This implies, 
first, that Southern existences do not meet the requirements of the purified ideal Northern 
theoretical types; and second, that they are not stable or permanent either in space or time. 
Both may have the potential to challenge the work of sociologists in the North and South, 
although in most Southern contexts, they can be considered a specific circumstantial advan-
tage. Emergent practices and agencies that Northern theories dismiss or avoid due to their 
theoretical imprecision could become a prolific field for Southern theories. My own research 
with the abahlali basemapulazini (black families living in white farmers’ land) in South Africa, 
for example, describes a contemporary indigenous existence that cannot be captured by the 
dualistic modern notions of rural worker or resident in the traditional reserves created by the 
apartheid (Rosa, 2012). The abahalali are outside the theoretical borders of the hegemonic 
Euro-American social sciences and any research on and with them should be sociologically 
ontoformative, including, for example, ancestors and dreams.
A specifically Southern ontological politics here should be enacted throughout the con-
frontation between stable and unstable, completeness and incompleteness, and, certainly, 
centre and periphery. As observed elsewhere (Rosa, 2016), this confrontation may also cre-
ate an option to give privilege to non-exemplary subjects already engaged in subverting 
 theory-making. The abahlali basemapulazini do not do politics only in modern unions or 
social movements: Their ontopolitical gatherings may include such Euro-American entities 
but never only them.
The recognition and importance of the ‘epistemic disconcertment’ caused by emergent 
ontologies both comprise an interesting movement within ANT and also characterise certain 
of the Southern sociological claims. Law and Lin call on postcolonial STS and ANT scholars 
to cultivate and dwell on disconcertment as a way to narrate ‘and enact differences or seem-
ingly improbable, impossible, or unreal worlds’ (2010:148). When studying land ownership 
disputes in Australia, Verran (2002) describes the Western and Aboriginal knowledge sys-
tems as ‘disparate.’ These authors conceive of either disparity or disconcertment as oppor-
tunities to continuously enlarge the disciplinary scope of sociology in a situation in which 
knowledge is in dispute. More specifically, such opportunities allow for the consideration of 
different and incommensurable existences, located in either different (geopolitical) regions 
or in the same nation state, thus casting welcomed doubt on the nation state as a perennial 
and integrative entity.
Within recent sociological debates, the question has been crafted in discussions on our 
subject as parts of one world (Archer, 1991), whole world (Connell, 2011) or many plural 
worlds (Law, 2015). Smart (1994) praises the debate as a political and moral undertaking 
that avoids treating the internationalisation of sociology as a legislative process or, I would 
add, as a means for the theoretical domestication of existences. Law (2015) takes on this de-
bate to reflect a contemporary conjuncture where we should think of difference as a matter 
that exceeds the conceptions of a liberal, Euro-American mindset. According to Law, we 
have ‘to wrestle with the implications that worlds in the plural are enacted in different and 
 power-saturated practices’ (2015:128). An important contribution from these ANT debates 
is that no single ontology, when commonly treated as a disciplinary prerogative in sociology, 
can regulate others without being performed as a theoretical power struggle. 
215
How to converge with Southern sociologies?
The consideration of the production of a less colonial and imperial world or an interna-
tionalised environment for sociology inspires the ANT/Southern Sociology encounter to 
enact a knowledge politics that is not ontologically bounded. In my view, such an encounter 
brings the ‘geo’ of geopolitics to the already known ANT debate on ontological politics. En-
acting ontological geopolitics is here understood in the way described by Latour (2016:16) in 
dialogue with Chakrabarty (2000) as not taking for granted the grid of the ‘the older Globe 
of the first imperial history.’ In this approach, departing from the notion of South would 
necessarily lead us to overcome the classic ways in which the global order was assembled and 
ultimately challenge its current meanings.
Based on this debate, a tentative answer to the question, ‘How to stage a convergence 
between ANT and Southern Sociologies?’ could be that a platform is created for the consid-
eration and introduction of the notion of geo-ontological politics. The notion, of course, would 
only come into play when authors establish the South as a performative oppositional plat-
form (Sandoval, 2000) and as an ontoformative effect on any research outside the imagined 
 Euro-American territory.
ontological innovations from the South
It is important to note that an ontological factor is not typically central to the Southern 
theories presented in the collections cited earlier. In the works of  both Connell and Santos, 
ontological quests are only presented in the cases of African intellectual movements (Yoruba 
indigenous sociologies included). However, researchers from other regions dealing with local 
intellectual traditions have moved the ontological dimensions of their objects to the central 
stage of their knowledge production. 
The convergence between Southern ontologies and theoretical challenges for the dis-
cipline has been found, among others, in the works of South American researchers like 
Viveiros de Castro (2004), who deals with the Amazonian cosmologies of South America, 
and De la Cadena (2015), who researches those of the Andes. Verran (2001, 2002) has done 
something similar in her research in West Africa and Australia. The work of these authors has 
translated what Connell defines as the social knowledge of colonised groups (most of them 
oral) into a theoretical–methodological approach. A shift of this kind partially arises from an 
intensive dialogue with some of the key principles of ANT, including the symmetry between 
academic and non-academic knowledge. 
According to Viveiros de Castro, ‘the question is how to configure the [indigenous] peo-
ple as theoretical agents rather than as passive “subject”’ (2004:4). This configuration does 
not occur as a simple translation of the ‘native’ perspectives into established ‘Euro-Christian’ 
academic notions; instead, it should subvert and reshape – or in my opinion, expand – the 
conceptual toolbox available in the disciplines. This is what the author calls ‘controlled equiv-
ocation,’ a perspective also used by De La Cadena (2015) to discuss the encounters between 
scholars, land struggles, shamanism and politics in the Peruvian Andes. It is an approach that 
privileges (ontological) difference rather than commonalities in the production of research.
In her studies of Andean indigenous land politics and nature, De La Cadena (2015) uses 
the term ‘the comedy of equivocations’ to describe the incommensurability of the mutual 
interpretations of Quechua activists and North American/Peruvian scholars. The activists 
are at the centre of the author’s narrative as she describes their conscious approach to differ-
ences when dealing with the richer and more powerful scholars. The Quechua were familiar 
with the stereotypes the academics hold and were also aware that these stereotypes served as 
a scaffold for continued relations with outsiders. In keeping with Viveiros de Castro (2004), 
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De La Cadena is not interested in presenting the ‘correct’ or precise translation of the Quec-
hua agencies of Peru, but she does take them seriously enough to challenge her own academic 
interpretation.
Yet, why aren’t Viveiros de Castro and De La Cadena regarded as Southern theorists? 
Even when taking ‘the [indigenous] people’ as theoretical agents, neither author appears to 
emphasise the classic geopolitics of knowledge. The bulk of the theoretical–methodological 
debate they each present is influenced by established Euro-American debates (ANT among 
them) and both have opted to avoid any discussion on inter-academic imperialist relations in 
Latin America. Again, nation states may not function as self-sufficient containers, but their 
part in assembling these associations is hardly negligible.
In the definition used at the beginning, I argued that Southern theories should con-
tinuously challenge the disdain for Southern ontologies arising from the imperialistic ap-
plication of  Northern theories to non-Euro-American existences. When pointing out the 
differences between the worlds of scholars and indigenous worlds, Viveiros de Castro and De 
La  Cadena do not necessarily address the sociological equivocations present in critical litera-
ture of the South. From my own perspective, most Southern scholars simply decide to apply 
Euro-American theories and methods as unequivocally and universally inspirational. Since 
we are using hegemonic conceptual tools, we tend not to problematise the equivocations. 
Southern sociologies, inspired by some studies in anthropology, should perhaps consider 
their local and empirical theoretical corpus as such when describing and reclaiming specific 
agencies and ontologies, including their own. 
Conclusions
In my view, the ontological quest described here would be fruitful for sociologists in the 
South. However, it would not have the same effect on the social knowledge described by 
Connell (2007) as Southern theory. It would be meaningless to affirm that ANT or any other 
academic proposal would directly affect indigenous thinking across the world. Instead, the 
proposed ideas here are meant to address what is considered an ambiguous and highly col-
onised mode of thinking known as academic sociology. 
Casanova’s notion of ‘internal colonialism’ (1965) could be used to refer to how main-
stream Southern sociologists were obliged or goaded into ignoring non-modern effects in 
southern political lives. As ‘potted plants in greenhouses’ (Nyamnjoh, 2012), some of us have 
been raised under the artificial but practical atmosphere of Euro-American modernity and 
its ontological pillars, which colonise existences across the globe. Accordingly, the resulting 
standard methodological procedures involve adapting and expanding consecrated ontologies 
to fit Southern subjects in work which has undoubtedly secured a mode of internationalism 
for the discipline. 
Under this form of  international consolidation, the ambivalence of certain Southern ar-
guments becomes very explicit. How can we claim to be part of a discipline without having 
the same subjects? How can we speak of Southern theories if our theoretical scopes are the 
same as those in the North? Inspired by ANT and Southern literature, I have attempted to 
show here that our common disciplinary ground is not (modern) ontology itself, but the 
continuous and variable process of assembling them to create unpredictable effects.
However, it remains challenging to research and think sociologically about certain rel-
atively autonomous subjects performed by indigenous existences. Indigenous people are 
present in the North, but only in some parts of the South do they represent the majority. It 
is no coincidence that most of the Southern works cited here aim to sociologically enact the 
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life of indigenous subjects with the consequent controlled equivocations of an asymmetrical 
solidarity. 
If we can find a substantial critique to this limitation within the discipline (Casanova, 
Connell, Quijano and Santos, among others), it is mostly in the works situated outside tra-
ditional sociological borders where native ontologies are enacted as subjects (De la Cadena, 
Viveiros de Castro and Verran among others). In citing such non-conventional sociologists, 
I aim to show just how far sociologists have to travel – all sociologists, but especially those 
of the South – to embrace ontoformativity as a theoretical–methodological distinction. This 
is, in my perspective, one possible way to claim autonomy while being part of a global disci-
pline, and could also serve to deter our continuous production of internal colonialism. 
As Verran (2002) and later Law and Lin (2017) suggest, when ANT meet the postcolonial 
collective and Southern theories, the path opens for a necessary methodological experi-
ment. In Southern theories, this would lead to a shift towards ontoformativity as a method 
and identity. For ANT scholars, the encounter with Southern perspectives would genuinely 
bring the ‘geo’ to the table of ontological politics in order to rethink the hegemonic grid and 
our system of coordinates (Latour, 2016). As the aforementioned works have suggested, there 
are more political collectives and agencies in the South than the classic ANT academics ever 
imagined, provoking welcomed disconcertments in academic colonial mentalities.
Notes
 1 Works like Alatas and Sinha (2017) have added new gendered, historical and geographical outlooks 
to sociological theory, though most of the courses, books and journals in the South continue to 
insist on masculinist 19th-century and Euro-American narratives.
 2 Adesina (2002) would certainly not agree with Connell (1997: xii) that ‘it is only written texts that 
allow the communication of complex social knowledge across planetary distances.’ In  Adesina’s 
perspective, the orature of Yoruba poetry is precisely the kind of source that can break with 
 Western tradition and the limitations on what is supposed to be known. 
 3 Quijano (2007), an important figure in the sociology of modernity/coloniality movement in Latin 
America, has highlighted the limits of the internal colonialism notion because it is limited to the 
Eurocentric notion of national state. While considering his admonition, it is important to note – as 
does Alatas (1977) – that national-state projects, despite their European roots, are still central pillars 
for peripheral critiques of mainstream sociological theories. I find it difficult to dissociate the cur-
rent dominant sociological understanding of the nation state from the classic Eurocentric theoretical 
exemplars.
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Actor-network theory (ANT) has been used in many different ways. From technoscientific 
entrepreneurship through environmental conflicts and organisation studies to healthcare 
practices, it has mobilised empirically oriented methods to explore heterogeneous ordering, 
fluidities, ambivalences and multiplicities. Moving from its earlier rather monolithic termi-
nology (Callon 1986; Latour 1988; Law 1986), it has decentred how it thinks about objects; 
it has shifted and itself become multiple (Mol 2002). 
At the same time, however, most of the cases important to its conceptual development 
have continued to come from Euro-America. The consequence of this is that the Western 
naturalism (Descola 2013) of those cases has remained embedded in its intellectual appara-
tus (think, for instance, of concepts such as ‘heterogeneity,’ ‘hybridization’ and ‘relational-
ity’ that aim at destabilising, while still being infused with, the naturalistic version of the 
empirical).
This tendency is particularly obvious in ANT-inflected work on Chinese medicine (CM). 
Thus, though ANT has changed as it has explored CM, it has also continued to draw on a 
relatively stable infra-language. In what follows, I use the term ‘ANT-immobile’ as a short-
hand to characterise this stability. I explore the power of this ‘ANT-immobile,’ and ask how 
far ANT has shifted and is capable of shifting what it takes to be ‘the empirical,’ as well as a 
possible non-Western alternative, by asking what ANT might learn from how CM handles 
difference.
World-mattering
There is a large literature on the translations, hybridisations and purifications of CM. For 
instance, Lei (1999) has described how the socio-material networks of Changshan (常山), a 
 Chinese herb, were re-networked by laboratory science into the biomedical relations of a 
new antimalarial drug. Karchmer (2010) has considered how techniques of ‘pattern differen-
tiation and therapy determination’ (辯證論治) have been used to translate, hybridise and pu-
rify CM in ways that simultaneously integrate it with, and distinguish it from, biomedicine. 
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In such studies, ANT has sometimes been used to understand CMs (I put these in the plural, 
for reasons discussed below), but this leaves us with an outstanding problem. This is because 
in such studies, CMs have been doubly domesticated. First rendered ungenerative by modern 
technosciences as these have translated CM into their own language, they have subsequently 
been further domesticated in the theoretical redescriptions created by ANT-immutable. 
Thus, as Karchmer (2010, 230) puts it:
We can’t understand the hybridity of contemporary Chinese medicine—the “integration 
of Chinese medicine and Western medicine”—without also understanding its opposing 
purifications—the constructions of “Chinese medicine” and “Western medicine” that 
doctors attempt to combine…. The dual processes of hybridization and purification are 
a central dynamic in the modern development of Chinese medicine….
But CMs and their relations with biomedicine do not have to be understood in this stan-
dard ANT language of hybridity and purification. Instead, ANT-immutable may be put 
at risk in its encounter with concepts and ontologies that are radically other. Zhan (2009) 
has traced  the  material and symbolic circulation of CM between China and the USA 
since Maoism. She has shown how CMs have multiplied in the processes of knowledge 
production, and has explored the worlding, temporalising and locating of CMs in this 
circulation. As a part of this, she has argued that we should examine how (medical) knowl-
edges are produced in uneven, interactive and translocal processes that constantly push and 
disrupt a set of ‘great divides’ (including those of ‘West’ and ‘other’ inadvertently upheld 
by ANT-immobile).
Somewhat relatedly, Mol has explored how differences in biomedical practices are han-
dled in the different practices of a Dutch hospital. Indeed, at first glance, the multiplicity 
of CMs is not very different from those of Mol’s post-ANT (Ward 2012). But despite the 
similarities, it is the disparities in which empirical differences are specified and handled that are 
most important for my argument. Mol (2002, 33) writes that: 
[a]n ethnographer/praxiographer out to investigate disease never isolates these from the 
practices in which they are, what one may call, enacted. She stubbornly takes notice of 
the techniques that make things visible, audible, tangible, knowable.
Thus, ‘the “disease” that ethnographers talk about is never alone’ (Mol 2002, 31). For in-
stance, in examining thickened intima in the pathology department, the ethnographer is not 
following the intima-in-itself, but rather the intima under a microscope or some equivalent 
of the microscope. 
However, whilst it is possible to explore CMs in the same biomedical style by follow-
ing observable empirical traces (Kim 2006), Mol is also suggesting that we think through 
the enactments of the world in the languages of the practices themselves. Studies drawing 
on CM resources of world-mattering such as duixiang (對象, ‘targeted appearance’), shi (勢, 
‘propensity’) or zheng (證, ‘pattern’) tell us that the clinical expressions of the body in CM 
practices are specified and handled in ways quite unlike those of biomedicine (Farquhar 
2012; Lin 2017; Lin & Law 2018; Scheid 2014). These are studies that have used CM’s own 
conceptual characteristics including ‘correlativity,’ ‘the empirical as conceptual’ and Daoist 
worlding logics to explore biomedicine–CM intersections. They have shown that CMs dif-
fer methodologically, politically and ontologically from ANT-immobile as much as they do 
from biomedicine. They have also reversed the direction of conceptual transfer and started 
Wen-Yuan Lin
222
to undo the naturalism of Euro-American infra-language by finding CM-inflected ways 
of world-mattering (Farquhar 2015; Kim 2006; Lin & Law 2014; Zhan 2011, 2014). This 
chapter works in the same way to ask how ANT might travel well and benefit from provin-
cialising itself as it intersects with CM (Chakrabarty 2000).
Lost in translation
How to think about and approach this topic? One possibility comes from anthropologist 
Eduardo Viveiros de Castro (2012). He starts from the assumption, not far removed from 
ANT, that realities in different locations are different. If translation is betrayal (traduttore, 
traditore), then any translation between realities is also and necessarily a mistranslation. De 
Castro highlights words in common, homonyms, that might appear to bridge these realities, 
but instead conceal differences and betray the reality of the Other world. But what should 
be done about this? Answering this question, he recommends the method of controlled equiv-
ocation (2004). We should, he says, scrutinise homonyms, recognise that mistranslations are 
inevitable and decide which world or worlds we are going to betray. 
This is a suggestion that has been picked up as ANT thinks about its mis/translations 
across empirical and ontological difference ( Jensen 2014). But de Castro’s work also suggests 
that we might ask how to hold onto the empirical realities of CM instead of those of ANT- 
immutable. How might we mistranslate the latter rather than the former? What might count 
as a better ‘balance of betrayal’? Latour (2005, 49) offers one solution. He calls for an empirical 
metaphysics that bases itself on ‘infra-language’:
[a]nalysts are allowed to possess only some infra-language whose role is simply to help 
them become attentive to the actors’ own fully developed meta-language, a reflexive 
account of what they are saying.
However, as Haraway warns:
It matters what thoughts think thoughts. It matters what knowledges know knowledges. 
It matters what relations relate relations. It matters what worlds world worlds. It matters 
what stories tell stories.
(Haraway 2016, 35)
The implication is that ANT-immutable may have flattened most of the metalanguage of 
Western actors and theorists but still holds on to a particular ‘empirical’ in its infra-language. 
Mol has made a similar argument, observing that the use of English-language intellectual 
resources betrays Dutch realities (Mol 2014), a concern that resonates with postcolonial cri-
tiques of the supposed universalism of Western conceptual and methodological apparatuses 
as these render the irreducibility of the Other (Cheah 2001).
The question, then drawing on Descola’s (2013) specifications of various ontologies, is 
whether ANT infra-language is not itself a version of an abstract of naturalistic Euro- American 
universality. Is it not based on and being confused with ‘the concrete world hegemony derived 
from Europe’s position as center’ (Escobar 2008, 167–168)? And if this is so, then instead of 
flattening CMs with such an infra-language, it might be better to ask how CMs’ intellectual 
resources could be used to inflect the infra-language of ANT – or inflect it further.
In what follows, I explore this first by searching for empirical, conceptual and ontolog-
ical differences hidden in ANT’s translations of CM, before considering how CM attends 
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to those differences and how this might inform the ways in which these are handled. I then 
consider the hidden empirical differences brought out by CM’s attention to correlativity, 
propensity and patterning. Finally, I explore the implications of this CM-inflected ANT.1
Correlativity
Dr. Hsu is a popular CM doctor in a major CM hospital, holds a PhD in epidemiology and 
is one of the most productive CM professors in a research university in Taiwan. In one of 
his studies, he uses questionnaires to differentiate CM patterns, using patterns of symptoms 
to identify types of problems among patients suffering from various diseases. Like most 
contemporary CM researchers, he publishes his findings in SCI (science citation index) 
journals. In clinical practice, Dr. Hsu specialises in cancer treatment, and he has designed 
a herbal decoction, Kuan Sin Yin (KSY), to help patients survive the rigors of chemo and 
radiation therapy.
There are straightforward ANT reasons for exploring this combination of treatments. For 
instance, a material semiotic reading of his practices tells us that these are heterogeneous and 
exhibit specific patterns of relations. At the same time, if we look at their specificities, then 
we discover that this translation is also a betrayal. Thus, KSY is a herbal complex formula 
(複方) based on the famous Four Gentlemen Decoction (四君子湯, hereafter FGD), designed 
for ‘supporting right [qi] (扶正[氣])’ which is composed of four herbs: ginseng (人參), baizhu 
(白朮), fuling (茯苓) and gancao (甘草). Dr. Hsu:
Because spleen and stomach, [which are] the earth (土) of the five phases, are the major 
generators of qi in the body after birth (脾胃屬土,主後天之氣) …. FGD … uses the four 
herbs that supplement qi and fortify earth….
Obviously, this is not a composition derived from a biochemical analysis of the properties of 
herbs. Instead, says Dr. Hsu, it works by matching herbs so that they can play the roles of sov-
ereign, minister, assistant and courier in a team created to correct biased disease propensities. 
So in FGD, ginseng is the sovereign for supplementing qi, while baizhu, fuling are, respectively, 
minister and assistant for fortifying the spleen, and gancao is the courier that harmonises the 
whole composition. 
To consider how this differs from ANT-immutable, we need to immerse ourselves in the 
world of CM. We need to understand that in this world, the ‘ten thousand things’ (萬物) 
(meaning everything) is at work, including diseases, people, decoctions and the Buddha, 
and the qi of yin-yang circulates through the ten thousand things in the dynamics of the five 
phases. We also need to understand that in the circulation of qi, the ten thousand things are 
always in specific, local metamorphoses (Nappi 2009). CM medications such as herbs are 
classified by property and taste (性味). They are ‘correlated’ in a huge canon of metaphorical 
links with their entry into specific meridians (歸經) (Unschuld 1986).2 And it is these links 
that make up correlativity.
Crucial to this is the complex movement of qi through this correlative web. Here, lines 
of correspondence and practical resonances can be drawn between meridians, directions, 
colours, climates, musical notes, emotions, tastes, sense organs and parts of the body. Im-
portantly, given its composition with different herbs, the roles that each herb plays may be 
different. So, fuling may have the inclination to go, in different circumstances, to the kid-
ney (water), heart (fire) and spleen and stomach (earth) meridians. When matched with the 
three herbs in the FGD composition, the correlative formation of qi will facilitate fuling to 
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balance the biased inclination of spleen and stomach. To make CM work for each patient is 
therefore to tinker between correlative patterns of qi while attending to each patient’s spe-
cific condition. And this is why Dr. Hsu not only modifies FGD into KSY but also adapts 
the treatment to the specific conditions of particular cancer patients, a point to which I 
return below. 
So how do the descriptions of CM and ANT compare here (Lin & Law 2014)? One 
answer is that in insisting on the heterogeneity of actors, ANT-immutable points to some-
thing important (Kim 2006, 2969). Even so, this does not really catch the significance 
of the specific ways in which ten thousand things transform in CM. The argument is that 
ANT  infra-language has inherited a certain naturalism in its cosmology which allows it 
to imagine difference with the notion of heterogeneity. However, the idea of difference in 
kind implied in this concept is foreign to CM. So, for instance, the earth, the spleen and 
stomach and fuling are not qualitatively different in terms of their qi. That idea makes no 
sense in CM. But neither are they homogeneous, for they are also different in their spe-
cific embodiments. As in the case of fuling, things are defined in their correlativity, such as 
the movement and composition of qi. This means that heterogeneity and homogeneity are 
simply not relevant as registers or realities – and that we are far from the infra-language 
of immutable ANT. The issue, then, is how to take empirical differences seriously whilst 
travelling across ontological difference with an ANT sensibility (Law & Lin 2014). To think 
about this, consider the following.
First, social science writ large shares the empirical legacy of the great divide between mat-
ters of fact (in scientific and experimental forms) and matters of opinion first institutionalised 
in the creation of experimental science in the Royal Society of London by Robert Boyle in 
17th-century post-Restoration England. To put it simply, this divide later spread worldwide 
in the colonialisation of the following centuries. 
Second, this empirical legacy goes along with assumptions about the relations between 
how we think on the one hand, and reality on the other. This works most straightfor-
wardly in natural science empiricism which seeks good ways of discovering that reality. 
It is more complex for social science where data include what people think, i.e. meanings 
and cultures. Here, the ‘cultural,’ together with ontological and empirical difference, may 
become data to be explained, while ‘reality’ is turned into whatever affords explanatory 
purchase. 
Third, despite the different ways of handling the relations between culture and reality, 
ANT-immutable holds on to particular kinds of ‘empirical reality’ in its infra-language, 
implicitly prescribing what is ‘really going on’ in its own terms of art, and so redescribes the 
metalanguage of the actors. Working in this way, ANT-immutable brings parts of the reality 
embedded in its terms of art into the world of the actors. The example I just gave for this 
operating procedure is the very notion of heterogeneity.
But what if the world we are trying to describe is not a single reality, and there are differ-
ent realities in different places? Of course, ANT knows that different practices enact different 
realities, but what if its infra-language is affiliated to one particular naturalistic version of 
reality (Law 2011)? And what if we want to do without that particular reality? In short, the is-
sue is probably less about whether to elide correlativity with heterogeneity or CMs with ANT in 
general, but more about the grounds on which ANT might work well with CMs. To put it in 
de Castro’s terms, what we are witnessing in ANT-immutable is an uncontrolled equivocation 
that conceals ‘empirical’ differences that are – or at least may be – important ontologically, 
theoretically and methodically. This suggests the need for the CMs to speak for their correl-
ative version of the ‘empirical’ and so to rearrange the tools of description.
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Propensity
So how do CMs know the correlative transformability of qi between the ten thousand things? 
This leads us to a second difference between CM and ANT-immobile. This has to do with 
‘propensity,’ an awkward translation for the Chinese word shi. Shi specifies the disposition, 
inclination, movement and momentum of qi of the body in a particular situation.
Dr. Hsu: Cancer patients undergoing chemo or radiation therapy suffer from deficiency 
in both qi and yin (陰虛). … [But modified FGD] ginseng was far too strong for cancer pa-
tients and usually caused dryness-heat (燥熱)… [so] it is replaced with dangshen at a lower 
dose, and I added huanqi as the sovereign herb for enhancing qi…. [I] added maimendong 
and nuzhenzi to nourish yin (滋陰) in the first version. But … radiation therapy damaged 
yin more severely and caused more heat symptoms than chemotherapy. …Nourishing 
yin too fast might retain the evils, … and huoxiang was good enough for waking up the 
spleen and stomach. So I designed the second version [of KSY] for patients undergoing 
chemotherapy.
Here, the two versions of KSY have different propensities for different types of patients, and 
they work to ‘support … the patients’ right [qi]’ by initiating the propensity of enhancing qi 
and nourishing their yin without directly supplementing yang with ginseng which might dry 
out yin. Thus, ‘the same’ herbs work in different ways in different formulae, while different 
prescriptions transform ‘the same’ disease propensities. This shi-as-reasoning also applies to 
the shi of radiation therapy and chemotherapy: The former damages yin more and causes 
more heat than the latter. 
But this describes only a small part of the propensities at work. Dr. Hsu thinks of cancer 
treatment as a balance between attacking evil and supporting right qi. This works in various 
ways. First, he acknowledges that biomedicine attacks evil and that most patients also use 
biomedicine. He thus encourages patients to use biomedicine and has developed KSY to sup-
port patients’ right qi. Second, he thinks of cancer treatment as being like climbing a moun-
tain. Patients need good guides and good company. So, he and colleagues organise groups to 
lead patients away from the evil qi trapping their spirits and bodies. The groups are named 
after KSY, since ‘Kuan Sin’ means to ‘broaden the heart.’ He also teaches patients Lotus Sutra, 
especially The Universal Gateway of the Bodhisattva, and Buddhist meditation, and asks them to 
pray to Bodhisattva. And to add to this list, he publishes Science Citation Indexed (SCI) pa-
pers to prove that CM patterning, KSY and meditation are effective. Overall, then, he works 
by tackling a wide range of propensities including those to do with patients’ bodies, the 
domination of biomedicine and science, and the social and spiritual conditions of his patients.
How does this intersect with the infra-language of ANT? One possible answer is that the 
working of CM herbs can be explored with ANT’s insights on networked relationality (Lei 
1999), but this is a poor translation because it conceals crucial differences between CM and 
ANT-immutable. This is because shi is not a ‘network of relations.’ Instead, it is an expres-
sion of (local) dispositions, directions of movement, tendencies or inclinations. Dr. Hsu’s 
interventions all depend on knowing the disposition of things, and how to exert influence 
over unbalanced propensities. The body of the patient, biomedical and scientific domination, 
and patients’ social and spiritual conditions are involved, and need to be rebalanced. KSY, 
patients’ groups, SCI papers and Buddhism – each is important. 
Although ANT also attends to things that are not atomistic or individual, a sensibility 
to shi reveals that things do not arise from specific patterns of relations. Rather, they lie 
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within the metamorphosis of the myriad things. They are part of shi. Thus, though the ANT 
notion of ‘relationality’ indexes part of the web of connections, it hides the crucial differ-
ences implied by propensities, differences that lie within constantly changing, correlative 
configurations. 
Patterning
So, the issue is not only ontological difference. Rather, it is how to make productive use 
of the differences hidden by ANT’s CM equivocations. Here is Joseph Needham on Chinese 
thought:
Conceptions are not subsumed under one another but placed side by side in a pattern, 
and things influence one another not by acts of mechanical causation [so] things behave 
in particular ways not necessarily because of prior actions or impulsions of other things, 
but because their position in the ever-moving cyclical universe was such that they were 
endowed with intrinsic nature which made that behavior inevitable for them.
(Needham 2005, 280–281)
The key here is pattern. To play with Mandarin, the pronunciation of ‘knowledge’ (zhī shì, 
知識) is identical to both ‘知勢’ (which literarily means ‘know propensity’) and ‘之勢’ (which 
literarily means the ‘propensity of ’ something). Indeed, Taiwanese people use shi to describe 
everything about the tendencies, situations and inevitable driving forces of daily life. This 
coincidence can be used, less coincidently, to say that ‘to know’ in CM is to know propensity 
or, more exactly, the propensity of something. And pattern differentiation is one of the arts 
CM uses to comprehend the endless differences that manifest themselves in the appearances 
of shi. For instance, patterning in CM diagnosis:
[O]pens a range of possibilities that are variously deployed according to the conditions 
of the moment…[and] include the habits and the training of the doctors as well as the 
manifestation of illness with which he is dealing.
(Farquhar 1994, 134)
How does this work? Dr. Hsu says that cancer patients undergoing biomedical treatment 
usually exhibit the pattern of ‘qi deficiency,’ and he further differentiates between those 
receiving radiotherapy and chemotherapy. This seems to fit well into ANT’s description 
of the multiplicity in CM practices. But as I have hinted, the nuances of CM multiple 
are in danger of being lost in ANT infra-language. Despite the similarity in practices, 
different doctors trained with different schools and working in different situations have 
their distinctive techniques of pattern differentiation, concerns and particular ways of 
combining herbs and resources as they help patients. And all of these vary according 
to the specific propensities at work. Without the help of the CM intellectual appara-
tus that differentiates these patterns, the ‘empirical’ specificities and differences become 
incomprehensible.
Thus, in clinical practices, the propensities of a specific disease caught in the art of pattern 
differentiation are not ‘out there’ disease objects.3 But neither are they subjective interpre-
tations by the doctors, nor simply disease representations. In the diagnosis of specific con-
ditions, patterns lie between doctors and diseases. The specificities of describing patterning 
have to grasp the existence of specific shi as an object of practice by engaging in shi-generating 
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practices (Farquhar 2012). By patterning manifested shi as objects, CM multiplies the arts of 
patterning by accumulating medical cases from different places and times. But this also means 
that CM practitioners working with shi do not bother with distinctions between theory and 
practice, or the empirical and the theoretical (Scheid 2008). The cases and their patterns are 
experiential conceptualisations that add to CM knowledge, and they do so without abstraction. 
Zhan (2014, 241) observes that
[r]ather than subscribing to the naturalized scale and order that underlies deductive 
or inductive thinking, metaphors and analogies in traditional Chinese medicine work 
sideways and in the specific, requiring practitioners to think relationally, critically, and 
creatively while confronted with particular clinical situations.
Thus, described in ANT’s terms, CM ‘hybridises’ without ‘purifying’ (Zhan 2009). Working 
with the empirical as conceptual, it is not only that patterns might vary from condition to 
condition, but that the art of patterning might also differ from school to school. There are 
various ways of diagnosing and a whole range of strategies of treatment. In short, and taken 
together, the insights of Mol and de Castro therefore suggest that CM doctors are not tack-
ling ‘the same’ disease, but that the different arts of patterning are making ‘empirical’ equivocations 
contingent on specific flows of shi as ‘objects’ of specific diagnoses. 
What does this mean for ANT? Despite the fact that both ANT and CM explore con-
tingent contexts of equivocation, ANT-immutable frames its cases using its own toolbox, 
and the logic of its intellectual apparatus remains relatively stable. Its material semiotics is 
not completely unfamiliar with the kinds of variability that I have just described, and it 
has the merit of extending the multiplicity and infra-language of empirical metaphysics. 
But if we attend to the alternative ‘empirical’ facts such as shi in the arts of CM patterning, 
we are no longer entirely in the world of material semiotics. We have moved to worlds of 
shi that are specific to the particular moments of particular diagnostic practices, such that 
the ‘same’ things and words index different ways of patterning propensities in different 
contexts.4 The lesson lies in the similarities, contrasts and convergences between how 
ANT and CM ‘apply’ their methods to differentiate the endless differences in their specific 
intersections, i.e. shi.
Where is ANT?
How can ANT travel well across the differences between itself and CM? If that is the ini-
tial question, then if we follow the lead of post-ANTs and read ANT-immutable through 
a CM-inflected equivocation, the question begins to change. It becomes: How will ANT 
learn from the hidden differences between CM and itself as they encounter one another? As 
we have learned from CM, the answer will not be stable. Indeed, only one thing is certain. 
Such an ANT will not rely on a limited and presumptively transportable intellectual appa-
ratus. Following Mol and de Castro, ANT practitioners will need to be cautious about their 
conceptual toolkit, and avoid drawing their models from a particular version of reality while 
delegating the practices of others to the periphery. 
And if the balance of betrayal were to shift in this way, what might this mean for a 
CM-inflected ANT? One obvious suggestion is that this would need to explore how CM 
handles empirical differences in the manifestation of shi in practices. If we focus on the in-
tellectual apparatus for detecting empirical and ontological differences (Mol 2014), then we 
can explore how ANT might trace world-mattering in different places where shi is in play. 
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As we have seen, Viveiros de Castro (2004, 5) advises us to allow alien concepts to deform 
and subvert the translator’s conceptual toolbox. Similarly, I have tried to displace ANT’s in-
tellectual apparatus by working with/on the specific shi of contemporary Taiwanese medical 
practices (Lin 2013, 2017; 林文源 2014). So doing ethnography of Chinese medical practices 
in Taiwan while working with material semiotics and writing in English in an attempt to 
be faithful to ANT is also to betray ANT-immutable – in the service of another ANT, and 
perhaps one that is ‘CM-inflected.’ This is because it attends to the lost empirical and onto-
logical specificities of shi (Law & Lin 2017). This resonates with Mol’s (2002, 54) emphasis 
on the importance of situated specificity:
The praxiographic “is” is not universal, it is local. It requires a spatial specification. In 
this ontological genre, a sentence that tells what atherosclerosis is, is to be supplemented 
with another one that reveals where this is the case.
Following the traces of CMs by moving from particular to particular and working within 
the specific practices in different locations (Zhan 2014: 240), ANT would have to open itself 
to the empirical mistranslations and displace itself by following local shi case by case and 
location by location. Applying the arts of patterning also suggests that ANT might be trans-
formed, provincialised and flourished with the shi of its own interventions in practices.
So what does this mean? What might it mean to think and do research if ANT’s con-
ceptual toolboxes were deformed and subverted in this way? Again, the logic of shi sug-
gests that any answer will also be situated and specific. CM has transformed and reformed 
itself time after time by differentiating the specificities into various schools of practices 
(Scheid 2002). But this can also be said about the differentiations and differences between 
ANTs’ displacements. And this implies, I am afraid and as Mol (2014) has warned, that 
no universal infra-language can travel across all empirical specificities. The ‘where’ that 
specifies where the praxiographic conceptual toolbox is located always needs to be supple-
mented with a ‘what’ and a ‘how.’ More generally, this means that doing ANT research is 
about how to make situated empirical and conceptual equivocations contingent on which 
specific flows of practices become ‘objects’ of material semiotic diagnoses, and on what 
ultimate ‘ground.’
And then, neither is the intellectual apparatus of shi-as-reasoning universal. Indeed, there 
are different schools of thought that find shi useful and deliver different patterns of ‘empirical’ 
accounts. For instance, mobilising Sun Tzu’s strategic understanding of shi might lead to a 
familiar, conventionally representational research, while a Lao Tzu-informed commitment 
to shi would probably end up with normative epigrams that highlight the contexted and im-
manent flows and counterflows of things in the world (Law & Lin 2018).
Conclusion
Drawing on CM, this chapter has reflected on ANT-immutable’s propensity to flatten em-
pirical and ontological differences with its infra-language. Warning against the politics of 
assimilation, I have argued neither for segregation nor essentialisation. Instead, I have sought 
to make differences in how CM handles difference explicit. Describing CM resources of 
world-mattering such as correlativity, shi and patterning in practice, I have sketched how 
CM allows itself to be mistranslated and absorbed into the empirical realities that it encoun-
ters. But these are just a few of the implications that come from a specific ANT encounter 
with Taiwanese CM practices. What are the patterns that might appear along the journey 
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of a CM-inflected ANT? What might count as ‘theory’ in such an alternative CM-inflected 
ANT? In what sense would this be more productive than other versions of ANT? And how? 
Perhaps Mol’s (2008, 55–56) words on doctoring are useful in this context:
Mis/translation is not a matter of implanting ANT intellectual apparatus, but of exper-
imenting with them…. 
Let us experiment, experience and tinker together-practically… Shared mis/transla-
tion requires that everyone concerned should take each other’s contributions seriously 
and at the same time attune to what bodies, machines, conceptual tools and other rele-
vant entities are doing.
All of this is yet to be explored, for here I have simply shown how CM correlative reality is 
mis/translated in the implicit commitment of ‘ANT- immutable’ to a naturalistic version of 
the empirical. But these interferences between ANT and CM in these Taiwanese encounters 
are just one set of possibilities. There will be many more challenges on the many journeys of 
equivocation that lie ahead.
Notes
 1 See Lin (2017) for details of the case and part of the argument.
 2 Correlativity has nothing to do here with statistical correlation.
 3 See Lin and Law (2018) for the implications of the art of patterning for STS.
 4 Saying that shi is manifested in specific moment of practice does not mean that shi is isolated from 
moment to moment as it would be in ‘position first’ Western theoretical preconceptions (Massumi 
2002).
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Section 4
Translating ANT beyond 
science and technology
Celia Roberts, Anders Blok and Ignacio Farías
‘Traditionally,’ if such a word can be used to speak about something so young, actor-network 
theorists have focused on science and technology. After all, the core discipline in which 
ANT was born – which Bruno Latour emphatically declared ‘the best discipline’ at the 2004 
 European Association for the Study of Science and Technology (EASST) Conference in 
Paris – is called ‘Science and Technology Studies.’ However, not only are the limits of what 
gets to count as ‘science and technology’ eminently stretchable but also, ANT can arguably be 
used to study and analyse almost any sociomaterial arrangements. For this section, then, we 
invited authors whose work takes ANT into new and possibly unexpected encounters with 
concepts, materialities, practices and spaces that are not conventionally classified as  ‘science 
and technology.’ We asked them to describe how they translate ANT in such  settings, and to 
explore and explain what happens both to ANT and to other academic disciplines and ideas 
when such encounters occur.
Some of the chapters articulate scenes and practices that are closer to science and tech-
nology than others. Amade M’Charek and Irene Van Oorschot’s chapter on race is probably 
the closest: Although their direct empirical focus is on criminology and public appeals for 
assistance in solving crime, the chapter explores the close links between such discourses and 
the science of genetics. Our question to them was simple: ‘What about race?’ Their answer, 
although clear, is far from simple. Race, they argue, is material and relational; any particu-
lar claims about racial differences – whether made in science or in criminological texts and 
 images – inevitably fold multiple historical textual and other practices. While ANT has proved 
immensely useful for theorising racialising discourses, scientific and otherwise, considering 
race also has profound – often under-considered – significance for all STS scholarship.
Uli Beisel’s chapter on public health in the developing world has a similarly close relation 
to science and technology – to biomedicine in particular – but her focus here is on how 
ANT helps us to understand the complexities and failures of antimalarial campaigns. Re-
ferring to her extensive ethnographic work in Ghana, Beisel shows how an ANT sensibility 
illuminates the ways in which pharmaceutical companies, philanthropists and health activists 
configure relations between mosquitoes, drugs and bodies that may not work in the best 
interests of human health. Taking ANT into the multiple and highly differentiated sites of 
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‘global health,’ she argues, facilitates new ways of seeing and acting against seemingly en-
trenched, life-threatening inequalities.
Both Liliana Doganova and David J. Denis, writing from the Parisian heartlands of ANT, 
brilliantly demonstrate how ANT concepts and methods can illuminate practices that are 
technical but do not relate directly to science: Namely, economic valuation, and maintenance 
and repair, respectively. In both cases, the authors provide clear and concise summaries of 
their fields, explaining precisely how ANT has contributed to new theorisations of endoge-
nous key concepts. Doganova argues that while ANT has already made strong contributions 
to valuation studies, it has further to go in exploring economic devices beyond those typi-
cally associated with markets. Denis similarly suggests that ANT has much to offer to those 
interested in repair and maintenance of objects and systems. While ANT has a rich history of 
studying resilience, solidification and strength, Denis proposes, ANT-inspired studies of re-
pair and maintenance highlight the necessity of exploring investigate fragility, breakage and 
diversity. How do things and systems – on scales ranging from national economies, through 
city transport systems to handheld devices – hold together in difficult circumstances?
Alexa Färber also takes us to the city in her exposition of the extensive and energetic 
debates around the use of ANT to study urban contexts. Building on the work of Bender, 
Blok and Fariás, she introduces the notion of ‘promissory assemblage,’ engaging with a range 
of disciplines, including anthropology and literary studies to argue that ANT can provide 
rich insight into many key issues of urban studies, including modernisation and infrastruc-
turing. The concept of promissory assemblage, she shows, may help scholars to theorise the 
 promise-oriented elements of cities: Her case studies are not-yet-built, endlessly-promised, 
urban public transport systems. How do people live with the promise of better transport that 
never seems to arrive? What kinds of subjectivities of endurance are produced? And how 
might ANT help to theorise cities as places of both hope and failure?
Finally, Arthuro Arruda Leal Ferreira takes us to psychology and psychotherapy – perhaps 
two of the least comfortable spaces for many advocates of ANT. In an intriguing account of 
an ANT-inspired ethnographic and interview-based study of patients’ and therapists’ experi-
ences of a particular therapy programme in Brazil, Ferreira explores ANT’s complex, some-
what obscured but yet promising, relationship to subjectivity. This chapter tells a nuanced 
and many-pleated story about how ANT might – despite its desire to eschew psychological 
interiority – facilitate our capacity to understand what is to be a human self. Exploring a set 
of lesser-known ANT texts and arguments, Ferreira gives those who think that ANT has 
nothing to do with minds delicious reason to pause.
Together, the chapters in this section showcase just how far ANT has come since its 
early days. They demonstrate both the endurance and the flexibility of its key ideas and the 
ingenuity of its various proponents in taking these further than their originators may have 
thought possible. Albeit a small and eclectic set of possible examples, the chapters will, we 
hope, both leave readers wondering where ANT might go next and give them tools for tak-
ing it wherever they want to go.
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Something ghostly
Let us start right where we always already are: in the middle of things.
Let us start, then, with the snapshot (see Figure 22.1) of an unknown suspect, released on 
the 9th of January, 2015, by the Columbia SC Police Department. It shows the face of an in-
dividual whose DNA was found at a crime scene. On the basis of this DNA, Parabon Nano-
Labs, a commercial company, produced a DNA-photofit: An image of what the perpetrator 
would look like. Striking is the suspect’s face, which is presented here in different shades 
(dark and light) and from different angles in a mug-shot-like fashion. Below the three faces, 
the image details information drawn from the DNA at the crime scene, such as geographical 
ancestry, skin, hair and eye colour as well as the absence of freckles. Categories are explicated 
by bars indicating colours or a map of the world marking places of origin.
There is something arresting about this image: Its portrait-like qualities ask us to consider 
the suspect’s face as a singular, identifying characteristic. However, as a collage, it details 
and disaggregates that face into measures of likelihood on several dimensions, showing how 
the ‘face’ is assembled out of a variety of measures. It also takes us from face to place, when 
a link is made between the suspect’s looks and his likely ancestry, and from individual to 
population, when it details the suspect’s likely ancestry in the categories of West African and 
North West European. It connects what is within the suspect – his DNA – with the surface 
of his body, his face. 
A lot is going on here: Both on the surface of the image and somewhere else. Something 
seems to be haunting the image in the jump from individual to population, from probability 
to typology (and back). What is made absent here? What places and times does this image 
implicate – fold within itself – only to produce this immediately legible surface? What ghost 
is here at work?
We propose to think of this ghost as the spectre of race, and this contribution is a way to un-
tangle the many ways race flickers between absence and presence, in and out of our historical 
moment. With Callon and Law, we understand that which is present to be irrevocably entan-
gled with productive and generative absences (2004); we also understand that which is ‘of the 
now’ to be produced by intricate foldings of multiple temporalities which are never entirely 
22
What about race?
Amade M’charek and Irene van Oorschot
Amade M’charek and Irene van Oorschot
236
lost (Derrida 1993; Bhabha 1994; Latour and Serres 1995; M’charek 2014). Thinking with this 
image, we contend, means thinking with the continuing and troubling realities of race.
This is not immediately obvious, perhaps. Since the 1951 UNESCO statement on race de-
claring that there is no scientific basis for classifying people racially, many have taken race to 
be a pseudoscientific concept. While the UNESCO statement has rendered some ways of un-
derstanding race quite unpopular or obsolete, we seem, however, to be quite unable to leave it 
behind (Lipphardt 2012). Indeed, as human biological difference continued (and continues) to be 
an object of scientific concern in practices of genetics and forensics, biological differences have 
become subject to novel forms of articulation and configuration (Abu  El-Haj 2007; Duster 2005; 
Fullwiley 2007; Koening et al. 2008; M’charek 2005, 2010; Nelson 2008; Whitmarsh, et al 2010; 
Schramm et al. 2011). In a way, race ‘haunts’ these practices and makes unexpected appearances. 
In this snapshot, for instance, race rears its head when we consider that the face demanding 
our attention is much more precise about the suspect’s phenotype than the genetic data seem to 
allow. For instance, there is no genetic test for the suspect’s hair texture, nor is there a measure 
of the relative thickness of his nose or lips. His interpolated West African ancestry does the rest 
of the work, it seems: It is that titbit of information that gives shape to his lips, nose and hair. 
Race is not only a continuing (if sometimes elusive!) reality, it is also a troubling reality in 
the sense that it troubles ready-made, binary distinctions and conceptualisations with which 
we apprehend, and act in, the world. On the one hand, the snapshot evokes a conception of 
Figure 22.1  Nanolab snapshot
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human difference as rooted squarely in our bodies, in our DNA. It is also a conception of 
race that has led researchers in a variety of fields to investigate to what extent distributions 
in genetic material influence intelligence, aggression, risk-taking behaviour or the relative 
risk of certain diseases (Duster 2005). On the other hand, these conceptions have histori-
cally been countered by emphasising the fictional, ‘constructed’ character of race. In such 
accounts, race has predominantly been viewed not as a thing in and of our bodies but rather 
as a social construction, taken more as a matter of ideology than of ‘real’ science. However, 
neither of the two conceptualisations of ‘race’ is adequate to grasp race in the political sense 
(M’charek 2013; Nelson 2008). 
The emphasis on the fictional, socially constructed character of race leaves us  empty-handed 
to apprehend and intervene in the burgeoning study of human difference, most crucially as 
it takes place in the practices of population genetics, biomedical research or forensic science. 
After all, while geneticists themselves may be quick to point out that the human genome 
displays more similarity than difference, precisely these genetic differences assume political 
salience in research and discussions regarding medical practices and healthcare (see Braun 
2002) or social order and crime (Raine 2008).
Against this background, we ask: What are we to make of this picture? It is too simple to 
write race off as politics by scientific means – especially if that means we end up lacking a 
language to talk about novel configurations of race. Meanwhile, treating human difference 
rather as an unquestionable fact rooted in nature runs the grave risk of recuperating or rein-
venting racial hierarchies – a move that overlooks how the body itself is an effect of practices 
of genetic ‘corporealization’ (Haraway 1997: 141). Contending with the political, ethical, 
cultural and economic impacts of the field of genetics requires a sustained engagement with 
the question of human difference: How such differences are made, where they become salient 
and consequential, and how they may be unmade.
In the following pages, we demonstrate how certain actor-network theoretically inspired 
moves are able to generate important diffractions in the study of ‘race.’ Central in this section 
are the distinctions between fact and fiction and nature and culture, distinctions that ‘race’ 
continually evokes as well as disavows. Here, ANT and especially feminist studies of techno-
science serve as ‘tools for thinking’ (Stengers 2005: 185), that is, as tools to think with, and 
through, the spectre of race. At the same time, we discuss how ‘race’ requires us to question 
and adapt our tools, as with the emphasis on the material-semiotic ‘network’ often comes a 
largely unattended kind of presentism, prioritising both that which is present spatially (in the 
network) and temporally (as a present). Race asks us, indeed, to attend not only to presence 
but that which is (made) absent, not only to the here and now, but to the forgotten or erased. 
As ghosts are not simply ‘of the past’ nor something ‘of the present’ (Buse and Scott 1999), 
race asks us to consider temporalities of various sorts. 
Diffracting race
If the preceding responses to race have concentrated on the question, what is race (fact or 
fiction? Nature or culture?), the primary contribution of ANT to the study of race has been 
to let go of such definitional exercises and instead ask: Where and how is race done? It calls us to 
attend to images like these not as a representation, but to ask instead: How does this image 
do race (M’charek 2013)?
With this performative rather than representational approach comes the possibility that 
we are not dealing with a singular, underlying reality, but instead with multiple realities. 
Mol’s (2002) conception of the object multiple has helped to attend to the specificity and 
situatedness of objects as they are made and remade in specific practices. In other words, at 
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stake in knowledge-making practices may not be different perspectives on essentially the 
same objects (e.g. disease or biological difference), but rather different ways of enacting an 
object. These different enactments may ‘hang together’ – for instance, when coordination or 
hierarchisation takes place – yet, we cannot assume, therefore, that these objects are essen-
tially the same thing, or related to a singular referent.
The snapshot is a case in point. It shows ‘race’ to be simultaneously something legible on 
the surface of the body as well as a matter of genes. It shows race to be tied to place, yet at the 
same time treats race as a probabilistic value. We are dealing, then, with a multiplicity. These 
different enactments of race ‘hang together’ in this case because they are brought together in 
one image, offering an individual up for inspection.
But how was this image made? It is one thing to talk about the realities it enacts, but 
it is another to carefully scrutinise how it came about. This is another crucial contribu-
tion of ANT to the study of race: It cautions us against understanding scientific facts as 
simple representational statements. It prevents us from forgetting that facts were made in 
the first place. 
Claes and colleagues (2014) are a prime example of such fact-making – which, as we 
will see, is also partially a practice of race-making. In their paper, which reports on the 
scientific work for the Parabon Snapshot-tool, they are interested in facial composite con-
struction on the basis of 24 single nucleotide polymorphisms (SNPs). Focusing on these 
SNPs, they argue, can help to generate an individualised image of a potential suspect. Their 
work is based on a study of the facial features and the genes of 592 individuals,  18–40 years 
old, clustered in three populations: US-American, Brazilian and Cape Verdean. They 
report that the three populations were genetically clustered according to European and 
African ancestry facial forms. In this research based on the study of genetic markers and 
facial landmarks facilitated by 3D images, genetic ancestry is the pivotal operator in their 
face-making technology: 
We first use genomic ancestry and sex to create a base-face, which is simply an average 
sex and ancestry matched face. Subsequently, the effects of 24 individual SNPs1 that 
have been shown to have significant effects on facial variation are overlaid on the base-
face forming the predicted-face in a process akin to a photomontage.
(Claes et al. 2014: 208)
Analyses of the 3D images of 592 individuals, the authors argue, have suggested 44 
 principal components (landmarks) on the basis of which all facial variation can be ex-
plained.  Recombining these data, the technology promises to uncover patterns that are 
invisible to the bare eye. 
Moving from the surface to the molecular, population genetics is called upon to produce 
a ‘base-face.’ In theory, this would be the average face compiled on the basis of 591 individu-
als. But the 24 SNPs aimed at individualising face are statistically accurate only when anal-
ysed within homogeneous populations. The individual can’t quite do without a population 
(M’charek 2000)! Hence the African and European ancestry populations. This means that 
the ‘base-face’ is the base-face of the population to which the specific subject is said to be-
long (African or European). In accordance with the genetic clustering of the 592 individuals 
based on ancestry markers, their faces are allocated to one of these populations. The 44 land-
marks can then be used to correlate and determine the base-face of one of these populations. 
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Of course, this is an operation not dissimilar to the making of racial types. The base-face 
thus becomes a racial type.
Specific ways of relating DNA and face are here at work. These ways of relating DNA and 
face can only occur in practices mobilising statistics, advanced genetic testing procedures, 
digital visualising software – and, we note, practices mobilising a conception of internally 
homogeneous yet distinct populations. Thus, race becomes a device that mediates between 
DNA and face. In that capacity, it is also a relational object: Not only made through relations, 
but active in making relations anew, too. Indeed, the mobilisation of population genetics 
in the production of an individualised face means that there might be other ways to make 
individual faces; ways, perhaps, that instead of mobilising population types involve scalar 
measures (a possibility the authors themselves mention). 
Materiality, relationality and multiplicity are key concepts in ANT-inspired  approaches 
and mobilised in this context which teach us important lessons with regard to race. 
 Characterised by a ‘pragmatic respecification’ (van Oorschot 2018) of the definitional 
question, ‘what is race?’ this approach is more interested in the question: ‘how and where 
is race done?’ This gesture is indebted in many ways to feminist studies of technoscience, 
and in particular the non-dualist thinking of Donna Haraway, whose thought, especially 
her figure of the cyborg (1991), continually resists the logic of either/or that structures 
our habits of thought (see Johnson, this volume). As we will see, with this pragmatic sen-
sibility comes a different way to attend to the reality of race, and the ways it is ‘natural’ 
or ‘cultural.’
Instead of defining ANT, the previous discussion has instead aimed to demonstrate its 
uses in the case of race. More than a theory in any substantive sense, it is first and foremost 
a pragmatic sensibility (see also Alcadipani and Hassard 2010; Law 1991). ANT is better 
apprehended as a lever to set things in motion, a tool to be ‘passed from hand to hand,’ than 
as a theory or fixed collections of instruments (Mol 2010). However, as we will see, race 
itself sets ANT in motion, too, and particularly the emphasis, in ANT, on present doings and 
an attendant relative neglect of absent or past doings. Indeed, paying close attention to race 
means running up against certain tendencies in the now canonical ANT studies of labora-
tories, clinics and other sites of knowledge-making. These tendencies are presentist in that 
the emphasis on material-semiotic network has often led analysts to concentrate on that 
which is present rather than absent, and secondly, presentist in the sense that they concen-
trate on that which is going on ‘in the present’ at the cost of developing an understanding 
of networks or objects as they make, mobilise or fold multiple histories and temporalities. 
In a way, ANT has not itself been impervious to a metaphysics of presence (Heidegger 
1962; Law 2006), prioritising the temporal present and what is present over the forgotten, 
illusive, erased or suppressed (Law and Singleton 2004). Both forms of presentism, we will 
demonstrate, handicap our thinking about and thinking with the spectre of race.
Going underground and surfacing again: race  
as an absent presence
Scientific practices are a matter of making relations between people, things, ideas and the 
recalcitrances of objects of study. The network, the oft-evoked metaphor to understand these 
imbrications, has been a crucial concept to attend to precisely this relationality, and has been 
crucial to uncover this sometimes fleeting and messy relational realities from narratives that 
would ‘black-box’ the network.
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Reading our image in relation, as it were, to relationality, we would be able to attend to 
the practices taking place in between a crime scene and the Snapshot. We would be able to 
ask questions about the gathering of evidence and the way legal standards of evidence collec-
tion, the distribution of tasks over officials in the chain of custody, the practices of forensic 
geneticists, the design of the genetic testing and the design of the software used in generating 
the snapshot. We could trace this image further, trying to follow it around as it mobilises 
interest and is taken up in practices of identification, investigation and legal truth-telling.
Indeed, a second snapshot (see Figure 22.2) based on the same genetic material, this time 
produced in 2017, is more suggestive of its implication in forensics and, by extension, in the 
legal system. The individual, we learn here, has now become part of a ‘case.’ The snapshot 
Figure 22.2  Nanolab snapshot result 2
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displays a case-number and a phone number to call with the police. This image, more so 
than the first, folds the individual into a circuitry of both scientific and forensic forms of 
truth-making; perhaps, it exists at their nexus, at the place the two circuits cross each other. 
The image’s implication in forensics draws our attention to a specific way of asking ques-
tions about our research materials that can teach us not only about race, but also about the 
presentist limitations of ANT. In forensics, the task is to use available materials as traces and 
clues to that which for now tends to escape our observations (see also van Oorschot 2018); it 
is particularly interested in following trajectories and uncovering paths. But forensics is also 
a practice of making relations, of drawing lines and connections even where these seem to 
be cut off. Following these traces and clues may take us to surprising places and actors that 
may not be immediately present, but do play a role in the production of this image. Actants 
shimmer in and out of existence, are themselves ‘pattern[s] of presences and absences’ (Law 
and Singleton 2004: 12) or go underground as soon as we try to grasp them, only to appear 
just in the periphery of our vision (see also M’charek et al. 2014).
In our image, ‘race’ is shimmering just like this. In tying face to place, the image is on the 
one hand suggestive of race as type. Locating this suspect’s face in ‘West Africa,’ evoked is a 
world in which different populations occupy different, circumscribed spaces in this world. On 
the other hand, this interpretation is belied by the probabilistic measures detailing the suspects’ 
ancestry, which falls apart into ‘92% West African’ and ‘8% North West European,’ suggesting 
that at stake is not typological ‘race’ but a probabilistic categorisation based on in ancestry popu-
lations. The tension is evident: ‘race’ flickers in and out of existence in the oscillation between 
these different ways to ‘read’ the image: as type and as ancestry. In this sense, ‘race’ acquires 
characteristics of an absent-presence: It becomes present at the expense of things that are made 
absent. Of course, the problem is not that things are rendered absent, but rather that this pro-
ceeds without further reflection (Law 2004) on what is being made absent and to what effect. 
Think, as an example, of something that is rendered unimportant and absent, for instance, of 
our own modes of seeing and witnessing. Would we have readily ‘seen’ race if the unknown 
suspect had been white? Or is our way of seeing ‘race’ part and parcel of sedimented infrastruc-
tures of knowledge? The suspect’s blackness alerts us to race in ways that suspend questions 
about the ways our very modes of seeing and glancing are racialised. However, the suspect’s 
race does not exist in and of itself. It is relational and its presence depends on many things that 
are made absent. Race, always in flight, forces us to ask precisely the question: What about race?
Folds of time
Studies within ANT have developed various ways to attend to the question of time, sensitis-
ing us to how scientific practices both take time and make time. The notion of ‘projectness’ 
(Law and Singleton 2000), for instance, alerts us to the way the relations between humans and 
nonhumans can be given a definite shape and a pre-established duration; how, in other words, 
the question of chronology and phasing is crucial to the way scientific projects are narrated 
and imagined (see also Law 2002). We also encounter temporalities as a salient ingredient 
of what we could call scientific self-descriptions: Scientific practices that like to distance 
themselves from traditions and are quite comfortable siding with ‘modernity’ in a narrative 
of historical rupture; or else, we might encounter a progressive teleology in which scientific 
advances are made standing on the ‘shoulders of giants.’ The fact that this is only one way 
to conceive of the way scientific practices relate to time is asserted, of course, in  Latour’s We 
Have Never Been Modern (1991), in which he makes the case that modernity, and the narrative 
of scientific progress, is a poor way to attend to the actual practices of us, Moderns.
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The study of human difference is similarly a field in which narratives of scientific prog-
ress can be encountered, while being haunted by histories of eugenics and colonialism. A 
narrative of historical discontinuity is one way to make race absent: Insisting that at stake 
in genetics is not ‘race’ but population, for instance, is a way to enact a break between the 
scientific now and the pseudoscientific, racist past. These narratives resonate with appeals 
to a post-racial present, in which we have moved beyond race… However, these pasts con-
tinue to haunt (Derrida 1993) the present. Colonial and imperialist histories are evoked, for 
instance, as we are dealing with a Snapshot from a suspect in the US, whose geographic, 
genetic origins likely lie in Western Africa – a fact that obliquely addresses the era of trans-
atlantic slavery and its consequences. More insidiously, yet another history is evoked in the 
‘interpretative jump’ from measures of hair, eye and skin colour to the phenotype presented 
in the image: A history of phenotypical classifications not wholly unrelated to 19th-century 
scientific practices and imperialism. A topological (rather than solely linear and chronological) 
understanding of time allows us to understand the absent-presentness of ‘race’ as an effect of 
temporal cuts and folds (M’charek 2014). 
A particularly striking demonstration of the relationship between scientific practices and 
racial histories is the so-called Anderson sequence (M’charek, 2005, 2014). The Anderson 
sequence was up until the late 1990s the sequence of mitochondrial DNA, used widely in 
genetic research as a standard reference against which other strands of mitochondrial DNA 
could be compared. These comparisons made it possible to measure differences between pop-
ulations (in their divergence from the Anderson sequence), or to correct technical errors in 
the sequencing process. Importantly, it was also used to measure genetic variations in mito-
chondrial DNA so as to trace genetic lineage (M’charek 2005). For quite a time, the  Anderson 
sequence was largely an unproblematised and unmarked, ready-to-hand tool in these genetic 
research practices. However, a closer look at its history suggests that racial histories are folded 
into this object in intricate yet revealing ways. First of all, the Anderson sequence was and 
is not, if we may use the problematic phrase, ‘naturally occurring.’ Instead, it is a collage of 
mtDNA drawn from three differences sources: Bovine DNA, placental tissue and the HeLa 
cell line. And this cell line, used especially in cancer research, was named after the woman 
whose cancerous cells were taken, in 1952, to be used in medical research:  Henrietta Lacks 
(or, as she was known by a pseudonym in the medical community: Helen Lane).
Henrietta Lacks, Landecker (2000) shows, was a black woman in the early 20th-century 
US. Her life as well as her encounters with a white medical establishment were significantly 
shaped by her blackness: This was a time in which doctors would routinely neglect to inform 
patients, especially black patients, of the exact nature of their disease as well as their proposed 
treatment. It was also a time in which medical tissues were taken for research without in-
formed consent. For decades after her death in 1952, it was that tissue that would significantly 
advance cancer research and acquire a life of its own: The HeLa cell line proved to agree with 
laboratory conditions and would replicate itself quickly, and offered researchers the oppor-
tunity to experiment almost limitlessly with cancerous cells. Again, however, race reared its 
head once when it turned out that the HeLa cell line had been contaminating a wide variety 
of labs worldwide, a realisation that led to an uneasy discourse linking these cervical cells 
with racially (and sexually) charged notions of promiscuity and pollution (Landecker 2000; 
M’charek 2005). The HeLa cell line and the Anderson sequence with it, then, is a folded 
 object: While its historicity may not be written on its surface, it is nevertheless folded into it. 
‘ History can be recalled in objects. History is never left behind’ (M’charek 2014: 31). 
Objects, then, can be conceived of as folds. Take another example of the relation between 
race and temporalities. Contrast our first snapshot with the second one presented earlier. 
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While the first snapshot was made in 2015, the second one was produced more recently, in 
2017. Aside from the way the image has been now more visibly implicated into a forensic 
circuitry, we see a few additional changes. While the first image spoke of a suspect with 92% 
West African and 8% North West European ‘roots,’ the second image disaggregates the sus-
pect’s DNA in more detail. The second image tells us that the suspect still shares most DNA 
with people from West Africa, but he has also ancestry in other parts of Africa. It now reads: 
West Africa, 77.39; Europe, 6.85; South Africa, 6.30; East Africa 5.5; Indigenous Africa, 3.14. 
To be sure, the DNA of the suspect did not change over time. What did change was the num-
ber of entries in the database to which the DNA of the suspect was compared a few years later. 
The larger the collection of DNA samples, the larger the diversity in ancestry produced – 
which reminds us of the fact that genetic difference is not in the DNA but of the DNA.
Curiously, we see that the suspect’s face, which is now based upon more precise and dis-
aggregated measures of ancestry, has not changed one bit. Indeed, by contrasting the more 
individualising specificities with the collectivising-type features, the face gains in reliability. 
Individuality moves front-stage, while race fades away, to become a matter of fact of diver-
sity. Contrasting the first and the second images allows us to appreciate the image as a folded 
object, in which time is an operator rather than a parameter or a chronological line on which 
to allocate events (Rheinberger 1997). The second image works precisely as a folded object 
as it superimposes two moments in time, two knowledge practices that are as far apart as two 
years. Indeed, denying the passage of a certain kind of time is also, of course, a way of doing 
and evoking time.
The notion of the folded object offers us a glimpse of what it could mean to treat practices 
as involving the partial silencing and partial mobilisation of histories, within which not only 
human beings, but objects too are complex folds of time. Presents, it turns out, are always 
made by intricate foldings of different pasts (Serres and Latour 1995). As such, the incorpo-
ration of such a sensitivity to temporality and history also provides a way into the question 
of politics, itself the articulation of possible futures. In particular in the case of politically 
sensitive topics – race, sex, belonging and the nation – an emphasis on the way histories are 
implicated in their making offers us a way out of presentisms or teleologies that are charac-
teristic of scientific practices and the erasure of racial histories.
Ghostly ANTics
If race is productively refracted using the combined ANT sensibilities of relationality, multi-
plicity and relationality, race itself productively addresses a largely implicit kind of presentism 
within actor-network theory. Crucially, race demonstrates that objects or networks are not 
simply spatial entities or accomplishments, but may flicker back and forth between presence 
and absence, and may be themselves temporally folded. Thinking with the object of race asks 
us to (re)consider other sites, networks and objects within these non-presentist terms. Can 
we have an eye for different and multiple temporalities as these are folded within ostensibly 
black-boxed, ‘ready-to-hand’ objects? Can we allow ourselves to trace not simply what is 
made present in networks, but those objects that contribute to the making of networks in 
more ambiguous ways?
And what would happen to our understanding of other concepts of the critical tradition 
using the emphasis on absences and time? Is it possible to conceive not only of race, but also 
of sexuality, gender or even class in such terms? Thinking along with these suggestions, we 
can not only consider, for instance, for the way sexuality is a matter of both cultural and sci-
entific modes of ordering and comparing bodies and objects (chromosomes, brain structures, 
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hormones, etc.), but also for the way these modes of enacting sexuality evoke and disavow 
multiple temporalities, such as the progressive temporality of child-adolescent-adult as much 
as a transhistorical temporality of sexual essentialism, i.e. the eternal feminine… Or think of 
the way class is not only a matter of bodies plugged more or less securely in certain circuitries 
of value (money, esteem, etc.), but also something that is selectively made invisible or sup-
pressed in networks ostensibly relying on performance. Thus, it may become possible, too, 
to refract the matter of intersectionality, for can we not understand intersectional ‘identities’ 
as congealing out of highly situated patternings of absences and presences (M’charek 2010)? 
Thinking with the spectre of race alerts us to the ways scientific practices are crucial to the 
doing of both objects and subjects, and the ways these congeal and dissolve in complex pat-
ternings of times and spaces. The spectre of race thus alerts us to the ways folds matter to the 
world as it is – and what it may become. 
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When reading the title of this chapter, you might have stumbled upon the term ‘majority 
world.’ So let me address this first, also because it might teach us something about the issues at 
the heart of this chapter. Majority world is a term introduced by the photographer and activist 
Shahidul Alam as an alternative to ‘third world’ or ‘developing countries’ (Alam, 2007). I like 
the term, as it immediately makes clear that in terms of numbers, ‘the third world’ is actually 
in the majority: Many more people live in countries that are economically worse off than in 
countries usually connoted as ‘first world’ or ‘developed.’ It also brings the privileges of the 
few and the continuing inequalities in terms of quality of life and health, as well as healthcare 
provision to the fore. 
This chapter is concerned with how ANT can help us understand some of these issues 
better than, or at least differently to, established disciplinary perspectives on health in the 
majority world. I find one of Latour’s examples in his classic book We Have Never Been Modern 
a useful starting point:
The smallest AIDS virus takes you from sex to the unconscious, then to Africa, tissue 
cultures, DNA and San Francisco, but the analysts, thinkers, journalists and decision- 
makers will slice the delicate network traced by the virus for you into tidy compartments 
where you will find only science, only economy, only social phenomena, only local 
news, only sentiment, only sex.
(Latour, 1993, p. 2)
It is exactly in this way that ANT has and continues to inspire social studies of global public 
health and medicine. The academic task, following Latour, is to draw things together, to map 
heterogeneous associations that together constitute our bodily, physical, political and social 
environments. This means that we need to adopt an ethos of being ‘in the midst of things’ 
rather than assuming distinct domains (Bingham, 2006). 
For my own writing, working in an after-ANT ‘set of sensitivities’ (Mol, 2010, p. 13) has 
meant trying not to divide the realms that make up the complex knots of realities. In this 
sense, I understand ANT, and importantly the developments that became known as ‘ANT 
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and after’ (Law and Hassard, 1999), with Mol as a set of ‘sensitive terms and enduring ten-
sions’ (Mol, 2010). In what follows, I will use a case from my own empirical work to explore 
what it means to follow an object through societies. I use my case study to focus our attention 
on, and weave together, key aspects of ANT-inspired scholarship on health in the majority 
world. I first introduce my case and focus on how one might best understand the bioecon-
omy of healthcare and its effects on local health and global science infrastructures. Secondly, 
I concentrate on discussing the role of evidence and the social construction of numbers, as 
well as human–non-human dimensions and ecologies of biosciences for health interventions 
in the majority world. At the end of this chapter, I make a case for how this might constitute 
thinking in the midst of things, and what benefits it might yield if we do not reduce phenom-
ena but follow their heterogeneous actor-networks. 
The case that I will discuss in this contribution is the development and clinical trials of a 
vaccine against malaria. Until today, no vaccine against malaria is licenced and the develop-
ment has been notoriously difficult. Research into vaccine possibilities and the development 
of vaccine candidates’ dates back to the early 20th century, but progress has been very slow 
for various reasons. The involvement of the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation (BMGF) in 
the early 2000s accelerated the vaccine development of one particular candidate called MOS-
QUIRIX considerably. The Gates Foundation saw it as a worthwhile investment because the 
development of a malaria vaccine has the potential to have a ‘huge impact’ on saving lives 
and so fits to the foundation’s overall mission of solving the grand challenges humanity is 
facing. But what exactly does such a framing of ‘huge impact’ do on the ground? How might 
it shift priorities in global health funding? Which effects might it have on local health systems 
and global science infrastructures? And how sustainable might the solutions these ‘new tools’ 
offer be? It is these questions I suggest we need to ask if we are interested in an ANT-inspired 
analysis of the politics of big solutions, of philanthropy’s role in global health and in the reg-
ulation of global science and the pharma industry. 
The promise of such grand solutions chimes with a phenomenon that Adriana Petryna, 
in her work on globalised clinical trials, calls ‘experimentality’ (Petryna, 2009). Petryna 
shows that in searching for profits and clinical subjects willing to take part in clinical trials, 
the pharmaceutical industry increasingly outsources and offshores trials to the economi-
cally worse-off majority world. She argues that patient protection in trials is tied to the 
market’s competitiveness and therefore ‘risks are unevenly distributed and its costs, unjust’ 
(ibid, p.188). Kaushik Sunder Rajan calls this ‘pharmocracy,’ a global hegemony of the 
multinational, Euro-American pharmaceutical industry (Rajan, 2017). Both scholars have 
been important in understanding the effects that the meeting of global science and bio-
capitalism has in an unequal world, and press us to inquire into what exactly globalised 
clinical trials mean for patients and health infrastructures in specific contexts. As Char-
lotte Brives demonstrates in her analysis of a mother-to-child HIV transmission drug trial 
in Burkina Faso, trial participation not only involves unequal conditions globally, but also 
ideas and norms travel with and are embedded in the trial design and practices. Follow-
ing Mol, Brives discusses these as ‘onto-norms’ (Mol as quoted in Brives, 2013) and shows 
how the ideas and practices measured and encouraged in the trial shape participants’ ideas 
of what constitutes ‘a good (HIV-positive) mother’ (Brives, 2013). Clinical trials can form 
intimate subjectivities of participants, and the broader conditions of access to care can also 
alter wider social relations, as Nguyen argues in his analysis of access to HIV drugs in times 
of scarcity in the 1990s in Burkina Faso and the Ivory Coast (Nguyen, 2010). Nguyen 
shows that in times when HIV drugs were not available for everyone, the ability to talk 
about oneself could determine if one got access to drugs or not. In the following sections, 
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I will trace some related threads connected to the development of the malaria vaccine MOS-
QUIRIX and inquire into its effects on global and local health infrastructures, as well as the 
bodies of humans and parasites alike.
MoSQUiRiX™ and the search for the Holy Grail: vaccine 
trials, global infrastructures and subjectivities
For decades, a malaria vaccine has been one of the holy grails of modern medicine. 
Dr Pedro Alonso, Director of the WHO Global Malaria Programme (http://www.who.
int/malaria/news/2016/gavi-malaria-vaccine/en/
Research on a vaccine against malaria started as early as the beginning of the 20th century. 
But to date, there is no vaccine against any parasitic disease in humans. This is not for lack 
of trying but is largely owed to the high biological complexity of parasites (in comparison 
to bacterial or viral organisms). In recent years, new scientific prospects have arisen from 
the possibility of mapping the genomes of humans and parasites. Due to recent advances 
in scientific knowledge, about 30 potential malaria vaccine candidates are currently being 
developed. Here, I will use the most advanced of these vaccines, MOSQUIRIX™, to illus-
trate what an ANT-inspired analysis can offer understanding global health and vice versa. I 
draw on ten years of ethnographic research on malaria control interventions, inter alia the 
malaria vaccine trials in Ghana and their attendant national and global science and health 
policy processes.
MOSQUIRIX™ was initially developed in GlaxoSmithKline’s laboratories in Belgium 
in the 1980s. In the 1990s, the vaccine went through initial test phases in Belgium and at 
the Walter Reed Army Institute in the USA, as well as a first proof-of-concept study test in 
Gambia and later Mozambique, where it was tested on 2,022 children aged 1–4 years in a 
double-blind, randomised, controlled trial. Vaccine development and trials started to accel-
erate substantively from 2001, when the public–private partnership PATH Malaria Vaccine 
Initiative (MVI) started to finance and coordinate the development and trials. MVI’s involve-
ment accelerated the development and trial of the vaccine considerably. By 2018, the vaccine 
had successfully finished phase II and III clinical trials and was in implementation trials. MVI 
is initiated and funded by the BMGF. For the Gates Foundation, a malaria vaccine has been 
attractive as it makes the promise of solving the notorious malaria puzzle for good: 
While the best job he could have in the world is the one he has, says Gates, the second 
best would be discovering new medicines. ‘It is a field that is changing. You get new 
tools all the time. You can have a huge impact. The kind of work and thinking that goes 
on is very like software’, he says.
(Sarah Boseley, Guardian, 2006)
It is exactly this thinking in superlatives that underlies the Gates Foundation’s work in ma-
laria. In 2007, the Foundation announced as its aim nothing less than the eradication of 
the disease. This is what Gates called ‘creative capitalism’ in his 2008 speech at the World 
 Economic Forum in Davos: Namely, the idea that where there are big problems, there lie 
great opportunities for impact, and therefore good financial investment. It is clear that this 
notion of ‘creative capitalism’ is – at least for Gates himself – connected to ‘doing good.’ 
However, as Linsey McGoey (2015: 235) has suggested, philanthropy as creative capitalism 
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might be a ‘selfish gift’ in the sense that it keeps the capitalist power balance intact while 
addressing inequalities through business innovations. Read in this way, Gates and the BMGF 
promise that creative capitalism can unite markets and morals (ibid, p. 16) and so solve the big 
problems of the world more efficiently than can state actors or private companies. 
But how does this big ambition translate on the ground, in places where the malaria 
vaccine was tested? What have the phase II and III clinical trials meant for patients and 
health facilities in one of its trial locations, namely in Ghana? Between 2007 and 2014, 
phase II and III trials were conducted in seven African countries. Ghana had two vac-
cine trial sites: Agogo and Kintampo. The malaria vaccine trials were among the first 
large-scale vaccine trials conducted on the African continent in history. As I also discuss 
elsewhere (Beisel, 2017), in order to adhere to international standards of trial regulation, 
a so-called ‘capacity building component’ has been important to the international consor-
tium conducting the trials: Funding from BMGF enabled the establishment of a Malaria 
Clinical Trial Alliance (MCTA), which is run under the umbrella of the INDEPTH Net-
work, a Ghana-based organisation that is also funded by BMGF. In practice, MCTA and 
MVI conducted ‘Good Clinical Practice’ training for health workers involved in all stages 
of the trials – from doctors, nurses, fieldworkers and malaria microscopists to trial man-
agement staff. This training was highly valued by participants and offered, for instance, 
local laboratory workers a rare opportunity to participate in international training and 
networking (interviews at malaria  vaccine trial sites in Ghana, 2008). Trial locations have 
also benefitted from new physical infrastructure, such as better equipment for laboratories. 
Such capacity building is an advantage for the participating hospitals, and contributes to 
biomedical capacity building of the trial sites in the seven participating countries (inter-
views at malaria vaccine trials’ sites in Ghana, 2008). 
However, such investments in selected hospitals are tied closely to research-trial institu-
tions. While they might offer better services to local populations, they at the same time rein-
force unequal geographies of healthcare provision within countries. Such investments create 
what has been called ‘archipelagos of science’ on the African continent (Geissler, 2013; Rot-
tenburg, 2009). In Ghana, extensive medical research has in the past been conducted in four 
key sites. It is these four regions where people have extensive experiences with clinical trials, 
and arguably the attendant health centres offer superior quality medical care. This medical 
privilege, however, in the case of the research hotspot in and around Agogo, dates back to 
colonial times and is tied to missionary efforts: The Agogo Presbyterian Hospital hosting the 
studies (inter alia phase II and III clinical trials of MOSQUIRIX™) was established by the 
Basel Mission in 1931. By 2007/8, when I spent time in Agogo, the MOSQUIRIX™ trials 
had meant that a German paediatrician was based in Agogo fulltime, that the laboratory was 
upgraded significantly and that staff involved in the trial had undergone additional training. 
By 2018, Agogo Hospital had 13 medical doctors. In contrast, the close-by governmental 
hospital in Konongo, a town with around double the inhabitants, had only one medical doc-
tor. This is just one example of the patchy and fragmented infrastructures and their colonial 
legacies that are built upon and sustained by large-scale clinical trials and other project-based 
global health investments.
This observation suggests that an ANT-inspired analysis asks: How do biomedical projects 
relate to general health infrastructures present; how might inequalities (inadvertently or not) 
be reinforced and what kinds of social effects might trial (non)participation have? It is also 
crucial to investigate what kinds of practices and projects are not funded under the logics of 
large biomedical investments. For instance, Ann H. Kelly and I analysed a mosquito larvicid-
ing project using the microbial insecticide Bti in Tanzania that initially attracted support by 
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BMGF but was discontinued when the project moved from trialling to sustaining the project 
(Kelly and Beisel, 2011). We suggested that the case study
raises the critical question of how global attention shapes its object. The strategic global 
map leaves out the malaria that begins where the pavement ends, in blocked drains and 
discarded plastic cups. Commitment to controlling this malaria might seem like a bad 
business decision, but we argue it is a good long-term investment.
(ibid., pp. 84–5)
In line with Petryna, Sunder Rajan and others, then, I suggest that ANT-inspired analyses 
should plot the patterns of global health inequalities, as health research in the Global North 
often receives more funding than African governments (can) spend on their basic public 
health infrastructure. This means that the political economy and social values embedded in 
trials and other global biomedical interventions need to receive careful attention in our anal-
ysis. However, in an ANT-inspired sensitivity, one needs to not only attend to the ‘bigger’ 
picture of health infrastructures, global R&D and their intended and unintended effects, 
but also weave this together with the seemingly ‘small’ changes and shifts in onto-norms 
and practices of these projects and interventions. Reading these seemingly ‘small’ or ‘unin-
tended’ effects and politics of these ‘big’ and ‘simple’ technological fixes together helps us to 
understand the effects of the politics of global health and to contribute to ‘diffracting’ these 
by shining light in unexpected places (Haraway, 1994).
But, you might ask, is this really ANT, or an ANT-inspired sensibility? Where are the 
non-human actants? Where are the heterogeneous assemblages? So far, this sounds pretty 
much like an established STS analysis of science as culture (and economy). Where is a hybrid 
analysis of following the virus (or in my case, the parasite) as Latour suggested it? Indeed, the 
story have I told so far is crucial in understanding global health, but it is not enough. It keeps 
the compartments of science, policy and economy intact and does not pay enough attention 
to complex entanglements. The next section, then, offers another take on the malaria vaccine 
trials. In the conclusion, I will attempt to draw these analyses together and then as a result to 
provide an answer to the question this chapter poses. 
Vaccine or ‘malaria reducer’? The prize of the Holy Grail
In response to the earlier section, Gates would probably concede that every biomedical in-
tervention has drawbacks and ‘unintended consequences’ (in other words, things that fall 
through the cracks and are beyond control), but he would surely argue (and he is not alone 
in this) that big projects like the malaria vaccine also potentially offer significant gains. Af-
ter all, a successful vaccine could be a game changer in disease control and elimination. As 
Pedro Alonso, the current head of the WHO Malaria Programme, put it, ‘a malaria vaccine 
has been one of the holy grails of modern medicine.’ So, the question then becomes: Has 
MOSQUIRIX™ been able to lead to the holy grail? 
This question invites us to include questions of efficacy, (un)certainty as well as socioeco-
logical dimensions of the vaccine into our analysis (for an extended discussion of these issues 
see Beisel, 2017). When in 2014 the MOSQUIRIX™ malaria vaccine completed phase III of 
clinical trials, it became clear that it will not have the protective effect for which many were 
hoping. The aim of the vaccine was never to provide full protection from malaria, but to of-
fer partial immunity of around 60%, simply put meaning that the immunity levels of immu-
nologically naïve individuals will be elevated to the level of having successfully lived through 
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a malaria infection. Sixty per cent is considered significant in public health logic, as it would 
avert six out of ten malaria infections (Interview, Vaccine Scientist, 2012). Considering that 
the large majority of malaria deaths occur in immunologically naïve children under five, it 
is assumed that this would have a significant impact on malaria mortality. The results of the 
trials, however, showed that the vaccine efficacy against clinical malaria in infants was 27%, 
‘with no significant protection against severe malaria, malaria hospitalization, or all-cause 
hospitalization’ (RTS,S Clinical Trials Partnership, 2015). Furthermore, initial protection 
rates declined quickly, making a four-dose vaccination regime necessary. 
A 2012 editorial in the New England Journal of Medicine stated that the vaccine’s efficacy re-
sults were ‘disappointing’ and that it remained doubtful that the vaccine will be licenced at the 
end of the trial (Daily, 2012). Other commentators were more optimistic and expected a posi-
tive licencing decision by the World Health Organisation (WHO). In 2015, WHO decided to 
insert an additional step before licensure, namely a pilot implementation study. The reasoning 
of the WHO’s ‘Strategic Advisory Group of Experts on immunization’ (SAGE) was as follows:
One primary outstanding question with regard to RTS,S/AS01 use in 5–17 month old 
children is the extent to which the protection demonstrated in the Phase 3 trial can be 
replicated in the context of the routine health system because of the challenge of imple-
menting a four-dose schedule that requires new immunization contacts.
(WHO/SAGE, 2015)
WHO worried that a four-part routine immunisation is neither practical nor affordable in 
many contexts in sub-Saharan Africa. 
The MVI had already anticipated this dilemma in a marketing document from 2001:
It might be necessary to get governments and individuals to change their thinking about 
what constitutes a ‘vaccine.’ At present many people regard vaccines as 100% effective; 
anything less is considered a failure, and thus of little or no interest. Conduct small mar-
ket studies to determine if it is better to promote this new product as a ‘malaria inhibitor’ 
or ‘malaria reducer’ — in order to focus purchasers’ minds on the actual benefits.
(MVI, 2001: 20)
But how useful is such a ‘malaria reducer’ for local populations, when, for instance, a study 
in Ghana showed that parasites are routinely present in approximately 58% of the population 
(Owusu-Agyei et al., 2009)? The people taking part in this study did not show any symp-
toms of disease; they were randomly chosen and then tested for parasite prevalence. In other 
words, in areas with high malaria transmission, people cohabit with parasites most of the year 
without necessarily developing symptoms of malaria. This is due to acquired specific im-
munity, which humans develop through continued exposure to malaria parasites and lived-
through malaria infections. Specific immunity is partial, meaning that it does not prevent 
all malaria infections, but makes malaria episodes less frequent and severe. In this regard, 
naturally acquired specific immunity is quite similar to the immunity the MOSQUIRIX™ 
vaccine provides. This, or so epidemiologists argue, could be a life-saving intervention for 
children under five years whose immune systems are still developing and who have not yet 
had an opportunity to develop specific immunity. However, even for these groups, infection 
with parasites does not necessarily lead to disease. As malariologist Kevin Marsh points out, 
‘even during the period of maximum susceptibility to severe disease, children spend the ma-
jority of their time parasitized but healthy’ (Marsh, 2002, p. 256, emphasis added). 
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Despite much scientific research on the topic, the concrete factors that render an individ-
ual vulnerable to developing malaria are still unclear. Disease interactions and adaptations 
are manifold but what remains uncertain is which factors make a human body vulnerable 
to malaria or protect against it. This uncertainty is also expressed in people’s reasoning and 
disease prevention practices that are based on their observed experiences with fever, as one of 
my research assistants reflected on our interviews in Ghana:
One man among the opinion leaders present for the workshop said ‘everyone is bitten by 
mosquitoes day in day out but those, who are more likely to get malaria, are those who 
eat a lot of oily food and stay in the sun for longer hours’. Among the pregnant women, 
there was a wide range of causes for malaria which included mosquitoes, unkempt envi-
ronment, staying in the sun for long hours, drinking dirty water (from stagnant source), 
eating a lot of oily food such as groundnut, eating excess sugar, houseflies and working 
around fire (…)
(Interview, Martin Agyemang, 2008)
Such reasoning could, of course, be dismissed as ignorance and evidence of lack of formal ed-
ucation as is regularly done in the biomedical literature and in health education approaches, 
but this does not do justice to what is going on. An unhealthy diet (eating too much sugar 
or fatty oils), or a weakened immune system (standing too long in the sun, being close to 
breeding places) could well be factors contributing to someone’s vulnerability to malaria. 
These are triggers of malaria that people observe in their bodies, their lives and their prac-
tices. While malaria gets transmitted by mosquitoes, it is not only caused by the presence of 
parasites in the blood. In high transmission areas then, malaria regularly lingers in human 
bodies and the body’s falling ill or not is determined by a complex chain of factors. Read in 
this context, a 30%–40% effective malaria vaccine, or ‘malaria reducer’ as MVI put it, would 
offer one additional tool in the complex game of malaria triggers, prevention and treatment. 
In addition, there is another dynamic at play that destabilises the rendering of the ma-
laria vaccine as ‘the holy grail’: this is related to biology. As the editorial in the New England 
Journal of Medicine quoted earlier puts it: ‘the success of this pathogen is related to prolonged 
coevolution with humans, allowing the development of cunning biologic strategies to resist 
immune-system clearance’ (Daily, 2012, p. 1). In other words, Plasmodium parasites are bio-
logically highly adaptable and mutable due to their long and successful history of cohabiting 
with humans, which makes them rather tricky to ‘defeat.’ As studies in mice models have 
shown, a partially effective vaccine might at best ‘buy us time.’ Indeed, a malaria vaccine 
would considerably increase evolutionary pressure in Plasmodia, which has in mice models 
resulted in the emergence of more virulent parasites (Mackinnon and Read, 2004). A par-
tially effective vaccine might be even less effective once ‘cunning’ parasites have developed 
tolerance to it. Considering this, and the high investments vaccine development requires, 
one might wonder if the hope for such a grand solution is the best way to limit the deadly 
circulations between humans, mosquitoes and parasites. 
Conclusion
My case study has, I hope, helped to showcase an important locus of analysis for global 
health technologies. Namely, the task to critically inquire into what ‘efficacy’ means, 
or to put it more generally, how global health science constructs its objects, as well as 
indicators and measures of success or failure. In this context, a whole body of work in 
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science studies has destabilised and differently contextualised calculative practices in 
global health, such as indicators, standards and evidence-based medicine in global health 
and the majority world (Adams, 2016; Brives, Le Marcis and Sanabria, 2016). To give 
one concrete example, Emily Yates-Doerr analyses how global health policy understands 
and measures ‘hunger.’ Juxtaposing this with understandings of hunger by Guatemalans’ 
and local physicians, she shows that the category is ‘not solid but is made and unmade 
variously’ (Yates-Doerr, 2015, p. 229). This means that while global health policy aims to 
measure hunger with mathematical certainty, ‘situated uncertainty’ at all three locations 
persists (ibid.). Yates-Doerr argues that the excavation of ‘persistent uncertainty’ offered 
by ANT-inspired analysis of global health policy and practice is crucial in offering up 
alternative responses to hunger. 
The malaria vaccine case study also resonates with a second field of scholarly engagement 
in global health, namely work on multispecies entanglements (Haraway, 2008). In the spirit 
of the Latourian quote with which I opened the chapter, this strand of scholarship has fol-
lowed viruses or parasites through landscapes and labscapes, economies and ecologies, to map 
the interwovenness of species and the effects this might have on human and animal health in 
the majority world (Kelly and Lezaun, 2014; Nading, 2014; Porter, 2016). In my own work, 
I have aimed to show how mosquito net markets and mutations in the genome of Anopheles 
mosquitoes are linked through humanitarian health commodities. Global health in mosquito 
net distribution, I argue, only values the nets’ immediate health benefits, and ignores the 
wider ecological dynamics and so inadvertently contributes to the development of insecticide 
resistance (Beisel, 2015). 
The entanglements of humans and non-humans, and of science, economy and ecology, 
are evident in malaria vaccine politics. Trying to understand the potential and pitfalls of 
a malaria vaccine for the communities who would need them the most, I have sought to 
suggest that we need to indeed find ways ‘not to slice the delicate network’ (Latour, 1993, 
p. 2) but rather to weave together science policy, philanthropy-economics, the sociopolitical 
effects on local health infrastructures with a critical reading of vaccine efficacy and the health 
ecology of the development of (potential) resistances. To paraphrase Latour, understanding 
malaria vaccines requires us to follow the parasite to the Gates Foundation’s offices in  Seattle, 
GlaxoSmithKline’s development labs in Belgium and the vaccine trial sites in Ghana, as well 
as neighbouring towns that do not benefit from the trial infrastructure, and, finally, to closely 
attend to the ecological dynamics in which parasite bodies are implicated. It is in tracing 
these complex and heterogeneous assemblages of science, economy and ecology that the 
contribution of ANT-inspired thinking and writing for understanding healthcare issues in 
the majority world lies. In weaving unlikely stories together, in transcending the boundaries 
between established disciplines and genres of thinking, a different kind of thinking about 
health science and human/non-human well-being can emerge. What makes the context of 
health in the majority world particular is surely that a special focus on health inequalities, 
the continuing problems of access to basic healthcare and a dominance of pharmaceutical 
R&D from the Global North is paramount not only to analysing, but also to ethically en-
gaging with healthcare issues as scholars. In this vein, I have suggested that for ANT-inspired 
analyses, it is crucial that we also ask what kinds of projects and health infrastructures do not 
receive funding and attention due to grand approaches like malaria vaccine development? 
What kinds of practices of caring for bodies, patients and environments fall off the agendas 
of philanthropists, pharmaceutical industry and global health policies? It is exactly here, 
where the study of health in the majority world can inspire STS, namely in taking more 
seriously the effects that situations of (often prolonged) economic, environmental and social 
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vulnerabilities and insecurities have on bodies (human and parasite alike), minds, infrastruc-
tures, and our living environments and landscapes more broadly. In times of rapid environ-
mental change that will unarguably have significant effects on health, it is urgent that we find 
ways to weave together asymmetrical and (seemingly) unconnected realities to deepen our 
understanding of what is at stake in global health. 
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introduction: ANT and the problem of value
“What is the value of…” is a question relentlessly asked today, and increasingly addressed in 
the language of quantification and economic calculation. Consider a few examples. What is 
the value of nature? The economic value of the “ecosystem services” that it provides to society. 
What is the value of pollution? The price of CO
2
 on emissions trading markets. What is the value 
of environmental regulation? The value of the human lives that it will help saving expressed 
in monetary units, and balanced against the costs that it will impose on “economic actors.” 
What is the value of scientific research? The number of publications and citations that it has 
generated, but also the amount of licencing fees that universities have been able to collect from 
the patents protecting research, or the amount of the investments that  scientists-entrepreneurs 
have been able to attract from venture capitalists or industrial companies. 
How can ANT research make sense of such questions and the peculiar kind of answers 
that they propel? Although attempts to define ANT tend to fail, most would agree with the 
statement that ANT is wary of nouns such as “society” or “value.” Echoing ANT’s broader 
move from a “sociology of the social” to a “sociology of associations” (Latour 2007), ANT 
scholars who have delved into the question of value have done so not by attempting to 
identify, describe or measure value(s), but by looking at processes and practices of valuation. 
The shift from value to valuation pertains to a pragmatist stance (Hennion 2016) that has 
been widely shared in the emerging literature on valuation, which spans STS, sociology and 
organisation studies (Berthoin Antal et al. 2015, Helgesson and Muniesa 2013, Kornberger 
2017, Muniesa 2011, Stark 2009). Studies of valuation inspired by ANT embrace a concep-
tion of agency as sociotechnical and distributed across heterogeneous agencements. In line 
with ANT’s prior ventures into the fields of science and technology (Latour 1987), and later, 
markets (Callon 1998), these studies have paid particular attention to devices. They have 
broadened the focus on “market devices” proposed by Callon et al. (2007), and brought to 
light the manifold valuation devices that are mobilised in queries about the value of things and 
attempts at making things valuable.
What is the value of ANT research into economic valuation devices? I will use this ques-
tion as a starting point to sketch the perspectives opened by ANT’s incursions onto a problem 
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that has long been considered as pertaining to the domains of disciplines like economics and 
management. I will start with a particular instance of the problem of value – the economic 
value of scientific research – in order to position ANT research in comparison with other re-
search traditions that have addressed the same kind of problem. I will then discuss what ANT 
research into valuation devices can bring to the vision of the economy in ANT-inspired 
accounts – a vision which, I will argue, tends to narrow the locus of economic activities to 
markets. I will conclude by exploring whether and how ANT research into valuation devices 
can be of any help in contemporary political debates, such as those on sustainable develop-
ment and climate change, which deeply engage the question of what is valuable. 
on the economic value of scientific research
How has ANT addressed the problem of the economic value of scientific research? Science 
is the empirical field in which ANT was born and from the study of which it forged its most 
powerful and challenging claims, namely the agency of non-human entities and the dissolu-
tion of the technology/society and nature/society dichotomies. Latour and Woolgar’s (1979) 
study of an endocrinology laboratory in California and Callon’s (1984) study of marine bi-
ologists introducing scallop harvesting in Britany are certainly the most famous examples 
of ANT’s take on science and technology. The main problem they were concerned with 
was the production of knowledge, and related questions of truth, objectivity and power. 
They described researchers as building credit and alliances, making investments and acting 
as entrepreneurs, but such economic terms were used rather metaphorically. The metaphor 
that dominated their understanding of the economic was that of the market (see Muniesa, 
2020). As they appeared in these accounts, researchers were certainly concerned with secur-
ing funding, but hardly concerned with demonstrating the economic value of their research 
in terms of the returns that it could bring to investors. What made research economically 
valuable was not the key issue at stake. 
One might wonder whether the place given to the problem of the economic value of scien-
tific research was the result of the theoretical inclination of early ANT accounts, which were 
engaged in vivid debates with the sociology of scientific knowledge, or a mere reflection of 
the absence of this problem in the practices they were observing. Whatever the answer, one 
can hardly observe the work of scientists today without constantly bumping into the problem 
of demonstrating value, and economic value in particular. The valuation of scientific work is 
certainly not a novel phenomenon; what is novel, however, is the extent of formalisation of 
the scientific value of research, through measures such as the number of citations, h-indexes, 
impact factors, journal rankings, etc. (Pontille & Torny 2015). Novel, also, is the institutional 
embedding of the quest for the economic value of research. The scientist-entrepreneur is no 
longer a metaphor, nor the portrait of a few heroes of the past, but what every researcher is 
urged to become by demonstrating the economic value of her research and providing her 
contribution to innovation and growth. One example, among many, is the recurrent com-
plaint that France “isn’t the hotbed of innovation it would like to be” because its scientists, 
mainly public servants, “rarely start a company to turn their discoveries into new products or 
services” (Pain 2017). Similar complaints, urging scientists to become entrepreneurs to help 
their countries, can be heard all around the world. 
One of the canonical examples of academic entrepreneurship is the birth, in 1976, of 
Genentech, often described as the first biotechnology start-up company. Interestingly, the 
events that led to the creation of this company, and more broadly to the “science business” of 
biotechnology (Pisano 2006), occurred not too far from the Salk Institute and precisely in the 
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period (1975–1977) when Bruno Latour was doing fieldwork there for his famous ethnogra-
phy of scientific work (Latour & Woolgar 1979). That was a troubled period for the Califor-
nian biomedical community, which was grappling with a groundbreaking but troublesome 
invention: Recombinant DNA. In the early 1970s, geneticist Stanley Cohen from Stanford 
and biochemist Herbert Boyer from the University of California developed a method for 
transplanting genes. While the controversy over the promises and threats of genetic engi-
neering was raging in the scientific and the public arenas, Stanford University and the Uni-
versity of California applied for a patent on the recombinant DNA process, and biochemist 
Herbert Boyer partnered with venture capitalist Robert Swanson to found Genentech. On 
October 14, 1980, a few months after the Supreme Court ruled that living organisms en-
gineered by man are potentially patentable, in the famous Diamond v. Chakrabarty case, 
Genentech went public, raising $38.5 million in a few hours and giving Boyer and Swanson 
a paper profit of $60 million (Hughes 2001). On December 2, the US Patent Office granted 
a patent to the Cohen–Boyer application, and on December 12, the Bayh–Dole Act was 
passed, giving the right and incentive to universities to hold patents on innovations arising 
from federally funded research. 
The success of Genentech did not go unnoticed. It was seen as yet another sign that 
 Europe “lags behind” the US: As one analysis explained, while “European scientists” played 
their part in the discoveries that led to the development of biotechnology, “American en-
trepreneurs were much quicker to exploit the new techniques” (Owen 2016). Reacting, the 
European Union set about building a regulatory environment that could favour the devel-
opment of biotechnology while meeting European citizens’ fears and doubts ( Jasanoff 2007). 
Many European countries implemented policies aimed at fostering academic entrepreneur-
ship and the creation of start-ups that would “valorize” public research and “transfer” its 
results from university to industry (Mustar et al. 2008). This gave rise to profuse research on 
the evaluation of these public policies and the success factors explaining the transformation 
of science into money. The results were disappointing: Europe was still lagging behind the 
US; it was unable to produce success stories able to compete with companies like Genentech, 
and while scientists had decidedly engaged in the creation of start-ups, the companies they 
built remained small, created few jobs and provided little financial returns for their “parent” 
research organisations. This, in turn, triggered even more research on how scientific knowl-
edge can be turned into economic value. 
Beyond the diversity of backgrounds and vantage points, research on the “valorization” 
of research has shared a common assumption, envisaging economic value as something that 
science inherently had and which only needed the right conditions to be unleashed. When 
the economic value of science was problematised, it was problematised “from the outside,” 
often from the standpoint of the policymaker who is concerned with measuring the contri-
bution of science to economic growth in order to fine-tune the right level of R&D spending 
and government support. ANT-inspired analyses have opened novel perspectives in this dis-
cussion in so far as they have problematised the economic value of science “from the inside,” 
that is, by espousing the viewpoint and concerns of scientists, who attempted to demonstrate 
the value of their research, and of investors, to whom these demonstrations were addressed. 
Instead of asking “what is the value of research?” (and, as a corollary, how can this value 
be augmented?), ANT scholars have been more likely to ask “how is the value of science 
demonstrated, negotiated and contested?” or rather “how is the value of science constituted 
trough practices involving a variety of (human and nonhuman) actors?”
I will take one example from my own work (Doganova & Eyquem-Renault 2009, 
 Doganova 2012). What do scientists do when they “valorize” their research and “transfer” it 
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to other territories typically referred to as “industry” or “the market?” They craft business 
models, write business plans and pitch their ideas to investors. They demonstrate the technol-
ogies they have developed at various events, conferences, meetings, networking breakfasts, 
etc. They calculate, by means of more or less sophisticated formulas, how much the future 
products that might result from their research are worth today, what revenues they are likely 
to generate and at what price they can be sold at those willing to buy them. These models 
and plans, demonstrations and formulae, can be analysed as “valuation devices.” How these 
devices operate, what kind of work they do and what effects they produce are the kinds of 
questions that an ANT perspective leads us to ask in order to understand how science is made 
valuable and why this matters. 
From market devices to valuation devices
The notion of “valuation devices” has been modelled after that of “market devices” devel-
oped by Callon et al. (2007) to refer to “the material and discursive assemblages that inter-
vene in the construction of markets” (p. 2). The notion of “market device” was itself inspired 
from ANT’s notion of “socio-technical device.” In line with ANT’s perspective on action 
as a distributed process, the focus on devices was not a focus on objects, be they objects with 
agency, but a focus on “agencements.” As Muniesa et al. (2007) put it in the introduction to 
the edited volume Market Devices, ‘instead of considering distributed agency as the encounter 
of (already “agenced”) persons and devices, it is always possible to consider it as the very 
result of these compound agencements’ (p. 2). Rather than a unit of analysis, devices can 
thus be seen as an entry point for the sociologist who seeks to understand how markets are 
constructed and operate.
The variety of objects and situations embraced under the label of market devices (in that 
edited volume, these include securities analysts’ reports, the financial chart, a purchasing cen-
tre, merchandising techniques, supermarket settings, focus groups, consumer tests, fishing 
quotas, index-based contracts and capital-guarantee products in financial markets, pharma-
ceuticals classification schemes, cotton prices and consumer credit scoring) raised an interest-
ing question: What makes a device a market device? The answer sketched by the authors was 
that devices can be qualified as “market devices” when they contribute to the construction of 
markets or reconfigure market situations such as shopping or trading. For example, a shop-
ping cart is a material device that is also “enacted” as a market device “because it reconfigures 
what shopping is” (p. 3). This definition of market devices pertains to a broader definition 
of economic agencements as agencements that render things economic, or perform processes 
of “economisation,” which was developed further by Çalışkan and Callon (2009, 2010) and 
Callon (2017). Marketisation is one modality of economisation, and markets and market de-
vices are one form of economic agencements.
The notion of valuation devices can serve as an entry point for the analysis of different 
forms of economisation, beyond marketisation. Economic valuation is indeed involved in a 
variety of settings some of which can hardly be described as markets. Courts are one of these 
settings. In courts, economic valuation can serve to calculate the monetary compensations 
that victims should receive. Focusing on oil spills and their damage on nature, Fourcade 
(2011) has highlighted the differences between the valuation methods used in different cases 
(the Amoco Cadiz and Erika ships in France, and the Exxon Valdez in Alaska), and the 
concomitant differences in the conceptualisation of the entities that are being compensated 
(“victims” and “nature”). That courts are not markets is a rather straightforward claim. More 
interestingly, the methods used to perform economic valuation in courts differ in whether 
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they embed a market logic. Fourcade notes that while French experts used the estimation of 
prices and costs, thereby creating fictitious market situations in which the biomass destroyed 
was priced, or the restoration of the environment destroyed was contracted out, US experts 
used a method known as “contingent valuation” which relies on surveys to estimate the 
worth of the environment to individuals. Contingent valuation can be analysed as a valua-
tion device that conceptualises the value of nature as a subjective experience, rather than as 
something that results from or is revealed by market transactions. It is a device that does not 
contribute to the construction of markets, but to solving a political problem: The distribution 
of blame and monetary resources across actors. 
Another interesting setting in this respect is public policy, where economic techniques 
such as cost–benefit analysis have been introduced in the quest for objectivity and rational 
decision-making (Porter 1995). Cost–benefit analysis can be described as a valuation device 
that translates a political problem (for example, should environmental regulation be im-
plemented?) into a decision-making exercise in which benefits and costs are compared (for 
example, the benefits that environmental regulation will produce for the population, and 
the costs that such regulation will incur for firms). It involves complex equivalences which 
transform lives saved in the future into amounts of money today. For example, the discussions 
on regulation over asbestos that took place in the 1980s in the USA involved controversial 
claims such as this one: The value of a human life saved by banning asbestos is 1 million 
dollars, but if the cancer provoked by asbestos remains latent and causes death 40 years later, 
this value should be “discounted” and brought down to 22,000 dollars, because an event that 
occurs in 40 years is worth less than an event that occurs today (this example is discussed in 
Doganova, forthcoming). 
Here again, the analysis should move beyond noting that making public policy is not 
constructing markets, to examine the modalities of economisation performed by different 
valuation devices. Cost–benefit analysis can thus be put in perspective with other devices 
that entangle environmental and economic valuation, such as certification schemes for “sus-
tainable” products, lists of “clean” technologies or carbon markets where CO2 emissions are 
exchanged (Doganova & Laurent 2016, Lohmann 2009). Such comparisons reveal that valua-
tion devices may differ in the way in which they articulate the economic and the political – as 
separate domains or enmeshed processes – and lead to problematising the very qualification 
of certain settings as “markets.”
Using valuation devices as an entry point, the analysis does not need to distinguish a pri-
ori between market and non-market settings. Following the foundational insights of ANT 
should rather lead us to look into the devices themselves and examine their “script” (Akrich 
1992), that is, the assumptions that they embed on what is valuable, who is entitled to value 
and whom is to be valued. Some valuation devices do indeed act as market devices, in so far 
as they configure valuation situations as situations in which a good is bought and sold, a price 
is set and property rights are exchanged. Other valuation devices, however, act in a different 
way: The valuation situations that they configure are not situations of market exchange, but 
situations of investment. One interesting example in this respect is Neyland’s (2018) analysis 
of social impact bonds – a new public policy instrument which combines the logics of social 
investment and payment by results – as an “anti-market” device: In other words, a device 
that configures a valuation situation that does not follow the laws of the markets, but that of 
investment.
To take again the example of scientific research and biotechnology discussed earlier, pat-
enting the process of replicating DNA and selling licences to those wishing to employ this 
process enacts an economic agencement that can be described as “marketisation.” Crafting a 
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business model in which recombinant DNA is transformed into an asset able to generate fu-
ture revenues for the investors who take a stake in it enacts a different economic agencement 
that can more aptly be described as “capitalisation” (Muniesa et al. 2017). Business models 
can be analysed as a peculiar kind of valuation devices, which value things by turning them 
into objects of investment, rather than objects to be bought and sold through market transac-
tions (Doganova and Muniesa 2015). ANT research into valuation devices thus opens a novel 
path into the study of capitalisation (see also Birch 2016, Leyshon & Thrift 2007), understood 
as a specific modality of economisation which is distinct from other modalities typically re-
ferred to as marketisation, commercialisation or commodification. 
Conclusion: valuing valuation devices
The observation that there are many kinds of valuation devices, each of which carrying 
specific assumptions about what is valuable and performing different modalities of economi-
sation, suggests that valuation devices themselves may be the object of valuation. A recurrent 
question addressed to valuation devices deals with their capacity to accurately measure the 
value of things. The questions that ANT research addresses to valuation devices take us in a 
different direction. They invite us to look into valuation devices and their “scripts,” and to 
explore the work that valuation devices do, the relationships that they build and the effects 
that they produce. 
How should we value valuation devices? Callon’s (2009) recent work on “civilizing mar-
kets” opens a promising path. Markets, Callon suggests, are neither good nor bad intrinsi-
cally; a good market is a market that is “designed well,” treated as an ongoing experiment and 
subjected to collective scrutiny that allows for concerns to be expressed and taken into ac-
count. Could we imagine, in a similar fashion, economic valuation devices designed in such 
a way that they embrace a variety of concerns and can be engaged with by a variety of actors? 
Ongoing efforts to reform economic valuation devices in response to concerns related to 
sustainable development and climate change shed light on two caveats that should be kept in 
mind when embarking on the path suggested by Callon. First, there are a number of actors, 
among which policymakers, economists, consultants and NGOs, who are involved in the 
production of alternative valuation devices, and a number of competing devices which all 
claim to perform better valuations. For example, a genuine market has developed around 
metrics for evaluating the environmental performance of companies and implementing sus-
tainable investment strategies (Chiapello 2015). Second, discussions on the reform of val-
uation devices are often expressed in the language of economics and require a degree of 
equipment that may hinder the collective scrutiny open to many different voices that Callon 
envisages. For example, current debates on how the future is to be taken into account in the 
present, the extent to which future generations should be cared for and the costs that we are 
ready to incur today to avoid future climate damage are still expressed in the language of dis-
counting – a language inherited from economics and finance which few will find appealing 
or even intelligible, and which carries with it underlying assumptions about the definition 
and sources of value (Doganova, forthcoming).
So what is the value of ANT research into economic valuation devices? It probably lies in 
its ability to intervene in contemporary debates on what is valuable by “de-scribing” (Akrich 
1992) the valuation devices involved in these debates. Such descriptions should be valuable 
if they fulfil a twofold role: Help concerned groups to engage with economic expertise, and 
render visible and debatable the assumptions embedded in different valuation devices, the 
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Why is ANT good for studying the city? In this chapter, I will argue that although the incorpo-
ration of ANT into the field of urban studies has been highly contentious, it has been variously 
productive and offers useful conceptual perspectives on the city and the urban (see Farías & 
Bender 2010, Blok & Farías 2016). The originality of an ANT approach to urban infrastruc-
turing or urban planning has, for example, demonstrated how engineering interacts with gov-
ernance and both contribute to urbanisation and the (post-)modern city as an object of diverse 
and competing knowledge practices (Doucet 2015; Hommels 2005). Working with ANT shows 
how agency is distributed within the socio-material situations of creating a city and highlights 
the contingency and multiplicity of these socio-material situations. Viewed in this way, infra-
structures contribute to the governance of how people and goods, production, services, con-
sumption and aspirations are centralised as a city. At the same time, unfolding infrastructures as 
processes of infrastructuring also reveals that they can hardly be ‘governed’ as such because they 
are constantly in the making: Contested, expanded and maintained (see Denis this volume). 
‘Cities,’ according to Bender, ‘invite such expansion of notions of agency and contin-
gency’ (Bender 2012, 137). By foregrounding that the city is materialised/objectified in, for 
instance, the ideal of technocratic functionality and simultaneously remains irreducible to it, 
ANT’s redescription of the very premises of modernity (Latour 1993) meets and advances 
urban studies’ basic assumptions about the modern city’s complexity, relying on the interplay 
of density and heterogeneity (Simmel 1903; Wirth 1938; for a critique, see Roskam 2011). 
Reflecting the affinities between urban history and ANT, Bender and Farías (2010) suggest 
conceptualising the city as urban assemblages. 
Conceiving the city as urban assemblages does not merely rely on its ‘capacity to incor-
porate more urban actors, many of whom we conventionally and routinely exclude from our 
analysis’ (Bender 2012, p. 129). The concept of assemblage provides to my mind, as an urban 
anthropologist, an awareness of the potentialities of the city. It is more interested in the emer-
gence of difference than in difference itself, in how these differences are virtual and therefore 
how the socio-material composition of the city contains a ‘present absence’ (see Farías 2010, 
p. 15). This version of ANT clearly refers to Gilles Deleuze’ and Félix Guattari’s (1980) use 
of assemblage/agencement and bears close affinities to various disciplines in the humanities 
(philosophy, history, literary studies, cultural/social anthropology and cultural studies). 
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These kinds of elective affinities may not be relevant to other fields of ANT research. Blok 
and Farías (2016, p. 3) remind us that ‘ANT does not provide a general theory of the social 
that could be applied to different cases and fields.’ Nevertheless, referencing Annemarie Mol, 
they describe ANT-informed research as an ‘experimental concept-machine finely attuned 
to the specificity of the objects and cases’ (Blok & Farías 2016, p. 3). In their volume, these 
cases and concepts range from the articulation of political protest in street assemblies, and 
the publicness of urban space in face of ‘mega events,’ to my chapter on economic practices 
as they spell out in low-budget mobility and sewage infrastructures. The notion of ‘urban 
cosmopolitics’ aims to ‘redistribut[e] the political across a broader spectrum of urban settings, 
material devices, and forms of embodied experience in the city’ (Blok & Farías 2016, p. 240), 
pointing out the irreducibly incomplete ‘common world.’ Urban coexistence becomes the 
focal point that articulates – and confirms – the political dimension of ‘urban cosmopoli-
tics’ as ANT-informed urban studies (see Blok & Farías 2016, pp. 2–3). Furthermore, pro-
foundly embracing philosophical scholarship (mainly Isabelle Stengers 2005 for conceiving 
cosmopolitics, and Peter Sloterdijk 2016 (2004) for spherology) and encouraging a multidis-
ciplinary intellectual practice, urban cosmopolitics stems from and reaffirms ANT’s position 
in the social sciences and urban studies. 
Following this trajectory, I conceptualise the city as promissory assemblage, highlighting 
the temporality and virtuality of urban assemblages. This concept grasps the urban as simul-
taneously attuned articulations in and of the city: The promise of the city that centralises 
resources and opportunities; the promised city as an object of desire in ‘urban imagineering’ 
(Färber 2011b, 2014a) and urban promises that articulate these and other expectations of the 
city. In this chapter, I will, firstly, revise different conceptual takes on the promise – from 
speech act and social theory, to literary and anthropological approaches – to unfold the 
analytical potential of the city as promissory assemblage around notions such as elusiveness 
and endurance. Secondly, I will suggest examples of how these articulations of promise in/
of the city implicate the project of Western modernity and therefore invite analysis with an 
ANT-orientation. In order to do so, I discuss studies of infrastructuring and show how its 
promissory quality adds to the centralising dimension of cities.
Arguing for a theoretical perspective and claiming the relevance of such a perspective, 
everyday intellectual practices should never be left unquestioned – even less so when we are 
committed to an analytical perspective such as ANT that is founded on curiosity about how 
scientific truth is fabricated (Latour & Woolgar 1979). Thus, questioning ANT as an intellec-
tual practice in urban studies in the final section reveals that in environmental, architecture 
and design faculties, ANT-orientated urban research has been received quite positively (see 
Guggenheim in this volume). This trajectory is quite opposite to the controversy surround-
ing the introduction of ANT to urban studies in 2011. I therefore conclude the chapter with 
a discussion of the potential – or promises – of multidisciplinary collaborations with ANT 
and the institutional settings that enable an integrative intellectual practice where the notion 
of promissory assemblage might seize – and thus challenge – the role of endurance as a con-
dition for the city’s promise as a centralising power. 
Unfolding the city as a promissory assemblage
Cities are neither simply objects nor are they subjects, although we often talk about them as if 
they were single actors doing something wilfully. Nevertheless, they may be considered ob-
jects of desire/s and enigmatic with regard to one’s attachments to them when we conceive of 
them as ‘clusters of promises’ (Berlant 2011, p. 24), or promissory assemblages. This approach 
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can be a means of studying the improbable centralising power or attractiveness of big cities 
and yet the evident ecological damage they engender. Interrogating this cruel ‘triumphalism’ 
of the city (see Roskamm 2017, p. 9) with the notion of the promise allows us to understand 
how cities are articulated and enacted as the place for (better) living, despite the fact that, 
for example, ecological concerns point to the harm to life that occurs there. Lauren Berlant’s 
literary analysis of the ways in which such contradictions are lived in the mode of endurance 
(in a mode of ‘despite’) demonstrates that it is a driving force for the continuity (rather than 
transformation) of social difference and inequality in (late) capitalism (Berlant 2011). The 
promise appears to be at the heart of endurance as an activity. 
My research on low-budget urbanity (Färber 2011a, Färber & Otto 2016) and urban imag-
ineering (Färber 2011b, 2014a) explores the possible connections between the often unful-
filled promises in the city, such as a variety of public goods facilitating low-budget housing, 
consumption and mobility, and the enduring promises of the city, enclosed in the imagined 
city as a place of equal opportunities and rights;1 between ‘the city as a promise’ of moderni-
sation and the ‘promised city’ as a desired object and destination for migration. Here, the co-
existence of different articulations of promise seems to be a general condition of experiencing 
and thinking the modern city. I draw on urban assemblage analysis and humanities’ concepts 
of the promise to problematise the unbroken centralising force of, and conditions for, cities. 
How does the promise as a concept in speech act theory and literary studies as well as phi-
losophy of law relate to an ANT notion of urban assemblages? Conceived of as illocutionary 
speech acts, promises are ‘organizing acts,’ as Bruno Latour writes, referring to John Austin 
(1962), that create a temporal difference ‘between an ensemble of antecedent and poste-
rior conditions’ (www.modesofexistence.org, entry ‘Austin’). Furthermore, promises create 
(only) rather stable, quasi-contractual relations between different actors (in Schneider 2005a): 
The relation between the promise as articulation, the promisor, the promisees and possibly 
different forms of what can count as ‘promissory notes’ (Wittrock 2000) such as a rendering 
in urban planning, or an agreed budget is later evaluated according to the un/ fulfilment of 
the promise. Promises therefore become attached to values such as responsibility, reliability 
and trustworthiness (Lahno 2005; Schneider 2005b). The quality of the promise also organ-
ises temporal difference. These organised relations are monitored based on moral, rather than 
juridical judgements. 
Interested in constellations of the social and how, for instance, newness emerges, urban 
assemblage scholars question the power relations and distribution of agency. Their interest 
in contingency also considers virtuality an integral part of urban assemblages. I suggest that 
studying the city as urban promissory assemblage highlights the everyday experience of 
contingency and virtuality. It points to how the promise organises rather loose social con-
nections, while enabling affective modes of endurance that articulate the city as an object of 
desire. 
Let’s take the projection of urban public transport as an example of an urban promissory 
assemblage. Public transport articulates promises to city dwellers about their possible con-
nectedness to and within the city but often fails to meet their expectations (Ureta 2015). 
It materialises promises about the metropolitan character of a city as well as subjectivities 
attached to the urban imaginary of equal opportunities and thereby encourages endurance 
regarding everyday experiences of inequality (see Farías & Höhne 2015; Harvey & Knox 
2015; Höhne 2012). Public transport often appears as a promised object of urban politics and 
as a hard-to-realise project of urban development.
Sometimes, these promises of future urban transport are realised unexpectedly decades 
later – like the Second Avenue line in the NYC Subway that was partially finished in 2017 
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after almost 100 years of projection. How do people live (in) the city as a terrain of not-yet- 
realised promises? How do they relate to a place that has become incomplete once the prom-
ise of something to come has been uttered – a not-yet-realised-place through the promise? 
How do we interpret the time passing while the promise is not fulfilled? And what does 
waiting entail in such a situation? Kemmer and Simone (forthcoming) address how residents 
of Rio de Janeiro and Jakarta manage to detach from the transitivity of urban promises and, 
in this way, to transform a passive waiting for a better future into an active mode of endur-
ance. They describe how the city is assembled under the impact of the promise, by high-
lighting how inhabitants of Rio and Jakarta’s urban cores maintain the everyday forms of 
cooperation and activism that generated promises of access to the city in the first place, and 
how this keeps them politically relevant to those who claim the authority to make promises.
This approach is not focused on un/fulfilment of promises; it instead opens up a specific 
time-space that social anthropologists Simone Abram and Gisa Weszkalnys (2013) describe 
as a gap when studying the ‘elusive promises’ of planning: 
The ‘gaps’ between ideal, ideology and practice fill themselves with things unplanned, 
unexpected and inexplicable, and with things that get overlooked and forgotten. … the 
ethnographer’s task is to chart how people deal with these gaps and mismatches, and 
to understand how they are significant to, and are occasionally elided by, the work of 
planning.
(Abram & Weszkalnys 2013, p. 23)
These gaps are time-spaces attuned by the promise and therefore qualified by a certain elu-
siveness. To return to the Second Avenue line in the NYC public transport project: People 
may forget about the promise even though the promise may have made them move to the 
area. They may never have heard of the promise, or have other reasons for staying. Perhaps 
they cannot move away or do not want to miss the moment when it is finally realised and 
meets their initial expectations and imagined lives. Situated in a ‘not yet,’ things are related 
to each other loosely ‘as if,’ and sometimes they are (re)assembled despite better knowledge, 
that is, ‘nonetheless.’ These multiple loose modes also allow us to rethink the important com-
mon understanding of the promise as something binding, as something that coincides with 
a relatively stable set of (moral) values: We might view it as an organising agencement that is 
only somewhat monitored. This almost uncontrollable presence in absence (or virtuality) of 
the promise attunes the time-space in a perhaps reliably loose way – and demands endurance 
to keep it staying. 
infrastructuring the modern city: the centralising 
agency of promises in/of the city
As projects of modernity, urban infrastructures have articulated the promises of different 
forms of society: From liberalism and capitalism, to communism and fascism. Based on the 
expectations of engineering expertise, the determinism of technological progress over nature 
and economic wealth (=growth), these promises have often failed while the urban situations 
that they have articulated have shown some ‘obduracy’ (Hommels 2005). This inevitably 
makes infrastructuring an emblematic field to study the above-mentioned potentialities, the 
expanded notions of agency and contingency central to urban assemblage research. From 
this perspective, Ash Amin and Nigel Thrift suggest conceiving the city in a Deleuzian 
vein through its relational modality or mode of connectivity, as a machine, mainly stressing 
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the multiplicity of assembling sociotechnical systems with a ‘combinatorial and rhizomatic’ 
agency (2017, p. 160; also see Jensen in this volume).
ANT-oriented urban studies focus on how agency is distributed and the contingent quality 
of infrastructures and infrastructuring alongside urban, social and environmental histories. 
William Cronon’s (1991) work on the connective character of Chicago’s urbanisation in the 
19th century (retrospectively deemed an ANT-study of the city avant la letter by Bruno Latour 
2005, p. 11), for example, demonstrates how the centralising effect of infrastructuring (mainly 
via railroads) is based on an effort to stabilise the connection between future commodities 
from the ‘Great West’ and the growing city of Chicago, and how ‘nature’ is objectified in this 
infrastructured metropolis. For Cronon, the urban promise of growth (profit and prosperity) 
is connected to ‘nature’ as its main resource (be it grain, lumber or meat), and yet claims a 
major difference/frontier at the same time: ‘If a city’s growth was assured by nature or – better 
yet – ordained by God, then only a fool could doubt its future promise‘ (Cronon 1991, p. 35).
Similarly concerned with modern urbanisation processes and related promises in/of the 
city is Patrick Joyce’s (2003) work on how liberalism materialises (in) the modern city. An 
affinity with ANT-oriented urban studies or assemblage theory is evident, for example, in an 
expanded notion of agency, when he writes that infrastructures 
set up the conditions of possibility in which freedom might be exercised. This freedom is 
where I take ‘liberalism’ to reside. And the action of these pipes, sewers, roads and lights 
comprised what I have called the agency of material things. ‘Conditions for possibility’ is a 
relevant term here, for these things did not determine outcomes (… the clear, unobstructed 
road had constantly to be dug up for maintenance, for example), so that these things car-
ried a certain capacity for action, and built into them were certain kinds of agency.
( Joyce 2003, pp. 11–12)
Joyce’s interest in the potentiality provided by these promising infrastructures coincides with 
an insistence on the distributedness of agency and most importantly on the contingency 
involved (the emergence of unforseeable possibilities, the breakdown and non-functioning 
of infrastructures) and its handling in the mode of maintenance. He thereby preconceives 
the subject of maintenance and repair studies that have become important to ANT-oriented 
urban research (see Denis this volume). Joyce shows that infrastructures of built and main-
tained roads or sewage pipes do not act as simple mediators of modernity – here in the shape 
of liberal ideas. Rather, they are ‘constantly creating problems for themselves in the very acts 
of operation,’ and therefore ‘political reason, in order to govern, forever had to create ‘prob-
lems’ and ‘questions’ around which governance might be thought and prosecuted’ ( Joyce 
2003, pp. 71–72). Governing by infrastructuring meant materialising liberalism in ways that 
promised the modern city. Maintaining infrastructures and therefore trying to govern po-
tentialities account not only for how engineering and technocratic expertise co-produce the 
multiplication of dis-/functionality. These modes of complicating the world as an arena of 
modern divides add to the complexity of the city as a promise of modernity. 
Today, these studies in ecological and social histories resonate with the ways in which 
 infrastructures have been conceived and studied in the vein of STS and in urban assemblage 
research. These have turned our attention from infrastructure as a stable object of engineer-
ing, design, governance and management to infrastructuring as historical instances (Bestor 
2004, de Boeck & Plissart 2004, Höhne 2012, 2017, Simone 2015). These instances unfold 
anything but smoothly. Concepts such as ‘splintering urbanism’ emphasise the extent to 
which commons are the result of former struggles and therefore under threat in the neo- 
liberal era of ‘networked infrastructures’ (Graham & Marvin 2001). The privatisation of 
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formerly common good infrastructures (streets, water, etc.) has led to spatial fragmentation 
of the city and enhanced social marginalisation in the city. In my view, splintering urbanism 
offers a possible refinement of the relation of promises in the city (infrastructures as a com-
mon good) and of the city (the place of equal opportunities, or, here, access).
Concerning the multiplicity of goods subjected to these ‘vast socio-technical meshworks’ 
(Höhne 2012, p. 163) (food, different energy resources, housing, education, etc.), the study 
of water and sewage infrastructuring in cities in the global south seems to count among the 
most urgent and revealing cases. The work of Colin McFarlane (2011c) in urban India and 
South Africa, for example, contributes to the problematisation of publicness/commonness. 
He studies conflicts around water infrastructures that question the integration (inclusion or 
exclusion) from the infrastructures and collective action around infrastructures (Graham 
et al. 2015). These conflicts rearticulate the centralising effect of unequal infrastructures and 
point out the elusiveness of the infrastructural promise of the city. However, these collective 
actions also challenge the everyday endurance of living with this elusiveness.
Back to the future: promises and threats of 
ANT engagements in urban studies
The question of how to describe ‘the world while keeping it open’ (Law & Mol 2002, 
p. 16; Latour 2005; see Pontille and Ossandón this volume) is, of course, not exclusive to 
ANT- informed research on the city, but the use of ANT in design-oriented institutions 
does promote new forms of representational work. The appointment of ANT-scholars in 
departments of architecture and planning – in Hamburg, Maastricht, Manchester, Munich 
or Stockholm – gives indirect credence to certain affinities and expectations attached to their 
intellectual practice (see Yaneva and Mommersteeg this volume). Moreover, the professional 
knowledge of architects and planners, for instance, regarding visual or three-dimensional 
representations might be attractive for collaborating on questions of complexity and compli-
cation. If ANT is ‘a theory heavy in gerunds’ (Bender 2012, p. 136), ANT-oriented research 
of the city might be(come) an intellectual practice ‘heavy in visuals’ that keep the world 
open. Thus, one  benefit – or promise – of researching the city and the urban with ANT 
lies in its accessibility to those disciplines confronting complexity in a visual and three- 
dimensional way. It is worth noting that such an overlap inevitably bears theoretical implica-
tions emanating from both sides that do not translate ‘well’ (see Guggenheim, this volume). 
Latour also presents various useful experiments in this regard (for his collaborations in exhi-
bitions, see Färber 2016, Petersen 2016, Thorsen & Blok 2016). Some of these experiments are 
listed on his website, others on the platform of the Programme d’Experimentation en Arts Poli-
tiques (SPEAP). On his website, we find Latour’s city-related research under the section pub-
lication and ‘media mix’: ‘Paris, ville invisible.’ This photo-text essay by Latour (text),  Emilie 
Hermant (photos) and Susan Shannon (layout) was published as a book in 1998 and made into 
a website by Patricia Reed in 2004. Although nowadays the website (indexed as ‘Sociological 
web opera’ by Latour) is a beautiful reminder of how more than a decade ago web design was 
able to mobilise text and image (Zitouni 2004), the book retains its surprising originality. 
The experimental and multifarious design of ‘Paris, ville invisible’ was ahead of its time in a 
very contemporary way, most prominently in the case of Rem Koolhaas’ publication ‘S, M, 
L, XL’ (Koolhaas & Mau 1997). In this particularly chaotic way of squeezing together images 
and texts, the city is articulated as a ‘haphazard material organization’ (Harper 2000, pp. 156). 
Today, graduates and faculty from the academic contexts mentioned earlier are motivated to 
find new ways of tracing urban assemblages. They echo, for instance, Law and Mol’s (2002, 
pp. 16–17) claim for listing, walking and telling stories when they work with notions such as 
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‘unfolding’ (Danusiri 2008), ‘randonner’ (Michaelis 2015), ‘itinérer’ (researchingacity.com) 
and ‘mapping’ (Yaneva 2012).
Reflecting on ANT-writing as an institutionally embedded intellectual practice not only points 
to existing and future spaces of ANT engagement in urban studies. It also sheds light on possible 
reasons for conflict in the broader field of urban studies. In this chapter, I have argued from the 
perspective of an urban anthropologist, situated more in the humanities than the social sciences. 
As such, I can embrace urban assemblage research and ANT-oriented studies of the city from a 
position where notions of agency, contingency, emergence and virtuality, as put forward by Farías 
and Bender (2010), do not pose theoretical threats. This is important to note because in 2011, 
the attempt to conceptualise the city as ‘urban assemblages’ (Farías & Bender 2010,  McFarlane 
2011) was received in quite an astonishing way. Within the broader field of urban studies, the 
introduction of ANT as assemblage research of the city sparked a polarising debate. Urban stud-
ies with theoretical roots in political economy (and a strong Anglo-North- American-German 
institutional background in social sciences) initiated a quite powerful response to ANT-inspired 
urban research that then had divergent, even partly contradictory, philosophical grounds (as well 
as institutional backgrounds in different European countries within cultural and social sciences). 
In the core forum for this debate – a set of 13 articles spread over five issues of the Journal ‘City’ 
(2011/15/2–15/6) – the differences were mainly debated along the notions of power and structure 
vs. agency and composition, and theoretical vs. empirical capacities – with assemblage in urban 
theory (McFarlane 2011a, 2011b) being minimised from the critical urban studies’ counterpart as 
a methodological approach with a certain descriptive capacity and value but no further analytical 
reach towards questions of power and society (Brenner et al. 2011a, 2011b).
This somewhat cacophonous backlash was perhaps partly fuelled by ‘the narcissism of se-
mantic difference – the enjoyment of a skillful argument between people who basically agree 
with each other,’ as sociologist Fran Tonkiss stated (Tonkiss 2011, p. 587). Certainly, it ensured 
that the very beginnings of an explicit ANT-orientation for theorising the city were polarised. 
ANT-orientated scholars working on the city are now well aware of its potential for creating 
conflict within urban studies. However, as an urban anthropologist who did not take part in 
this debate but commented on it (Färber 2014b, 2014c), it was astonishing to observe how this 
boundary work and its antagonism became an almost inevitable reference point in urban stud-
ies. For a while, other positions within the field of urban studies garnered much less attention, 
which is why I have emphasised humanities’ and cultural studies’ perspectives here.
Asking what ANT analysis can offer urban studies, I have suggested the notion of the city 
as ‘promissory assemblage.’ This concept acknowledges the multiple ontologies of urban as-
semblages as a promise of the city, as the promised city and urban promises. To study the city 
as promissory assemblage gives analytical access to: The promises attached to modernity that 
are articulated in urban infrastructuring; the elusiveness of promises that we confront through-
out modernisation and urbanisation; and to the connection between urban opportunity (and 
misfortune), subjectivation and endurance as a mode of activity that does not facilitate change. 
Herein lies the political relevance of researching the city with an ANT lens: Allowing us to 
detect ‘immanence and change’ (Acuto & Curtis 2014, p. 10) in and of the city, it also helps us 
to find enduring means to collectively address the false promises in and of the city.
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Note
 1 Distinguishing promises in and of the city echoes the paradigmatic claim of urban anthropology in 
and of the city (Hannerz 1980).
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The question about the presence of the issue of subjectivity (or the modes of its production) 
in Actor-Network Theory (ANT) won’t receive as generous an answer as it would if it con-
cerned Gilles Deleuze’s and Felix Guattari’s schizoanalysis or Michel Foucault’s archaeologies 
and genealogies. Amongst the writings of the best-known, earlier proponents of ANT, the 
clearest references to subjectivity are to be found in the work of Latour (1987, 1991, 2004, 
2005, 2011), even if relevant methodological discussions can be found in both Law (2004) and 
Mol (2002). Clearer still are the references one finds in the work of Isabelle Stengers (1989, 
1992a, 1992b, 1999) and Vinciane Despret (1999, 2004, 2009, 2011a) and in the field of Polit-
ical Epistemology (PE). Here, the contributions of Stengers and Despret will be considered in 
their connections and their interface with the work of Latour, especially due to their shared 
interest in concepts such as risk, generalisation and recalcitrance.
Because Latour is the key author (amongst the classics of ANT) when it comes to explor-
ing the issue of subjectivity, I take his writings as the basis for the present chapter. There are 
four relevant threads running through his work:
1  Criticism of the modern division between a human/social/political/subjective domain 
and a natural/universal/scientific/objective domain, where the function of psychological 
knowledge would be to work as a stabiliser for the first group (especially devoted to sub-
jectivity) and the function of epistemologies would be to work as a stabiliser for the second 
group (Latour 1987, 1991, 1996, 1999). According to him, nature, society, objectivity and 
subjectivity are all effects of processes of purification, and they are the last to arrive, like 
Elizabeth II of England when the Parliament makes a decision (Latour, 1987).
2  An amodern alternative – represented by the ethnopsychiatric work of Tobie Nathan 
(see Latour, 1996, 1998b, 2011) – to the accounts of subjectivity that result from the 
‘modern divide’ and purification work.
3  An approach to subjectivity as an effect produced by processes of various kinds within a 
realist–constructivist perspective (Latour 2003, 2004, 2005).
4  A description of concrete and specific situations whereby subjectivities are produced by 
sociotechnical devices (Plan 49 in Latour & Hermant, 2009).
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A Berlin wall in modernity
Let us start with the first aspect. Even if the writings of Latour (1987, 1991, 1996, 2002, 
2011)1 under consideration have different purposes and directions, they also have a common 
basis: They extend David Bloor’s (1976) principle of symmetry, which calls into question 
the opposition between modes of analysis for ‘successful’ (‘correct‘) and ‘failed’ (‘incorrect’) 
forms of science. Thus, further dualities, or further alleged essential oppositions, are sym-
metrised and called into question by ANT: Culture X Nature; Subjectivity X Objectivity; 
Modernity X Pre-modernity; Civilisation X Primitivity. Those oppositions do not intersect 
but they do touch, especially the first two. Resistance to the division between subjectivity 
and objectivity – of most interest here – is the central subject of Pétite Réflexion sur le Culte 
Moderne des Dieux Faitiches (Latour, 1996). Indirectly and by approximation, we can also rely 
on the criticism of the division between culture and nature as it appears centrally in many 
texts (Latour, 1989, 1991 1999, 2011). The ontological thesis is that all of these divisions are 
peculiar to specific, localised historical settings, such as the 16th-century debate between 
Robert Boyle and Thomas Hobbes, as in Latour’s (1991) reading of the work of Shapin and 
Schaffer (1985).2 Before the modernist purification of culture and nature, fetishes and facts, 
all what exists are various configurations of hybrids, or factishes.3
It is important to link this debate to Latour’s (2003) realistic constructivism, according to 
which the more complicated the practices and arrangements constructing a thing, the more 
real it gets, thus eschewing the traditional division between realism (according to which re-
ality is objective and not constructed) and constructivism (which points to processes of artifi-
cial production). In this line of reasoning, subjectivity and objectivity, nature and society, are 
not starting points but consequences of processes of purification (Latour, 1991) or drainage 
(Latour, 1996), regulated as they are by the Modern Constitution (Latour, 1991), the main effect 
of which is to multiply the hybrids (Latour, 1991) and factishes (Latour, 1991, 1996).4
In Pétite Réflexion sur le Culte Moderne des Dieux Faitiches, psychology is called into question 
as the great heir, together with epistemology, of the modern separation of subjectivity and 
objectivity. This division acts as a suction pump, attracting entities to each of these poles of 
purification (subjective and personal versus objective and real). On the epistemological side, 
we find the debate about the production of facts; on the psychological side, we find the debate 
about the ways in which subjectivity – understood in terms of beliefs, that is, in terms of our 
errors relative to scientific reason – is produced. As Canguilhem (1966) puts it, psychology 
emerges in the modern project, as the mind’s apology to scientific reason.
The fabrication of the selves
The alternative lies, according to Latour (1991), in fostering an amodern attitude (not  anti- 
modern, nor premodern, nor yet postmodern). Such an attitude is characterised by a positive 
view of the hybrids and of the processes of fabrication of entities that occur in various net-
works, such as our modes of subjectivity. The alternative to the purification that is associated 
by Latour with most psychological traditions lies, according to him, in the ethnopsychiatric 
work of Tobie Nathan (Latour, 1996, 1998b, 2011). This leads us to the second aspect of 
 Latour’s approach to subjectivity.
For Latour, Nathan swims against the ethnopsychiatric current formed by the work of 
other experts, such as Georges Deveraux, who have always attempted to understand the ex-
perience of non-Western groups in terms of internal, unconscious entities, more in line with 
republican, modern French ways (Latour, 1998b). The way in which Nathan handles issues 
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related to subjectivity avoids purification; he does not convert variegated experiences into 
internal entities. According to him, non-Western human groups share with Westerners the 
ontological belief in the existence of invisible beings (or beings of metamorphosis; see Latour, 
2011). However, for non-Westerners, these invisible beings are not internal, personal or gov-
erned by universal psychological laws. They aren’t bound by the subjective limits of a world 
of beliefs and fantasies, but cohabit a common vital world. Nathan’s work is achieved by 
acknowledging and welcoming, in French territory, the non-modern experiences reported 
especially by his immigrant, diverse clientele, without translating them into modern terms 
or reducing them to some ultimate, true view of our subjectivity. Even better, he multiplies 
versions of the fabrication of our subjectivity, and of our selves (Latour, 1998b), a process in 
which intervention and suggestion are key aspects.5
Accordingly, it is possible to think of subjectivity as a hybrid production, in much the 
same way in which Latour thinks of the production of reality by technical–scientific devices 
(Latour, 1987; Latour and Woolgar 1979). Here, we find the third and fourth meanings 
that open up new leads for studies in subjectivity production, especially as it is achieved by 
psycho-techno-social, and therefore less modern, devices (a theme that has developed in the 
Iberian-Latin American literature)6. In these third and fourth meanings, we find references 
to rather peripheral parts of Latour’s books and papers (Latour, 2004, 2005, 2009).
Constructing the subject
The best leads as to how Latour conceives of this manifold production of subjectivity in a 
positive way (the third sense)7 can be found in two texts: How to talk about the body? (2004) 
and the thesis about subjectivity plug-ins developed in Reassembling the Social (2005), where 
he discusses a version of the social in terms of face-to-face meetings. The first question 
that comes to mind is: What could a paper about the body teach us about the production 
of subjectivity? By eschewing every modern division (such as that between subjectivity and 
body), we can, even if this isn’t easy, understand those two modes of the same process of 
constructing hybrids or factishes as constantly co-articulating and co-affecting entities.8 Here, 
the body cannot be defined as ‘an essence, a substance (…), but rather, (…) an interface that 
becomes more and more describable as it learns to be affected by more and more elements’ 
(Latour, 2004, p. 205). As an example of this power of being affected, Latour considers 
the learning process of specialists in the perfume industry (also called ‘noses’) with a kit of 
odours, during which they are trained to make entirely new distinctions of smell. For the 
author, this learning process is not the simple acquisition of an ability by a natural body, but 
its reciprocal construction with the world: ‘Acquiring a body is thus a progressive enterprise 
that produces at once a sensory medium and a sensitive world’ (Latour, 2004, p. 207). This 
articulate body allows one to experience and obtain knowledge about the world (and of other 
bodies) by being co-produced together with them, registering differences in new modes and 
expanding contrasts between phenomena which were previously considered homogeneous: 
‘Articulation thus does not mean ability to talk with authority (…) but being affected by 
differences’ (Latour, 2004, p. 210). Without a division between subjectivity and the body 
(or other materialities), it is not difficult to understand subjectivity as produced by multiple 
modes of articulations.
In Reassembling the Social (2005), Latour even more directly reflects on the composition of 
subjectivity in a comparison with plug-ins, discussing the possibility of thinking the social in 
an elementary form as the face-to-face meeting of people. However, for Latour, even the psy-
chological abilities that are supposedly more pure than others (be they affective or cognitive) 
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are not natural entities in people, but rather are incorporated in the same way that a plug-in 
is installed in a computer: ‘They could be called subjectifiers, personalizers, or individual-
isers, but I prefer the more neutral term of plug-ins, borrowing this marvellous metaphor 
from our new life on the Web’ (Latour, 2005, p. 207). All the components that constitute 
these abilities flow and are distributed in a series of materialities and practices that compose 
the psycho-morphs, which are the creators of our subjectivity: ‘floods, rains, swarms of 
what could be called psycho-morphs, because they literally lend you the shape of a psyche’ 
(Latour, 2005, p. 212). Thus, in the same way that novels and soap operas can constitute our 
affections, calculation practices and linguistic distinctions can generate our cognitive forms: 
‘Of course I am, but only as long as I have been individualized, spiritualized, interiorized’ 
(Latour, 2005, p. 212).
Maybe the model of subjectivation through plug-ins is too simplified: In the same way that 
for Latour objective reality is produced through extensive controversies in action ( Latour, 
1987), the production of subjective reality is certainly a process that is as much or even more 
unstable and conflicting. What makes ANT interesting in this case, more than its strict doc-
trine, is the possibility of presenting a strong constructivist and controversial approach to the 
production of subjectivity (Latour, 1999). Research in subjectivity production must take this 
plural and frictional composition into account. However, before we develop this reflection, 
we must explore the fourth meaning proposed by Latour.
inside psycho-techno-social devices
The forth possible approach to the issue of subjectivity is even more peripheral in Latour’s 
work. We can briefly mention Plan 49 in Paris: Ville Invisible, written in collaboration with 
Emilie Hermant (Latour and Hermant, 2009). Here, Latour clearly refers to the way in 
which Parisians subscribe to ‘the psy sciences’ and the humanities. But the two fast pages 
of that plan function more like a tasting menu or a free sample describing these practices.9 
How do those practices of subscription happen? How do processes of subjectivity production 
take place here? How can we carry out such studies with what Latour (2005) calls the light 
equipment of ANT, following the actors in their modes of composition without forcing on 
them the weight of the great explanatory categories, shaped by the modern dualities? Here, 
we move away from Latour’s writings and into the work of other ANT scholars (Law, 2004; 
Mol, 2002) and allies (Stengers 1989, 1992; Despret, 1999, 2004, 2011a) to explore processes 
of subjectivation engendered by sociotechnical devices (and especially the devices of the 
human sciences).
The production of worlds and modes of research
Starting from Latour’s approach, which is at the same time constructivist and realist and 
attuned to controversy, how can we think about the ways in which we can study the pro-
duction of subjectivity? Before answering this question, we need to better understand the 
performativity of scientific knowledge. For this, I will rely on ANT-related approaches that 
focus on various political modes of scientific knowledge production, such as the work of Mol 
and Law, as well as Stengers’ and Despret’s PE.
For ANT and PE, scientific knowledge is constituted of the traces of a plural performance, 
in the articulation and coaffectation between various actors and in the unexpected produc-
tion of effects, permeated by controversies (Latour, 2004). If scientific knowledge can no 
longer be distinguished in terms of good and bad representations, assuming an external term 
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of evaluation (as traditional epistemologies assume), how can it be evaluated? The answer 
lies in the specific modes of connection between entities, in a microphysical analysis of the 
modes of articulation. What characterises bad or good articulations? In the first case, we have 
a situation where the articulation between various entities is extorted or conditioned to an 
expected response, without any risk. In the second case, we have an articulation where the 
testimony goes beyond a mere response, opening up to the risk of invalidating the research-
er’s own questions and propositions and letting the research raise new questions: In other 
words, this constitutes a recalcitrant relationship. Scientific knowledge thus does not lead to 
a thin and uniform reality but to the unfolding of diverse possible worlds and subjectivities, 
including researchers and researched entities (Despret, 2004; Latour 2004).
From this stems a singular characteristic of ANT and PE regarding the multiplicity of 
scientific knowledge. Most epistemological approaches identify multiplicity as a sign of a 
pre-scientific state, while the presence of a unified project and its rationality (Canguilhem, 
1966) or a paradigm (Kuhn, 1962) is a sign of scientific activity. In ANT and PE, in contrast, 
multiplicity is considered more positively. Referring especially to PE, Latour (2004, p. 220) 
points out this positive approach: ‘Generalization should be a vehicle for travelling through 
as many differences as possible – thus maximizing articulations – and not a way of decreasing 
the number of alternative versions of the same phenomena.’ This completely inverts certain 
critiques of the scientific status of human sciences, such as that established by Canguilhem 
(1966), referring to psychology.
Similarly, Mol (2002) and Law (2004) take multiplicity as a positive aspect of many sci-
entific and technical devices in their concept of ontological politics. For these authors, more 
than being a representation of a pre-existing reality in different perspectives, scientific prac-
tices produce distinct (multiple) worlds, without any ultimate unity (singularity), but are 
also not entirely inarticulate (plurality).  Here, the term ‘multiplicity’ is specified: It is not an 
anomaly in a unique and singular world, as is the perspective of Euro-American metaphysics10 
(Law, 2004, p. 25), and neither does it point to a plurality of events without connections: ‘We 
are in a world where bodies, or organisations, or machines are more than one and less than 
many. In a world that is more than one and less than many. Somewhere in between’ (Law, 
2004, p. 62).
An example of this performed multiplicity can be found in Mol’s study (2002) of arte-
riosclerosis, which is not seen as a pathological state that is inherent to the body that is rep-
resented in different perspectives (in the laboratory or in clinical exams). Instead, each one 
of these scientific practices enacts a mode of arteriosclerosis, a pathological reality that does 
not necessarily converge, but that is also not entirely disjoined. Mol uses the term political 
ontologies, since each scientific practice constructs a particular reality among other possible 
ones. This, in an interplay with other scientific practices, constitutes a multiverse: More than 
one and less than many.
Clinical devices and modes of production of subjectivities
How can we conduct research on the modes of subjectivity production present in diverse 
technoscientific networks? First, we need to consider the remarkable diversity of political 
ontologies present in the many scientific devices, and expressed in their multiple capacities of 
fabricating subjects or ‘artificial selves’ (Latour, 1998b). As we have seen before, this produc-
tive aspect of subjectivities is not considered by ANT or PE as a parasitic remnant, but as an 
actual aspect of the production of knowledge. The problem of certain scientific devices (such 
as those used in most psychological research) is that they very frequently present a mode of 
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knowing based on the extortion of their witnesses (Stengers, 1989), not only in the way the 
tasks are demanded, but especially how these observers are positioned, rarely introducing 
problems or questionings. Here, Latour, Stengers and Despret all highlight the relative obe-
dience and docility of human beings towards scientific authority:
Contrary to non-humans, humans have a great tendency, when faced with scientific 
authority, to abandon any recalcitrance and to behave like obedient objects, offering the 
investigators only redundant statements, thus comforting those same investigators in the 
belief that they have produced robust ‘scientific’ facts and imitated the great solidity of 
the natural sciences!
(Latour, 2004, p. 217)
For Latour (1997, p. 301), the human sciences (psychology included) would only really be-
come sciences if they did not imitate the objectivity of the natural sciences, but the possibility 
of recalcitrance. In other words, we can say that their major problem is not their capacity to 
influence and produce subjects, but to extort and create docility, inhibiting the possibilities of 
recalcitrance. In this way, while seeking the ‘objectivity of the natural sciences,’ the human 
sciences frequently extort their research subjects, thus producing standardised subjectivities.
Despret (2004) provides a very interesting discussion about this, focusing on the design of 
psychological research. She points out that much of the history of psychological methods can 
be told as the change from a design in which the research subjects should be trained experts 
(as it was done in the first psychological laboratories at the end of the 19th century based on 
practices of introspection), to one in which the participants should be deprived of any infor-
mation about the objectives, questions, resources and hypotheses of the research. The point 
of depriving subjects of information was to avoid the researchers’ influence in the production 
of experimental results. Thus, the research subjects are shifted from being experts, with an 
importance frequently exceeding that of the experimenters, to being ‘anyone.’11 Importantly, 
Despret proposes a reversal of the way most manuals in the history of psychology read this 
shift: Moving from the trained subjects of the first psychological laboratories to the naïve 
subjects present in most of our present laboratories is not a step forward in the direction of 
objectivity and control, but a step backward from the possibility of recalcitrance, creating doc-
ile, asymmetric and limiting articulations in relation to its witnesses: ‘Subjects without the 
excellence of expertise do not pose a risk of taking up a position in investigations’ (Despret, 
2004, p. 97).
Lost in a labyrinth: walking through a division of applied psychology
Rather than continuing this historical analysis of the changes in research design in the psy- 
disciplines into the present, in the remainder of this chapter, I’d like to draw attention to the 
micropolitical effects of research practices: Producing worlds or subjectivities involves great 
political risks. More specifically, I’ll dwell on a research programme that our group has been 
developing at the Division of Applied Psychology (DAP) of the Institute of Psychology of the 
Federal University of Rio de Janeiro (UFRJ), in order to follow the diverse ways in which 
certain psychological guidelines entail distinct types of production of subjectivity (Ferreira 
et al., 2013, 2014). The DAP offers some psychotherapeutic services of different orientations 
(psychoanalysis, cognitive-behavioural therapy (CBT), gestalt therapy, institutional analysis 
and existential analysis) to the community as a low-cost service, using as therapists student 
interns, who are supervised by a professor or a psychologist of the Institute of Psychology. 
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Our research is being done through interviews and field observations of the participants’ 
actions (patients, interns and supervisors) when they are put in contact with different psycho-
logical services, following the many ways in which these subjects are formed through differ-
ent kinds of articulations. Our research makes use of some parameters of the ANT and PE: 
The participants are taken as experts on the topic, without any division between common 
and scientific knowledge; and, since they are considered experts, we ask them to describe 
their practices and experiences, as well as the clinical processes. In other words, we follow the 
actors and their descriptions of their actions (Latour, 2005, Chapter 7, part 1).
We have been observing supervision sessions (where the clinical cases were discussed by 
supervisors and interns)12 and interviewing patients, interns and professors-supervisors across 
clinical services of different orientations. We also attend to further actors in this scenario 
such as the architecture of the building, the laws that regulate internship, the rooms where 
the sessions are held and so on. A base questionnaire works as a general script, allowing an 
open space for the hints and indications of the participants. In order to prevent the questions 
from being seen as a test of knowledge, we often ask the participants to share their thoughts 
about what they consider to be the best research topic for a group studying the DPA to pur-
sue (as proposed by Despret, 2011b). In this way, we expect that the participants can assume 
a position of expertise that can favour a more recalcitrant effect. One of the objectives we 
are pursuing with this research is to understand how the negotiation of meanings between 
such different lines of thought with different parameters can happen in this common space. 
Latour (1999), when speaking about the creation of scientific concepts, coined the concept 
of ‘immutable mobiles,’ which allow ‘new translations and articulations, while keeping some 
forms of relationships intact.’  Generally in psychological technical devices, we point out 
that, unlike other sciences and technics, there would be several ‘mutable immobiles’ (Ferreira 
et al., 2013); they are immobile because they are restricted to a certain orientation, and mu-
table thanks to their potency for producing different subjectivities in connection with their 
sociotechnical arrangement.13 In other words, there is the unlikely possibility of articulation 
between different psychological orientations in the DAP, which leads us to suspect that this 
set of practices is much better characterised by plurality than by multiplicity in Law’s (2002) 
terms.
We have searched for a point in which these practices connect and articulate concepts and 
experiences between interns and patients or even the circulation of the last between different 
therapies. What we observed is that there is no form of contact that can guarantee even the 
slightest articulation as multiplicity: The interns are not allowed to discuss the cases during 
triage and, even though the various teams are open to the circulation of patients from team to 
team (as they claim in the interviews), this rarely occurs (according to the same interviews). 
How does this state of plurality engender processes that produce subjectivity? We can inves-
tigate this both from the perspectives of the interns and of the patients.
On the intern-therapist’s side, much of their education consists in the constant criticism 
of other orientations; it is almost as if part of the pedagogy of becoming a psychologist of a 
certain school was to accept its share of criticism against the other schools. This is in line with 
Foucault’s (1994) claim that psychology grows by denouncing the myths of other orientations 
(concerning the duration and focus of therapies as well as the concepts of the orientations). 
An interesting effect of subjectivation (Ferreira, 2013) takes place when an intern inhabits 
more than one orientation: For instance, there was an intern working in a psychoanalysis 
team who reported having worked in a CBT research group. Even if she wasn’t constrained 
in a more problematic way, she reported a series of daily acts of prejudice, involving stereo-
typed views of both orientations: Of CBT as a practice of self-help and of psychoanalysis 
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as linked to the question of sexuality or to severe abnormalities. She even reported being 
questioned for having both of those experiences on her CV. This leads us to the conclusion 
that the obstacles to the circulation and composition of a common world across different psy-
chological orientations can be radical to the point of it being impossible for them to inhabit 
the same professional career or the same body. A process like one of purging (of the former 
practices) and of conversion (to the new ones) would seem to be necessary.
This question of plurality does not affect the patients when it comes to defining an 
identity: The association with a group that manages a specific therapeutic practice isn’t 
an issue for them. Likewise, their processes of subjectivation are not limited to transfor-
mations in the therapeutic practices: Patients link therapy to very diverse practices in 
very active ways.14 We can define patients in various ways, but not as passive and patient 
creatures. When analysing the interviews, rather than classifying the practices of a given 
orientation as either extortive or as favouring recalcitrance, we found a series of clues in 
the uses that patients made of the therapies that pointed to specific techniques of the self. 
These manifested themselves in attitudes of problematisation of the self and instances 
of collective life – such as prejudice, stereotypes and subliminal messages – which led 
to rather peculiar exercises, such as the constitution of diaries and the appropriation of 
therapists’ discourses.
Rather than simply classifying the clinical practices as producing docility or as open to 
recalcitrance, we tried to use those concepts to assess the openness that research itself can 
operate in relation to recalcitrant discourses, acting on modes of subjectivity production. In 
this sense, reflecting on our practices should be constant. We have here intended this practice 
of becoming unfamiliar with ourselves to involve both the act of researching itself and the 
revision of concepts (such as the boundary between docility and recalcitrance). In this way, 
we can ask ourselves how mutually exclusive, when it comes to the modes of articulation, 
recalcitrance and docility are. 
A short answer
This chapter offers a way of exploring in an ANT fashion some devices of the Psy-sciences, 
considering the third and the fourth approaches of subjectivity proposed by Latour with 
some methodological reflections of other ANT (Mol and Law) and PE authors (Stengers and 
 Despret). Promoted also by some researchers of Ibero-American countries (An interesting 
map in Ferreira & Carrasco, 2017), this approach can, from a southern perspective (Santos, 
2014; see also Rosa, this volume), foster new perspectives for studying the production of 
subjectivities, similar to what ANT did for research into the modes of production of realities. 
Only the polyphony of the field, in my view, can expand our versions of subjectivity.
Notes
 1 While Science in Action (Latour, 1989) is clearly a textbook, We have never been modern (Latour, 1991) 
contains deeper philosophical and historical debate. Pétite Réflexion sur le Culte Moderne des Dieux 
Faitiches (Latour, 1996) is halfway between being textbooks and being works in which he develops 
his views conceptually.
 2 In the final chapters of Pandora’s Hope (1999), Latour gestures at the idea that the division between 
science and politics began in the debate between Socrates and Callicles.
 3 Wordplay: in French, faitishes results from joining together fait (fact) and fétiche (fetish).
 4 Here, the argument is that the modern divide of nature and culture would not stop the prolifer-
ation of hybrids and factishes, but, quite on the contrary, the modern constitution leads to their 
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unaccountable multiplication and extension. We have never been modern (Latour, 1991) gives us a 
lot of examples such as the Green Parties or the Carbon debate.
 5 For the differences between views and versions, see Despret (1999) and Latour (2004), especially 
concerning the principle of generalisation in Political Epistemology. For the question of influence 
and its conviction in Modernity for being a kind of cure that happens for bad reasons, see Stengers 
(1992a).
 6 This matter has had a strong presence in the Iberian-Latin American literature (see Ferreira and 
Carrasco, 2017).
 7 In that case, there is a descriptive activity, which consists in following the actors (2005) instead of 
focusing only on criticising, as Latour himself seems to do in most of his texts about subjectivity.
 8 A further virtue of that paper is that in it, Latour makes his proximity to Political Epistemology 
clear by providing a list of its ten guiding principles (such as the generalisation, the risk and the 
recalcitrance principles).
 9 Perhaps some references need to be done to some medical-psychiatric social versions of alcoholism 
in Law (2004, Chapter 5).
 10 John Law (2004, pp. 24–26) considers Euro-American metaphysics as the common assumptions of 
the major modes of scientific knowledge, such as the precedence and independence of the reality to 
be represented, besides its definability, singularity and universality.
 11 In this book, Hans, le cheval qui savait compter, Despret (2004) notes that this change in the experi-
mental designs can be observed in a specific laboratory where a researcher (Pfungst) tries to analyse 
the real ability of a horse (Hans) to make complex mathematical calculations. Suspecting that most 
of the horse’s correct responses were due its ability to react to human expressions (supposedly 
present when the horse was reaching the result by tapping his foot on the floor), Pfungst decided 
to investigate by introducing in the experiment a person that did not herself know the question 
proposed.
 12 Supervision sessions are weekly meetings between supervisors and interns aiming to discuss the 
cases conducted by the latter. Their function is not only to improve the approach of the cases, but 
mainly to train the students in clinical practices.
 13 This use is in some sense similar to Guggenheim’s (2009) analyses of buildings.
 14 This is similar to what Foucault (1995) calls techniques of the self.
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The rise of maintenance and repair studies
In ‘Power, technology and the phenomenology of conventions: on being allergic to  onions,’ 
Star (1991) recalls how science and technology studies helped reconsider the question of 
power in social science. One of the main outcomes of STS, she states, is that they demonstrate 
that both science and technology are what Latour (1987) called ‘politics by other means.’ 
Identifying the contributions of different streams of research and the more or less passionate 
disputes that arose between them, Star specifically highlights the weaknesses and the gaps of 
ANT-oriented accounts. Most of those, she claims, following Haraway (1991) and Fujimura 
(1991), are a matter of standpoints. While Callon, Law and Latour, among others, aim to 
open the black boxes of facts and artefacts in order to describe hitherto invisible processes, 
they stand – and remain – on the side of the ‘winners’: Those whose translations and intéresse-
ments are successful, and those who delegate and discipline. ANT scholars don’t devote many 
words, if any at all, to those who are translated, disciplined and delegated to. This is highly 
problematic, Star argues: Not only are the experiences of the latter worth examination in 
order to study ‘politics by other means,’ but the place of these ‘losers’ and their own invisible 
work are crucial to the very stability of the networks in which they participate. To illustrate 
her point, Star returns to Latour’s famous ‘sociology of a door-closer’ (Latour, 1988) and 
dwells on one of his sentences:
As a technologist, I could claim that, provided you put aside maintenance and the few 
sectors of population that are discriminated against, the groom does it job well, closing 
the door behind you constantly, firmly and slowly.
(Latour, 1988, p. 302)
To that hypothetical statement, Star retorts that:
There is no analytic reason to put aside maintenance and the few sectors of population that are 
discriminated against, in fact, every reason not to.
(Star, 1991, p. 42, my highlights)
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During the two decades that followed the publication of Star’s paper, numerous works in 
STS have enriched the critique of ANT, thanks notably to feminist scholars. ANT ‘itself ’ has 
evolved, and its most well-known contributors have taken some of these recriminations into 
consideration (Latour, 2005; Law & Hassard, 1999). Yet, most of these critiques and adjust-
ments have echoed only the second part of Star’s statement. It’s first half has long been ignored, 
with maintenance remaining an obscure, largely unexplored domain. Recently, however, a 
body of academic work on maintenance and repair has been rapidly growing, providing 
important contributions to science and technology studies by shifting the attention from the 
processes of ‘form-giving’ to those of ‘form-keeping’ in Ingold’s terms (Ingold, 2013).
Even though Akrich (1993), Orr (1996) and de Laet and Mol (2000) have paved the way, it 
is undoubtedly the contributions of Henke (2000) and Graham and Thrift (2007) that set the 
agenda2 of what we can call today ‘maintenance and repair studies.’ In these seminal papers, 
the three authors shape the problematisation of maintenance and repair, building on Goffman’s 
work on ‘backstage’ activities and the vulnerability of social interaction ( Goffman, 1959), and on 
the ethnomethodological analysis of ‘repair’ in conversation ( Schegloff,  Jefferson & Sacks, 1977). 
Their demonstration is straightforward: If social order is constantly maintained by generally 
unnoticed gestures during interaction, we should also investigate the operations that daily shape 
and preserve material order. Whether accomplished by dedicated workers or lay persons, made 
on huge technological systems or small objects, these operations, which are ‘the main means 
by which the constant decay of the world is held off’ (Graham & Thrift, 2007, p. 1), are indeed 
countless. Their close and careful examination should, therefore, considerably help refine and 
strengthen our understanding of the role of objects and technology in the very constitution 
and continuation of modern societies. This is what Edgerton, another pioneering scholar on 
the subject, please for in his book The Shock of the Old, a chapter of which is entirely devoted to 
maintenance. Maintenance and repair, he states, though particularly difficult to grasp, are essen-
tial dimensions of the global history of technology (Edgerton, 2006, p. 75–102).
Since these early appeals, maintenance and repair have been of growing interest in  various 
areas of research, and more and more scholars have brought to light an incredible vari-
ety of hitherto neglected objects and practices. In the last years, studies have documented 
 maintenance and repair activities in ICTs (Cállen & Sánchez Criado, 2015; Houston & 
 Jackson, 2016; Jackson, Pompe & Krieshok, 2012; Rosner & Ames, 2014), Arts (Domínguez 
 Rubio, 2016), large infrastructures (Barnes, 2017; Ureta, 2014), software and information 
systems (Cohn, 2019; Fidler & Russel, 2018), urban settings (Denis & Pontille, 2014, 2019; 
Strebel, 2011), legacy buildings and heritage sites (Edensor, 2011; Jones & Yarrow, 2013), 
domestic consumption (Gregson, Metcalfe & Crewe, 2009; Rosner, 2013) and even corpse 
preservation (Yurchak, 2015). In the following sections, I propose to give hints on these 
emerging maintenance and repair studies by articulating, beyond their variety, two of their 
main contributions. First, I’ll show that maintenance and repair studies help reconsider an 
old legacy of ANT: The opposition between breakdown (crisis, controversy) and routine 
( taken-for-grantedness). Second, I will suggest that these studies renew the way matter (or 
‘materiality’) is generally treated in ANT accounts, namely as ‘that which resists.’
Before breakdown, beyond closure
Most researchers investigating maintenance and repair are wary of what Edgerton calls 
‘ innovation-centric accounts’ (Edgerton, 2006, p. xi). They aim instead to produce more bal-
anced depictions through the (re)discovery of the people, workers and users who participate 
in the daily life of technologies, long after their invention. Maintenance and repair studies 
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thus append a constantly expanding gallery of portraits to the figure of the lonely innovator. 
Withdrawing from the innovation-centric approach by exploring maintenance and repair 
activities also helps to widen the understanding of objects themselves. Things that are main-
tained and repaired are far from what Jackson calls the ‘bright and shiny tools’ ( Jackson, 2014, 
p. 227) that innovation-centric accounts exclusively focus on, and that studies of technology 
generally stage. As Domìnguez Rubio (2016) reminds us, the brand-new, perfectly shaped 
and fully functional objects some scholars seem to have in mind when they insist on material 
agency are sparse in our daily lives. We rarely deal with pristine artefacts. Rather, we use and 
live surrounded by countless things that age more or less dramatically. Actually, technologies 
usually live a long life, even the most complex ones: Ships, airplanes, cars (Edgerton, 2006), 
urban infrastructures (Graham, 2010), software (Cohn, 2019)… Yet, long-lasting objects are 
neglected in innovation-centric accounts, and in most STS reflections. So are the manifold 
operations, from routine maintenance to exceptional repair, that take part in the durability of 
these objects. Maintenance and repair studies aim at bringing this unseen territory to the fore.
In doing so, these studies also encourage reconsideration of ANT’s traditional approach to 
what appears to be the opposite side of brightness and sheen: breakdown. Since ANT’s incep-
tion, breakdown has played a crucial role in what we can call its Heideggarian posture. This 
posture distinguishes two conditions for technologies. The first one is characterised by ordi-
nariness and describes a technology ‘ready at hand’ in the sense of Heidegger (Verbeek, 2006), 
that is taken for granted. Used without being questioned, artefacts here function as ‘black 
boxes’: Stable objects whose composition is mostly unknown. It is this very mundaneness 
that gives power to technologies, most ANT accounts argue. Since nobody knows what these 
artefacts are made of, the decisions and the assumptions that are inscribed in them become 
naturalised. Automation, routine and mundane uses are the ‘other means’ of politics here. But 
such a peaceful state is problematic for scholars who, under such conditions, cannot grasp the 
political and moral dimensions of technologies. In order to reveal these dimensions, ANT and 
most STS scholars claim, one has to find the moments when technologies become ‘present at 
hand,’ that is debated, discussed and problematised anew. Accidents, controversies and breaks 
are typical of these moments: They are occasions of breakdown that shatter black boxes, in-
terrupt any taken-for-grantedness and bring numerous hitherto invisible components to light. 
Breakdown, in contrast to routine, brings the sociotechnical depth of technologies into light.
To call this binary reading of technology into question is one of the main contributions of 
maintenance and repair studies. Indeed, studying maintenance and repair practices precisely 
consists in paying attention to all the overlooked situations that take place in the interstices 
of routine and breakdown, situations in which technologies are never completely functional 
and never completely broken:
It is in this space between breakdown and restoration of the practical equilibrium— 
between the visible (that is, ‘broken’) tool and the concealed tool—that repair and main-
tenance make its bid for significance.
(Graham & Thrift, 2007, p. 3)
This has important consequences, for instance, for the way in which infrastructures can be 
questioned and analysed beyond the rhetoric of great catastrophes and collapses. The master 
narratives that focus attention towards the threats of disasters actually obscure the way infra-
structures work on a daily basis. Yet, their mundane mode of existence is less characterised 
by the risks of technological apocalypse than by ‘a vast and hidden economy of repair and 
maintenance … continually at work’ (Graham, 2010, p. 10).
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Investigating things in such intermediary states inherently leads us to reconsider another 
early ANT bedrock: the widespread metaphor of closure. Even at rest, artefacts are not as 
sealed and as stable as they may appear, maintenance and repair studies show. The ability for 
technologies to remain the same and to be taken for granted by most of their users requires 
a constant work that such terms as ‘black box’ or ‘immutable mobiles’ seriously understate.
Studying dwelling maintenance, for example, Strebel (2011) coins the notion of ‘living 
building’ to highlight the mundane life of edifices, daily punctuated with repair and main-
tenance operations: 
The living building is another kind of architectural drama, one that is performed in 
and through the successive scenes of interruptions, troubles and disturbances that con-
cierges continually encounter and the ways they solve these problems in order to keep 
the building going.
(p. 259)
The interruptions and troubles Strebel describes remind us that, for some people and in 
some situations, even the apparently most stable artefacts cannot be totally taken for granted. 
Maintenance work engages certain people in very specific relationships with objects that 
hinder complete closure and opacity.
Exploring maintenance and repair also leads us to discover forms of troubles and malfunc-
tioning that are not always, and not by everybody, considered as breakdowns. This is particularly 
visible in situations where specialised maintenance workers take care of artefacts that users are 
supposed to enjoy as if they were always available and functioning. The taken-for- grantedness 
these users can rely on is the result of the ceaseless attention and intervention of maintenance 
workers. The mission of the latter is to detect breaches and flaws before any breakdown can be 
experienced by the former (Denis & Pontille, 2015). Mentioning the different relationships a 
railroad engineer and a passenger have with rails, Star explains that ‘one person’s infrastruc-
ture is another’s topic, or difficulty’ (Star, 1999, p. 380). In a similar manner, maintenance 
and repair studies show that, in many situations, one person’s breakdown, or ‘repairable’ in 
 ethnomethodogy’s terms (Schegloff, Jefferson & Sacks, 1977), is another’s mundane functioning.
More generally, these studies also show that breakdown is not necessarily a clearly iden-
tifiable event. Rosner and Ames’ comparative research on the ‘One Laptop Per Child’ op-
eration in Paraguay and the Fixit Community in California foregrounds, for instance, the 
relationality of breakage, which is not a universal, univocal thing that happens to objects. 
Rosner and Ames (2014) demonstrate that both in Paraguay and in California, ‘definitions of 
breakdown lay on a continuum’ (p. 328). Similarly, Cállen and Sánchez Criado (2015) insist 
on the repeated trials and tests that allow the various menders they observed to gauge the 
flaws and fragilities of objects that are not clearly broken: 
Despite the fact that vulnerability is in many practical situations easy to identify – such as 
when a clear breakage happens while using something, after an accident or as a result of 
a disaster – it usually emerges out as part of an ongoing process of sensing and practical 
manipulation, hardly ever recognised at first glance.
(p. 22)
These accounts of neither fully functioning nor definitely broken technologies resonate 
with de Laet and Mol’s description of the Zimbabwe Bush Pump, the breakdown of which, 
they show, is nothing but an ‘intermediate stage’ (de Laet & Mol, 2000, p. 240). In fact, in 
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numerous situations, the endurance of objects is negotiated (Cohn, 2019; Rosner & Ames, 
2014), and overly limited definitions of breakdown are contested.
What is at stake, therefore, is not only the reconsideration of breakdown, but also of stabil-
ity and order itself, as relational phenomena that draw on and are inscribed in specific repair 
and maintenance activities.
Rethinking matter: fragility and material ecology
Another important contribution of maintenance and repair studies consists in providing a 
particularly distinctive look at objects and their role in modern societies. Following ANT, 
maintenance and repair scholars refuse to reduce artefacts to signs or receptacles of external 
social forces (Latour, 1996). Yet, their extensive forays into the material dimensions of the 
world lead to unprecedented depictions, and prompt a decentring of the investigation of 
matter and materiality beyond the sole figure of immutability. Inspired by Mol (2008) and 
Puig de la Bellacasa (2011), several works have notably highlighted the relationships between 
maintenance, repair and care (Denis & Pontille, 2015; Houston & Jackson, 2016; Jackson, 
2014). As care, maintenance and repair practices indeed take decay and vulnerability as a 
starting point. Fragility is here the primary – ‘normal’ – property of matter. Everything has, 
in a way or another, to be taken care of. 
Such a stance markedly contrasts with how objects’ agency is problematised in most 
ANT-inspired works, which have typically focused on solidity, resistance and permanence. 
If artefacts’ abilities to shape our world are to be questioned, maintenance and repair studies 
claim, they also have to be investigated in the most mundane situations, including those in 
which these abilities appear uncertain, even failing. In other terms, maintenance and repair 
bring to light an overlooked side of objects that scholars interested in understanding material 
agency should not ignore.
During my own investigation on subway signs design in Paris (Denis & Pontille, 2014; 
2015), I experienced such a revelation. I started my research following the lead of standard-
isation, eager to understand the genesis of the Parisian wayfinding system. At first, in an 
early ANT fashion, I recognised an ordering process, in which a new set of omnipresent and 
standardised signs had been given a crucial role. Yet, once I entered the maintenance depart-
ment and encountered the maintenance workers, I discovered a completely different aspect 
of the mode of existence of these seemingly immutable and immobile signs, and was forced 
to seriously reconsider the way I had analysed the whole ordering process. Shadowing several 
maintenance runs, I progressively understood that the standardisation, stability and perma-
nence of the set of signs actually drew on a constant care, a daily attention to the numerous 
mutations the signboards were subject to (wear, moisture, rust, strokes, thefts…). The signs 
were thus materially fragile and their strength was enacted by a daily maintenance work.
In his study of conservation of the Saint Anne Church in Manchester, Edensor (2011) in-
vestigated the ‘materiality’ of the stone, a solid entity par excellence that one might consider as 
the most immutable thing to be. Edensor explains that in the eyes and hands of the workers 
who strive for historical authenticity, Saint Anne’s stone presents, on the contrary, unstable 
properties that vary over time. Far from being inert and impervious to its environment, the 
stone is subject to numerous deteriorations (i.e. discoloration, crumbling, cracking…) that 
challenge not only the aesthetic characteristics of the legacy building, but its very permanence.
Besides putting fragility to the fore and thus widening the understanding of material 
agency, maintenance and repair studies also directly echo Ingold’s call for exploring the ma-
terial heterogeneity of objects, technologies and infrastructures. Ingold writes, 
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it is as though our material involvement begins only when the stucco has already hard-
ened on the house front or the ink already dried on the page. We see the building and 
not the plaster of its walls, the words and not the ink with which they were written. In 
reality, of course, the materials are still there and continue to mingle and react as they 
have always done, forever threatening the things they comprise with dissolution or even 
‘dematerialization’.
(Ingold, 2007, p. 9–10)
If meticulously observed, activities such as mending, restoring, up-keeping, fixing or pre-
serving offer manifold occasions to fathom the material ecology that is hidden when objects 
are apprehended as crystallised artefacts. These activities precisely deal with the crumbling 
plaster, the ink and more generally the way materials interact long after the processes of 
‘form-giving’ (Ingold, 2013). Repair and maintenance operations bring to light the material 
‘intra-actions,’ a term that Barad (2003) uses to characterise the kinds of material transfor-
mations that do not imply the encounter of previously recognisable discrete components.
The workers in charge of preserving Saint Anne’s Church (Edensor, 2011) do not con-
sider the building as a unified and stabilised entity. On the contrary, they deal with it as an 
unsettled assemblage of partly unknown elements, constantly subject to external and internal 
disruptions. Materials have been added to the structure of the church over time (iron staples, 
mortar…), and their behaviours have important consequences on the building’s life. The 
quality of air, which has been changing over the years, is also critical to the church assem-
blage, as are ‘birds, bats, rodents, insects, bacteria, plants, fungus, lichen and moss’ (Edensor, 
2011, p. 242). Preserving a heritage building requires a considerable amount of work which 
largely consists in exploring this particularly complex and uncertain material ecology and 
tackling its challenges.
It is important to note, though, that maintenance and repair studies do not fully endorse 
Ingold’s normative stance: There is no such essentialist expressions as ‘in reality’ in their 
accounts. What maintenance and repair studies investigate are the situated enactments of the 
material properties of objects, through specific instruments, theories, gestures, skills, etc. Far 
from being the result of an academic interpretative work, the recognition that ‘the artefact 
is not a discrete entity but a material form bound into continual cycles of articulation and 
disarticulation’ (DeSilvey, 2006, p. 335) is always staged as a grounded and partial outcome 
of repair and maintenance practices themselves.
Notably, this means that the components of the material ecology are anything but a start-
ing point in repair and maintenance activities. There are no such things as an exhaustive list 
of relevant material properties or a stabilised body of knowledge that would provide a strict 
framework for handling the things that are to be taken care of. Repair and maintenance 
practices are exploratory and imply a great amount of improvisation (Henke, 2000; Orr, 
1996). This is telling in the contrasted cases of informal maintenance practices studied by 
Callén and Sánchez Criado (2015). The migrant waste pickers and the ‘hackers’ in collective 
repair workshops both engage in exploration processes. They progressively identify material 
properties and artefact vulnerability ‘through attentive and careful ‘tests’ on matter’ (p. 22) 
ranging from situated sensing and manipulating to informal experiments.
These material enactments obviously involve workers’ bodies. Making ‘matter speak’ 
(Sanne, 2010) and ‘listening’ to it are embodied processes. Dant (2008; 2010) has regu-
larly emphasised the importance of perception in maintenance and repair. He showed that 
mechanics who repair cars engage in a continuous interaction with matter, as they try to 
appraise the composition and condition of objects, not only touching, hearing and smelling 
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(and sometimes tasting) them, but also configuring a convenient ‘manipulatory zone’ through 
their displacements (Dant, 2005). As one may imagine, such embodied explorations are far 
from always being gratifying and safe, and maintenance and repair activities should not be 
over-romanticised. Besides dealing with dirt (Dant & Bowles, 2003; Shaw, 2014), disassem-
bling objects and exploring matter sometimes put workers’ health at risk, especially when 
their activities take place in countries with fewer safety regulations (Gregson, 2011).
It is worth adding though that the interest in perception and embodied practices in main-
tenance and repair studies does not aim to revive any body/matter dualism. Neither bodies 
nor knowledge are isolated from an alleged external environment in this work. In his pi-
oneering paper, Henke, for instance, describes the body of repair workers as a ‘networked 
body’ to emphasise the material and cognitive interdependencies of repair work:
…in fact, it may be more appropriate to say that a given worker’s body is ‘networked’ 
through performances of skilled repair. This does not mean, of course, that the body 
does not learn, but rather that the interaction of body and setting is the crucial relation-
ship to understand repair.
(Henke, 2000, p. 63–64)
Hence, human bodies are fully part of the material ecology that maintenance and repair 
activities assemble in situ.
Several works in maintenance and repair studies also insist on the organisational and 
geographical distribution of activities (Edensor, 2011; Jackson, Pompe & Krieshok, 2012; 
Domínguez Rubio, 2014). Repairing mobile phones in the workshops of downtown 
 Kampala, for instance, is not as local an activity as it may seem. It is framed by different 
authorisation regimes that shape specific dependencies with manufacturers and network pro-
viders and involve:
a complex global and local flows that sustain repair work, ranging from forms of local 
collaboration (though also competition) that connect technicians (…) to the wider dis-
tributions of knowledge, expertise and material resources to be found in the tools and 
online resources that local repair workers regularly draw on in tackling the breakdowns 
they confront.
(Houston & Jackson, 2016, p. 8)
In addition to the sometimes chaotic material ecology of workshops, thus, ‘an ecology of tool 
developers, who sometimes hack each other’s devices in the pursuit of unlocking algorithms’ 
(Houston & Jackson, 2016, p. 9), is at play. The extended view Houston and Jackson provide 
on mobile phone repair greatly illustrates how maintenance and repair studies help explore 
the multiple ‘entangled agencies’ (Edensor, 2011) that characterise the life of objects, way 
beyond the divide between alleged ‘human’ and ‘non-human’ agencies and the obsession 
around sturdiness and immutability.
Conclusions
Let me gather the contributions of maintenance and repair studies I underlined here with 
a quick summary of a case Domìnguez Rubio has been investigating during his research 
on contemporary art conservation (Domínguez Rubio, 2014). Certain ‘unruly’ artworks, 
Domìnguez Rubio explains, can be particularly challenging for Museums in their
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ongoing effort to control the unrelenting process of physical degradation that threatens 
to undermine the specific relationship between material form and intention that defines 
artworks as meaningful and valuable objects.
(p. 620)
This is the case of Nam June Paik’s ‘Untitled,’ in the Museum of Modern Art (MoMA) in 
New York. The original technologies this installation was based on (U-Matic desks, CRT mon-
itors, analogic cameras…) progressively became obsolete and its conservation involved the re-
placement of several of its components. As long as he lived, the artist supervised and validated all 
of these delicate ‘updates’ but when he died, the MoMa faced uncertainties and dilemmas. How 
could the team of curators and conservators decide to replace a piece without endangering the 
authenticity of the artwork? How far should the maintenance of the oldest technologies go? What 
Domìngez Rubio shows is that the discussions and negotiations deployed to tackle these issues 
not only have consequences on the material and symbolic composition of the artwork itself, but 
also transform the organisation of the museum, modifying the hierarchies between curators and 
conservators and expanding this traditional landscape to encompass new actors (including com-
puter scientists and audiovisual experts). From the standpoint of its continuous preservation, Nam 
June Paik’s ‘Untitled’ thus appears as a vulnerable artefact never completely broken, but never opaque nor 
taken for granted for its various caretakers, who constantly explore the uncertain material ecology in 
which it takes part in order to enact, again and again, its stability and authenticity.
The body of work that I have assembled here under the probably-too-fashionable ex-
pression of ‘maintenance and repair studies’ is, of course, heterogeneous and does not offer 
a coherent set of empirical results and theoretical developments. Yet, it does account for a 
certain sensibility, an ‘ethos of care’ (Puig de la Bellacasa, 2011) that directly echoes Star’s 
call for taking the neglected entities of sociotechnical assemblages into account (Star, 1991). 
Moreover, the issues these ‘studies’ raise go way further the questions I isolated in this  chapter 
in order to underline their contributions to the so-called ‘post-ANT’ landscape. What should 
be kept in mind is that they raise the curtain on what appears to be a vast continent of people, 
objects, sites and practices that, although familiar and mostly accessible, remained unnoticed 
and unexplored for decades. Considering the variety of objects and situations these first 
works scrutinise and the richness of their analysis, there are a few doubts that we are just at 
the beginning of a long-lasting trend that will lead to more exciting discoveries.
Besides this empirical variety, it is also important to recognise the theoretical potential of 
maintenance and repair studies, each of their explorations offering an occasion to document 
original ways of enacting order, identity and authenticity, but also inviting us to denaturalise 
the relationship between maintenance and order. Whilst one may think that maintaining ob-
jects or infrastructures always amounts to bringing things back to order, we saw here that things 
are not so simple. First, studying maintenance and repair directs attention to the relationality of 
order (if an order is repaired or maintained, which one is it, from which standpoint?). Second, 
certain forms of maintenance have less to do with order than with precariousness and the life 
that emerges in the interstices (or the ruins) of innovation and even capitalism (Tsing, 2015).
Maintenance and repair studies also bring ways to unfold and discover power relations 
from the starting point of the various object ontologies that are enacted in distinct regimes of 
maintenance, from generalised care to organised non-repairability (Denis & Pontille, 2017). 
They thus pursue the ontological inquiry that ANT instigated in social sciences, by collect-
ing and describing hitherto unexplored situations in which the question ‘what is (and remain) 
an object?’ is practically addressed.
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Notes
 1 The author-in-the-text is David J. Denis, whereas the author-in-the-flesh is twofold: Jérôme Denis 
and David Pontille. Since the end of the 1990s, we have used the attachment of our two civil names 
as a way ‘to diffract’ our own authorship, following Haraway (1996), and to disrupt the emphasis of 
single individuals performed by most of research assessment frameworks. As the editors of the ANT 
Companion were concerned with two different chapters bearing the same name(s), we created a 
fictional author as a way to pursue the diffraction process. Such a gesture is perfectly in line with 
the semiotic foundation of ANT (see the second footnote in Latour, 1988), which both insisted on 
the generative process of writing practices that bring new entities to existence and participate in 
their maintenance. See also Jérôme D. Pontille’s chapter in this volume.
 2 Brand’s book How building learn (1994) should also be mentioned. Although not academic, it has 
inspired early research on maintenance.
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If the situatedness of knowledge and practice has always been a key actor-network theory 
tenet, and if ANT refuses to accept scales of ‘local’ and ‘global,’ ‘micro’ and ‘macro,’ as pre-
given and static, then these insights may also profitably be turned back on ANT itself. What 
specific sites and scales of exploration and inquiry is ANT itself committed to; and how, in 
turn, do such specific sites and scales make a difference to ANT’s own predilections and prop-
ositions? If the previous section commenced a journey outwards and away (as it were) from the 
laboratories and (other) testing grounds of science and technology, then the present section is 
meant to continue and attenuate that journey. Here, we invited authors to attend specifically 
to the question of how moving through divergent sites and scales of practice and assem-
blage, and taking their spatio-temporal specificities seriously, may work to both challenge and 
change ANT, sometimes in unforeseen and perhaps at times even troublesome ways.
Given the unboundedness of these very notions (site, scale), it comes as no surprise to 
note that such an endeavour amounts to a double-edged challenge: To question and rethink 
ANT’s own sites and scales are also, simultaneously, to question and rethink the centrality 
taken on by specific versions of these notions in ANT itself. Here, the terms may be said to 
bear family resemblance to the notion of ‘context’ so famously and vehemently cast aside by 
ANT (‘context stinks!’ as Latour once quoted architect Rem Koolhaas). However, just as this 
was hardly the last word on architecture’s sites (viz. Yaneva and Mommersteeg’s contribution 
to this section), neither ‘context’ nor ‘site’ or ‘scale’ shows any propensity to disappear as 
empirical, methodological and conceptual challenges anytime soon, in ANT or elsewhere. 
Better, then, to address them head-on and with a view to their (self-)implications for ANT. 
Based in part on his own ANT-informed inquiries into the contemporary stakes of poli-
tics, Endre Dányi sets the section off by discussing a tangible and symbolically loaded build-
ing type of equal importance to (so-called) political modernity as that of the laboratory: the 
parliament. Are parliaments, he asks, still privileged sites for studying politics and liberal 
democracy, particularly once politics is taken as a form of practice and a set of problems in 
the ANT vein? Drawing on Brian Rotman, Dányi proposes to think of parliaments not 
only as sites but also and importantly as ‘meta-sites,’ that is, as a set of organising logics that 
remain crucial to a whole range of contemporary practices, including within ANT’s own 
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imagination of politics. From here, he proceeds to sketch certain limits of parliamentary 
democracy as a mode of doing politics, calling for increased analytical and practical attention 
to the many ‘aboves’ and ‘belows’ of parliaments.
In their chapter, Albena Yaneva and Brett Mommersteeg continue this kind of analytical 
attention to a specific locus of practice, yet with a twist: This time around, as noted, the 
inquiry concerns the very ‘becoming’ of sites as built-up and inhabited locales in and via 
the expert practice of architecture. Having questioned the way architectural theory (and 
practice) tends to parcel up ‘the site’ in recognisably dualistic ways, as either (too) ‘objective’ 
or (too) ‘subjective,’ the authors proceed to sketch an alternative reading of what they term 
the movement of site-ing in architectural practice. It is in and through this movement, they 
show, that not only a new building but also and simultaneously its very site or location, with 
its specific relations and dimensions of (urban) economy, politics, culture and materials, come 
into being and stabilise. Adding a further twist to this argument, Yaneva and Mommersteeg 
end by stressing the active role played also by the (ANT-informed) ethnographer in achiev-
ing such collective site-ing.
While he adopts a slightly different vocabulary, collective work of site-ing is also at play 
in Robert Oppenheim’s subsequent chapter, in which he explores the question of how the 
South Korean city of Kyŏngju helps ANT think place and scale. This very question, of 
course, presumes a backdrop of ethnographic engagement (itself sited and scaled, we might 
add). As an anthropologist working amidst wider political reconfigurations in 1990s South 
Korea, Oppenheim began studying a technical controversy on high-speed rail construction 
and the threats it had widely taken to pose to the historical and cultural city of Kyŏngju, once 
the country’s capital. For these purposes, the so-called post-ANT conceptions of multiplicity 
and topology proved helpful, as he details, in rethinking the very notions of place and scale. 
Adding further layers to this point, Oppenheim proposes in his chapter to draw on wider 
anthropological resources to study those ‘circulating normativities’ whereby scale-making 
efforts come to attain persuasive force.
Emerging from a kindred ethnographic commitment, only this time set amidst Paraguay’s 
vast and sprawling soybean fields, Kregg Hetherington’s chapter turns in part to the site of 
the courtroom to better understand how slow-moving environmental harms (sometimes) be-
come eventful political disruptions. In recounting the human story and legal case of  Silvino 
Talavero, a young boy killed from pesticide poisoning in the early 2000s, Hetherington 
discusses the fine line separating politics from ‘the uneventful’ in a situation of routinised 
poverty, ill health and silently accumulating environmental destruction. Here, he argues, the 
political theorising of Jacques Rancière, amongst others, supplements ANT’s own take on 
eventfulness in ways that help make sense of the lasting legacies of Talavero’s legal case. At 
times, Hetherington asserts, courts may amplify disruptions already underway, thus exercis-
ing their own scalar effects.
In the sections’ two final chapters, the notions of scale and site, respectively, may be said 
to reach a certain limit, or vanishing point, in ways that serve to question their utility as 
much as their ANT incarnations. Here, in her chapter, Kristin Asdal deploys her own work 
on the politics of nature(s), often set in the context of Norwegian parliamentary politics, to 
ask whether ANT is equally good at dealing with local, national and global natures. Beyond 
detecting the ‘trick-like’ character of the question itself (after all, when did ANT ever ac-
cept such scalar designations as ‘local’ and ‘global’?), Asdal places the discussion centrally on 
the territory of ‘Nature’ itself or, rather, the way ANT has come to translate this term as so 
many always local and specific imbroglios of non-humans with humans and technologies. 
In the face of Gaia and other ‘nature-wholes’ worked-out-there, she argues, we encounter 
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the challenge of respecifying the very sites where politics of nature is done, including that 
welter of bureaucratic offices, councils and (yes) parliaments, all of which are somewhat local, 
national and global at once.
If ‘Nature’ indeed proves difficult to scale, for the ANT analyst as for everyone else, then 
much the same might be said for ‘the digital,’ as the site (or ‘meta-site’?) picked up by Carolin 
Gerlitz and Esther Weltevrede in the sections’ final chapter. Here, drawing on their collec-
tive experiences in inventive research settings of digital method development, the authors 
ask what happens to ANT, and its telltale emphasis on the socio-material grounding of the 
social, in digital sociology? Digital sociology, they argue, works both as attention to techno-
logical media settings and a challenge to invent new digitally aware methods, and in doing 
so, it challenges ANT to move from simply ‘following the actor’ and into a more intricate 
terrain of having to reconfigure its own empirical apparatus via ‘interface methods.’ Using 
the example of bots and other devices of automation on Twitter, Gerlitz and Weltevrede 
conclude that not all digital relations are equally visible or traceable from the outset. As such, 
their intervention serves as a valuable reminder, relevant for the entire section (and indeed 
the companion volume as such), that what ends up as the sites and scales of ANT-informed 
inquiry is partly a matter of the method apparatus deployed.
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This chapter addresses the question in the title in three steps.1 In the first part, I present the 
key terms of the title – politics, parliaments and liberal democracy – more or less as they 
appear in the Actor-Network Theory (ANT) literature. In the second part, in order to high-
light a number of current developments that pose major challenges for both political theory 
and ANT, I discuss a set of complementary terms – people, problems and worlds – through 
snippets from my recent empirical work. Finally, I offer a tentative answer to the title’s ques-
tion, the aim of which – in the best of parliamentary fashions – is intended not to close down, 
but rather to generate further debate. 
Parliaments as sites and meta-sites
Politics
ANT has always been about politics (for a general overview, see Lezaun 2017; Michael 2016; 
for an explicit discussion on ANT and politics, see Harman 2014). From the outset, it has 
focused on how politics is being done ‘by other means’ – mostly by technical and scientific 
means that make it difficult to disagree, to resist or to develop alternatives. 
In such a short chapter as this one, it is not possible for me to provide a comprehensive 
overview, but here are a couple of vignettes that illustrate my opening statement. In his 
classic study of scallop farming, Michel Callon (1986) used an explicitly political vocabulary 
(problematisation, interessement, enrolment and mobilisation) to talk about technoscientific 
developments in France and Japan. In his historical analysis of the Portuguese colonisation of 
India, John Law (1986) examined how control-at-a-distance had been established through 
sailing vessels as miniature versions of a European model of governance. In his portrait of 
Louis Pasteur as a cunning stage manager, Bruno Latour (1988) described how laboratories 
participate in politics by connecting otherwise disparate places such as dairy farms and acad-
emies. And in a series of works on healthcare, Annemarie Mol (2002, 2008) has shown how 
multiple realities are being not only known but also done through material practices, opening 
up ontological politics as a new mode of engagement. 
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As these vignettes show, the central component of ANT’s politics – not unlike the politics 
of governmentality studies (Barry et al. 1996; Lemke 2016; Rose 1999) and feminist techno-
science (Haraway 1991; Suchman 2006) – has been to make visible the political aspects and 
consequences of seemingly apolitical practices (science, engineering, planning, but also market- 
making, to name a few). In doing so, ANT also makes such practices potentially alterable 
again via public forms of inquiry and contestation (Marres 2013).
Parliaments
Despite the political character of ANT, there has been relatively little work on explicitly 
political institutions and processes (although see Barry 2001). The term ‘parliament’ first 
entered the vocabulary of ANT as a metaphor: In We Have Never Been Modern, Bruno Latour 
(1993) talked about the ‘Parliament of Things’ as a scheme that might replace the Modern 
Constitution, that is, the cosmology associated with the West (mostly Europe and North 
America) based on the separation of Nature and Culture (see also Latour 2004a). The meta-
phor is very similar to Michel Serres’ (1990) ‘Natural Contract,’ which is a poetic and philo-
sophical reflection on the end of the Cold War and the changing role of the environment and 
other non-human entities in politics-to-come. 
In the 1990s, the ‘Parliament of Things’ as a metaphor generated a lot of interest, but it 
took quite a while until parliaments became actual sites and objects of ANT inquiries. The 
breakthrough was undoubtedly Bruno Latour and Peter Weibel’s (2005) Making Things Public 
exhibition and catalogue, which tried to do to legislatures what ANT scholars had done to 
laboratories: Open them up and examine them as sites and ‘meta-sites.’
I use the term ‘meta-site’ the way Brian Rotman (1987) used the term ‘meta-sign’ in his 
analysis of the semiotic status of ‘zero.’ He argued that ‘zero’ (introduced to European math-
ematics only in the 13th century) is not simply one sign among many, but also a sign that 
indicates the absence of all other signs, and as such stands both inside and outside the semiotic 
system it is associated with. In his wonderful book, Rotman went on to analyse the historical 
development of two similar meta-signs, the vanishing point in perspectival art in the 15th 
century and paper money in economic exchange in the 17th century, without which neither 
a European way of seeing nor a European way of doing business could have achieved its he-
gemonic status. In a similar vein, in my view, it makes perfect sense to consider the Western 
parliament, developed in the 19th century, as a ‘meta-sign’ or a ‘meta-site,’ that is, a set of 
organising logics that are constantly extended, transposed and inscribed into other places in 
order to regulate what may count as ‘good politics.’
Since Latour and Weibel’s exhibition, a couple of ANT-inspired works have further 
specified this line of inquiry. Here are some more vignettes: In her detailed historical and 
ethnographic work on the Assemblée Nationale, Delphine Gardey (2015) has analysed the 
workings of the French legislature quite literally as a political body, with very gendered 
characteristics. Based on archival work, Kristin Asdal has traced how various non-human 
bodies (such as whales) could enter the Norwegian Parliament as contested objects (Asdal 
2008; Asdal and Hobæk 2016). In my own work on the Hungarian National Assembly, I have 
examined how a 19th-century version of parliamentary democracy was reinvented and reap-
propriated after the collapse of state socialism (Dányi 2012; 2013). And in his research on the 
German Bundestag, Thomas Scheffer (2014) has extended his ANT-compatible ethnometh-
odological gaze to faction offices to show how bureaucrats and politicians are collectively 




In one way or another, the aforementioned vignettes elaborate what it means to call parlia-
ments the meta-sites of politics. By closely regulating the ways in which various political sites 
and moments may relate to each other, legislatures insist on the hegemonic status of parlia-
mentary democracy across national borders, and on different scales. This, however, does not 
imply that parliaments are the only places where politics happens. In fact, a strong argument 
in ANT has been that in order to understand the state of contemporary democracy, we need 
to move beyond standard political institutions. Michel Callon and his colleagues’ (2009) sug-
gestion, for instance, has been to concentrate on ‘hybrid forums.’ Bruno Latour (2007) and 
Noortje Marres (2007) have shifted focus to various publics that develop around concrete 
issues. John Law and Annemarie Mol (together with many colleagues, see Law & Mol 2008; 
Law & Singleton 2013; Law et al. 2014; Mol et al. 2010) have made important attempts to 
articulate ‘good politics’ in terms of care, rather than those of choice or conflict.
While these research directions have been clearly productive, in one way or another, 
they have all operated under the assumption that liberal democracy, unchallenged by other 
models of governance since the end of the Cold War, is here to stay (at least in Europe and 
North America – more on this below). This is not to say that ANT scholars have been un-
critical of liberal democratic politics; it just means that their critiques have been practised 
mostly against the background of liberal democracy (Latour 2004b; see also Brown 2009; 
Ezrahi 2012). Recent developments, however, suggest that this background is less robust 
than it seems: The cracks made visible by the Brexit referendum, the election of US president 
Donald Trump and the sustained support of Viktor Orbán’s vision of illiberal democracy, to 
name only the most obvious examples, have exposed the vulnerability not only of standard 
political institutions (including opinion polling companies and mainstream news media), but 
also of democratic politics as such. 
The limits of parliamentary democracy
If the aforementioned statement is right, then similar to the opening scene of An Inquiry into 
Modes of Existence (Latour 2013), where readers are asked to trust the institutions of science, 
rather than the indisputable certainty associated with science as such, we as ANT-inspired 
scholars might have to find new ways of engaging with the institutions of democratic poli-
tics without the sense of indisputable certainty that stems from 1989 as ‘the end of history’ 
(Fukuyama 1992). But how to do this? In the past couple of years, I have focused on a num-
ber of political developments that, instead of moving beyond parliaments, seek to advance 
practices that operate between the insides and the outsides of parliamentary politics. These 
practices, I argue, pose important challenges for political theory and ANT alike. Let me 
show what I mean through three examples.
People
In the ANT literature, there has been plenty of discussion about the importance of extend-
ing politics to non-humans – in a way, this is what the ‘Parliament of Things’ has been 
about (Braun & Whatmore 2007; Harman 2014). However, the ways in which humans and 
non-humans collectively constitute a demos – a ‘people’ in a political sense – have received 
much less attention. What the European refugee crisis (among other events) has shown is 
that, in addition to the problematisation of the non/human distinction in politics, it is crucial 
to examine who or what may be political, and how (Isin 2001).
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Antoine Hennion and his colleagues (2016) have engaged with a version of this question 
by carefully documenting the uses and the dismantling of the Calais refugee camp (also 
known as ‘the Jungle’), while Amade M’charek (2018) has drawn attention to the political 
significance of refugees’ bodies crossing the Mediterranean sea – both dead and alive. In a 
historical and ethnographic research I have conducted with Sebastian Abrahamson, the focus 
has been on a hunger strike that took place in Brussels in 2012 (Abrahamsson & Dányi 2019). 
More than three years before the outbreak of the European refugee crisis, that hunger strike 
was initiated by 23 sans-papiers from North Africa and the Middle East, who desperately 
wanted to get work permits, but who – without any documents – stood no chance to find 
their way in the labyrinth of Belgian bureaucracy.
The hunger strike lasted for more than a hundred days, and – despite wide coverage in the 
media and strong support by many Belgian citizens and international activist groups – ended 
without any tangible results. Still, in a political sense, it would be a mistake to call it a failure. 
From a parliamentary perspective, the hunger strikers were humans, but not political beings. 
And yet, there they were, in the symbolic capital of Europe, doing politics without uttering 
a word. As their silent bodies were getting weaker and weaker, the standard vocabulary asso-
ciated with democratic politics, based on the distinction between zoē and bios (bare life and 
politically qualified life – see Agamben 1998), was becoming less and less useful. Such di-
chotomies as us/them, activity/passivity, strength/weakness pointed at the limits not only of 
political theory, but also of ANT’s relatively narrow understanding of what it is for humans 
and non-humans to be political, epitomised by such terms as ‘interressement’ (Callon 1986) 
or ‘trials of strength’ (Latour 1988).
Problems
In a democratic context, ANT appears much better suited to talk about the objects than the 
subjects of politics. Sometimes, these objects have been referred to as issues (Marres 2007), 
other times as matters of concern (Latour 2008). Here, I call them problems, partly because it 
is more common to talk about the making of such objects as problematisation (Callon 1986; 
Foucault 1984), and partly because it is easier to recognise parts of democratic politics as sets 
of institutions and processes organised around specific problems. 
In ANT – and in Science and Technology Studies (STS) in general – such sets of insti-
tutions and processes tend to be discussed in terms of policy (see Gill et al. 2017; Gomart & 
Hajer 2003). Indeed, it is possible to say that policies are materialised ways of knowing 
and handling problems that mobilise particular assemblages (Ureta 2015). A good example 
is drug use as a characteristically modern problem (see Courtwright 2001; Schivelbusch 
1993). In the European Union, drugs have been repeatedly on the agenda of national par-
liaments, but since the early 1990s, there have also been considerable efforts to know and 
handle drug use as a European problem. Perhaps the most important outcome of those efforts 
was the establishment of the European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction 
( EMCDDA) – an EU agency based in Lisbon. 
As part of my research on problematisation processes, in 2015, I attended a workshop or-
ganised by the EMCDDA, where I had the chance to learn more about the complex ways in 
which ‘Europe’ has been performed into being (partly) through statistical data associated with 
drug use (Dányi 2018 – for a similar argument in a different domain, see Laurent 2017). With 
various ANT references in mind, I could also observe how in the EMCDDA’s reports, drug 
use has been subtly framed as a criminal and a medical problem, disassociating Europe from 
the United States and its war on drugs (‘the greatest policy failure of all times,’ according to a 
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UN expert). What I could not see at the EMCDDA workshop was how drug use also has the 
capacity to challenge what it means to call something a problem in the first place.
To open up the politics of problemness, I had to leave the air-conditioned rooms of the 
EU agency and join a group of social workers running a harm-reduction programme in 
the outskirts of the city. The Portuguese drug policy is one of the most progressive ones in 
the EU, so – unlike their colleagues, for instance, in Budapest – the social workers in Lisbon 
were able to do their rounds in abandoned factories and empty parking lots, distributing ster-
ile needles, wet wipes, citric acid and other items that make intravenous drug use safer, with-
out fear of being arrested or harassed by the police. This, however, does not imply that they 
knew how to solve drug use as a problem. What they knew was that formulating solutions, 
through legislation or by other means, is only one mode of relating to problems. Another one 
is to keep looking for better ways of living with them (see also Jensen 2017). 
Worlds
So far, everything I have written in this chapter is about the politics of the ‘West,’ mostly 
Europe and North America. This is a bias very much present in both political theory and 
ANT (see Lin and Rosa, this volume). One attempt to remedy this has been triggered by a 
remarkable exchange between Ulrich Beck (2004) and Bruno Latour (2004c). The former, 
critically revisiting Kant’s notion of cosmopolitanism, speculated how – confronted with 
climate change – a Western understanding of democratic politics could be extended beyond 
nation states without replicating the horrors of colonialism and totalitarianism. In response, 
the latter borrowed Isabelle Stengers’ (2005) concept of cosmopolitics in order to re-politicise 
‘the cosmos,’ that is, the world we in the West believe we inhabit. This, indeed, was Latour’s 
point: If cosmopolitan politics is about different worldviews, cosmopolitics is about different 
worlds and everything that populates them. Unless we find a way to articulate such differ-
ences, there is no chance for democracy on a global scale. 
How to engage in cosmopolitics? Latour’s suggestion, working with and away from 
Stengers (see Savransky, this volume), is to proceed slowly and carefully, and take into ac-
count everything – every thing – that may be required for the composition of a common 
world. However, others, for example Mario Blaser (2016), Marisol de la Cadena (2010) and 
Helen  Verran (2007), suspect that a gradual composition of a common world might be nei-
ther feasible nor desirable (see also Law 2015). The best we can do – as scholar-translators – is 
to help different worlds become momentarily visible to each other, generating new possibil-
ities within already existing political practices and institutions. This was the advice I tried 
to follow with Michaela Spencer, when in 2016 we did our first round of fieldwork in the 
Northern Territory in Australia. Not trained as anthropologists, our aim was not to describe 
Indigenous politics as such, but to document various instances in which different worlds – 
Western and aboriginal – become visible to each other (Dányi and Spencer 2019). 
Early on, we learned about the Northern Territory National Emergency Response (the 
‘Intervention’), which was a bundle of laws passed by the Australian Parliament in 2007. It 
was expected to solve a range of problems in aboriginal communities, from drug and alcohol 
use to child abuse and domestic violence. According to our respondents, the Intervention 
might have been well-intended, but from a cosmopolitical point of view, its  implementation – 
which relied heavily on the military – had a disastrous effect. The forced medical examina-
tion of aboriginal children, for example, did not only trigger bad memories of a violent 
colonial past; it also undermined many local initiatives aimed at bringing together Western 
and Indigenous authorities. 
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In order to formally object to the way in which the Australian government had de-
signed and executed the Intervention, the Yolngu – an aboriginal people in north-east 
Arnhem Land in the Northern Territory – organised a parliamentary ceremony called 
the Ngarra. Such parliamentary ceremonies, which consist of a series of performances by 
various clan groups, are normally not accessible to an uninitiated Western audience. This 
particular ceremony, however, was recorded and a shortened video of it was uploaded to 
YouTube (Riyawarray 2008). As some Yolngu elders explained in the video (and later to 
us in person), this Ngarra was not a ceremony for the sake of ceremony. It was a deliberate 
cosmopolitical act during which a world otherwise invisible to the Australian Parliament 
was momentarily made visible. The participants of the ceremony did not ask for a sym-
bolic recognition of sameness, as humans or Australians. They asked for a very practical 
recognition of difference. And they redeployed the parliament to effect this claim, however 
temporarily.
Tentative answer
So, are parliaments still privileged sites for studying politics and liberal democracy? What I 
have tried to show in this chapter is that parliaments as sites might no longer be privileged, 
but the most interesting developments in democratic politics are very closely related to par-
liaments as meta-sites. 
The three snippets of empirical work have indicated, albeit differently, moments when 
parliamentary politics breaks down or reaches its limits. We have seen the difficulty of op-
erating according to an us/them division in the first case; the difficulty of doing politics 
through problem-solving in the second case and the difficulty of dealing with cosmological 
difference in the third case. At the same time, these moments also outline modes of doing 
politics – hunger strikes, harm reduction programmes and Indigenous initiatives – that have 
the capacity to transform parliaments as meta-sites. 
In light of this, the aim of the chapter has been to help us, ANT-inspired scholars, re-
think politics as ‘an endangered mode of existence’ (Latour 2013) by sensitising ourselves 
to practices that connect the insides and the outsides – or the ‘aboves’ and the ‘belows’ – of 
parliaments in interesting and unexpected ways.
Note
 1 Earlier versions of this chapter were discussed at the Institute for European Ethnology at the 
Humboldt University in Berlin, at the Centre for Anthropological Knowledge in Scientific and 
Technological Cultures (CAST) at the Ruhr University in Bochum, and at the Department of 
Communication at the University of California San Diego. I am grateful to the organisers and 
the participants of these events for their helpful suggestions and to Anders Blok for his detailed 
comments on previous drafts. The arguments outlined in this chapter have been developed over 
the course of many conversations. Special thanks to Sebastian Abrahamsson, Róbert Csák and 
Michaela Spencer for the collaborative research, and to Thomas Scheffer for all the provocation. 
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As early as the 1990s, Science and Technology Studies (STS) scholars have engaged with 
 urban and architectural themes. These first studies looked at town planning as a technol-
ogy and the city as an ‘enormous artefact’ (Aibar & Bijker, 1997), the invisible networks 
that shape big metropolises (Latour & Hermant, 1998), and urban obduracy and change 
( Hommels, 2005). Meanwhile, the sociotechnical analysis of innovations introduced by 
Madeleine Akrich and Bruno Latour in the late 1980s (Akrich, 1987, 1992), which had in-
spired work on design, focused on how technical objects generate specific modes of social, 
political and juridical organisation. This scholarship gradually led to further explorations in 
industrial ( Dubuisson & Hennion, 1995, 1996) and engineering designs (Bucciarelli, 1994; 
Ferguson, 1992;  Henderson, 1999; Law, 2002; Vinck, 2003).
Yet, architectural design remained a completely unmapped epistemological territory of 
STS analysis until 1996. In that year, Michel Callon released a seminal paper advocating the 
importance of Actor-Network Theory (ANT) as a methodological perspective for deepening 
our understanding of architecture. Arguing that ‘the results of the anthropology of science and 
technology are transportable to the field of architectural studies,’ he set an agenda for the decades 
to come (Callon, 1996, 1997). The first STS-inspired empirical study of architectural practice 
appeared on the pages of Social Studies of Science in 2005 (Yaneva, 2005), followed by studies 
devoted to the ethnography of architectural practices (Houdart & Minato, 2009; Latour & 
Yaneva, 2008; Loukisass, 2012; Yaneva, 2009a; Yaneva, 2009b). These works redescribed the 
socio-material dimensions of designing architects and set an ANT-inspired research agenda. 
The studies of cities through an STS-informed approach multiplied as well, as witnessed in 
a number of edited volumes (Blok & Farías, 2016; Farías & Bender, 2010; Guggenheim & 
Söderström, 2011, see also Färber, this volume) and special issues of Science Studies journals 
(Yaneva & Guy, 2008; Yaneva, 2011) and architectural journals (Yaneva, 2018).
When the ANT methodology started travelling outside its privileged domains of action – 
science, engineering, medicine and markets – the list of non-humans began to expand from 
the repertoire of microbes, scallops, bacilli, metro systems and other technical objects to 
include Portuguese ships, sick bodies, African elephants, drug addicts and amateurs of music. 
This list has since stretched to include an even more varied assembly of non-humans com-
monly found in architectural and urban worlds: Architectural renderings (Houdart, 2008), 
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scale models (Yaneva, 2005), city plans (Zitouni, 2010) and maps (Nadaï & Labussière, 2013; 
Vertesi, 2008), for instance. However, as the ANT methodology has travelled to increasingly 
more domains, site itself has not yet been subject to the scrutiny of an ANT enquiry. In this 
short article, we will prepare the groundwork for one possible account of site.
‘Site’ as an object of (architectural) analysis
Despite its prominent status in design and in architecture, site has received little attention in 
architectural theory. More often than not, notwithstanding the technical and professional- 
oriented literature on ‘site analysis’ and ‘site planning’ (Lynch & Hack, 1984), site is conflated 
and grounded in other notions that have played a larger role in architectural discourse such 
as context, region, locality, setting, territory and land or landscape; or it is explored through 
historical examples of architectural projects without conceptual reflection. While in practice, 
sites are subject to a variety of analyses, observations, visits, tests, studies, plans and reports, 
bursting with different problematics like noise pollution, constraints, histories, traffic and 
logistics, trees and vegetation, layers of soil, waste, neighbours, visual impacts, among oth-
ers, in theory, sites have been simplified and digested in mainly three ways: As tabula rasa, as 
natural facts and as social constructions.
Typically, sites are characterised as an external reality, a physical space with varying phys-
ical attributes out there, or within a series of representations, appearances and social relations 
superimposed over that external reality. In the modernist discourse of architecture, the site 
loses these characteristics as they are actively ignored. The physical and social aspects of the 
site are removed from the scenography in order to posit an abstract, idealised understanding 
of design that eschews the specificity and particular conditions of a site in search of the uni-
versal conditions for design (Redfield, 2005). Thus, the aim was to remove all pre-existing 
qualities and values of a site, to arrive at a zero point, a tabula rasa, from which to build. 
By reducing site to a tabula rasa free of influences and attachments, and focusing solely on 
the products and objects of architecture, modernism’s effects on thinking about site in archi-
tecture are substantial and far-reaching. In fact, all the subsequent discussions of site can be 
understood as reactions to the modernist discourse, circling around two foci: Do buildings 
fit into their sites, the context, constraints and parameters? Or do they emerge from the site, as 
a set of influences and determinants?
Responding to the modernist idea of a tabula rasa site, such follow-up discussions of site 
present it either in terms of primary or secondary qualities.1 For the former strand of analysis, 
site is no longer a nuisance to suppress, but a resource to actively draw from as inspiration. As 
Ian McHarg (1971) argues, for instance, in the tradition of genius loci, design ought to extract, 
draw out the values that are hidden within the physical and natural aspects of a site; site, still 
a passive resource, is nevertheless an important aspect for design.
Here, the site, while present, acts as the architectural representative of Nature, a mute 
objectivity whose hidden values require human actions in order to be drawn out. The nat-
ural values of a site are captured by technical processes, in their purity, not yet spoilt by the 
social (Lynch & Hack, 1984; McHarg, 1971). This understanding of a site qua Nature is com-
monly found in landscape architecture (Meyer, 2005), drawing from 19th-century garden 
theory (Hunt, 1992). By upscaling site to a multi-scalar complexity of interconnected forces, 
ranging from the biological and physical to the economic and the political, recent landscape 
architecture theory highlights the continuity of a site across scales and domains. Still, akin 
to site planning, it remains by and large a process by which such interconnected forces can 
be captured, rationalised and turned into an objectified pattern (Gissen, 2010; McQuade & 
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Allen, 2011; Mostafavi & Doherty, 2010). Even as a totality of interacting forces, both ‘natu-
ral’ and ‘human’ site remains a set of facts out there: Either as a rough (‘wild,’ ‘bucolic’) set of 
values or as a smooth, rationalised pattern.
The third interpretation of site moves onto secondary qualities: We jump from the objective 
to the subjective. Within this body of literature, we are led from a phenomenological under-
standing of place (Beauregard, 2005; Hornstein, 2011) to the socially constructed nature of a 
site (Burns, 1996; Burns & Kahn, 2005; Kahn, 1998). Site is thus reduced to a perspectivism, 
where its physical nature is lost behind partial individual perspectives and social  relations. Here, 
the discussion of site coincides with the increasing importance of place,  region and context in 
architectural theory, and acts as an architectural avatar for these  concepts, mimicking the the-
oretical discussions of space and place in the ‘spatial turn’ in geography. Rendered as different 
kinds of ‘appearances,’ site, as a concept in this body of literature, becomes interchangeable with 
its conceptual avatars, and loses its architectural specificity.
From this all-too-brief exploration of the concept of site in architectural theory, we can 
see that site has not been able to escape the effects of the Modernist influence. Either it is 
a blank slate whereupon, in a ‘double-click,’ buildings emerge without influence; or it acts 
as the architectural equivalent of Nature, as a stubborn set of facts (always set against the 
urban, the city, which are human artefacts); or, alternatively, as a social construct (always set 
against the impossibility of ‘true’ objectivity). In other words, site functions as a mediating 
interface between architecture, nature and society, caught between objective reality and sub-
jective perception or social relations – bifurcated between primary and secondary qualities. 
In architectural theory, the concept of site has thus followed a similar trajectory as notions 
of space and place, from an absolute empty container, to a physical and external ‘outside,’ to a 
product of social relations or subjective perceptions. Yet, if we follow the process of planning 
and architectural design, site appears as situated in the midst of reports, analyses, visits, tech-
nologies, measurements, photographs and tests; site is actively dissected and observed, folded 
and unfolded – more than a container, an object or a social construct. Thus, site emerges as 
a set of movements to follow. 
Movements of Site-ing
If we follow design and construction processes, how often do we encounter a site simply as 
nature ‘out there’: Physical, static and passively awaiting the intervention of an adventurous 
designer? Conversely, how often is a site a pure social construction: A cultural product that is 
fabricated alongside another cultural construction, a building or infrastructure? Against the 
stubbornness of a site qua set of facts, and against the relativity of a site qua social construct, 
we are interested in moving beyond the two, not by adding them as two absolutes, but by 
focusing on what is frequently forgotten in the literature: How site matters in design, plan-
ning and construction processes, and the very work of accounting for site, working with it, 
according to it. We will call this specific work site-ing; this includes the work of placing and 
spacing simultaneously the built (a building or an urban infrastructure) and the site itself. 
In what follows, we will zoom into specific situations where the work of site-ing  becomes 
visible, and is made visible with ANT tools. We will trace the site-ing moves as ways of 
 rearranging and repositioning the elasticity of the malleable urban networks of a city.  Site-ing 
 appears as a major work of questioning simultaneously the site and the built, nature and 
culture, building technologies and meaning. Unpacking these moves of site-ing will also 
illustrate the work that is needed by an ANT-informed ethnographer to unravel the com-
plex agency of sites in design making, and to recalibrate, subsequently, the techniques of the 
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ethnographic enquiry. We will reflect on the figure of the ethnographer, and will account 
for the recalibration of her specific trajectory, practices and interview techniques as they 
constitute the work of site-ing the ethnographer. 
Site-ing a building
In 2014, the then Chancellor of the Exchequer of the UK government George Osborne an-
nounced in the Autumn Statement a new scheme called the ‘Northern Powerhouse,’ aimed 
to enhance growth in the North of England. At the ‘heart’ of the scheme is ‘Factory,’ an arts 
and cultural building in Manchester designed by the Office for Metropolitan Architecture 
(OMA)2, which would act as the ‘home’ of the Manchester International Festival (MIF), a 
peripatetic arts festival, and a ‘cultural anchor’ for the regeneration of St. John’s neighbour-
hood in Manchester city centre.3 Factory’s site is situated in a historically complex location, 
full of imposing constraints, from ‘listed’ historic buildings, neighbouring urban elements 
to the future developments of St. John’s. Due to this, planning Factory has shown to be a 
laborious movement of site-ing.
We first encounter the complexity of the site in the rhetoric used by the designers in their 
presentations of the project to different audiences. During a recent presentation by the head 
of OMA’s UK office, Carol Patterson presented the site as an active and surprising participant 
in design: When they had visited the site in Manchester, they realised that, instead of the sim-
ple box shape in a simple location that was stipulated in the competition brief, how complicated 
and enfolded that site was. It was only through the process of planning and development, 
which unfolds these features of the site, and that they confront its complications.
In her presentation, Carol explained that ‘there were a lot of things that interweaved be-
tween our site: some of the cultural history, the music history and the future’; the site, they 
discovered, was full of historical artefacts and references that play an important role in the fu-
ture of the site, and the building-to-be.4 The site, as suggested, is ‘interwoven’ with features 
that need to be untangled and unfolded. Following the movement of site-ing requires the 
crafting of a new context, the constrained act of site expansion and redistribution. Through 
these movements, we witness the Factory site growing and being defined at the same time that 
the building is outlined in design.
Expected to be completed by 2021, Factory provides us a rich opportunity to see the 
movements of site-ing up close. We can still witness the movements, the expansion and con-
traction of the Factory site, and the continual back and forth process from one locale-of- 
practice to another (that is, planning offices, design and engineering firms, acoustics labs, 
public consultations, client’s headquarters, among others), as it expands to other entities, 
accommodating their agency into the larger aggregate that Factory site will become. Site-ing 
is made in between many locales and aims to ‘anchor’ the complexities of the building site, by 
untangling and retying the threads, through negotiating and recalibrating the connections 
that it enters into.
One simple way to explore these movements is to slowly move through the planning 
documents, which do not have a simple representative function, but give us access to the 
specific knowledge practices and modes of organisation involved in site-ing work (Hull, 2012; 
Riles, 2006). Here, as particular ‘inscription devices’ (Latour & Woolgar, 1986), the var-
ious injunctions of the site are unfolded. We do not only have various viewpoints onto a 
virtual building, but the documents themselves (and the studies therein) unearth (literally 
sometimes) these various locales and connected entities within the site. Each document acts 
like ‘oligoptica’ (Latour, 2005; Latour & Hermant, 1998) that capture different aggregates, 
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entities and locales, whether the composition of soil, flow of traffic or the various histories of 
the site, and never against some common substantial nature. They not only unfold the mul-
tilayered strata of the site that gathers actors as mediators (Asdal, 2015), but the documents 
transport the Factory site to other locales-of-practice, modifying it as they move. 
In other words, not only are there many different aggregates within the one place, but 
this site travels to and gathers different locales-of-practice into it: From OMA’s office in 
Rotterdam to LevelAcoustic’s acoustic laboratory in Eindhoven to the city council rooms in 
Manchester, Planit’s UXB (unexploded bombs) labs in York, the warehouses of the 1800s, 
to BuroHappold’s offices in Bath. In all these movements, something is gained, something is 
added to the living aggregate that the Factory site is about to become. 
However, this is not merely a process of unfolding, but – to reiterate – of re-crafting 
connections and aggregating them into a new context. Site-ing becomes a movement that 
reconfigures connections to achieve a single voice: Turning the many different aggregates 
and locales that need to be visited in order to recollect the Factory site for design. In other 
words, the site cannot remain a pure multiplicity, but requires closure as a practical necessity 
for planning permission and to be used in design (Figure 29.1).
Returning to Carol’s presentation, we hear her develop a narrative through the conflu-
ence of histories specific to Factory’s site: Important features that not only impinge on the 
design, but are also enrolled in the trajectory of the building-to-be in order to allow it to 
move. It is situated within the old headquarters of Granada TV, sitting atop the brick-arches 
of the Grade II-listed Colonnaded Railway Viaduct, whose now disused railway lines lead to 
a non-listed yet important industrial Bonded Warehouse that abuts the site to the East. Thus, 
rising above the Manchester and Salford Junction Canal, an industrial canal from 1839, the 
site is full of recalcitrant constraints that have become enlisted in its trajectory. It is important 
Figure 29.1  Factory, OMA – building site in Manchester (Authors’ Own)
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to note, though, that this history does not rest in the background as a grand narrative to jus-
tify the site’s importance. Instead, it is a crafting of context that actively unfolds in the con-
struction and recollection of the Factory site. With each document and each urban feature, 
another actor is invited into the fold of the site, expanding its reach, enrolling others; thus, 
we witness the composition of site. As planning unfolds, its aim is to ‘compose’ a site, not in 
contradistinction to the context, but simultaneously with it.
At the groundbreaking ceremony, which took place on the site of Factory during MIF 
months later, Rem Koolhaas informs a crowd of Mancunians, in response to a question about 
Manchester’s heritage, that, yes, nostalgia serves a purpose, but only up to a point.5 Site-ing is 
neither a process of collecting a series of facts about the site, nor is it a way to extract the spirit 
of a place that pre-exists. It entails work that gathers actors and locales of practice into a single 
voice for two reasons. First, as a rhetorical device, the site-ing work composes a site, which 
makes an argument for the building; it is a way of doing words with things. Secondly, it folds 
in a specific way the contours of the site into an active ‘origami’ that also reacts to the other 
givens and constraints in the design and planning of the project. While these enlisted actors 
need to be negotiated into the project, they are nevertheless recalibrated along its trajectory. 
In both these senses, we see how site-ing is not a way of finding breathing room in a dense 
urban location, but it is rather about tracing a project trajectory to witness the right composi-
tion of the site for design. In other words, it is not a passive ground that a building fits into, or 
a determining context, but a composition that shifts and modifies as new entities are enrolled 
or subtracted. Moving through the planning documents, as they travel from one locale of 
design and construction to another, following designers as they engage in grasping the com-
plexity of the site and composing it as a full-blown participant in the project, we can trace 
the manifold of the Factory site, the necessity to unfold, to multiply and then to aggregate 
it again in order for the project to succeed. The planning documents and design movements 
reveal site not as a resource that exists in potential, waiting to be realised, nor as an exercise in 
cultural fiction, but as a living ‘trajectory of actualisation,’6 a process of crafting, redefining 
and aggregating a new context.
Amidst the site as a composition that shifts, how is the ethnographer supposed to navigate 
through this shifting field, to walk on this shaking ground of dispersed locales-of-practice? 
As we will now unfold, there is more to this than the tracing of planning documents and 
designers’ moves, in that the ethnographer participates in the very work of site-ing.
Site-ing the ethnographer
Unlike other standard ethnographic studies, less time was spent in this field. However, a 
few specific techniques helped intensify the presence of the ethnographer, maximising the 
time spent. The work of site-ing made the ethnographer move from one locale-of-practice 
(of design, planning and construction) to another, equipped with camera, notebook and tape 
recorder. Meanwhile, the participants in the ethnographic study continued to work in these 
various locales, surrounded by their objects, documents and tools, knowing that another 
colleague was being interviewed at that moment and that a specific part of their practices was 
being revealed, documented and ethnographically captured. Their movements sometimes 
overlapped with the ethnographer’s moves and this led to the synchronic visibility of all the 
participants in the study, a form of co-presence7 that maintained the transparency of the dis-
persed locales of the ethnographic enquiry. 
It is well known from STS’ laboratory ethnographies that knowledge production is embed-
ded in local environments (Merz, 2006). As Knorr-Cetina (1995, p. 151) argues: ‘If construction 
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is wrapped up in bounded locales, the ethnographer needs to “penetrate the spaces” and 
the stream of practices from which fact construction arises.’ While in other ethnographies 
where we have spent years living immersed in an office (OMA, Rotterdam) or frequently 
 travelling to visit a practice (FOA, London), this study included the work of site-ing. When 
the  ethnographer gained access to the ‘stream of practices’ of the Factory-making, most of 
the ethnographic interviews8 were conducted as locale-based interviews in a specific place of 
practice and included elements of immersive observation.
As an ethnographic interviewing technique, this contextual inquiry implied going to the 
participants’ offices to gather qualitative data in order to capture the natural setting of specif-
ically situated design, engineering and planning practices, and witness how the participants 
work, asking specific site-related, object-focused questions about what they were doing and 
why. Observing different actors and questioning them in their environments was paramount 
for bringing important details about their practice to light. Locale-based interviews in design 
studios, planning and engineering offices, city government offices and public presentations 
acted as site-ing devices recalibrating the ethnographer’s presence and the presence of others.
Only rarely would an interview have a script and a fixed scenario, a sitting plan that would 
not change. Instead of engaging in a directed question-and-answer interviewing style, a static 
situation where everyone and everything is seated, ‘in place,’ the  ethnographer spends time 
exploring the specific locale-of-practice, wandering, pointing to specific objects, touching 
documents, folders and screens that were currently in use, thus  collecting a series of spe-
cific features about the building-making. This ‘wandering around a  locale-of-practice’ type 
of interview prompted a number of questions emerging from the contextual  specificity of 
the practice that unfolds and the socio-material circumstantiality of that  locale-of- practice, 
streaming right from the world of objects, instruments and documents. That is, the 
 ethnographer also sites herself according to the rhythm of the enquiry that will lead to the 
composition of the Factory site.
Site-ing, as an ethnographic strategy, is thus a way of ‘establishing co-presence.’9 Site-ing 
is not a rhetorical device that aims to convince. Instead, it is almost the opposite: Cracking 
‘open’ the black box of studios, labs and planning offices, fissuring practices typical for this 
locale into many different associations. It implies that nothing is still; site-ing moves us all 
forward through new connections and additions. The ethnographic interview reminds us of 
the site-ing process outlined earlier in the example of the Factory site composition through 
planning documents and tracing design moves. Through this site-ing process, we do not 
capture the world of the locale-of-practice in toto, but only fragments of it.10 It entails work 
that gathers people, documents, bodies and skills and sites them according to the ANT eth-
nographic enquiry: The interview itself becomes a way of producing words with things. By 
the strolling in the locale, the stream of new questions, the interviewees wandering around 
the ANT ethnographer and the dance of the objects activated ‘on the go,’ site-ing folds in a 
very specific experiential, but always fragmented way the contours of the locale-of-practice, 
hosting the interview, in an active relational spatial ‘origami.’
Much as in design practice, it is the ‘active’ nature of the locale that gathers talking ob-
jects, instruments, scripts and actors together, to the extent that the place of ethnography 
is not a passive backdrop for an ethnographer ( just as site is not a tabula rasa), but rather 
‘activates’ the interview; the entire collective assemblage of enunciation speaks. Neither the 
actors nor the researcher speaks; rather, the building-making processes are spoken through 
them. The site-ing interviews are thus reminiscent to the work of composing a musical piece, 
where all participants contribute to finding the right tones, the good arrangements and ac-
tivate new connections, which, when aggregated together in the rhythmic flow of a stream 
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of practice, will generate a full-fledged set of tones that make sense. In these interviews, the 
locales-of-practice site us all through co-presence; the stream of the interview experience op-
erates symmetrically through the researcher, and the actors convoked, as well as the devices 
and questions that activate it further.
Walking through different locales-of-practice where the site-ing is preformed, we stroll, 
visit, stop and discuss specific objects, the interview stages change as we move, and different 
objects appear and disappear from the misty scenes. Stopping by, site-ing around, and engag-
ing in discussions that last longer than a question-and-answer sharp rhythm allows creating 
specific settings where the objects can talk, and the interviewees will talk with the objects to 
the researcher via the objects, and in many different locales-of-practice. Thus, the ethnog-
raphy of the Factory-making is a walk on its own, a long and interrupted walk capturing 
‘occasions’ or events. In this walking process, both interviewer and interviewees are situated, 
their boundaries blurred and the ‘being-in’ of a passive space turns into an active regime 
of ‘being-with’ many locales-of-practice that unfold. If site-ing interviews involve strolling 
within a locale-of-practice and with it, walking with the Factory site relies on exploring and 
walking with many locales-of-practice in a pluriverse ethnographic journey of enquiry. In 
each of them a different feature of Factory site is extracted and added to the composition. 
This also sites the ANT ethnographer within the unfolding dynamics of design and construc-
tion, and vibrant urban processes that are all interconnected. In addition, it makes the ANT 
ethnographer complicit to site-ing, that is, to the composition of the Factory site, lending to 
it some stability and coherence.
It is impossible to witness all the locales-of-practice: Only so many fragments from proj-
ects, rhythms and time spans are witnessed. Not being able to visit all of the locales-of- 
practice, to be present there at the same time and in the key moments of decision-making, we 
abandon the ambition of establishing connections or comparisons with other building proj-
ects, architectural firms and urban developments. Instead, bringing experiences from differ-
ent locales of the Factory-making together, assembling information from site-ing interviews 
and walking as a way to recreate simultaneity and synchronicity, revealed the multi-actorial 
and multifaceted nature of design, and allowed the ethnography to capture a building world 
as it opens itself up to scrutiny, and as it takes us, as Donna Haraway (1991) would say ‘in the 
belly of the monster.’
Multi-Site-ing
If the site is never ‘out there’ but always requires the work of site-ing, grasping the site in de-
sign and construction processes also demands the tedious work of an ANT ethnography that 
constantly sites the researcher. This is the double work of multi-site-ing and re-site-ing, of going 
back and forth between the different locales-of-practice, over and over again, from which a 
notion of an ‘ethnographic site’ is generated as something that remains the same throughout 
all these movements.
Just as the site is neither ‘there’ ready to accommodate a building, nor appears as a purely 
social or material construction, so is the work of the ANT ethnographer: None of her in-
terviews happen ‘on-the-spot.’ The locales-of-practice are not ready at hand, waiting to be 
studied. They all require the active work of site-ing and re-site-ing the researcher; each of them 
provides partial access to the composition of the Factory site as an object of analysis. They 
have to congregate. It is only when assembled into an ethnographic account that the eth-
nographer’s work begins to ‘resemble’ the designers’ and planners’ site-ing work. Following 
the pitfalls of site-ing the researcher within this shifting ground of composing the Factory 
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site, nothing is stable or could simply begin from a tabula rasa. The ethnographer begins 
in the middle, as it were. It becomes even impossible to allude to the seemingly similar 
concept of multi-sited ethnography developed by George E. Marcus (1995). With ANT in 
hand, confronting objects and devices that act back, facing unknown sources of agency, and 
immersed within contextual mutations that shape as we move, we are rather part of an en-
quiry of ‘multi-locality.’ The scope of this ANT enquiry goes far beyond a notion of ‘multi- 
sitedness’ as every single ‘site’ (termed here locale-of-practice) is also produced as a subtle and 
‘multi-local’ work of composition.
None of the participants in the design and planning process of the Factory can grasp its site 
totally on the spot. The ANT ethnographer is just as myopic. It is through the act of joining 
the site-ing of the Factory that the ethnographer becomes an integral part of folding its spatial 
‘origami’ further, along with many designers, planners, engineers and other participants in 
the different locales-of-practice. The Factory site composition becomes the ethnographer’s 
own locale. Each move adds new tones. All of them eventually achieve stabilisation (albeit 
fragile): A Factory site gradually emerges as we reach the end of this account about its mak-
ing. Coherent and stable, the site is required to eventually host a building that stands heavy 
and unbearably durable. Composed and sound, the ethnographer eventually completes her 
account that is light and inevitably re-writeable by other researchers who can also take up an 
enquiry into the question of site.
Notes
 1 This old philosophical divide is most clearly articulated by John Locke in Essay Concerning Human 
Understanding (1997 [1689]). Primary qualities refer to the brute matter extended in space, whereas 
secondary qualities refer to phenomenal, subjective attributes. But it is also the foundation for 
modern Occidental philosophy as the split between appearances and reality, the phenomenal and 
noumenal worlds, as well as the split between being and becoming. For the diagnosis of this divide, 
see Alfred North Whitehead’s lectures in The Concept of Nature (2015 [1920]), what he has called 
the ‘bifurcation of nature.’
 2 OMA is a Dutch architectural firm, based in Rotterdam, founded in 1975 by Dutch architect Rem 
Koolhaas and Greek architect Elia Zenghelis, along with Madelon Vriesendorp and Zoe Zenghelis. 
It is one of the leading practices in the world today. See Yaneva’s ANT-study of design in the mak-
ing (2005 and 2009a) based on material from this practice.
 3 OMA. (October, 2016). “Design and Access Statement: Factory”. Manchester, UK: Manchester 
City Council.
 4 Patterson, C. ( June 2017). Manchester Architect’s Symposium: Factory.
 5 Koolhaas, Rem, Ellen Van Loon, and Hans Ulrich Obrist. ( July, 2017). The Factory Panel: Spaces for 
Culture.
 6 See Gilles Deleuze’s work on Bergson (1991 [1966]) for a philosophic account of the ‘trajec-
tory of actualisation,’ the production of the new, as it differs from the realisation of pre-existing 
possibilities.
 7 Anne Beaulieu (2010) put forward the concept of co-presence as a way to shape fieldwork. If other 
authors underline the desirability of physical co-location as a requisite for ethnographic investi-
gation, Beaulieu shifts the focus on achieving co-presence by emphasising that interaction is a 
potentially rewarding but precarious achievement (Goffman, 1957), and that physical presence is 
not equivalent to availability for interaction (Goffman, 1971). While physical co-location can be 
a resource for participants, it is not in itself a sufficient criterion for co-presence. Co-presence de-
centralises the notion of space without excluding it. Beaulieu argues also that the possibility of co- 
presence might be established through a variety of modes, physical co-location being one among 
others. Co-presence as a starting point enables a more symmetrical treatment of forms of interaction.
 8 For a discussion on ethnographic interviews, see: James Spradley, The Ethnographic Interview, 1979, 
Wadsworth and John Van Maanen, Tales of the Field: Writing Ethnography, Chicago: Chicago Uni-
versity Press, 2011.
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 9 Per Beaulieu’s understanding of co-presence as an interactive accomplishment by participants and 
ethnographers alike that does not share the unidirectional and ocular-centric connotations of wit-
nessing, or interrogating.
 10 For a discussion about the problematic of contexts and wholes in cultural anthropology and ANT, 
see Tsing (2010). In our account of the Factory ‘site,’ we see the congregation of many wholes that 
come together, but not as ‘parts’ that fit within a greater ‘whole’ that encompasses them. Neverthe-
less, at the end of the planning process, there needs to be a relatively stable ‘site’ for the building to 
be granted planning approval, and for the building to be built, and likewise, the ethnographer com-
poses an account that is more or less coherent, without assuming to have captured its object ‘wholly.’
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Somewhat more than a decade ago, I wrote a book on the making or assembly of place at 
the intersection of urban development, heritage politics and the practice of popular histo-
riography in the South Korean historic city of Kyŏngju (Oppenheim 2008). My disciplinary 
background is in anthropology, and this project was meant to be in dialogue with the anthro-
pological literature on place-making of the era, which mostly hinged on the representation 
and social construction of places. ANT did several things for me in this project. Most simply, 
it helped me connect traditionally different anthropological topics, everything from festivals 
to heritage tourism to social movement organisations to development planning, via their 
own mutual connection to objects of concern such as railway infrastructures, historic arte-
facts and organisational forms. It helped me ontologise the question of place, to treat place 
not just as meaningful but as a setting for doing things. Most specifically, it helped me offer 
a definition of place as a pragmatic ‘intertopological’ effect, the dimensionality that exists 
when hinterlands of settled relations are drawn into new configurations, spanning several 
senses of ‘proximity’ and ‘distance’ all at once (see also Oppenheim 2014).
This focus on the intertopological aspect of place is not the emphasis of the present 
 chapter, but it is worth tarrying here a moment, in part because the direction I sought to 
take the anthropology of place has been convergent with ANT-inspired theorisation of ur-
ban assemblages in the field of urban studies (Amin and Thrift 2002; Blok and Farías 2016; 
Farías and Bender 2010). Calling upon more complex spatialities more clearly evident in 
later ANT work – including Annemarie Mol and John Law’s exploration of topologies and 
Bruno  Latour’s understanding of ‘plasma’ (Latour 2005: 241; Mol and Law 1994; Oppenheim 
2007) – I had envisioned place as an ‘intertopological’ effect among overlying topological 
arrangements in interference with or acting as ‘hinterlands’ with respect to one another 
(Oppenheim 2008: 14–15; see also Law 2004: 27–35). In a more formal subsequent defini-
tion, place was presented as ‘a simultaneity of terrains of actuality and potentiality and of the 
intertopological movements that inextricably connect and collect them’ (Oppenheim 2014: 
396) – in other words, a spatiotemporality not only of the connected and unconnected, but 
also of the potentially, or not yet, connected.
In parallel, urban assemblage theory, itself put forth as an flattening alternative to ap-
proaches that view urban politics as determined by underlying political economic forces 
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(Farías 2010:6), has conceptualised ‘the city (or site) multiple’ (Farías and Blok 2016: 
2;  Lepawsky et al. 2015: 189–190; drawing upon Mol 2002) as composed of overlapping 
 assemblages – versions, articulations or enactments of the city – that may interact, interfere 
and become coordinated through the course of urban politics (see also Ureta 2014). Assem-
blage urbanism theorists have likewise turned to Latour’s ‘plasma’ to conceive of the way 
assemblages exist as potentiality with respect to one another, ‘defin[ing] a virtual horizon of 
indeterminate possibilities and possible becomings’ (Farías and Blok 2016:14). Place in my 
original argument and ‘cityness’ in urban assemblage theory have made similar room for 
the copresent temporality of the not yet (Farías and Blok 2016:10; Lepawsky et al. 2015:185; 
Simone 2010; see also Färber, this volume).
The emphasis of this chapter is instead on what I call ‘circulating normativities’ as key 
sites at which the coordination of conflicting assemblages and the recombination of place 
occurred in 1990s Kyŏngju urban politics. Such normativities include visualisations, material 
points of view, obligatory procedures and conceptual objects raised to iconic importance. 
Among them are the ‘panoramas’ and ‘oligoptica’ that Latour (2005:175–190) advances as a 
way to flatten processes of visualising and seeing away from methods that regard either the 
politics of representation or panoptic physics of power as existing on a separate plane from 
the concrete negotiations of assembly. More broadly, this approach is in alliance with anthro-
pological work that takes such normativities or representations-in-the-plural as themselves 
‘artefacts entangled’ in associative dynamics of place-making (Hull 2012:4). In what, then, 
lies the capacity of such circulating normativities to connect and mediate among assem-
blages? The argument here is that as actants, normativities often do this additively, by being 
multiplied or redoubled themselves. The coordination of the city multiple is thus commonly 
an effect of the multiplicity or partiality of objects of concern (Law 2004; Mol 2002).
This is a consideration of ontopolitical process, part of the mechanics or physics or prag-
matics of place-making. Yet following Farías and Blok (2016) further, the action of circulat-
ing normativities can also be examined in terms of their cosmopolitical aspect, as nodes for 
the articulation of ethical mappings of a shared political setting. What gives some circulating 
normativities, and not others, the force to rewire place? In the present example, one answer 
is the way such normativities were able to index and access compulsory scales. Scale-making 
as an emergent aspect of assembly processes is an important ANT claim, but one that Blok 
(2016: 607) notes ‘arguably remains under-theorized in assemblage urbanism.’ Kyŏngju in 
the 1990s offered a situation in which scale-making took place not in a wholly open-ended 
fashion (an analysis that the simple ANT maxim that ‘actors make scales’ would seem to in-
vite), but rather in relation to a set of scales – ‘local,’ ‘national’ and ‘global’ – that themselves, 
in turn, are not analytically a priori but rather were taken as ‘pre-given’ and desirable by actors 
with various positions on urban politics (Slater and Ariztia 2010: 91). ‘Linking up’ with these 
scales was a powerful act in urban disputes, to do so successfully brought the force of a host 
of associations. An urban development successfully rendered ‘global’ enlisted, as if by short 
circuit, a host of other desiderata linked to ‘globalisation’ in 1990s South Korea.
This chapter thus treats scaling in parallel to the assembly of place as a whole; scales 
are not natural containers for place assembly, but assembly may draw upon hinterlands of 
scalar routinisation, and with consequence. The coordinating capacity of circulating nor-
mativities was mediated by their ability also to activate routinised scalar potentialities with 
a more properly ethical, cosmopolitical claim on the desirable. This is how a conflict in 
which different participants accused opponents of paying insufficient attention to necessary 
scales of Kyŏngju’s being became one in which Kyŏngju was refigured as an appropriately, 
appealingly global–local–national common world.
Robert Oppenheim
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As was the case in Asturias as discussed by Slater and Ariztia (2010), mid-1990s Kyŏngju 
presented an analytical situation in which much place-making activity by residents and non- 
residents alike was conducted in relation to scales that were understood as ‘pre-given.’ The 
city, like other South Korean regional cities, was simultaneously called upon to scale up and 
down, to ‘be (more) global’ and ‘be (more) local,’ even as Kyŏngju also, owing to its historic 
character, confronted ongoing, more particular imperatives to maintain its unique ‘national’ 
character in a set of ways. What such moves might concretely mean was contested by various 
actors, but the necessity of them and their scalar points of reference were broadly accepted. 
In ‘following the actors,’ one frequently followed them to and through these touchstones. 
This section begins with the substance of these scales’ compulsory character, leading to two 
questions for a post-ANT framework that continues to take scaling as a result of process and 
not its precondition. How are such compulsory scales themselves reinforced, and how are 
they invoked in the making of place?1
The government of President Kim Young Sam (1993–98) chose segyehwa, ‘globalisation,’ 
as its policy cornerstone and rhetorical dominant. Segyehwa could mean many things, and was 
linked to a variety of developments in diplomacy, economics and social policy (Kim 2000). 
Culturally, segyehwa supposedly inaugurated a new openness, and slogans such as ‘the most 
global thing is the most Korean thing’ permeated official publications. There was a focus on 
building the ‘world-class.’ Among the most talismanic of infrastructural developments to 
which the label was applied was South Korea’s high-speed rail network, later christened the 
KTX, which was in its design and early build stages in the 1990s. As had been the case with 
Japan’s shinkansen (Hood 2006), the KTX became and has since been iconic of South Korean 
modernity itself, as well as a consistent companion to other South Korean entries onto the 
world stage. It was the high-speed railway that would be the central object of a significant 
debate over development in Kyŏngju.
The same era, however, also produced new economic demands on regional cities and 
counties. Changes in the funding relationship between the national government and local 
municipalities led to a situation in which such municipalities were newly compelled to com-
pete for state and provincial investment. They also attempted increasingly to attract interna-
tional interest and investment directly. Neologisms like ‘glocalisation’ (either in  English or as 
chibangsegyehwa) gained some currency in the media. Despite its established base of historical 
tourism, Kyŏngju was not immune to these dynamics. In the early 1990s, city officials at-
tempted to attract a new provincial administration building, for instance, and new  efforts 
were made to monetise tourism by developing food products suitable for  Japanese-style 
 omiyage travel gifts.
Interlaced with these developments also came expectations placed upon the local as po-
tentially a newly democratic and newly responsive sphere of political action. The end of 
military rule and the democratisation of national politics beginning in 1987 brought, within 
a few years, local self-governance (chibang chach’i), with direct elections for city councils and 
mayors. Social movement organisations also targeted the local as a newly significant setting 
(Oppenheim 2008:197–221).
In Kyŏngju’s case, however, these new dynamics unfolded against the backdrop of an 
extant set of demands to speak for the Korean nation. The city owes its historical landscape 
of temples, pagodas, stone Buddhas and other monuments to its status as the location of the 
capital city of the first millennium kingdom of Silla. In the 1960–70s, Kyŏngju was devel-
oped according to a plan that emanated from the South Korean presidential residence itself as 
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a showpiece historical preservation and reconstruction zone and a tourism destination. But in 
the post-Korean War period, Kyŏngju also had a unique role with a specifically South Korean 
national narrative. In conventional historiography, Silla was the state that, in the 7th century, 
defeated two other Korean kingdoms and thus achieved the first unification of the Korean 
peninsula. This account of an original unification at the hands of a southern state, by a king-
dom ascribed with martial valour, appealed to the military rulers of South Korea seeking 
reunification with the North on their own terms within a politics of hostile national division.
To reiterate, these global, local and national scales at play in the 1990s are not intended 
as sovereign contexts, natural scalar levels that produced effects in Kyŏngju out of their own 
inherent dynamics (see Carr and Lempert 2016). Rather, the point here is akin to Callon’s 
(1998) contention about the formatting effects of economics upon the economy: They were 
routinised scales of reference performatively reproduced in laterally reinforcing knowledge 
practices. While beyond the scope of this chapter, their routinisation, their reinforcement 
as compulsory, can be theorised in terms of various relations of interdependence or ‘inter-
scaling’ (Philips 2016), as when, for instance, a mayoral candidate in one of the novel local 
elections sought to demonstrate his local(ist) bona fides by showing up at a Kyŏngju festival 
that presented itself as organised by and for local residents as opposed to tourists. Such scales 
could, in turn, be indexed or invoked by circulating normativities, operating as ‘scaling 
devices’ in Slater and Ariztia’s (2010:92) terms, as mechanisms of ‘reconfigur[ing] and posi-
tion[ing]’ Kyŏngju in relation to their desirability and cosmopolitical persuasiveness. It is to 
these that the argument now turns.
Kyŏngju’s high-speed railway controversy
From 1995 to 1997, Kyŏngju was embroiled in a controversy that provided a condensed case 
of ‘place in the making’ and of ‘urban politics in action.’ The issue was the inclusion of a 
Kyŏngju station in the plans for South Korea’s first high-speed railway line, as well as the lo-
cation of the station and the path of the railway through the city. As of early 1995, the initial 
proposal called for a routing and station very close to Kyŏngju’s urban and historical core. 
When the Ministry of Culture publicly raised objections to this plan, it created a political 
aperture in which a host of demands and proposals by different actors – ranging from calls for 
the cancellation of the Kyŏngju station entirely on historical preservationist grounds, to de-
fence of the initial plan, to ideas for alternative Kyŏngju track and station locations –  became 
items of popular and technocratic debate. Eventually, a revised routing proposal, which 
maintained a Kyŏngju station while locating station and track along a pathway farther from 
the city centre, emerged from a coalition of Kyŏngju expert and civic organisations. Over the 
course of months, this revised routing and its advocates managed to coordinate urban politics 
and Kyŏngju things such that it became a sufficiently agreed-upon new design – an ‘obvious’ 
solution that somehow had not been obvious previously. 
The process of coordination by which many (if hardly all) initial pro- and anti-Kyŏngju 
station forces, and the versions of Kyŏngju for which they stood, arrived at a settlement was 
complicated and multi-agentive, and a fuller accounting is beyond the scope of this chapter 
(see Oppenheim 2008:139–194). Here, the focus is on a small group of selected normativities 
and on the coordinations that they articulated. In a classical ANT vein, such normativities 
were mediations that helped (partially) align and (partially) enrol some actants into support 
while (partially) deflecting some others. In a post-ANT mould, meanwhile, they were also 
scaling devices that specifically drew in scales taken as pregiven and desirable, which thus also 
‘folded’ in actors’ ‘theoretical’ prefiguration of the proper shape of a solution (Gad and Jensen 
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2010:73). With slight exaggeration of the clarity of the distinction, we might say that if the 
coordinating effect of normativities helped make the Kyŏngju railway solution make sense, 
their performance of compulsory scales helped invest this solution with something deeper 
and more affective: A ‘sense of appropriateness’ (Strathern 2004:10), an aesthetic forcefulness.
Global–national scaling from equivalence to connection
Both initial advocates and opponents of the routing of the high-speed railway through 
Kyŏngju invoked themes of the globalisation discourse of the era to imbed their arguments 
within claims on the proper global–national relationship. ‘The most Korean thing is the most 
global thing’ was heard, first and foremost, as a statement that South Korea was ready to em-
brace the world and deserved the world-class, not least in technology and infrastructure, and 
the high-speed railway became iconic of this new order (see, for instance, the cover image of 
Kongboch’ŏ 1995). For celebrants of the railway, it articulated regimes of equivalence: Japan, 
Germany, France, China and other advanced or powerful nations all had high-speed trains, 
and so too should South Korea. More subtly, however, the Korean–global pairing in this cen-
tral globalisation trope was also taken as a call for self-recognition that deeply Korean things 
were also (already) world class. Even as the train system would rely crucially on imported 
technology, the railway project was invested with historicity such that its realisation was pre-
ordained as a national achievement. Government officials and other boosters were wont to 
characterise the high-speed rail project as ‘the largest national undertaking since Tan’gun’ – 
since, that is, the mythological foundation of Korea itself legendarily five thousand years in 
the past. Beyond the economic benefits it might bring, for advocates of a Kyŏngju high-speed 
rail station it was both appropriate and an affirmation that South Korea’s world-class histori-
cal city should be included within a world-class historical enterprise.
Opponents of large-scale development in Kyŏngju, including initially those of the high-
speed railway station, questioned these supportive interrelations. At moments, they artic-
ulated a different version of global equivalence in which Kyŏngju’s potential world-class 
status figured as its participation in global practices of historic and natural preservation. 
Yet more often, and more simply, development opponents portrayed Kyŏngju’s national 
historical significance and its transformation according to a globalist agenda as inimical. 
One archaeologist turned the historicising formula of advocates on its head: Bringing the 
high-speed railway to Kyŏngju would be ‘the greatest destruction of cultural objects since 
Tan’gun’ (Yi 1996:282).
As planning and construction of the high-speed railway as a whole advanced in the late 
1990s, however, another icon, or normativity, of the railway’s significance began to cir-
culate. This vision of the railway deepened its efficacies in relation to the global and the 
national as compulsory scales of reference. In brief, it was one that redoubled the role of the 
high-speed railway not only as a symbol of South Korea’s global coming of age, but also as 
an actual future agent of global connection. Figuratively, this futurist manifesto took the 
form of portrayals of the railway as part of a ‘new Silk Road,’ or fantasies of future rail travel 
from Seoul to Paris (and somehow it was, very often, Paris). Visually, it took the form of 
maps that envisioned the South Korean rail line as part of a larger Eurasian rail network, via 
which one might eventually be able to travel from Pusan at South Korea’s southern tip over 
the Trans-Siberian Railway ultimately to a western European destination of one’s choosing. 
Because this potential of the high-speed railway presumed the presently (then and now) im-
possible act of traversing North Korea, it also redoubled the project’s aspect as an agent of na-
tional mission; it rendered national reunification in the future anterior and thus figured it as 
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an assumed future, as that which will have happened. For Kyŏngju in particular, this version 
of the high-speed railway made connection more urgent, since it turned the question from 
the city’s membership in a global club of culture cities to the potential of their physical com-
munion. It also drew upon the historical assemblage in which Silla chartered the once and 
future unification of Korea from the south, interpellating its successor, Kyŏngju, as proper 
coparticipant in this action. A decade later, a map bespeaking this future could be found on 
the wall of an equally significant site, the station at Torasan, the last station north of Seoul 
before the border with North Korea (Figure 30.1).
The scalar deepening of the high-speed railway’s global–national puissance helped make 
the railway irresistible, but it did so more by obviating conflictual politics, imposing a more 
multidimensional globalism over the concern of railway opponents, than by mediating con-
flict. Other normativities, however, would more directly intervene and rewire place in the 
process.
Coordinating objects, situating voice
The coalition of civic and expert organisations that took the lead in bringing about a reso-
lution to the 1995–1997 Kyŏngju high-speed rail dispute advocated for passage of the line 
through the city, but along a revised routing that would place the tracks and the Kyŏngju 
station farther from the central urban district. Crucial in the ultimate success of this proposal 
were several circulating normativities. In this subsection, two are considered: The wanggyŏng 
(‘royal capital’) as visual icon and tapsa (‘field study’) as verifying empirical ritual. These were 
nodes at which positions, and differing assemblages of Kyŏngju, were mediated, at which 
their objects crossed and intermingled and thus at which the active and potential relation-
ships among assemblages constitutive of Kyŏngju place as such were recast. They also drew 
upon and drew in multiple normative scales, largely through the mechanism of their own 
multiplicity.
By the time of the dispute, the local had gained depth as a compulsory scale of reference in 
Kyŏngju. Among other developments, resident amateur historians and other cultural actors 
Figure 30.1  Trans Eurasian Railway Network map, Torasan station, 2007.  Photo by author
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created new civic festivals that positioned themselves as being by residents, for residents – 
as opposed to tourists or state legitimation. These events celebrated the Kyŏngju taun, the 
‘Kyŏngju-appropriate’ or even ‘Kyŏngju-like,’ which thus gained currency as an ideological 
lodestone alongside ‘the global’ and ‘the national’ as cited in the reversible couplets of 1990s 
globalisation discourse.
The revised routing solution to the Kyŏngju railway controversy mediated initial pro- and 
anti-Kyŏngju routing sentiment by spatially dividing the city into a zone from which railway 
development should be excluded on historical and archaeological preservation grounds and an 
exterior zone in which it would be permissible. The key conceptual–historical object invoked 
to effect this spatial sorting was the wanggyŏng or ‘royal capital,’ the precinct at the heart of 
the ancient Silla capital city and thus the site of many of its treasures. By proposing a station 
and routing outside the wanggyŏng, advocates proposed to arrest a trajectory of historical de-
struction; at the same time, the wanggyŏng implicitly defined areas outside itself as of lesser 
historical significance and thus appropriate for developments of all kinds. Thus did the wang-
gyŏng coordinate conflicting assemblage politics and reassemble Kyŏngju. At the same time, 
the wanggyŏng gained some of its force and logical plausibility in Kyŏngju by drawing upon the 
moral universe of the ‘Kyŏngju-appropriate.’ The wanggyŏng was itself multiple, and among 
its versions were a specific vista over the central city from a nearby mountain frequented es-
pecially by local historians and cultural enthusiast groups, a panoramic icon in the form of a 
poster of a painting done by a Kyŏngju artist that portrayed the ancient Silla wanggyŏng in all 
its glory from roughly the same imagined perspective, and a rule-of-thumb rendition as the 
area within the ring of five mountains (oak) that surround central Kyŏngju (Kang 1996b:59). 
In order to grasp the wanggyŏng railway solution and to feel its claims, residents could variously 
look down while hiking, look at their walls and look up while downtown.
In the course of promoting this wanggyŏng mediation, the revised routing solution also co-
ordinated procedures and participation in such a way as to insist upon the appropriateness of, 
and impart itself with the quality of, a greater degree of local Kyŏngju citizens’ involvement 
in planning the railway through their own city. This coordination hinged in significant part 
on the polysemy of the practice of tapsa. Tapsa literally means ‘field study’ and includes the sort 
of site visits engineers might make, but also includes the historiographical act, enframed by a 
metaphysical ideology of encounter, of travelling to historical monuments or sites in order to 
experience the past more directly. In this latter mode, tapsa had long been one of the signature 
procedures of resident amateur historians hiking the cultural landscape of Kyŏngju and the 
basis of their claim to know and represent the ‘Kyŏngju-appropriate.’ In the Kyŏngju railway 
debate, defenders of the initial planned line at first responded to advocates of the revised 
routing by noting that the established plan had been subject to field inspection – a tapsa – by 
development planners, while the revised routing had not. Revised line advocates responded 
by questioning the validity of any tapsa that involved only central development planners and 
not resident historians or professors at Kyŏngju universities, whose local knowledge they thus 
placed on par with planners’ technical expertise (Kang 1996a: 9). And when, some months 
later, a highly public tapsa of routing options was undertaken, it prominently featured a bal-
ance of types of experts in which Kyŏngju local knowledge was well represented (Kyŏngju Sin-
mun 1996). As the wanggyŏng had done with embodied Kyŏngju perspective, tapsa coordinated 
positions in part by pulling in a newly valorised world of local practice.
At the same time, however, other coexisting versions of the wanggyŏng and tapsa worked 
to enrol or neutralise still other divergent positions and versions of Kyŏngju and also, simul-
taneously, to draw in cosmopolitical imperatives cast at a more national scale. Nationwide 
professional archaeological and historians’ organisations had been among the strongest initial 
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opponents of any routing of the high-speed railway; they tended to reiterate Kyŏngju’s signif-
icance to national history and identity, which implicitly trumped resident agendas. Towards 
this audience, there was another version of the wanggyŏng, itself an artefact of archaeological 
and philological synthesis: A grid plan reconstruction of the Silla wanggyŏng first undertaken 
by a colonial-era Japanese historical scholar and an object of discussion within specialised aca-
demic writing since then. While this redoubled the wanggyŏng as sorting mechanism through 
yet another visualisation, it more subtly also reiterated the value of nationally scaled academic 
expertise as such by enfolding it within a specialised academic knowledge artefact. The case 
of tapsa was yet clearer. At the time of the railway controversy, the dominant depiction of the 
practice nationwide was a series of bestselling books by the art historian Yu Hongjun, Na 
ŭi munhwa yusan tapsagi (The Chronicle of My Field Study of Cultural Remains) (Yu 1993). 
This series posited personal visitation and investigation of Korea’s historical sites as a new 
project of critical-democratic national citizenship, a way for individuals to work beyond the 
pabulum and manipulation of history under preceding authoritarian regimes. The prominent 
role of tapsa in the resolution of the Kyŏngju high-speed railway also carried the suggestion 
that it would be animated by this same democratic empiricism.
Conclusion
Visualisations of the wanggyŏng and the trans-Eurasian railway of the future, as well as oblig-
atory procedures such as tapsa, were nodes at which different versions of Kyŏngju and the 
high-speed railway were crossed and activated in relation to one another, recasting place rela-
tions of actuality and potentiality. The habits and vantage points of Kyŏngju amateur history 
were drawn into the question of the line’s routing through the city, while Silk Road histories 
and futures became part of the high-speed railway as a whole. Circulating normativities 
worked in effecting coordination by speaking to multiple audiences through their own mul-
tiplicity. Different renditions of the wanggyŏng made the sorting of zones for preservation and 
development make sense for everyone from specialised archaeologists to walkers in the city; 
the polyreferentiality of tapsa sutured authority across a similar range. The rendition of the 
South Korean high-speed railway as a segment within a future continent-spanning network 
shifted it from being only an agent of international technologist competition – a value that 
could be countered with the proposition that countries can also compete to preserve their 
history – to one that also promised connection, which had no easy riposte.
Yet, the hinterlands drawn together in the course of the Kyŏngju railway issue included 
some that bore the colour of scalar participation, which carried along projects of realising one 
or more compulsory scales. Resolving the dispute was not merely about resolving technical 
questions – where the line should run, and who should be empowered to verify the decision. 
It was also about crafting a vision of appropriate politics and an appropriately multiscalar 
Kyŏngju, which would be world class and locally responsive, an avatar of global communion 
and an icon of (South) Korean cultural achievement along with once-and-future (re)unifica-
tion, in a suitable mix. This is not to reinstate analytically prior scales (global/national/local, 
macro/micro or whatever) as contexts, but it is to recognise that classical ANT advice to fol-
low the actors as the actors engage in scaling implies an open-endedness to this process that 
is frequently foreign to actors themselves. To account for actors’ reflexivity in scale-making 
is to account for their touchstones, pregiven scalar commitments to which the performativity 
of their versions of assemblage is tethered, as well as the cosmopolitical force that successful 
navigation of these touchstones can impart to the act of coordination. To treat such scalar 
touchstones as (pre-)packaged within and articulated through circulating entities, such as the 
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‘circulating normativities’ of this chapter, meanwhile, is to foreground the possibility of 
folding post-ANT concerns with aesthetics and theoretical recursion back into a more clas-
sical ANT processualism. The problem with ‘following the actors’ is the futurelessness that 
the trailing metaphor, left unexamined, implies – a futurelessness that is not a property of 
the actors’ own action. Thus, one may indeed follow the actors, but only provided that one 
remembers to follow them also to and through their (ethical, aesthetic or cosmopolitical) 
anticipations and orientations.
Note
 1 ‘Post-ANT,’ here, invokes several implications of my approach developed by Gad and Jensen 
(2010:72–74). First, they identify post-ANT with Marilyn Stathern’s (1991: xvi) ‘postplurality,’ 
one consequence of which is an attentiveness to the recursive participation of actors’ ‘theoretical’ 
mappings in ‘empirical’ processes – and thus, a dissolution (in the spirit of ANT commitments to 
symmetry) of priorist theoretical/empirical or theoretical/descriptive distinctions themselves. But 
the entanglements of theory also imply the entanglements of scholarship: A second consequence is 
that one cannot ‘follow the actors’ while escaping responsibility for following them in some direc-
tions and not others, as I do here and did in my original Kyŏngju study in making place and scale 
the point of the exercise rather than, for instance, seeking to offer my own solution to the city’s 
development woes.
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In early 2017, I went to the eastern frontier region of Paraguay to interview soybean farmers 
about their ongoing dispute over national agriculture regulations. Soy is not only the most 
extensive export crop in South America, it is one of the most economically significant crops 
globally, providing most of the world’s animal feed, edible oils and preservatives, along with 
hundreds of industrial by-products (Du Bois et al. 2008). Modern, chemical-intensive, soy 
farming is by far the largest contributor to the Paraguayan economy, and over the last 20 years, 
it has been responsible for huge environmental and social changes, including deforestation, 
land concentration and the creation of a new wealthy class of farmers, most of them Brazilian 
migrants.1 It is not surprising that soybeans should be one of the most controversial things in 
Paraguayan public discourse, what in actor-network theory is commonly called a ‘matter of 
concern’ (Latour 2004). But one of the things that struck me in my interviews was how often, 
when asked why soybeans had generated such widespread controversy, farmers made reference 
to a single event, the death of a young boy from pesticide poisoning 14 years previously.
I had heard about the case of Silvino Talavera from environmental justice activists in 
Paraguay, but it had been years since it had come up in those circles. And yet here were the 
soy farmers themselves still talking about it as a historical rupture in their relationship with 
soy and the state. After a court found Talavera’s neighbour guilty of negligence in Silvino’s 
death, these farmers believed that they were the victims in the case, which had pitted new 
social movements against them, created the regulatory landscape they were still fighting and 
even helped elect a president they despised.2 Silvino had died of ‘natural causes,’ they told 
me (often with awkward caveats like ‘that doesn’t mean it wasn’t a tragedy’), and belief to the 
contrary was a sign of both Paraguayan ignorance and corruption.
Silvino’s death was a political event in the sense meant by Jacques Rancière (1999), in 
that it disrupted the way people made sense of the world. To most Paraguayans, prior to 
that, soy had seemed like one agrarian product among many, and the many pesticides used 
to grow it simply part of the farmer’s toolkit. Afterwards, soy had become what Timothy 
Morton (2013) calls a ‘hyperobject,’ a massive, harmful thing, with limits that were hard to 
define, and relations that were hard to account for.3 As such, it was also the source of endless 
31
How can ANT trace slow- 
moving environmental harms 




Can ANT trace slow-moving environmental harms?
concerns and controversies, and failed attempts to define the problems it created or to solve 
them with regulations.
This case is instructive for ANT for at least two reasons. On the one hand, it demonstrates 
how situations become eventful, and, by extension, how mere things become matters of con-
cern. It suggests that attention to the temporality of such things helps us to see how publics are 
generated around environmental harms (Marres 2010). By highlighting some recent theoreti-
cal crossings between ANT and Jacques Rancière (1999), this essay helps to explain how much 
effort it takes to make certain things public, and helps to see the role of activists and criminal 
courts in that effort. If the history of environmental problems in the 20th century has taught 
us anything, it is that the creeping harms of late industrialism are very hard to make visible (cf. 
Fortun 2012). This essay suggests that ANT’s recent engagements with contemporary envi-
ronmental politics have much to tell us about why this is so. In doing so, it also offers ANT a 
way of heeding more carefully the delicate line that separates the uneventful from the eventful.
eventfulness
In the last 15 years, Bruno Latour has made a forceful pitch to rethink the politics of ANT 
around what he calls dingpolitics, a form of democratic contention organised not only around 
ideas, deliberation or facts, but around what he calls ‘matters of concern,’ those lively things 
that have presented themselves as problems (Latour 2005). Starting with the Politics of Nature 
(2004a), much of this work is presented as a kind of recipe for radical democratic inclusive-
ness of the non-human, and increasingly a way for ANT to engage in ‘ecologization.’ The 
argument goes that since there can be no objective ‘nature’ to which we can refer unequivo-
cally in environmental politics, and therefore no final experts or spokespeople for a singular 
universe, politics ought to be organised around a plurality of voices speaking for things. In 
other places, Latour (2004b) has called this a ‘cosmopolitics,’ building primarily on Isabelle 
Stengers’ (2010) work. If traditional cosmopolitanism is the rejection of parochial politics 
among inhabitants of a singular cosmos, then for Stengers, cosmopolitics further rejects the 
parochial ontology of such a universe and asks us to be involved in the production of multi-
ple worlds (see Savransky, this volume). Latour proposes a ‘due process’ for this cosmopoli-
tics, inviting multiple representatives of matters of concern into metaphorical ‘parliament of 
things’ which attempts to ‘compose a common world’ (Harman 2014).
It is tempting to apply Latour’s vision of multiplying dialogues to a situation like the 
Paraguayan soy boom, where different people have quite different senses of what soy is and 
what kinds of harms it perpetrates, particularly when one of the primary contenders is rou-
tinely disqualified from official politics. Peasants speaking an indigenous language, living on 
a frontier in a country that most consumers of soybeans can barely place on a map, are rarely 
listened to, particularly if their opinions don’t sit comfortably within a standard political on-
tology. But ANT’s rush to embrace new entities and connections is also, potentially, its blind 
spot. Latour’s parliament of things, for instance, tends to understate the enormous difficulty 
of rendering something like soybeans public, to turn it into a matter of concern and, by ex-
tension, of allowing peasants to be its spokespeople (see Marres 2007). As Watson (2011) has 
argued, while Latour’s parliament breaks down divides between the social and the natural, it 
tends to do so while (still, inadvertently) privileging the authority of science, and dismissing 
the kinds of oppositionality that is central to subaltern politics. This is why it is important to 
pay attention to those moments when new beings are admitted in public discussion, and see 
what sorts of  spokespeople emerge alongside them. 
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A focus on events, in addition to things, is very much in keeping with Latour’s conception 
of networks. Like Stengers, Latour borrows from Whitehead an underlying ‘occasionalist’ 
metaphysics, which sees propositions as ‘occasions given to different entities to enter into 
contact’ (Harman 2009: 79–82; Latour 1999: 141). Part of the charisma of Latourian ontol-
ogy is the irrepressible profusion of relations, as new entities arise from such occasions all 
the time. But as Marilyn Strathern (1996) points out, actor-networks do not go on forever. 
They are, at different moments, ‘cut’ in the act of observation, interpretation and narration, 
and cuts are just as consequential as connections.4 Events, I suggest, are one kind of cut: 
Occasions for new forms of relating which simultaneously produce a rupture in other rela-
tions. In doing so, they also produce a temporal distinction between a past and a future, and 
a specificity that allows them to be reiterated into the future (see Wagner-Pacifici 2017). Or, 
to follow Stengers (2015: 39), an ‘event … brings the future that will inherit from it into 
communication with a past narrated differently.’
A brief discussion of a technical aspect of the modern soybean industry helps to make this 
clear. The Paraguayan soy boom really took off after 1999, when farmers began to plant a 
new variant known as Roundup Ready, the first commercially available genetically modi-
fied crop. The biotech industry that created them is built around the ability to patent living 
organisms that they have engineered. More precisely, though, biotech patents ‘events,’ the 
name for any identifiable gene mutation which reiterates itself through an organism’s repro-
duction. Thus, Roundup Ready soybeans bear the genetic echo of a temporal rupture in 
the soybeans’ genealogy, produced and patented by Monsanto engineers. If the event is thus 
partly a result of new sets of relations occasioned in the lab, property in the event is derived 
from further cutting of relations (to other soybeans, for instance, to previous genetic knowl-
edge, and to the people working in the cafeteria at the lab) in order to isolate a patentable 
difference.
But genetic modification is eventful beyond the strictly genetic sense. When these new 
food crops appeared, they also produced knowledge controversies around the world, with 
environmentalists arguing that genetic modification posed risks to human health, to crop 
biodiversity, to independent farms or even to ecosystems broadly. In a series of cases brought 
before the Environmental Protection Agency in the United States, crop scientists argued that 
genetic modification did not substantially change the nature of the organisms in question, 
and therefore should not be subjected to further regulatory restrictions. Essentially, they ar-
gued that genetic modification may have produced a genetic event, sufficient for the recogni-
tion of property rights, but not an environmental, nor public health one, which would entail 
further public oversight (Schurman and Kelso 2005). Nonetheless, in other jurisdictions, the 
controversy over genetic engineering was successfully made eventful. Stengers herself names 
the struggle over GMOs as paradigmatically eventful, not just because it produced various 
regulatory changes within the European Union (EU), but because it ‘made both scientific 
experts and … politicians think, as if a world of problems that they had never posed was be-
coming visible to them’ (2015: 39).
I suggest that Rancière’s (1999) notion of the political, as moments of ‘disruption’ or inter-
ruptions in a given distribution of the sensible, is a useful way to think about how we might 
identify such events.5 For Rancière, novel associations are precisely not given in the way that 
Latour might have it, because specific distributions of bodies are held in place by regimes of 
visibility, or what Rancière refers to as ‘police,’ rather than politics. What Rancière allows us 
to see here is the effort that goes into bringing new beings into view.6 Indeed, I would sug-
gest that the event, which first allowed biotech companies to patent living organisms (a US 
supreme court decision known as Diamond vs. Chakrabarty, in 1980), is paradigmatically 
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political in Rancière’s sense, because it produced what he would call a ‘scandal in thinking,’ 
evidenced by the many denunciations of ‘Frankenfoods’ that followed (Whatmore 2002). 
In other words, the political event here is not the genetic event produced in the lab, but the 
court case which made certain kinds of genetic mutations into a form of capital. Those who 
benefited from their new rights to own property in genetic events then set about trying to 
police further disruptions to the distribution of these new organisms, disruptions that might 
have limited the profits they could derive from them.
As Alain Badiou (2005) has it, an event produces a rupture with the context that pro-
duces it. But Rancière takes this further, suggesting that events enable new languages (see 
 Papastergiadis 2014), like Frankenfoods. Only then do occasions produce what Povinelli 
(2011) refers to as their own interpretive frame, making it possible to narrate the event as a 
separation of before and after (Wagner-Pacifici 2017). It’s this second order of interpretation, 
and iteration that makes events necessarily a public affair. Here, Noortje Marres’ (2010) 
provocative work on the assembly of publics is useful. Instead of understanding publics as ab-
stract spaces of deliberation, she favours the notion of ad hoc groupings that coalesce around 
issues or objects which affect people in a way that requires systematic attention (ibid: 191). 
Publics, for Marres, are ‘heterogenous assemblages’ formed around any sort of harm that im-
plicates a wide variety of actors for collective intervention (Marres 2007: 768).7 Elaborating 
somewhat, the key here is that publics are not formed by people around things or relations per 
se, but by harms which implicate people, who then go on to reiterate those harms as events. 
And this finally offers us a clue as to why criminal courts are such key sites of struggle 
for so many activist movements, despite the obvious problem that court cases are so rarely 
effective for redressing widely distributed harms, and, as an extension of the police, are con-
servative with regard to the existing distribution of things. What the Talavera case shows so 
well is that law, and criminal law in particular, is a potent site for the production of events. 
As Latour (2010) himself pointed out, law does not produce facts (in the way that science 
does) but rather judgements, which are made by linking a series of texts produced by a par-
ticular circumstance (some of which might be scientific) to a larger body of texts, including 
legislation and past judgements, that together constitute existing law. Internally, law changes 
through judgement events (precedents), similar to DNA mutations, as these are reiterated in 
future legal settings. But legal tinkering with eventfulness can also come to exceed law and 
the courtroom. Creating a discourse whereby particular circumstances come to fit, or not, a 
repertoire of criminal narratives, can produce a kind of public amplification – one powerful 
node along which Marres’ heterogeneous assemblages come to be assembled. In that sense, 
the court’s actual judgements may not matter as much as the way proposals assembled for the 
court contribute to the construction of an event.
The temporality of natural causes
At 7 am on January 2nd, 2003, Petrona Villasboa de Talavera sent her 11-year-old son  Silvino 
out with his cousin to the local corner store. It was already very hot, and a key point in the 
day when both domestic and agrarian work was being carried out in anticipation of the 
midday heat. So when Silvino was riding his bike home along the dirt road, his neighbour, 
 Hermann Schlender, was out spraying his soybeans. Schlender drove too close to the road; 
one of the wings on his sprayer passed over Silvino’s head, dousing him in a mix of herbicide 
and insecticide. Later that night, the whole family fell ill with debilitating stomach cramps, 
vomiting and diarrhoea. Everyone recovered after a few days, except for Silvino, who was 
finally brought to a local health post on January 7th, where the doctor diagnosed him as 
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having been intoxicated with organophosphates. He was dangerously dehydrated, but the 
health post had no saline solution with which to treat him. Over the course of the day, he 
was transferred to another health centre and finally to a regional hospital, where he died that 
afternoon.8
All of this happened in the epicentre of the soy boom, where migrant farmers from Brazil 
had been resettling to for two decades. Because soy is a high-intensity, mechanised crop, 
it also has dramatic local effects in places like eastern Paraguay that had previously been 
dominated by forests and small-scale peasant farms.9 It was now a centre of new wealth and 
cutting-edge technology. But the transformation had excluded families like the Talaveras 
who had been living there much longer but could not afford the upfront costs of this kind 
of agriculture. One of the major controversies that followed from the case was around who 
bore responsibility for protecting families like his, living in small, permeable shacks, from 
soy’s various risks to human health, particularly the widespread use of Roundup herbicide 
necessitated by Roundup Ready beans.
It is not that peasant families like Silvino’s hadn’t been complaining for years about soy 
farms, even decrying them as violent. But despite the comparatively rapid advance of the 
frontier, soy’s violence is slow, in the sense meant by Rob Nixon (2011: 6): ‘calamities that pa-
tiently dispense their devastation while remaining outside of our flickering attention spans.’10 
Soy’s violence creeps up on you like the smell of Roundup wafting onto your patio just be-
fore breakfast. Or like the shift from precarious employment to chronic unemployment. For 
a population that has fought poverty for generations, that has endured brutal military and 
police repression, it is hard to get many people excited, to get them to notice even, the slow 
accumulation of rashes, headaches, cancers and birth defects that seem to cluster around soy 
fields. The same is true of the general, cumulative effects of poverty, which is also uneventful. 
Poor health and diet, labour insecurity, poor education, crumbling infrastructure, displace-
ment, high rates of infection, injury, violence and mortality, all predate soy. These do not 
rise, as Elizabeth Povinelli (2011) puts it, to the level of event, because they are part of the 
cruddy and cumulative effects of abandonment. From an experiential point of view, the soy 
frontier primarily entails an intensification of these cruddy, cumulative conditions, and each 
rash and each day spent home from school are merely ‘quasi-events‘ that ‘confound response’ 
(ibid: 144). It is not hard to relegate these effects to the background of rural experience. But 
this is why the death of a small boy is so potentially disruptive. On its own terms, deaths 
always produce cuts for someone. Separated out from the merely cumulative, the story of a 
death is easily repeated, and invites others to see it as eventful.
In the trial, this attribution of responsibility boiled down to the question of whether 
 Silvino had died because of Schlender’s actions, or because of ‘natural causes.’ In some ways, 
then, the trial recapitulated what Latour (1993) has called the ‘modern constitution,’ the 
ontological premise that human and natural causes belong to different realms. I argue that 
the invocation of natural causes is also an argument about time. Human agency has its own 
time – and for anyone to be found culpable of a criminal act (indeed, for a criminal act to ex-
ist at all), they need first be thought of as events rather than merely as iterations of an ongoing 
and unexceptional process called ‘nature.’
In the trial, then, the invocation of ‘natural causes’ is a statement about uneventfulness, or, to 
use a language closer to Rancière’s, it is the means of policing the reigning distribution of the 
sensible. This is why for the trial lawyers as well, the distinction between nature and poverty 
is hazy. The prosecution argued that the toxic exposure was negligible and that Silvino had 
died from ‘malnutrition,’ or perhaps food poisoning due to the house’s unsanitary conditions, 
both of which were considered ‘natural.’ In his guilty ruling, the judge acknowledged that 
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there were two kinds of causes for the death at play, but reversed their significance. ‘We are not 
talking about a NORMAL boy, who is well-nourished and strong,’ he wrote in the ruling, and 
for this reason one should be sceptical of the claims by industry spokespeople that the chemicals 
could not have killed him. For him, Silvino’s poverty was a background condition that added 
to the responsibility of those spraying dangerous substances. What the defence called a natural 
cause, the judge turned into the context for Schlender’s negligence, which stuck out as part of a 
particular event. This was the basis for the first ruling of guilt against Schlender.
Disqualification
If the court’s institutional function in cases like this is to judge whether or not an event has 
occurred, the way it proceeds is primarily through disqualifying potential narratives. ANT 
readers are used to beginning their analysis from an injunction against disqualification. In 
his essay on facts and fetishes, for instance, Latour (1999) shows how the figure of the fe-
tish functions as a form of accusation through which the fetishist is disqualified for making 
an ontological category error by ascribing divinity or agency to a mere thing. Stengers 
(2010) takes this further, showing that there is a direct relationship between the absence of 
non- humans in politics and the disqualification from political speech of those deemed non- 
rational.  Operationalised in the criminal court, this kind of disqualification takes the shape 
of attacking the credibility of witnesses and the evidence that they produce.11
When the case against Schlender reached its second appeal, in 2005, the defence at-
tacked the physical evidence that had been presented by the prosecution. In lurid detail, 
backed up by the explanations of 11 biochemists, the defence went after both the clinical 
assessment of local doctors and the various substances extracted from Silvino’s corpse and 
from his surviving family members. None of the original lab reports could be trusted, 
they argued, because the materials had been mishandled from the outset. A full necropsy 
hadn’t been performed on Silvino’s body because the family didn’t have the resources to 
do so right away, and as per Paraguayan custom, he had been buried within 24 hours of his 
death. Tissue samples were only taken, therefore, after the body had been in the ground for 
a week. The local doctor had written in his report that he suspected Silvino to have been 
intoxicated with organophosphates, a highly toxic class of insecticides which were not 
found on the farm. The same doctor (who had been unable to find saline solution the day of 
Silvino’s death) had also apparently used saline solution to preserve tissue samples from the 
autopsy, which had further degraded the samples and undermined lab results. The defence 
mocked the doctor’s incompetence both for having an unstable supply of saline solution in 
his clinic and for not being an expert pathologist. The family came in for even less subtle 
disqualification, as trace amounts of chemicals in their blood were attributed to the family’s 
lack of personal hygiene, their inability to wash their clothes daily and inadequacy of their 
storage for household insecticides. 
Silvino’s body, and the household he lived in, was too poor to offer a reliable account of 
events, and so too was the minimal public health infrastructure of the town. Even the judges 
would later be accused of being parochial and corrupt. The true stakes of the ‘natural cause’ 
argument now become sharper. In the first instance, nature, including poverty, was a state of 
uneventfulness. Having lost this argument, the defence returned again, arguing that poverty 
made everyone and everything around Silvino’s body incapable of bearing witness to that 
event. They were disqualified for living in conditions where expertise, or even reliable subjec-
tivity, was impossible. Whatever the case, not only did poverty and ignorance kill Silvino, pov-
erty and ignorance also made the network around Silvino incapable of speaking on his behalf.
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This tells us a lot about why criminal courts, on their own terms, are not very good at 
dealing with economic inequality or environmental injustice. Povinelli’s distinction, be-
tween the cruddy and the eventful, is not just a matter of temporal perception (this would 
be Nixon’s argument), it is a partition of time that is held in place by the courts themselves. 
As Javier Auyero and Deborah Swistun (2009) argue in their remarkable book about lead 
contamination in an Argentine slum, these are common features of environmental justice 
cases. Poverty is the perfect alibi, because it not only distributes causes across a range of sites, 
it also fogs the accounting practices on which the court depends for disentangling one cause 
from another.
The judge who heard the second appeal showed just how uncertain any of the facts of 
the case remained. Sentencing Schlender to two years in prison for criminal negligence, 
he then immediately suspended the sentence and allowed Schlender to go home.12 Silvino’s 
family, and the now massive network of lawyers, activists and supporters gathered around 
them, declared this a compounding injustice. But injustice or not, they had accomplished 
what in retrospect was a far more impressive goal, and which all those supporters embodied: 
a new public had been born of disruption. More interesting than what went on in the trial, 
the facts presented, the expertise marshalled and the decisions reached, was everything that 
happened around the trial. Fourteen years later, no one I spoke to ever brought up Hermann 
Schlender’s name, and few remembered Silvino’s. But they could narrate the event in detail, 
and bristle about the new language it had created: agroquímicos (agrichemicals) had become 
agrotóxicos (agrotoxins), biotecnología (biotechnology) had become transgénicos (transgenics) and 
productores (producers) had become sojeros (soy farmers). And what assembled these objects, 
which together were (perhaps) capable of killing a boy who was not Schlender, but soy itself. 
The abiding slogan from the Talavera case is la soja mata, soy kills.
Disqualification as ethnographic opportunity
The literature on environmental justice is full of stories such as this one, written by activist 
academics drawn to the charismatic stories of communities rising up against corporate pol-
luters. And yet as Auyero and Swistun (2009) point out, most environmental harm does not 
produce such disruptions. Instead, it further disqualifies those affected from speaking about 
their own marginality. Recent ethnographic work, sitting somewhere between ANT and 
political economy, has begun to correct this, providing us with careful portraits of the com-
plexities of environmental harm, and the many lines that lie between disqualification and 
eventfulness (De la Cadena 2015; Li 2014; Lyons 2016; Tironi and Rodriguez-Giralt 2017). 
Above all, these sorts of studies have shown how difficult it is to isolate the relationships and 
to generate simple solutions. Soy is a perfect instantiation of this problem. It cannot be tried 
in a courtroom, isolated in a lab or regulated on the basis of inherent properties. It is not 
a proximate agent in Silvino’s death nor in any other grave harm – the way, for instance, 
Schlender or Roundup or even Salmonella might be. But nor is it so diffuse as to be entirely 
dismissed as ‘nature,’ the way poverty is. Instead, it is somewhere in between, a ‘hyperobject,’ 
hard to delimit, but also clearly present, offering footholds for activists to make it eventful.
The same is true of an environmentally engaged dingpolitics, for which such environmen-
tal actors, and their awkward, stuttering temporality, offer an ethnographic opportunity. In 
contrast to earlier iterations of ANT, which contented themselves with tracing the occasions 
for the emergence of all sorts of new beings, this new project tells the stories of those beings 
that have already broken through disqualification to disrupt the distribution of the sensible. 
In doing so, it directly engages with the tyranny of those powerful ways of thinking that 
335
Can ANT trace slow-moving environmental harms?
hold relations of violence in place by calling them ‘natural.’ That project need not hew to 
a particular ideological line, nor does it come with a guaranteed slate of answers. Instead, 
it does something more subtle, as criminal courts sometimes do, by amplifying disruptions 
already underway.
Notes
 1 For an overview, see Hetherington 2013; Fogel and Riquelme 2005.
 2 Fernando Lugo was Paraguay’s first leftist president, elected from 2008 to 2012, on a promise, 
among other things, to improve environmental regulations and protections for the rural poor.
 3 This is somewhat different than the formulation of object multiplicity more common in ANT (for 
example, Law 2004; Mol 2002). Soy is multiple as well (Hetherington 2014), but what is at stake 
in making soy public is less a struggle to define soy differently, as it is to be overwhelmed by its 
excessiveness.
 4 Latour might object that the very act of cutting creates its own connections – that the repression 
of hybrids generates new ones (esp. Latour 1993). But in the sorts of struggles we are talking about, 
the question of who is trying to create connections and who is trying to cut them is consequential.
 5 A similar line of argument has been taken up by Marisol de la Cadena (2015) and  Marrero- Guillamon 
(2016).
 6 Rancière’s primary concern here is with human actions, but there’s no reason why we needn’t think 
of such disruptions beyond human agency (Bennett 2010: 105–107; Marrera-Guillamon 2016).
 7 Marres follow’s John Dewey’s pragmatic conception of publics here.
 8 For a full recounting, see https://kurtural.com/cicatrices/.
 9 Although this effect can be found throughout South America, it is especially acute in Paraguay, 
where rural inequality is more pronounced and regulations less strict (Hetherington 2013).
 10 As in Nixon’s usage, I only evoke this general ‘us’ as a first approximation of the various tempos 
of environmental violence and the way they can be taken up and made perceptually available – or 
publicly recognisable – by political action. 
 11 This well-known tactic for discounting the knowledge of affected populations which Wynne 
(1991) called the ‘cognitive deficit model’ of public understanding of science. 
 12 ‘Suspension’ meant transforming the sentence into a period of probation, conditional on his not 
reoffending. Since two years had already passed, the probation was deemed to have been served.
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What is the size of an actor-networked nature?
The question indicated in this chapter’s title immediately made me want to ask back: Is this 
not precisely the kind of question that actor-network theory (ANT) does not ‘allow’ for? 
That of questioning and troubling categories of scale like the local, the national and the 
global is core to what ANT is about. Put a little differently, to presuppose that there is some-
thing we could call local, national or global natures is to take for granted precisely what ANT 
would start questioning right from the start.
This side to ANT is not a hidden mystery. To the contrary, it is something those who 
have become renowned for inventing the theory have always been quite explicit about. Take, 
for instance, Bruno Latour and his ‘The flat-earthers of social theory’ from 1996 where the 
flat-earthers are precisely himself and colleagues:1 ‘Look at those flat-earthers! They do not 
have the modesty of interactionists. They claim to account for big things as well as for small 
talks, for agencies as well as for structures’ (Latour, 1996, p. xii). But how then, we must ask, 
do these flat-earthers claim to account for these things? The answer is ‘[l]ocal interactions, 
plus objects and instruments, plus number of connections, plus accounting procedures! That’s 
all there is in their Meccano’ (Latour, 1996, p. xvi). The point then is not that everything 
is local, but how something may become larger – by way of instruments and connections.2 
Hence, instruments (as well as theories) are performative and produce size that was not there 
to begin with.
Even though the intervention from the flat-earthers of actor-network theorists was 
 directed to sociologists in particular, Latour is perfectly right when it comes to the flat-
earthers’ immodesty. ANT is not a theory trying to encompass simply the social in a different 
way, but also nature and the natural.
As in Latour’s account again:
…if you wish to go further and shift from the social to natural sciences and start talking 
about the geography of Britain, the hydrography of France, or the meteorology of 
 Germany, they [the flat-earthers] will answer by showing you geologists drawings maps 
of Britain; you will learn everything about instrument networks along French rivers; 
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and instead of the weather above Munich, they will list the satellites and weather stations 
and computers that ‘make up’ the meteorological charts and draw the polar fronts on 
your evening newspaper.
(Latour, 1996, p. xiii)
Hence, the performativity thesis goes for nature as well, that is, the size of nature is not sim-
ply there to begin with, but made by way of instruments and connections.
So we might conclude already here; from an ANT perspective, the perspective of ‘the 
flat-earthers,’ the aforementioned question is downright impossible to answer or, worse, not 
even the slightest interesting.
From describing to troubling actor-network theory
But maybe there is something interesting to this question after all? Perhaps precisely the 
aforementioned question might help us with not only describing ANT, but also with seriously 
engaging with troubling and questioning it? What I will be doing in the following is to keep 
carrying this initial question with me, first in relating to it more indirectly, and then later, 
towards the end of this contribution, to answer it more directly. However, in order to answer 
this question well, I suggest we trace what nature does for ANT, that is, what kinds of inqui-
ries and questions it has allowed for.
My take on this will be to do this through different versions. I will attend closely to Bruno 
Latour’s work from the late 1990s. This was the point in time where ANT proponents, nota-
bly Latour, started explicitly to relate to questions that had to do with ecology and environ-
mentalism. Hence, this was not so much the nature that emerged in laboratories, but rather 
the natures that appeared beyond laboratories and became part of a politics of nature – that 
is, in political controversy. However, in order to grasp this move towards an explicit politics 
of nature, it is both needed and useful to read the move in light of earlier work and debates.
Allowing for nature: a baseline version of actor-network theory
To be clear, ANT was already very well equipped to do this move into politics of nature 
as ANT proponents had from its very beginnings criticised conventional social sciences for 
their ways of ‘escaping’ nature and all things ‘natural’ for the benefit of sticking solely to social 
categories. The turn and escape to ‘the social’ on the part of social sciences could be under-
stood; it was reasoned, in light of the fight against positivism and the fear to be swallowed by 
an imperialist natural science in the late 19th century.
But the result of this fight, where the social sciences handed over ‘nature’ to the natural sci-
ences for the benefit of claiming jurisdiction over the social, was that the world became divided 
into disciplines in ways which did not reflect how the social and the natural in reality out there, 
outside disciplinary borders, is very much entangled.3 The point of departure for a follower of 
ANT would then be to acknowledge that society is composed just as much by the natural and 
the technical as by the social, and so to take this into account when doing social science.
Following this line of reasoning, one could argue that to keep doing social science with-
out taking nature into account equals doing bad science, or put differently, misrepresenting 
the world as it actually plays out – in the wild of socio-material controversies.4
To be sure, there certainly is and never was full agreement over this, not even in science 
and technology studies (STS). The book ‘Science as Practice and Culture,’ edited by Andrew 
Pickering (1992) allows for a very interesting entry point which has come to go under the 
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name of the chicken-debate. What would an ‘allowing for nature’ imply in practice? Would 
one not simply run the risk of losing all that which the tradition of the sociology of scientific 
knowledge had accomplished and now instead return to a version of positivism? That is, if 
one wanted to include nature and the natural in the social scientist’s equation and explana-
tion, how to do this without simply relying on the natural sciences which one had spent years 
finding means and approaches to interrogate and critically analyse by social science means?
Hence, one of the core objections to the ANT approach to nature from a sociology of 
scientific knowledge approach was that this would leave the social scientists to once again 
take what the natural sciences said about nature for granted. From another angle, meanwhile, 
critique came from feminist science studies, most notably as formulated by Donna Haraway 
(1997) along the line that ‘nature’ in the Latourian ANT version was a nature too much 
dominated by men and far from sufficiently lively.
To be clear, the notions I relied on earlier, namely ‘bad science’ and ‘bad representations,’ 
were never the actual wording by ANT scholars like Latour and others. But let me neverthe-
less use it here in order to highlight that there is indeed a moral to or in ANT. This ‘moral’ 
has to do with providing better descriptions and doing better science – and to facilitate a bet-
ter politics of nature. I will return to this later on. For now, we can simply state that a version 
one or perhaps a baseline version of what ANT allows for is to take nature into account in 
our social, or socio-material, analyses.
Re-inventing nature empirically
One both influential and controversial contribution by Michel Callon (1986), which has 
come to go under the name of the ‘scallop paper,’ was in fact a recipe (coming even with its 
own vocabulary) for pursuing such a procedure, i.e. allowing for nature in social analysis. 
The recipe was about not taking only social forces and actors into account but also the forces 
and agency (including resistance) of non-humans, scallops in this case.
As such, we could perhaps answer in the affirmative also when it comes to the question if 
ANT is good at taking local natures into account in the social scientist’s analysis and narrative. 
Because in one important and particular respect, the scallop paper does its nature-analysis 
in very much the same way as Latour (2007) would later argue was how actors engaged in 
environmental dispute, when we study them closely, always do. They always relate to nature 
in its concrete and, to use that word, local, specificity: It is always about that river, those trees, 
this pack of wolves. And in Callon’s case, the scallops of St. Brieuc Bay.
I will return to this crucial nature-point later. But first we must ask again if it makes sense 
or does justice to ANT to employ the label local nature. As I touched upon already earlier, what 
ANT allows for is rather to pose the question of scale as empirical questions. For instance, how 
far does a specific ‘local’ nature go or how far does it reach? Moreover, and not the least import-
ant, what enables this ‘nature’ to travel in the first place? What are the means by which nature 
or non-human entities and organisms are equipped or enabled to move or to grow? Hence, im-
portantly, when allowing for nature, it is not nature as such that is the entity ANT puts forward. 
In fact, it is quite problematic to equate ANT too quickly with any ‘material turn.’
Not a material turn, but a turn to words and  
things, a ‘nature-semiotics’
Scholars like Jane Bennett (2010) have been drawing on Latour in order to underpin and 
substantiate a material turn, a turn towards taking ‘vital materiality’ into account. However, 
Kristin Asdal
340
the materiality and the nature in ANT are close to always a nature mediated by instruments 
or devices. It is a nature that is equipped to move and to travel by way of a heterogeneous set 
of devices, such as graphs, maps, computers and documents.
ANT is a material-semiotic turn which does not live by any opposition between the  material, 
on the one hand, and the linguistic, discursive or semiotic, on the other. As is well-known, 
ANT borrowed enormously, not so much from sociology as from the humanities and  literary 
theory, more precisely a theory of semiotics, but also book-history (see e.g. Asdal and  Jordheim 
2018; Law 1999). But it did not do so in order to exchange the semiotic for the material, to 
exchange things for words. As Latour, for instance, writes in Pandora’s Hope (1999):
The old settlement started from a gap between words and the world, and then tried to 
construct a tiny footbridge over this chasm through a risky correspondence between 
what were understood as totally different ontological domains: language and nature. 
I want to show that there is neither correspondence, no gaps, nor even two distinct on-
tological claims but an entirely different phenomenon, circulating reference.
The point then is not to put two domains of language and nature in opposition, but rather 
to investigate how nature is enabled to move, to circulate, by way of, for instance, words 
inscribed into documents, maps, digital devices and so on. In doing this move, ANT does 
not only ask us to take nature into account, but also the means by which nature is taken into 
account and made available to us, as, for instance, by way of the scientific lab. The nature in 
Latour or the initial ANT version was always a nature constructed, represented and modi-
fied. It is a nature that is made real by way of its representations. The latter is the particular 
version of realism (if we would like to use that word) which we can take from ANT.
So the interesting question here, from an ANT perspective, is not so much if nature is 
local, national or global but the extent to and the means by which nature is enabled to move 
from one locale to another locale and the means, quite precisely, by which nature is made 
available to us. For this purpose, what we could call the ‘nature-semiotics’ offered to us by 
ANT is, I would argue, indeed quite promising.
Doing away with a global or all-encompassing nature?
But now we must return to where I initially promised to start, namely with Latour and his 
book Politiques de la Nature (2004 [1999] but see also Latour 2007). One way of describing this 
work is in fact that it was a project for doing away with any such thing we could call a global 
nature. The kind of nature taken as a global whole, an all-encompassing reality or system of 
interconnections. As such, it would be fair to say that even if scale to ANT is made into an 
empirical question, that of dealing with global nature is something ANT must be really bad at!
Let me explain: As long as ANT scholars were simply talking about scallops, or whatever 
single species we could think of, this move to encompass non-humans could indeed be irri-
tating and provoking to social scientists and others. Hence, there was potentially a problem 
with too many enemies. One the one hand, those who read ANT as a way of giving subject 
status and position to non-humans and on the other hand, those who took it to offer nothing 
but a realist, positivist trap of taking natural science and its facts and objects for granted.
Yet, there was also a problem with (potentially) the wrong kind of friends. In particu-
lar, radical or ‘deep ecological’ environmentalists who would gladly welcome nature into 
the equation and argue that Nature, capital N, was more important to preserve than single 
humans and the will and desires of the human population. Hence, again, there is this issue 
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of normativity and a politics of nature to take into consideration and account for. What if a 
Nature-global was being put up against the social? And who was, eventually, to speak on this 
Nature’s behalf? A group of experts, a technocracy, at the cost of ordinary democracy? Here, 
it is worthwhile reminding that Latour’s book also has a subtitle: How to bring the sciences 
(read: nature) into democracy.
The assumption that nature will cut short democracy
At this point, to Latour, the precondition for including nature in the equation became, so to 
speak, to eradicate capital-N nature. The argument is substantiated with empirical findings. 
Arguably, when people, environmentalists for that matter, talk about their attachment to na-
ture, this is always in the concrete. They talk about this specific river, these Platan-trees in the 
midst of Paris, this park of elephants in Amboseli … Hence, also empirically, the argument 
goes, nature is, if not local in character, then at least concrete, situated and specific.
Hence, in trying to answer our question, we must have an eye for how the demand for 
taking nature into account (as was indeed the demand from ANT) was simultaneously a de-
mand to do this in a quite specific way. This is related to how such an inclusion was also part 
of an argument and indeed a critique on ANT’s part. A critique of Nature capital n, which 
would, if let in, rather than becoming integral to democracy, cut short politics and the political 
process. In short, the way in which nature was let into the equation by ANT was simulta-
neously as part of a democratising and politicising argument. ‘Nature’ was conceived of as a 
determinist anti-political entity which had to be bracketed, indeed taken apart and away, for 
the benefit of nature-entities in their (so to speak) ‘uniquenesses,’ ‘richnesses,’ ‘heterogene-
ities’ and singularities. Only then could nature, which had now been transformed into plural 
‘natures,’ be taken into democracy.
Obviously, we need to see this move as a truly classic STS argument: An argument in 
favour of politicising and democratising the sciences at the expense of expert rule and tech-
nocratic government. But we must also see it in line with ANT more specifically: When 
taking ‘nature’ into account, this was not to be accepted as an entity above and beyond hu-
manity, but rather an entity to be studied in its imbroglios with technologies and humans. So 
does this then imply that ANT is not good at dealing with global natures? The answer must 
indeed be in the affirmative, again, if we equal Nature capital n with the global. Or, more 
precisely, it is not so much bad at it, as it is downright against it.
At this point, you, our reader, might already have protested: The aforementioned conclu-
sion comes a little bit too easily! So let me rephrase this just a bit: Dealing with ‘nature’ in 
an ANT manner is a laborious affair. To do so demands that one actually traces and demon-
strates how (1) an assumingly global nature comes into being – hence not takes it at face value 
but demonstrates how such versions of nature are produced in the first place, and (2) how 
humans (for instance) are involved, entangled with and attached to a global nature.
So far, we have treated our question regarding what ANT is good at when it comes to 
nature (be it local, national or global) very much in line with earlier work by ANT scholars 
and Bruno Latour most notably. However, there is in fact a quite important thing to note 
here. While the laboratory studies through which ANT was very much developed and em-
ployed (for instance, Latour, 1987, 1988, Latour and Woolgar, 1986, Law, 1994) were detailed 
empirical and ethnographic studies, this is not the case when it comes to the Politics of Nature 
book of Bruno Latour. In contrast to many of Latour’s and companions famous and earlier 
studies, this one is not based upon comprehensive ethnographic studies. In fact, it does not so 
much study neither nature nor politics in any extensive detail. This is actually an interesting 
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weakness of the book, as the book stands out as more of an overriding philosophical argu-
ment than a broad empirical study (see also Jensen, 2006). In doing this, it also very much 
presupposes how nature ‘behaves’ in politics. And the presupposition is that Nature capital n 
cut shorts politics and acts in a determinist way.
How does nature behave in democracy?
So let us return again to our initial question: Is ANT equally good in dealing with local, 
national and global natures? Well, the problem as I have now pointed out is that ANT in the 
version spearheaded in Latour’s book treated natures as if there is only local, that is, specific, 
concrete and ‘individual’ nature-objects. It is only in environmentalist’s theories, Latour ar-
gues, that there is a Nature capital n, and if there was a Nature capital n in practice, this would 
be a threatening de-politicising entity, impossible to make integral to democracy.
But surely, nothing prevents us from working with nature in an ANT manner and demon-
strating that there is more to nature than scallops and elephants and so on, and, that there are 
indeed ‘nature-wholes’ in practice, too, that is natures that go beyond the single and the more 
easily situated versions. We can and should trace how such nature-wholes are scientifically, 
bureaucratically and politically made (Asdal, 2008). In fact, when pursuing such a task, the 
argument can be justified that Latour was wrong in his argument that the natures we are 
dealing with are simply local (to use that word then) in character. Moreover, ‘nature-wholes,’ 
versions of Capital-N nature, do not work in a determinist way and do not de-politicise and 
cut short politics the way it was supposed. In fact, is not this precisely what Latour (2017 [15]) 
more recently have been realising (in a dual sense) in and via the figure of ‘GAIA’?5
Becoming good at allowing for nature
The space for words is too limited to delve into the GAIA-theory and the cosmopolitics of 
Latour in this intervention (but see e.g. Blok and Farias 2016). Let me rather stay with the 
question I was asked to answer. Or perhaps it would be a good idea to modify the question 
that I was asked to answer. Because a different way of asking the question is perhaps to stay 
where I began: What is it, when it comes to nature, that ANT allows for and can assist with? 
Then, answering the question would be much easier: ANT definitely allows for and may as-
sist us in taking nature into account in analysis. I would even argue that more than allowing 
for, it demands us to be inventive and to become good at doing precisely that. Here, the ques-
tion is not so much if the nature is local, national or global, but rather what local, national or 
global natures do, and how they come to ‘be’ their size?
And interestingly, there are a couple of things that ANT has been very good at – and 
which is particularly important, I would argue, in discourses about nature. ANT has been 
particularly good at tracing and demonstrating the means by which nature-objects come into 
being, the way they are being realised as well as what it takes to achieve agency. One of the 
ways in which this has been put into words (apart from throughout the series of laboratory 
studies) is Latour’s way of pointing out how nature is ‘instrumentized’ (Latour in Asdal and 
Ween, 2014) – that is, how it is enabled by instruments in order to emerge, become visible and 
realised. Also in this respect, it is a slight irony how ANT continuously is made part of the 
so-called material turn and the argument that non-humans have, as opposed to achieve, agency.
There is no easy turn to nature, be it local, national or global, with ANT. ANT is ac-
tually very bad at turning directly to the material. Which, to my mind, is one of its merits. 
Nevertheless, the ‘translational’ and the material-semiotic which I delved into earlier – that 
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natures, for instance, often are coupled with words, enter into our forms of life by way of 
documents, via the digital, by particular conceptual formations, via laboratory equipment, 
staining-techniques and so on – is too easily forgotten in favour of the apparently lively and 
‘into your face’ materiality.
A nature modified
But then, what was the question again – and did I actually answer it? I mean, what did the 
editors mean by their question: Is ANT good at dealing with…? So far, I have made my task 
easy, taking this expression to mean more or less the same as relating to or taking into account. 
In what other manner might ANT, whether local, national or global, be said to be good at 
dealing with natures? This warrants us to address the tricky question regarding how ANT 
relates to political theory and political practice.
In fact, there seems to be an underlying ideal, sometimes perhaps an explicit ideal, in 
ANT, that nature is something we can and should deal with, in a deliberative manner, a man-
ner of reasoned, democratic dialogue. And that through such deliberative manners we will, 
eventually, come to agreement with which versions of nature to take into account, account 
for, bring into the collective and so forth. Ironically however, tracing how nature is already 
being taken into account and how nature is already part of ordinary institutions such as par-
liaments and bureaucracies have been done by ANT scholars only to a much lesser degree.
Interestingly, it is as if ANT has been much better at dealing with arguments around and 
about politics of nature, than in fact doing politics of nature – in other words, tracing the ways 
in which political arrangements, ministries, parliaments, councils, bureaucratic offices do 
politics of and with nature, be it local, national or global in character. In order to be good at 
this, we might benefit more from borrowing the methods by which ANT scholars pursued 
their laboratory studies than the reasoning around how nature behaves in politics and ordi-
nary political institutions (Asdal and Hobæk, 2016, see also Danyi this volume, as well as, for 
instance, Barry, 2001 and Marres, 2012).
How are policies and politics of nature in such arrangements instrumentised and realised? 
In pursuing this task, we might come to the conclusion that Nature does not play the hege-
monic part in politics as ANT initially reckoned it did. Maybe Nature, even if talked about 
as a unitary thing, more acts as a starting point for the political discussion rather than as the 
endpoint? What if nature is constantly modified by other entities, such as the economy? 
(Asdal, 2008). Hence, more studies might end up modifying ANT. But then again, it is not 
really ‘ANT’ but us that need to be good at pursuing such tasks.
So maybe one lesson when it comes to ANT ought to be like the one ANT scholars used 
to apply on environmentalists, philosophers and scientists alike: Do not listen to what the 
classic ANT scholars say about nature/s (be it local, national or global). Follow their practices 
and the methods they used in their laboratory studies and let these inspire us in our ways to 
new sites, such as parliaments and bureaucracies and offices.
Notes
 1 The contribution is a foreword to the book edited by Michael Power (1996): Accounting and 
 Science: Natural Inquiry and Commercial Reason. Cambridge Studies in Management 1996.
 2 For this concern with that which seeks to become larger, see also interestingly Bruno Latour’s 
postscript Irreductions in The Pasteurization of France (Latour, 1988).
 3 See, for instance, Bruno Latour (1993). We have never been Modern. For the debate and position 




 4 See in particular the three contributions in the book by H.M. Collins and Steven Yearley (1992), 
Steve Woolgar (1992) and Michel Callon and Bruno Latour (1992).
 5 See also the very interesting interview of Latour in New York Times by Ava Kofman (2018). 
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Data-intensive platform media bring up but also reconfigure the question of the socio- 
material grounding of the social once again. Unlike popular understandings, actor-network 
theory (ANT) maintains that digital platforms offer ‘a more material way of looking at what 
happens in Society’ (Latour, 1998 in Venturini et al., 2017, p. 3), since it materialises social 
interactions. Viewed from the perspective of digital sociology, platforms take on at least a 
threefold role regarding the social (Marres, 2017) – as site for the distributed accomplishment 
of the social, as methodological access point to data about the social and as infrastructures for 
participatory research and outreach.
In this chapter, we explore how recent engagements with digital platforms in digital so-
ciology and related areas does more than just vindicate ANT’s outlook (Latour et al., 2012) 
of a flat  socio-material account of the social without inbuilt levels of ‘micro’ and ‘macro.’ 
Platforms are characterised by providing computational infrastructures (Bogost and Mont-
fort, 2009) that enable heterogeneous stakeholders including users, developers, partners, or-
ganisations, companies and others to participate in their data and features (Gillespie, 2010). 
In this context, we argue, social media platforms reconfigure who or what can count as an 
actor, what counts as social and what as material, and, we argue, render these ambivalences 
very much a question of method, thereby posing new challenges to ANT. We take up ANT’s 
empirical principle to ‘follow the actors’ and draw on an investigation of automated platform 
 engagement – that is the use of bots, scripts, cross-syndication or auto-created content – to 
revisit fundamental principles of ANT. What or who is an actor? The platform? The user 
account? Third-party software? The issue?
The question of concealment of actors is not new to ANT and there was a brief period 
during which sociologist believed that social media may have solved this problem through 
their pre-structured profiles, actions and data formats (Savage and Burrows, 2007). Recent 
research and particularly the rise of bots and automation have shown that the problem is 
reintroduced again, this time in a medium-specific way, as platforms do not unveil or do 
not know if one is dealing with human, bot or half-automated use practices and are char-
acterised by missing, nested or invisible traces, obfuscated infrastructures, automated usage 
33
What happens to ANT, and 
its emphasis on the socio- 
material grounding of the 
 social, in digital sociology?
Carolin Gerlitz and Esther Weltevrede
Carolin Gerlitz and Esther Weltevrede
346
and commensurating data-points (Gerlitz and Rieder, 2018). This does not only open up 
the question what constitutes an actor, but also the delineation between the human and 
the non-human and the affordances of ‘following’ as a methodological principle. What or 
whom can we follow, that is, trace from one situation, relation or context to the next one? 
We suggest that accounting for the non-human/human configuration is increasingly a ques-
tion of method and of infrastructure in the context of platforms. By revisiting discussions of 
how methodological alignment and interface method may require to work with and against 
platform configurations and their infrastructural affordances (Marres and Weltevrede, 2013; 
Marres and Gerlitz, 2015; Weltevrede, 2016), we suggest that platform-based methodologies 
may involve different, unexpected and more difficult manoeuvres than straightforward acts 
of following.
Digital sociology and the socio-material grounding of the social
The transforming capacities that computational and digital media technologies bring to the 
study of the social have been addressed early on in ANT work. In a first step, we draw on a 
few selected interventions to arrive at the current state of digital sociology.
Most authors initially focused on the digital as a seemingly bigger and better access to 
social data, which offers direct, transactional data (Savage and Burrows, 2007), allows to 
trace (issue) networks (Marres and Rogers, 2005) or vindicates a flat ontology between ac-
tors and networks (Latour et al., 2012). Latour et al. (ibid), for instance, suggest that the 
socio-materiality of online and particularly platform media finally allows to experience and 
realise a variety of more abstract ANT claims, most notably the seamless transition between 
actors, relations and networks. From the authors’ perspective, such flat ontologies – or, more 
precisely, ‘1.5 level’ ontologies, in that the digital allows for shifting aggregates to emerge 
bottom-up, so to speak – even seemed to be hard-wired into the web, through hyperlink- 
relations or user profiles. Digital media are supposed to produce and present data in such ways 
that researchers can travel – or ‘click’ (ibid, p. 599) – from actors to relating attributes to net-
works and back without proclaiming a higher structural level as ‘there is no whole superior 
to the parts’ (ibid, p. 600).
Take the example of the social media platform LinkedIn: Users are characterised by the 
organisations they worked for, which are themselves characterised by the other users who 
worked there or endorsed them. The technicity of platforms, Latour et al. continue, lures 
researchers into following the actor by clicking on their profiles and following their associ-
ations, attributes and unfolding networks. It is through digital methods and tools that such 
experience can be transformed into scaled-up issue networks which abstain from reintroduc-
ing hierarchical distinctions between actors and networks. Even though the role of method 
is emphasised, there is, however, little methodological reflexivity in this 2012 Latour et al.’s 
account: Much like with ANT in general (Latour, 2005), the question of which relations and 
attributes can be accessed and which remain inaccessible in platform back ends is bracketed 
out; and how platform data have been accomplished in the first place is seemingly of little 
concern to the authors.
Gradually, attention amongst ANT-influenced scholars shifted towards the work that 
platforms and research devices do in enabling and rendering the social methodologically 
accessible: The idea of following the actor was supplemented by following the medium and 
the development of medium-specific research devices (Rogers, 2013). Digital media sur-
faced more prominently as methodological access point and research objects themselves – 
leading to forms of medium research – and the ways digital and methodological devices 
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inform research were problematised and reflected upon (Ruppert et al., 2013; Marres, 2012). 
 Drawing on a long-standing interest in the role of the research apparatus as an active agent 
in the production of knowledge, Ruppert et al. (2013) stress that digital platforms ‘are both 
the material of social lives and form part of many of the apparatuses for knowing those lives’ 
(2013, p. 24). As such, they inform both what modes of sociality can be realised and how 
they can be known.
Following Ruppert et al. (2013), digital devices collapse action and datafication, and 
 produce transactional data which provide heterogeneous and granular accounts of actors. 
Transactional platform data allow to engage with what seems to be ‘whole populations’ 
that are non-coherent, dynamic and mobile. While the idea of transactional data promises 
access to the social, it also complicates it. Digital devices, Ruppert et al. continue, generate 
data or ‘inscriptions’ which are assembled into specifically configured ‘research apparatuses,’ 
together with other tools to extract, analyse and visualise these data. As a result, they enable 
cascades of inscriptions, in which data are translated into new formats and combinations. 
This, however, also increasingly makes previous inscriptions difficult to retrace. Although 
Ruppert et al. set out to move away from using the digital as mere access to the social, and 
towards a reflexive deployment of its inscriptions, they do not fully attend to how that data 
are accomplished and the entanglements between the human and the non-human that are 
enabled, pushed or made impossible through platform data.
In her account of digital sociology (2017), Marres draws these questions together by 
claiming for a ‘device-aware’ sociology (2017, p. 114), which ‘foregrounds the computa-
tional dimension of social enquiry as well as social life’ (2017, p. 39). Making sociology 
‘device-aware,’ Marres claims, is largely a concern of method, and raises questions about 
whether digital media have in fact introduced new methods or not. Yes, they have, suggests 
Richard Rogers (2013), as they offer ‘natively digital’ data-points such as links, likes or 
tweets which afford the development of new methods and tools. No, they have not, others 
claim (Abbott, 2011; Venturini et al., 2012), as digital media come with established concepts 
and methods of the social build into them which they simply allow to operate on a larger 
scale. Hyperlink analysis, from this perspective, builds on the traditions of predigital network 
analysis and just allows to scale it from micro-ethnographies to aggregated overviews span-
ning across platforms (Venturini et al., 2012).
Marres and others intervene in this debate by asking how inbuilt methods interfere in 
research in new ways. Digital platforms may come with specific analytics built into them 
( Marres and Weltevrede, 2013; Marres and Gerlitz, 2015; Weltevrede, 2016), some of which 
are fairly straightforward, such as the bias towards positive affect on Facebook or the interest 
in trends and popularity on Twitter, whilst others are more difficult to detect. Such bias of 
data may not be specific to digital platforms (Venturini et al., 2017); however, they still chal-
lenge the ‘sovereignty’ of the researcher (Marres, 2017, p. 95) as the methods and concepts 
pushed by the medium may not be in line with one’s own. From this perspective, Marres 
continues, simply following the actors (in classic ANT vein) is being complicated and she 
instead invites researchers to gain a sensibility for how platforms and research tools inform 
research, and what account of sociality they produce or make traceable (2017, p. 97).
Interface methods (Marres and Gerlitz, 2015) are methods that pay attention to such 
‘methodological uncanny’ which may arise when the concepts and methods of the devices 
do not align neatly with those of the researchers. These methods explore different ways how 
research questions and the bias built into devices can be made to ‘interface,’ by following 
platforms, but also working around them (for instance, through means of data cleaning) or 
even working against them. Attention to the socio-material grounding of the social thus 
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becomes a question of method, which could either focus more on the medium (by following 
its bias) or the social (by aligning differently to media bias) (Marres and Weltevrede, 2013). 
The social cannot simply be described by tracing associations in digital platforms, as such 
descriptions (a) remain inattentive to how these relations have been (infrastructurally) ac-
complished and (b) are difficult to accomplish when scaling up to tens of thousands of tweets, 
posts or network relations (Marres, 2017, p. 132). Digital sociology thus challenges ANT to 
move from following the actor (that is platforms, their users and their predefined data for-
mats) to reconfiguring the empirical apparatus in ways that explicate, deploy or work against 
medium biases.
In their latest publication, Latour, Venturini and others (2017) acknowledge the limits of 
simply tracing actors by recalling their past engagement with digital media. Admittedly, they 
fell for the promise of preformatted digital data as opportunity to scale ANT up, only to be 
confronted with the bias built into the data. Venturini et al. thus distinguish between traces 
(‘all the inscriptions produced by digital devices’) and data (‘inscriptions having undergone 
the cleaning and refining necessary to make them useful knowledge objects’) (2017, pp. 2–3). 
Doing digital ANT is no longer presented as following (or clicking) data traces in digital 
media, but as a methodological accomplishment that involves turning traces into data and 
making them accessible in research infrastructures. In this sense, Venturini et al. claim that 
the conceptual flattening of actors and networks is not build into the medium but needs to 
be accomplished on the methodological level.
Whilst the notion of straightforward acts of following actors (and their networks) as well 
as representational data has thus been put to question, we would like to think these inter-
ventions further by problematising the distinction between actor and network as well as the 
human and not-only-human anew. We do so by drawing on a research project that explores 
automation in digital platforms.
Social media automation or the not-only-human  
of digital platforms
Automated use of social media platforms has advanced into the subject of both academic in-
terest and public deliberation (Ferrara et al., 2016). Different from manual engagement with 
platform features, automation involves all forms of software-supported platform practices, 
ranging from bots, cross-syndication (automatically posting from one platform to another), 
algorithmic content selection or creation, sensor-triggered engagement and other scripts. 
These practices are usually realised with the help of third-party apps that directly connect to 
platforms via their application programming interface (API) and are regulated by platform 
policies. Automation is often associated with spam, trolling or manipulation of trending 
topics, but can also entail scripts to automatically promote new posts on news sites or blogs 
in social media. Especially in the aftermath of recent elections in the US and the Brexit vote, 
automation has been criticised to manipulate public opinion by pushing niche positions, 
spreading fake news, trolling users or altering the tone of debates through affective politics 
(Woolley and Howard, 2016).
These discussions often reduce the diverse spectrum of automation to the phenomenon of 
bots, that is, fully automated robots, as a platform-specific and rapidly proliferating phenom-
enon. Bots are presented as the unwanted non-human ‘other,’ technically complex and mali-
cious, capable of political and social manipulation. However, on a technical level, bots are not 
too dissimilar from the software and scripts social media managers and publishers have been 
using on a daily basis over the last decade: Social media management software such as Dlvr.it 
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or HootSuite provide the software infrastructures that assist users in writing and scheduling 
social media posts, make content suggestions, allow cross-posting on multiple platforms and 
auto-replying to customer requests. These practices are now largely associated with bots but 
are part and parcel of software supporting social media professionals and in the latter case 
explicitly invited by platforms. Furthermore, an increasing amount of platform users do not 
engage with Twitter, Facebook or Instagram via their official web and app interfaces, but use 
third-party software called social media ‘clients,’ ‘sources’ or ‘apps’ that are built on top of 
platforms, connect directly to their databases and may offer additional functionalities as listed 
earlier (Gerlitz and Rieder, 2018).
The question is what counts as an actor or a network in this context. Is the automated user 
account an important actor? Or should the emphasis rather be put on the human user that 
operates connected user accounts? And is the total amount of automated tweets that serve one 
specific purpose, such as pushing a certain issue agenda, the preferred network? Or should 
we rather focus on the third-party apps that enable forms of automated engagement? Follow-
ing from this, how to attend to the human and non-human configuration in either of these 
perspectives? In what follows, we ask how digital platforms reconfigure human/non-human 
dichotomies into a more complex continuum and therefore challenge certain methodological 
assumptions underpinning both ANT and digital methods. 
Departing from an investment in human/non-human symmetry, it is problematic on 
several levels to limit automation to a sole focus on bots. First, this fairly narrow category 
reduces what should instead be seen as a spectrum of automation. Bot detection methods 
follow the data formats delineated by the medium and largely aim to detect automation 
on account level, by studying profile information, linking patterns, rhythms of activity, 
follower/followee ratios, style of writing or a combination of these (Ferrara et al., 2016). 
Such approaches often lead to false positives as it proves difficult, for instance, to distinguish 
between bots and manual accounts tweeting with a very high frequency. Secondly, such a 
narrow perspective renders invisible many modes of automation practices including those 
that focused on the redistribution of information, accounts that mix manual and software- 
assisted tweeting (for instance, through Tweet-buttons), as well as forms of cross- syndication 
which translate manual content from one platform into the data formats of another. While 
debates often focus on the actors (i.e. bots), what is more relevant are automation practices 
and accomplishments. However, these are being obfuscated by the platform. Automation is 
therefore highly unstable and hard to disentangle from ‘human activity’ due to obfuscation 
by the platform infrastructure. 
This leads us to the third point: The reduction of actors to bots suggests that manual 
and seemingly social practices can be disentangled from automated and material-technical 
practices. It proposes that the material inscriptions of automation software can be carved 
out, or at least be named, and supports a representational approach to platform data. In that 
sense, the focus on bots attempts to stabilise a contested, unstable phenomenon. The nu-
anced automation practices, original data-sources and underlying technicity that feed into 
platforms, however, get largely bracketed out as platform infrastructures and especially APIs 
often obfuscate where and from whom data came from. If we ‘follow the actors,’ we would 
be leaning to clean data from all signs of automation to get to human actors. If we ‘follow 
the medium’ – understood as the platform API-preferred data collection and analytics – we 
would remain inattentive to the wide spectrum of human and non-human accomplishment 
in the data. By contrast, to maintain a sensibility for the socio-material accomplishment of 
the social, we cannot hold on to purified accounts of the social but need to consider various 
degrees of automation as part of the social. 
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Methodological manoeuvres for tracing  
social media automation
In our work, we explore these issues by tracing how automation is technically accomplished 
through third-party apps, how it is subject to multiple nested infrastructures and works with, 
through and against the concealment of these infrastructures. In what follows, we experi-
ment with different methodological manoeuvres of following and working with and against 
actors and medium that may allow us to gain a different sensibility for the fabrication of the 
social in the context of Twitter. We do so by selecting a specific starting point to account 
for the socio-material accomplishment of the social on Twitter, namely the apps from which 
accounts tweet. 
These apps make use of the Twitter API infrastructure to directly input and output 
selected data to and from Twitter and are called ‘sources’ in Twitter’s developer docu-
mentation.1 The platform offers a variety of sources for data input and output themselves, 
most notably the Twitter.com web interface and specific apps for smartphones and tablets, 
but the majority of sources are developed by third parties. These are crucial for the im-
plementation of custom scripts and software that support automation practices, rely on 
Twitter’s technical infrastructure and are subject to its regulation. Twitter has invited for a 
multiplication of sources from the launch of the platform; however, it follows mixed poli-
tics regarding automation which is both encouraged in some cases and contested in others 
within the platform.
During its first years, Twitter encouraged third-party development of apps without many 
restrictions on automation, before successively implementing restrictions on different levels. 
The most notable cut was implemented in 2012 under the category of the Developer Rules of 
the Road in combination with API updates when Twitter introduced a stricter authentication 
system (before developers could use the API anonymously) and rate limits to API calls, which 
ruled out anonymous and high-volume automation.2 Now, automation is largely regulated 
through Twitter’s Automation Rules, which explicitly encourage creative experimentations, 
marketing, automated direct messaging and automated content sharing.3 Even though de-
velopers can no longer operate anonymously, creating an app through the Application Man-
agement remained fairly easy (Gerlitz and Rieder, 2018) up until July 2018, when Twitter 
introduced a more strict app application process.4 The distinction between promoted and 
prohibited behaviour is not always entirely clear. For example, in the Twitter’s Automation 
Rules, the platform forbids activities that can be categorised as spam, misleading, conflicting 
with privacy regulations, exceeding rate limits and specific actions like doubling accounts, 
auto-posting to trending topics, which require a situated evaluation. In short, the type and 
degree of possible automated practices are being co-produced between third-party software, 
the materiality of the platform API and its policy rules.
There are several methodological obstacles to attend to when approaching automation 
via the source metric which complicate straightforward ideas of ‘following’ traces. The first 
obstacle is that data on the source of a tweet are largely not accessible in the interface of offi-
cial Twitter clients as the platform does not straightforwardly make infrastructures build on 
top of the platform visible to its private users. In order to arrive at the source of a tweet, one 
needs to access the attributes of tweets via the Twitter API. Knowing the source, however, 
does not come with knowledge about its automation features and practices, which need to 
be explored differently. Second, automation can be obfuscated and rendered untraceable 
on source level – Tweet Button activity, for instance, appears in the database as coming 
from the official Twitter Web Client (Gerlitz and Rieder, 2018) – but also through bought 
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interactivity and engagement offered by social media marketing services. Developers might 
resort to these tactics because Twitter has doubled down efforts to identify and block un-
wanted automation, amongst other things by focusing on the source.5 Although automation 
is an integral part of the platform infrastructure – our research interest thus aligns with the 
medium’s configuration – methodologically the analytic affordances of the platform infra-
structure do not privilege an easy pathway to follow the continuum between automation 
actors and their networks. It is through this nesting of infrastructures of platforms and apps 
that an alternative positioning is needed, which both follows and works against the medium. 
It ‘follows the medium’ by making use of the materialisation of automation in the platform 
infrastructure; however, it goes against medium method by circumventing the preferred way 
the platform affords to follow traces and thus develops shortcuts and workarounds to render 
the platform ontology flat(ter).
In the data set used for this research,6 we explore tweets from the week running up to the 
Brexit referendum7 as this event is considered particularly contested and prone to automation 
(Howard and Kollanyi, 2016). Within our data set, we take the top 100 most used sources8 
and identify their affordances for automation. To gain more information, we draw on the 
websites provided by developers when registering an app (this means that information is not 
always available), create accounts to analyse the interfaces of the third-party app (if available, 
some software does not have a public-facing website) and/or explore their tweet syntax, 
informing a bottom-up characterisation of automation attributes. We do not use sources to 
merely identify automation, but to contribute to a more fine-grained language to address 
the spectrum of automation on social media and to reflect on the entanglement between the 
human and non-human configuration.
In accounting for automation attributes and the human/non-human configuration they 
enable, we differentiated three partly overlapping levels, namely degree of automation, type 
of source (and what practices it enables) and its main (automation) functionalities. Figure 33.1 













Figure 33.1  Spectrum of automation
Differentiation based on the top sources in the Brexit Twitter data set. The tree map visualises the hierar-
chy of sources in the Brexit data set, 17–23 June 2016. The numbers 0–5 indicate sources categorised by 
degree of automation, the size of the parts is scaled by the number of tweets sent from a source and the 
colour of the parts indicates the type of source. Visualisation made with RAWGraphs.io.
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as the spectrum of handing over calculative capacities to software and allowing it to find, 
select and post content on one’s behalf. The distribution of sources indicates that the major-
ity of the top 100 sources are classified as degree 0 of automation, which refers to manual 
 tweeting – a surprising finding in the Brexit data set. However, our approach cannot account 
for masked automation as discussed earlier. The only type of source in this category are social 
media clients, which we defined as external software offering largely the same functionalities 
as Twitter, allowing private users to read/post content via external interfaces. In some cases, 
clients allow tweeting from multiple accounts or to operate multiple platforms.
Degree 1 introduces blended forms of automation by allowing users to (semi-) automatically 
repost or schedule their own content from other sources. The most recurring type in this 
category is cross-syndication, which we define as the reposting of existing content defined 
by the user, including cross-platform posting, buttons and automation recipes. Sources in 
degree 2 add an additional level of automation as they facilitate the (semi-)automatic repost-
ing of content of others, often based on recipes, cross-syndication or topical selection. The 
most recurring type in this category is again cross-syndication with sources focusing on the 
reposting of external content of other accounts from the web or social media, including, for in-
stance, reposting rss-feeds. Sources in degree 3 introduce significant, but often rudimentary, 
automation by offering automated interactions, such as auto-direct message, auto-reply or 
auto-retweet. Types of sources in this category are more diverse, including clients, cross- 
syndication, but also introducing two new types: automators and managers. Automators 
include sources which only function on automating Twitter action and interaction, often 
in a rudimentary way, such as auto-retweeting. Managers are addressed at professional users 
and largely offer advanced functionalities such as collaborative tweeting, multi-accounts, 
advanced analytics, (algorithmic) content-recommendation and scheduling.
Sources of degree 4 introduce auto-created or recommended content based on  (algorithmic) 
selection or recommendations by the source. Managers and content aggregators are prom-
inent in this category, handing over more and more calculative and agentive capacities to 
software. They can include more complex forms of automation such as machine learning or 
algorithmically composed tweets. Different than cross-syndicators which operate based on 
user selection, content aggregators directly offer users’ topics, tweets or links for automated 
posting. Only one source is categorised as degree 5 – sources are included in this degree if 
they can auto-post auto-created content, such as data from sensors, external databases or the 
Internet of Things (IoT), taking over the process of content selection and posting entirely. 
The source in this category, for instance, offers the functionality to automatically create ac-
counts and creates news-based content to tweet from these accounts.
In addition to the degree and type of automation, we differentiate the sources based on the 
automation functionalities they offer. In Figure 33.2, the dendrogram visualises the spectrum 
of functionalities of sources hierarchically by degree of automation and types of sources, and 
highlights how automation functionalities of sources increasingly gain complexity in the 
higher degrees of automation. For example, a client in degree 0 obviously offers little au-
tomation functionality besides allowing users to access multiple accounts. Clients in degree 
1 typically offer additional functionalities such as cross-syndicating and scheduling posts. 
 Clients in degree 3 offer content-recommendation, advanced analytics and automation of 
core Twitter functionalities such as auto-retweet, auto-like and auto-direct message.
In this sense, the visualisation supports the differentiation in degree of automation and 
shows how automation is involved in the redistribution of both calculative and agentive 
 capacities – as automation software not only takes over the act of posting, retweeting or re-
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or machine learning. Furthermore, these proliferating functionalities complicate the no-
tion of the individual account. In digital research, platform accounts are often considered 
as pointing to one individual user. A variety of sources, however, allow users to run several 
accounts (see function ‘multi-account’) or collaboratively handle a single account (see func-
tion ‘collaborative’). In combination with other functions especially offered by managers – 
such as content-recommendation and scheduling – manual and automated tweeting can be 
blended in the context of a single account and the notion that accounts equal individuals is 
put to question. 
Our categorisation exercise offers first pointers for a more nuanced account of automation, 
which is (a) not limited to account level, (b) differentiates between own and external content, 
(c) distinguishes automated content production, selection and interaction, and (d) shows the 
variety of ways in which manual tweeting can be software-supported or translated through 
source functionalities, which themselves are part and parcel of the material infrastructure. To 
account for the entanglement between human and machine as practice requires methodolog-
ical manoeuvres beyond simply following traces, as the seemingly ready-made data formats 
obfuscate their heterogeneous accomplishment. The case of automation also shows that there 
is no single medium to follow, as platforms are set up as infrastructural, socio-material assem-
blies that enable but do not easily explicate the relation-making of their data. 
The socio-material accomplishment that leaves no traces
We would like to conclude by drawing out a series of interventions we think digital sociol-
ogy offers to ANT, using our interest in distributed platform infrastructures to push the 
three roles platforms play in digital sociology (Marres, 2017) further and ask: How does one 
do digital sociology in ways that are attentive to the role of the digital as site, access and en-
gagement of the social?
Firstly, digital sociology and platform-sensitive engagement with the digital respecify 
ANT’s established idea of the continuum between the actor and the network (Venturini 
et al., 2017). The issue of automation has shown that research will have to accommodate 
a variety of digital part-humans part-machines which, however, cannot (only) be treated 
as type or actor but as practice, that is dynamic, situated and emerging in relation to the 
 material-technical affordances of the medium. As shown in the case of Twitter, an account 
does not necessarily represent a human user, as it is accomplished in distributed and situated 
ways, just as a tweet is not a tweet, commonly understood as a uniquely typed post. Both 
occupy a continuum between manual and fully automated activity, which is supported by 
distributed infrastructures of support software. The notion of the continuous and relational 
monad (Latour et al., 2012) is useful when approaching (semi)automated activity; however, it 
is not possible to seamlessly follow them, as often automation does not translate into visible 
(or even clickable) traces. 
Secondly, the infrastructural concealment of platforms complicates the distinction be-
tween what Venturini et al. (2017) consider as trace, namely inscriptions by digital media, 
and data, that is, traces readied for research through the methodological apparatus. What 
appears as trace or inscription in the context of the platform is often a highly composite 
measure assembling heterogeneous input sources and has been subject to cascades of inscrip-
tion (Ruppert et al., 2012) by various stakeholders such as developers or users which have 
been rendered invisible. Instead of stabilising platform data as demarcated by the medium, 
digital sociology needs to revisit distinctions between traces and data, their accomplish-
ment and their alignment with one’s research objectives (Weltevrede, 2016). Platform media 
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thus challenge ANT to not only pay attention to existing but also to missing, nested or no 
longer visible traces, most notably in the context of black-boxed dataflows. As platforms 
constantly recombine, commensurate and circulate data through their related infrastruc-
tures (Beer, 2017), a sole focus on flat ontologies and associative relations of actors needs 
to be supplemented by a critical investigation of what counts as platform data, and how it 
has been accomplished and stabilised. Here, both ANT and digital sociology would benefit 
from engaging more carefully with an infrastructural perspective which draws attention to 
exactly such black-boxed, distributed accomplishment. From this perspective, ANT’s notion 
of ‘following’ as a methodological principle advances from a seamless movement to a situated 
methodological configuration which may involve cuts, jumps and fissures. 
Thirdly, the platform perspective pushes the notion of interface methods (Marres and 
 Gerlitz, 2015) further, as bias is not limited to the capacity of a platform to pre-structure 
its data for preconceived analytical aims (positive affect on Facebook, popularity measures in 
 Twitter) – but subject to ‘in actu’ realisation through different stakeholders and their practices 
on a platform. What does it mean, if users, companies, organisations and bots all use the plat-
form with a different idea of sociality (promotional, deceptive, affective, etc.) in mind? Whilst 
the data capture mechanisms of platforms may come with some forms of bias built into them, 
the way they are appropriated, negotiated and repurposed by their stakeholders may introduce 
yet other, potentially even more heterogeneous bias. In the context of distributed platform me-
dia, interface methods thus need to negotiate and configure these multiple dimensions of bias.
To return one final time to Marres (2017), when taken together this means that meth-
odological alignment may require to work against some actors and biases, whilst allowing 
in others. Furthermore, medium research and social research occupy a continuum in which 
they challenge the disciplinary boundaries between sociology and media studies. It is not 
only in ‘social research’ that attention to the socio-material grounding of the social becomes 
a question of configuring method. Also ‘medium research’ can open up questions of align-
ment to media bias, following the preferred configurations of the medium to study bias ef-
fects, or by aligning differently the methods built into the medium – following the medium 
against the medium.
Notes
 1 Twitter defines the source metric as ‘Utility used to post the Tweet, as an HTML-formatted 
string. Tweets from the Twitter website have a source value of web.’ See https://dev.twitter.com/ 
overview/api/tweets (last opened April 3, 2019).
 2 See https://blog.twitter.com/developer/en_us/a/2012/changes-coming-to-twitter-api.html (last 
opened April 3, 2019).
 3 See https://support.twitter.com/articles/76915 (last opened April 3, 2019).
 4 See https://blog.twitter.com/developer/en_us/topics/tools/2018/new-developer-requirements- 
to-protect-our-platform.html (last opened Nov 12 2018).
 5 See https://blog.twitter.com/official/en_us/topics/company/2017/Our-Approach-Bots- Misinfor 
mation.html (Last opened April 3, 2019).
 6 A special thanks to all members of our Digital Methods Summer School 2018 research project group 
entitled ‘Method Maps: Visualising Automation’: Anne Helmond, Fernando van der Vlist, Mace 
Ojala, Laetitia Della Bianca, Karmijn van de Oudeweetering, Cindy Krassen, Daniela van Geenen, 
Lisa-Maria van Klaveren, Angeles Briones, Iulia Coanda, Liping Liu, Emilija  Jokubauskaite, Ece 
Elbeyi, Gabriela Sued, Enedina, Eloy Caloca Lafont.
 7 The data set contains tweets mentioning ‘brexit’ from 17.-23.06.2016 and consists of 2,914,134 
tweets by 786,494 users.
 8 The data set features tweets from 8,302 distinct sources. 2,818,718 tweets are sent from the top 100 
sources, which is roughly 97% of the tweets in the data set.
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What happens when academics and other public intellectuals take ANT out into the world in 
an attempt to make a deliberate difference and/or to set up some kind of social experiment? 
In this section, authors narrate and analyse their experiences of working with ANT and 
closely related concepts and approaches in a diverse range of places and spaces. Coming from 
a variety of intellectual and professional backgrounds, these authors engage ANT to shape 
political actions, environmental interventions and design processes, even, astonishingly, to 
run a public hospital! In each case, the chapters describe how ANT travels, where and how it 
works or gains traction, and where it stumbles or needs development. As a group, the chap-
ters provide strong testimony to creative intellectual work and energetic engagement in the 
problems of contemporary life: In our view, they are inspiring, even exhilarating. 
As with all the chapters in this collection, the authors in this section present personal, 
arguably eclectic, versions of ANT. From our perspective, this is completely as it should 
be (perhaps even more so in this section than elsewhere). Here, ANT operates as a kind of 
tool kit or set of resources, rather than a totalising worldview or methodological approach. 
(Indeed, perhaps we can conclude, finally, that this is how ANT works best.) We could 
have filled a whole book with chapters like these – such a text would be a brilliant sequel or 
companion to this volume. Our choice of authors for the current book focussed on diversity 
of topics and approaches, as well as national contexts. As ever, we also chose people’s whose 
work we really like! As with all the sections, then, this group of chapters is intended to be 
inspirational and provocative rather than exhaustive. 
In terms of geography, Section 6 takes us around the globe: From Japan, to Chile, Spain 
and the UK. We travel to famous cities – London, Barcelona; to smaller towns – Puerto 
Montt and Saitama; and to the Cumbrian fells and lakes. Here, we encounter many chal-
lenging materialities: Overflowing cow shit, burst hospital water pipes, radiation-affected 
vegetables, electricity-monitoring devices and wheelchairs trying to mount kerbs. We are 
introduced to people working in, with and against these materialities: Farmers collecting and 
redistributing slurry; labourers trying to fix the pipes; activists and consumers trying to de-
cide which vegetables are safe to eat; designers making new monitoring devices and disability 
activists building and testing ramps. In each case, our authors contend, ANT helps not only 
Section 6
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to understand what’s going on intellectually (to provide an interesting analysis) but actually 
to make things happen differently. 
Sometimes, this works by facilitating new conversations and by opening up lines of 
thought and action that may otherwise have remained unclear. For disability activists in 
 Barcelona, for example, ANT became a resonant framing for thinking about relations be-
tween bodies, technologies and environments. For the ANT researchers involved, working 
in and with activists also hugely enlivened their own understandings of these issues. Tomás 
Sánchez Criado and Israel Rodríguez-Giralt suggest the term ‘ joint problem-making’ to 
describe the ways in which researchers and activists can work together to make a difference 
to the world and to ANT. For the farmers, consumers and activists of Kashiwa trying to 
work out what to do about irradiated food in post-Fukushima conditions, ANT has helped 
to make sense of scientific information, to build a workable understanding of the dangers of 
food grown or harvested in radiation-exposed conditions, and to reach forms of consensus 
about how to proceed. Shuhei Kimura and Kohei Inose argue that ANT has helped them, 
both as anthropologists and as concerned citizens, to ‘gift an ethnography-based story’ to 
their compatriots in order to help everyone live better with the enduring effects of the 3.11 
disaster. In both cases, ANT is not a theory or method that can be simply applied to the work 
of activists but rather is a productive material-semiotic practice that stimulates questioning, 
provokes alternative visions and facilitates productive storytelling.
On other occasions, ANT has been used to establish particular kinds of forum. Follow-
ing Latour’s work on the politics of Nature and Dingpolitik, as well as Callon’s Acting in an 
Uncertain World, Emma Cardwell and Claire Waterton describe and explore the capacities 
and challenges of hybrid forums or knowledge collectives in addressing environmental and 
farming-related controversies. Reporting on two extensive empirical studies – of algae in the 
Lake District’s Loweswater, and of slurry on UK beef farms – they argue that ANT- inspired 
knowledge collectives can create spaces to say and do things that might otherwise remain 
unsaid and undone. Engaging with recent STS work on matters of care, they also explore 
what remains ungraspable in these collectives, and start to think about the significance of 
such challenges for ANT-inspired involvement in environmental politics. 
For Alex Wilkie and colleagues, ANT provides a similarly material resource. ANT is in 
the room when the ‘Sustainability Invention and Energy-demand Reduction: Co- Designing 
Communities and Practice’ research group engages in design practices to assess the limita-
tions of existing electricity-usage monitors and to build more interesting ones. Wilkie’s 
chapter outlines and explains this process, introducing some fascinating and important con-
cepts (retroscription and procomposition) to describe the resultant practices
that, on the one hand involves an active participation in lived reality of using a smart 
energy monitor and transferring this experience, by way of visualisation, into a diagram 
of use in which the efficacy of the appliance is laid bare.
Designing the new Energy Babble, Wilkie argues, shows that ANT can be used to do so 
much more than generate clever description: It can be enrolled to make literally shape collec-
tives of people, environments and things. Indeed, each of these chapters shows how bringing 
ANT to the table, allowing it to flourish in spaces of deliberate intervention and experimen-
tation, facilitates imaginative and non-normative ways of working with and through such 
assemblages. 
But who could have thought that ANT might be useful for actually running a pub-
lic hospital? In his wonderfully evocative piece, Hospital Director and ANT scholar Yuri 
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Carvajal Bañados shows us how. For Carvajal, working with ANT and related theories is 
a double-edged sword –necessary and clarifying but also politically risky. Indeed, during 
the drafting of his chapter – a drawn-out process for most of the authors and the editors 
of this book – Yuri stopped being the Hospital Director. Nonetheless, he concludes that 
‘ANT worked for the Puerto Montt Hospital as a valuable enzyme.’ Concluding the section 
and thus the book, this sentence can perhaps work as a metaphor for ANT more generally: 
Enzymes are necessary, vitalising catalysts that are part of complex systems of action and 
reaction. They cannot work alone, but form lively connections to a wide range of other 
entities and systems. 
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Can ANT be a form of activism?
Tomás Sánchez Criado and Israel Rodríguez-Giralt
Ever since the 2011’s indignados or ‘15-M’ (May 15th) movement started – occurring after 
the occupation of Spain’s main city squares, and later on developing into interesting forms 
of urban activism – the personal and academic life of many of us in Spain has turned into 
a perpetual unfolding of particular protests and activist struggles, with a lasting impact on 
our modes of doing research. One good example of this was Tomás’ ethnographic involve-
ment, since 2012, in an open design initiative called En torno a la silla (ETS). This initiative 
comprised a few people who had met in the ‘functional diversity commission’ of the 15-M 
encampments in Barcelona,1 where different wheelchair-using activists of the Independent 
Living Forum had come across other people – all of them long-standing participants in 
several activist groups and initiatives and some of them with design and making skills – and 
started doing things together in a ‘free culture’ atmosphere. After suffering from the inac-
cessible conditions of the precarious places they started to occupy and share, many of those 
participants decided to intervene in these spaces.
For instance, in the summer of 2011, before ETS came into being, a material intervention 
was undertaken in the yearly Gràcia district festivities, aiming to reclaim the accessibility lost 
during the festival due to the emplacement of street decorations and concert stages. At the re-
quest of the Festivities Council of the Fraternitat Street, where Sebastián Ledesma (one of the 
members of the functional diversity commission) lived, singular yellow ramps (Figure 34.1) 
showing the black and yellow inscription ‘revolution will be accessible or it won’t be’ were 
produced and displayed. After this first attempt, the people who would later initiate ETS – 
Antonio Centeno, an independent living activist, Alida Díaz, architect, and Rai Vilatovà, 
anthropologist and craftsperson – sought to join forces to co-design a free/open kit ‘to activate 
the wheelchairs’ environments’ otherwise, comprising a portable wheelchair ramp and other 
gadgets transforming the wheelchair,2 a kit whose main results would be digitally documented 
and openly distributed so that anyone could draw inspiration from it. This was not an act 
of charity by do-gooders, but rather an experimental attempt to prolong a nascent friend-
ship between specific ‘disabled’ and ‘non-disabled’ people by technical and material means. 
Tomás later joined the project when they were beginning to prototype these elements, and 
in the practice-oriented and engaged context of everyone doing something for the common 
 project, he made his ethnographic skills available, acting as an audiovisual ‘documenter’ of the 
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collective. Several other people came and went in the following years, devoting great amounts 
of time to the audiovisual documentation, the open prototyping, the public reflection and/or 
the organisation of workshops and events to show and discuss what it meant to act in this way.
All of this was a common way of ‘acting’ popularised at the time of the 15-M. Indeed, 
ETS could be said to be part and parcel of a singular activist ecology, an heir of the particular 
‘collaborative turn’ that the 15-M enacted. As various scholars have tried to convey (Arribas, 
2018; Moreno-Caballud, 2015), 15-M’s main form of collective action pivoted around not 
only just a wild experimentation with ‘artivist’ initiatives – mostly against austerity measures, 
political corruption and technocratic forms of knowledge production. It also showed a deep 
concern with enacting a politics of listening and of the ‘liberation’ and documentation of 
knowledges in the wake of a broad ‘free culture’ ethos (Corsín & Estalella, 2016; Martín 
Sáinz de los Terreros, 2018; Postill, 2018). In a time of great collective effervescence, this 
‘15-M’ way of doing politics also shaped forms of research grounded on an ethics of com-
panionship and an experimentation with the modes of joining together different people, 
knowledges and kinds of worlding.
In this chapter, we would like to think with the ETS collective, and in particular the 
research engagement afforded by their intense social and material explorations in the envi-
ronmental intervention and remaking of wheelchair users and their surroundings. We will 
characterise this particular form of research activism as ‘ joint problem-making’: Comprising 
a series of social and material interventions to problematise, transform and account for the 
worlds being produced together with others. Our main aspiration in doing this would be to 
describe the impact it had on us as researchers: Or, to be more specific, on our ways of engag-
ing ethnographically, and to consider how this might inspire the ‘experimentally collabora-
tive’ or ‘activated’ ways in which ANT researchers might engage in other activist ecologies. 
ANT research on technoscientific activisms
But before attempting to delve into this, allow us to briefly outline some of the most import-
ant ANT-related works dealing with activist initiatives and social movements. Already in 
Figure 34.1  Sebastián Ledesma testing the ramps at Fraternitat Street. Picture CC BY Func-
tional Diversity Barcelona commission (August 2011, used with permission)
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the 1990s, ANT had attempted a certain redefinition of ‘collective action’ beyond human- 
centric accounts and a means-ends understanding of action that was fundamental in opening 
up an agenda around technoscientific activism, charting hybrid collectifs and their ‘multiform 
kinds of agency’ (Callon & Law, 1997: 113). On the one hand, for ANT accounts, action 
was framed as ‘collective’: Meaning that agency is to be described as a distributed and ma-
terially heterogeneous process, imputable to particular entities only after the fact. This par-
ticular stance allowed the sociology and anthropology of social movements to expand their 
reach, paying attention to the role of more-than-human actors in particular forms of activ-
ism  (Rodríguez-Giralt, 2011). On the other hand, ANT-related scholars became interested 
in going beyond an instrumental understanding of action (Latour, 2002): Paying attention 
to the thorny issue of mediations or the multifaceted role of ‘attachments’ in these hybrid 
collectifs (Gomart & Hennion, 1999) and how they prod particular forms of doing, either in 
action or in passion, in particular events. In fact, continuing their early analysis of the very 
particular ‘power of reason’ (Latour, 1987), ANT-related scholars took issue with how forms 
of technoscientific activism challenge that power in particular ways. That is, they sought to 
engage in understanding particular forms of ‘activating’ technoscientific issues, be it through 
expanding given matters of concern and ‘truth politics’ (e.g. addressing experiences not con-
sidered), or disputing particular arrangements or agencements that make hybrid collectifs, such as 
markets (Callon, 2008).
In Acting in an Uncertain World, Michel Callon and associates (2011) explored the  boundaries 
and challenges of the mode of knowledge production known as ‘secluded research.’ Building 
on Latour’s (1987) seminal explorations on how laboratories gain power through gathering 
inscriptions in centres of calculation to ‘act at a distance,’ they describe the particular op-
eration that takes place in laboratories as one of ‘Translation’ (capitalised in the original): 
A threefold process that goes from a transportation of the world into the miniature space of 
the lab through the accumulation of inscriptions (translation 1), to the many manipulations 
and calculations of a research collective in that space until the phenomenon is controlled 
or ‘black boxed’ (translation 2), and can then be brought back into the world as a stable 
entity potentially changing existent relations (translation 3). However, as they suggest, in 
the last decades, a whole gamut of ‘hybrid forums’ – including both experts and laypersons – 
of the most varied kinds (e.g. environmentalist or embodied health collectives) have been 
 putting secluded research in crisis (see Waterton and Cardwell, this volume), generating 
many  avenues for the renewal of the ancient STS project of ‘technical democracy.’ Indeed, 
their main proposal was to open up a research programme on what they called ‘research in 
the wild’ (Callon & Rabeharisoa, 2003), a term used to describe the many different practices 
of laypersons seeking to ‘activate’ technoscientific practice in particular ways, potentially 
democratising the who and how of technoscience. One of the most interesting contribu-
tions of these works is its singling out of the role of ‘emergent concerned groups’ (Callon & 
 Rabeharisoa, 2008): That is, those who audaciously search to find ways to transform the 
market and/or technoscientific arrangements that leave them behind or cause them to suffer 
from particular unpredicted overflows. 
Indeed, this was ANT researchers’ main contribution to broader discussions in STS 
around activism and social movements (Hess et al., 2008). Interestingly, these discussions 
have also been important for the consolidation of STS:3 Indeed, this has become a research 
domain probing into the processes by which scientific truth and credibility, or technical 
objects, are publicly opened up for debate, scrutiny, control or co-construction in different 
narratives in which activism becomes a democratising agent, an ‘activator’ of alternative 
technoscientific practices.4 In turn, these reflections have opened up interesting debates with 
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regard to: (a) The normative horizons of STS practice and how activism may contribute to 
the co-construction of science and technology and to public control and participation in the 
development of science and technology (Sismondo, 2008); and (b) the different meanings of 
politics and democracy, and what STS could do to better articulate science, technology and 
democracy (Latour, 2007; Marres, 2007). However, in most of ANT and STS literature, the 
role of the analyst is left untouched: Most works present themselves as a study of activism, not 
studies in and through activism. In contrast, we want to ask: How does the activation, crit-
icism, contestation and dispute of technoscientific knowledges and arrangements ‘activate’ 
(Rodríguez-Giralt et al., 2018) our own research practices or us as researchers?
Becoming ‘activated’ as researchers
But how to open up a reflection against our own very ‘dogmatic negations,’ to use Stengers 
and Pignarre’s (2011) terms? That is, how to resist the impinging professionalisation of ANT 
as a ‘too comfortable,’ ‘self-complacent’ or ‘undisputable’ research space? Perhaps we might 
draw inspiration from two research programmes in STS that have been developing more 
explicit ‘materialist-interventionist’ versions of what an ANT-related mode of engagement 
might look like: (1) The debate around action-oriented research or the role of ‘situated inter-
ventions’; and (2) the debates around ‘matters of care.’
In recent years, a debate has arisen in STS around how to develop a more ‘action- oriented’ 
type of engagement in the worlds we study, and the practical ways in which such more socially 
and politically committed interventions might take place. We specially refer here to the work 
of Teun Zuiderent-Jerak and colleagues (Zuiderent-Jerak & Jensen, 2009;  Zuiderent-Jerak, 
2015). In contrast to some calls for a transformation of STS foregrounding, a ‘realistic’ (Bal et 
al., 2004) or an ‘engaged’ (Hamlett, 2003) political ethos, theirs stands out because of a desire 
to develop a situated stance: One where normativities are addressed as part of the reflexivity 
displayed in different types of experimental modes of intervention beyond textual/discursive 
means. This is not, for sure, a new relativist agenda but rather an approach to specificities: 
A descriptive and reflexive attitude of exploring 
the different forms interventions can take […] in a hybrid space, in which many agents 
constantly negotiate and influence each other, in order to achieve multiple conflicting 
goals. A picture emerges of intervention as mutual betrayal, or, more positively, as a pro-
cess of artful contamination whereby actors spread their agendas, ideas and aspirations.
(Zuiderent-Jerak & Jensen, 2009: 230–231)
Another inspiring materialist-interventionist agenda we could draw from to rethink ANT 
modes of engagement stems from the critical reflections by several feminist technoscience 
scholars around care. Feminist debates in STS not only have complicated and unsettled care 
as an analytic (Martin, Myers and Viseu, 2015; Mol, 2008; Jerak-Zuiderent, this volume; 
Puig de la Bellacasa, 2017), but have also sought to foreground the impact these vocabularies 
and reflections might have on our role as analysts. For instance, in Puig de la  Bellacasa’s (2011) 
parlance, ‘care’ ought to be considered as, simultaneously, an ‘affective state,’ a  ‘material/ vital 
doing’ and an ‘ethico-political obligation.’ Interestingly for our purposes, she is perhaps one 
of the most vocal in inviting us to think with the collectives and issues we work with as a 
matter of care. As she puts it: ‘transforming things into matters of care is a way of relating 
to them, of inevitably becoming affected by them, and of modifying their potential to affect 
others’ (Puig de la Bellacasa, 2017: 64). 
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This affective obligation should then lead scholars to address carefully those collectives 
whose particular ecology of practices makes them more vulnerable with regard to particu-
lar hegemonic forms of knowledge production and politics. This involves finding ways of 
‘speaking well’ about the practices we study: That is, characterising the mode of action of its 
practitioners without disregarding what matters to them (see López, this volume), but also 
foregrounding the frictional relations we may have with them. In some occasions, as it hap-
pened with our independent-living friends, a careful attitude might entail finding alternative 
vocabularies to the one around care – highly disputed because of its perceived connotations, 
implying their treatment as passive objects or recipients of care (see Shakespeare, 2006).
When brought to the study of activist groups, these series of concerns may be translated 
into a commitment to approach such groups not only as ‘recipients of the academic gaze’ 
but also as ‘knowledge-making agents in their own right,’ as several works in the litera-
ture of social movements have stated for years (Casas-Cortés et al., 2008; Melucci, 1989; 
 Rabeharisoa et al. 2014). This sensitivity has also helped to articulate a wealth of modes 
of research engagement that open themselves to activism: such as militant research, feminist 
research, emancipatory research, indigenous and decolonial research, participatory action 
research, etc. We believe that all of these lines of inquiry, foregrounding a problematisation 
around intervention, and in allowing us to think with and from activism as a mode of research 
pave an interesting way for ANT to draw inspiration and to carefully explore the ways in 
which activism might change our own research practices (Rodríguez et al., 2018). To expand 
on this, allow us to go back to the case of ETS.
engaging in ‘joint problem-making’
In late 2012, Tomás began curating the social media of the ETS collective – notably, the 
blog and social networks – taking minutes, and helping in the coordination of the process 
of documentation, crafting tutorials and how-to guides, and preparing meetings and public 
presentations. This mode of ethnographic engagement had lasting effects not only in the par-
ticular ways of undertaking research, but also in what the collective was doing. In fact, their 
free/open design practice foregrounded different practices of forms of ‘relating’ – forging 
relations with others and accounting for them – that were absolutely central in their design/
interventive practice. Even as documentation played a fundamental role, it was taken as a 
driver of non-predicative forms of knowledge (Criado & Cereceda, 2016): That is, as a form 
of showing others our efforts to make do, either to inspire them or so that they could relate 
to us and start newer dialogues, rather than as a form of evidence (or, if at all, as evidence that 
another life could be possible). 
Actually, as was the case in other developments and alliances derived both from the 15-M 
encounters (see García-Santesmases et al., 2017) and from the Spanish independent living 
modes of doing ‘emancipatory networks of knowledge’ (Centeno, 2009), ETS can be con-
sidered an interesting exploration in collaborative modes that related to particular forms of 
engagement and co-activation around research.5 Ours was a paroxysmal state of ongoing 
convulsion, sadness and suffering, but also full of moments of sheer joy and exaltation with 
many being drawn into calls for action, feeling moved and ‘taken’ by different and previously 
incompatible kinds of collective explorations: From actions around the monstrous problem of 
mortgages and evictions to the expansion of DIY practices and collective architecture; from a 
renewal of movements searching for a re-democratisation of institutions and  decision-making 
or even for the transformation of political topologies (e.g. Catalan independence movements 
or the creation of new political platforms, but also emerging trans-feminist, environmentalist, 
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decolonisation and independent-living movements) to street-level democratic initiatives in 
social (i.e. anarchist-related, commons-led) spaces. This, of course, is not particularly new 
if one pays attention to the impact of, say, feminist or disability rights activist agendas in 
different strands of post-ANT research. But, in our case, it decisively contributed to activate 
us as ANT-inspired researchers:6 Something we felt when engaging with such an open and 
‘self-experimental’ ethos to create alternative research relations and to collaboratively forge 
other tales or accounts.7
The 15-M’s political effervescence produced alternative knowledges that impacted on 
established forms of expertise and markets (cf. Roelvink et al., 2015). But in there we also 
witnessed a repertoire of activism going beyond the classic ANT concern with the ‘transla-
tion of knowledge’ (research in the wild) or the ‘modulation of markets’ (concerned groups). The 
15-M, in turn, created the conditions of what could be called wild research: That is, a form 
of activism that entailed different forms of gathering together laypeople, social scientists, 
long-time activists and designers in exploratory practices in and through where all involved 
felt activated to engage in alternative and always collaborative forms of research. This meant 
avoiding ready-made solutions and explanations, giving centre stage to the ones usually left 
aside, and promoting an innovative exploration of arranging worlds together with many 
others having the experience, capability and the means to describe and transform them in 
new and creative ways. 
Rather than a desire to produce ‘situated interventions,’ it was this collaborative intensity 
that ‘activated’ us, as researchers, towards other modes of moving and activating research, 
and through which we also put others in motion.8 This was also what activated our particular 
modes of ‘speaking well’ of these activist practices (cf. Rodríguez-Giralt et al., 2018), some-
thing we attempted in and through documentary and academic activities, but also engaging 
in research interventions that facilitated particular forms of what we could call, following 
our epistemic partners’ modes of relating, ‘ joint problem-making’ (Criado & Rodríguez- 
Giralt, 2016): That is, ways of problematising – both materially transforming and conceptually 
 accounting – their own worlds together with others (a friend from ETS joyfully called this a 
practice of ‘adding up our fates,’ which is probably a more appropriate register than the one 
around care). In fact, ‘ joint problem-making’ also became a particular mode in which Tomás 
engaged ethnographically in activities of note-taking (Criado, 2018); ETS’s documentation 
being not just a note-taking device ‘from the field’ – for ETS members to narrate their 
 undertakings – but a fundamental space in the articulation of that very field as a joint research 
space for all involved. These forms of joint problem-making also developed into manifold ‘ex-
perimentally collaborative’ research endeavours (Criado & Estalella, 2018), when we hosted 
events where our friends and colleagues could present their ideas in public, and where differ-
ent approaches to DIY could be shown and demonstrated; or in bringing our counterparts so 
that they could present on an equal footage in academic venues; or in co-writing texts, open 
design tutorials and blog posts with reflections about our experiences in common. 
Conclusions
In this text, we have explored what happens to ANT when we engage in activist ecologies. 
We have done this through the particular reflection of our involvement in a particular instance 
of the 15-M and independent living movements in Spain, and how they affected or, rather, 
‘activated’ alternative modes of engaging in these particular ecologies. We believe ETS to be 
a good case to think with about the different issues arising when trying to experiment with 
more collaborative, engaged and action-oriented ways of doing ANT research. In particular, 
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we have expanded on a particular mode of ethnographic ‘ joint problem- making’ as a con-
crete strategy to do this. But this is far from the only possibility in which ANT’s research 
modes could be experimented upon, if not repurposed, when engaging in activist practices. 
In what ways could ANT be reshaped when engaging in other activist settings? Or, rather, 
can ANT be a form of activism? 
In pointing out all this, our hope would be that ANT could become a more open and 
nonconformist research space: An ‘activated’ practice, problematising in newer ways the re-
lationship between description and action, exploring the manifold ways of being an analyst 
or a researcher that might be available when engaging in these settings. This does not neces-
sarily mean a call to engage in normative or programmatic interventionist agendas. On the 
contrary, it might mean developing a more careful, curious and situated ethos, whereby newer 
understandings of normativity and the politics of research, including experimental forms of 
joint problem-making, could be developed through particular ways of relating to or, rather, 
‘becoming activated’ as ANT researchers in, activist ecologies.
Notes
 1 Stimulated by the inclusive and participatory atmosphere of 15-M movement, several ‘functionally 
diverse people’ – most with activist backgrounds in the Spanish Independent Living Movement – 
congregated in the Spanish squares and created commissions of ‘functional diversity’ (Arenas & 
Pié, 2014). These commissions created the conditions for engaging in lively discussions about the 
several challenges faced by the functionally diverse and the empowering dynamics taking place in 
the squares.
 2 For a story of the ramp’s open prototyping, see Criado et al. (2016) where we detail how the ‘in-
clined plane’ of the ramp was an experimental space, putting to a test given care arrangements, and 
allowing tinkering with alternative ones.
 3 For instance, Cozzens (1993) reflected on whether STS could be considered a social movement in 
itself.
 4 A classic reference of STS work on technoscientific activism is, perhaps, Epstein’s (1996) on 
AIDS and the ‘impure science’ of ACT-UP interventions. But other interesting have arisen in 
the last decades, such as ‘embodied health movements’ (Brown, 1997), ‘evidence-based activism’ 
 (Rabeharisoa et al., 2014) or ‘technoscience otherwise’ (Murphy, 2012). Besides, activism and so-
cial movements have been at the background of relevant moves in STS ways of addressing public 
engagement in science and technology, from the work on ‘civic epistemologies’ ( Jasanoff, 2005) to 
the more recent emphasis on ‘material publics’ (Marres & Lezaun, 2011).
 5 At that time of the main 15-M mobilisations, we were both starting a collective research project 
called EXPDEM: ‘Political Action of Groups Concerned with the Promotion of Independent- 
Living in Spain’ (funded by the Spanish Ministry of Science and Competitiveness grant CSO2011-
29749-C02-02). In an explicit gesture towards forms of ‘emancipatory research’ (Oliver, 1992), the 
EXPDEM project was conceived from the onset including different activist members as part of its 
advisory board and as co-researchers (Antonio, one of ETS’s members being one of them). With 
this, we aimed to prevent researchers from ‘speaking for the other’ (cf. Ruby, 1992) and to create 
instances of friction and shared reflection.
 6 These issues were articulated in RedesCTS, the STS space/network where many ANT-oriented 
researchers in the Spanish context regularly met. For a polyphonic account of it, check the collec-
tive video, produced as a report of the 2013 ¿Y si no me lo creo? | What if I don’t buy it? meeting in 
Barcelona, available at https://redescts.wordpress.com/archive/
 7 Indeed, in this we also felt the inspiration of the 15-M movement, which had entailed in a brutal 
explosion of forms of documentary ‘open-sourcing’ – in digital platforms, booklets, zines, blogs or 
how-to guides – whereby our cities were turned into ‘infrastructures of apprenticeship’ (cf. Corsín & 
Estalella, 2016).
 8 After disassembling the notion of the social and interrogating the concept of movement, Latour has 
recently rearticulated the notion of social movement to put forward a politics that moves individuals 
into active engagement and dialogue (Latour et al., 2018).
367
Can ANT be a form of activism?
References
Arenas, M., & Pié, A. (2014) Las comisiones de diversidad funcional en el 15M español: Poner el cuerpo 
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After the 3.11 disaster hit Japan
At 14:46 JST on March 11, 2011, an earthquake of magnitude 9 occurred off the Pacific coast 
of Japan. It led to gigantic tsunamis, which swallowed a wide range of the coastal landscape 
of the country, and then caused explosions and meltdowns at three reactors of Tokyo Electric 
Power Company (TEPCO)’s Fukushima Dai-ichi Nuclear Power Plant (F-1). This triple di-
saster killed more than 15,000 people mainly in the Tohoku region and, by releasing massive 
amounts of radiation (the second level 7 accident on the International Nuclear Event Scale 
after Chernobyl), damaged the planet in a multifaceted way. With its direct and indirect 
damage, the 3.11 disaster is one of the worst in the Anthropocene.
Not surprisingly, it is highly troublesome to demarcate the disaster. As historians have 
stressed, March 11 is not the date when it was created: This accident has deep roots in Japan’s 
history of modernisation. Although it was the accident of F-1 that brought the dame to the 
fore, it is severely difficult to cut the network of the responsibility for it, legally or scientif-
ically (Strathern 1996). A comment from the chairperson of the independent investigation 
commission in the National Diet is symptomatic: The fundamental causes of the nuclear 
accident ‘are to be found in the ingrained conventions of Japanese culture’ (The National 
Diet of Japan Fukushima Nuclear Accident Independent Investigation Commission 2012). 
Also, it should be noted, the 3.11 disaster is still unfolding. Most of the affected communities 
have not recovered. One hundred and thirty-six people who died in 2016, for example, were 
officially recognised as ‘disaster-related deaths,’ that is indirectly caused by the 3.11 disaster. 
Moreover, its long-life radiological impacts on humans and non-humans on the planet are 
largely still uncertain. 
Despite this, the political actions to make the disaster a thing of the past are compelling in 
Japan. Just nine months after the explosion, Prime Minister Noda (DPJ)1 declared officially 
the ‘convergence’ (shūsoku, a bureaucratic, euphemistic expression describing the demise) 
of the Fukushima accident. In October 2013, hoping to host the Olympic Games in 2020, 
Prime Minister Abe (LDP) announced to the world that the Fukushima radioactive water 
was ‘under control.’ Domestically, the government strongly encourages evacuees to return 
home according to their plan, ignoring dissenting voices.
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Against the government’s bureaucratism, the momentum of social change, a temporary 
alignment of diverse groups under a banner of ‘anti-nukes,’ could not bear fruit. Gradu-
ally, conflicts between different knowledge and agendas, small and large, came to the sur-
face. Intense debates about the prevention of health risk, energy policy, what people outside 
Fukushima should do and so on made citizens weary. While some kept resisting the gov-
ernment’s high-handed reactions, others overcame (or threw away) their political distrust 
through the ‘change’ of the government at the first national election after 3.11, ironically, 
from DPJ to LDP.2 In terms of political atmosphere, Japan quickly seems to have returned 
to the same state before the accident, or, dare we say, become worse. Under the dominating, 
‘restorative’ LDP administration, individuals become nervous about being seen as a ‘politi-
cized’ person, who openly expresses their opinions on ‘Fukushima’ or other sensitive social 
issues. Public discussions about ‘Fukushima’ are thus becoming less visible, and different 
perspectives on the issue are left incommensurate. Each camp gains ground from different 
information and knowledge from various sources, factual or fake, and evaluates others’ words 
and deeds from their (inflexible) standpoint. They are like different ontologies: While there 
is health damage from low-dose exposure in a world, there is no such thing in another. In this 
world(s), coordination between them (Mol 2003) can no longer be expected. 
In this chapter, we retrace emerging networked engagements with the sociopolitical state 
of things triggered by the 3.11 disaster in Japan.3 It is not an objective study of radiation 
after the accident; it looks more like storytelling. A key task of public anthropologist is, we 
believe, to gift a slow, ethnography-based story to the public to cope with the given reality, 
and hopefully, to help bring forth a better reality. As shown later, our approach benefits 
from ANT’s basic ideas: A fact is realised with a network of human and non-human actors; 
non-humans can play as an important role as humans; the reality of a fact, the identity of 
an actor or the meaning of the event is relational to its association with other (Latour 1987, 
2005). In this chapter, we do not pursue ‘normative’ actions of ANT to open the black box 
of a fact and to follow the process of its closure. Instead, we attempt to display a network’s 
potential to expand as a way to resist the hasty closing of the black box.
Repairing the reality
In the aftermath of the earthquake, tsunami and the nuclear accident, major parts of Japan’s 
social infrastructures of information, transport and energy were temporally paralysed, split-
ting the country into (roughly) three categories with significantly different experiences of 
the early phase of the disaster: Those directly affected by the earthquake, tsunami and/or the 
radiation leak; those who felt their lives were in danger of possible radiation exposure and 
those who could manage to live ordinary life away from the epicentre geographically and/
or psychologically. Both of the authors of this chapter fell into the second category. For sev-
eral weeks after March 11, we were so frustrated, prevented from knowing what was really 
going on. Tense reports and miscellaneous predictions (optimistic and pessimistic, realistic 
and exaggerated) regarding the Fukushima power plants were continuously aired. Without 
adequate measuring devices, radiation is silent and invisible. Even with them, it is highly 
difficult to predict its behaviour and consequences.4 We felt as if our reality dissolved in the 
extreme uncertainty.
The initial reactions were to ‘repair’ this collapsed reality by visualising what was going 
on.5 Morita, Blok and Kimura (2013) articulated an ad hoc public which assembled a civic 
radiation monitoring map by using freely available software. On March 13, a video direc-
tor in central Japan called via twitter for people’s collaboration in building a Google Map 
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covering radiation monitoring posts all over the country.6 The map soon attracted followers, 
over time becoming one of the most important tools for citizens concerned by radiation risks 
to take stock of the situation. The map came to serve as the infrastructural node of an emerg-
ing sociotechnical network, formed through the ad hoc collaboration of ‘amateur’ citizens 
with no formal scientific credentials, but with practical knowledge gained through collective 
learning processes.7 This civic map gradually came to structure what people ‘saw’ in their 
immediate surroundings (Fortun 2004) and came to play an important role in supporting 
people’s assessments and actions. In other words, it became an important ‘cartographic’ tool 
for citizens to restore some sense of grip on an otherwise fractured reality. With the map, 
people gained a (temporary) means not only for knowing the real-time radiation levels in 
(or near) one’s locality, but also for assessing the plausibility and credibility of (‘reassuring’) 
official press releases and (‘catastrophic’) circulating rumours.
While with his colleagues Kimura followed an ad hoc, online network, Inose describes 
his own attempts to ‘repair the reality’ on his ‘welfare farm (fukushi nōen)’ (2015). As a part 
of a sustained social movement concerning disability in Inose’s hometown of Saitama,8 a 
relatively big city 25 km north of Tokyo, a group in which he participates has run a ‘welfare 
farm’ where disabled people, volunteers, students, children and parents, and farmers have 
worked together for about a decade. By exposing their vegetables to radiation, the 3.11 
 disaster  endangered the group’s activity. On March 15, a monitoring post in Saitama mea-
sured a radioactivity level of 1 μSv/hr, 40 times higher than usual. They were unprepared 
since Saitama is more than 200 km away from F-1 and got worried whether their vegetables 
were safe or not. Although a young researcher of soil science and volunteer named Ishii shared 
with other members his knowledge about the radiation, it was too abstract and complicated 
for them to be reassured. Some even distrusted his ‘scientific,’ numerical explanation. 
Yet, Ishii did not give up. He reviewed the relevant literature and participated in var-
ious activities such as a visit to Chernobyl organised by the agricultural cooperative of 
Fukushima. Finally, he launched an experiment on the transfer of radioactive materials from 
the soil to a plant in a town in Fukushima. His experiment was, retrospectively speaking, a 
re- examination of how multiple actors, human and non-human, are related to each other 
in the complex process called agriculture, and a struggle to reconnect the relationships in a 
more resilient way. Consequently, it led to his (re)discoveries including the effectiveness of 
traditional mix cropping in keeping lower the radiation dose of the crops. What is crucial is 
that he could share the findings of his experiments with other members of the welfare farm 
this time, by providing it as a story, where materials and places otherwise alien – vegetables 
in  the welfare farm, caesium, traditional farming, Saitama, Fukushima and Chernobyl – 
meet. In a sense, Ishii gifted his fellows an actor-network story! Resonating with their own 
story of the disability movement in Saitama, his story touched the group members, providing 
them with a touch of reality and clue how to live with it.
Confronted with the harsh ‘fact’ of nuclear accident, some might have thought that the 
intellectual game of ANT was over. Yet as demonstrated earlier, with ANT, we can capture 
the emergence of local efforts of assembling human and non-human actors that ‘patch’ a col-
lapsed reality with a temporary tool (map or story) created by themselves.
Remaking a reality9
Let’s turn to our next story. Kashiwa is another commuter town 50 km northeast of Tokyo. 
As with Saitama, a rapid influx of newcomers after the Second World War created friction 
with natives. To mediate this and to animate the city after the burst bubble economy, in 
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the late 1990s, the local chamber of commerce held a town planning course (machi zukuri 
juku) for young residents. A mixed group of newcomers, sons of local farmers, owners of the 
shops at the mall and so on joined in. When the course was completed, this group formed 
a voluntary organisation called ‘Street Breakers’ (hereafter SB) and started hosting social 
events to revitalise the central district of the city. Among their successful projects are those 
of supporting street musicians and managing a monthly street market of local goods. Along 
with the street market, local vegetables gained popularity with local restaurants as well as 
health-conscious Kashiwans. The concept of local production for local consumption (chisan 
chishō) was gradually taking root in Kashiwa.
The 3.11 disaster ruined this optimistic mood. At the early stages, people in Kashiwa, 
more than 200 km away from the F-1, kept watching. Yet in April, unexpectedly, it turned 
out that there were many hot spots of radiation in the area including Kashiwa. Repeated 
again and again in media coverage, the name of Kashiwa became a symbol of hot spots away 
from Fukushima. Although many Kashiwans felt disturbed, their concerns and reactions 
were not identical: Mothers were anxious about their children’s health; farmers about the 
shipment of their vegetables; municipal officers about population outflow and so on. Worried 
mothers promptly launched a campaign for collecting signatures to make the city govern-
ment prevent schoolchildren’s radiation exposure, asking them, as part of increased food 
safety, not to use local vegetables for school lunches (cf. Sternsdorff-Cisterna 2015). Their 
action made the farmers feel abandoned because the aware mothers had been their best cus-
tomers. In contrast, farmers could not take immediate action. Individual farmers hesitated to 
calculate the radiation levels of their land or vegetables, since a high score would constitute, 
they supposed, objective evidence to stop the shipment of overall agricultural products from 
Kashiwa. Therefore, they attempted to keep the score ‘unknown’ (cf. Petryna 2002), which, 
in turn, disturbed mothers. In this tense situation, the municipal government did not actively 
intervene ‘to stay out of trouble.’10
As a heterogeneous civic group, SB gradually took actions to change the stressful, hostile 
atmosphere. At the end of July, 2011, they hosted a closed roundtable, inviting concerned 
citizens. A small group of people including local farmers of direct sales, consumers-residents 
including the signature campaigners, and the owner of a farmer’s market, sat down at the dis-
cussion table. Yet, not surprisingly, in an oppressive air, everyone attempted to probe others 
participants’ thoughts without offering their own. The only thing the first roundtable could 
decide on was its general rules: To hold monthly meetings, not to discard any opinions and 
to adopt the rule of unanimity for future actions.
SB then invited Takahashi, manager of an IT company, to join the roundtable. They 
thought he would be interested in it, knowing he had personally imported dosimeters. As a 
business person, his position was different from the farmers or consumers, but he was also a 
concerned resident attached to Kashiwa. At the second roundtable, his dosimeters attracted 
both sides’ interest: He (or his instruments) came to mediate between them. During the sum-
mer of 2011, he devoted himself to mastering these devices, resulting in launching a private 
dosimetric service for foods at a low price in October. 
In November, Igarashi, a sociologist member of SB, shared with local farmers the results 
of a consumer questionnaire about Kashiwa vegetables that he had conducted with the par-
ents of preschool children. It suggested that if the farmers show diligent effort to provide 
appropriate information about radiation, health-conscious consumers in Kashiwa would 
be strong supporters of local agriculture. His findings gave them a glimmer of hope. The 
atmosphere of the roundtable improved gradually and mutual trust among the members 
was fostered.
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To reconstruct face-to-face relationship between consumers and farmers in Kashiwa, SB 
embarked on a dose measurement project. It is easy to predict that a design for a meaningful 
test for both farmers and consumers is extremely difficult. If air dose can be measured to 
some degree by a portable instrument on site, the testing of soil and crops requires a sample 
inspection by a large machine in a laboratory. While a rigorous test (such as an inspection 
of every crop in a laboratory) would require too much time and money, a simple test on site 
is not accurate enough to convince consumers that the crops are safe. In addition, the total 
mechanism of radiation transfer between the soil, water and crop was too complex for SB 
members to identify. As a trial, they measured the variation of the air dose in several spots 
in one crop field and compared the scores with the radiation level of crops grown there, and 
found that there was no direct relation.
After a long discussion, they decided to inspect the soil dose, as a substitute for total in-
spection, accepting that there was a rough correlation between the radiation level of crops 
and the soil (not the air) where it grew. Another breakthrough was made by Takahashi’s 
comment: ‘LB200 is portable and we can use it for on-site inspection.’ By then, he had ob-
tained different types of dosimeters. LB200 was one of them. Although it was a rather simple 
measuring device running on an electric battery, Takahashi realised, the LB2000 could be 
effective in Kashiwa in determining the location of relatively contaminated soil. Yet, no one 
except Takahashi thought that a 25-kilogram instrument was portable. Thus, SB established 
a two-step test of radiation level. First, they would measure on site the radiation level of the 
soil sample obtained from the five points (four corners and the centre) of a crop field with 
the ‘portable’ instrument with moderate accuracy. After finding the highest radiation point 
of the field, they would then rigorously test the radiation level of the crop taken from that 
point in a laboratory. They also independently established the standard for shipment: less than 
20 bq/kg.11 What was crucial was that it was not a value decided by outsiders like scientists or 
bureaucrats, but the result of their – a diverse group of Kashiwans’ – own discussions. It was a 
private but deliberate and sharable standard. 20 bq/kg is a criterion acceptable for most (if not 
all) health-conscious consumers, settable as a realistic goal for local farmers, and a detectable 
amount that is both technically and financially feasible for the SB.
The members of the roundtable named this two-step inspection as ‘My Farmer Method’ 
(mai nouka houshiki), suggesting the importance of building personal connections between 
farmers and consumers. As they released the results of the inspections publicly via the In-
ternet, the anxiety in Kashiwa concerning local vegetables was alleviated. Additionally, a 
substandard soil or vegetable no longer meant merely the presence of urgent risk. Instead, it 
offered a tangible, viable target that encourages Kashiwans’ collaboration in taking counter-
measures. Obviously, such an inspection never ameliorates the damage from the 3.11 disaster, 
nor makes clear the entire mechanism of the radioactive damage. However, through the 
pragmatic and democratic process to implement the two-step inspection, Kashiwans could 
redirect their attention from present uncertainties into their liveable future.
The spontaneous ‘citizen science’ emerging from a commuter town suggests an ‘art of liv-
ing’ with uncertainty (cf. Tsing 2015), if not a solution for an Anthropocenic disaster. Here, 
ANT’s ideas help us elucidate what is going on and narrate it as a story. With time and care, 
SB has reassembled human and non-human actors, based on their attachment to the town. 
Tools, numbers and affect mediate their collaboration. Scientific knowledge is vital for its de-
velopment, but never eliminates uncertainty related to radiation. Personal stories are fragile, 
but can create a temporal alliance among heterogeneous actors, bracketing uncertainty. SB 
was willing to open the network to new actors and to explore potential of each actor. The 
capability of the actors is relational: For example, in the network, Takahashi is not merely a 
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manager of an IT company nor is LB2000 merely a dosimeter running on an electric battery. 
In this way, Kashiwan network expands, bringing change in their perspective regarding the 
landscape they are facing with (cf. Waterson and Cardwell, this volume).
Towards a more public network
As time passes by, visible traces of the 3.11 disaster are rapidly covered or erased, sometimes 
by force. The Anti-Nuclear Tents, set up by citizens in September 2011 in front of  Ministry 
of Economy, Trade and Industry, have served as a symbol of anti-nuclear movement for 
years. At midnight on a Sunday in 2016, they were removed forcibly but silently by the 
 government, without citizen’s stiff resistance and criticism. The removal was symbolic in two 
senses: It embodied state actions to ‘close the black box’ or to make the disaster a thing of 
the past; and on the other hand, it epitomised the feeling of weariness among citizens these 
days. Now, the majority of Japanese people are for the government, passively or actively, 
as LDP’s consecutive election victory suggests. As we explained earlier, public discussions 
on  ‘political’ issues are becoming less visible. Resonating with neo-liberalism, difficulties 
related to the nuclear disaster are being considered personal rather than public issues. While 
 thousands of people are still living as evacuees, Fukushima City is enjoying an economic 
boom generated by reconstruction projects.
In this situation, empowerment of the affected people is vital and necessary but yet not 
enough. The present (and perpetual) challenge for public anthropologists is to reach the pub-
lic, who keep a silent distance from ‘political’ issues. For this purpose, with help from ANT, 
we follow the sequels to the stories we have narrated, attending to the importance of the rela-
tionship generated through eating. In fact, food has been a target of heated controversies after 
the 3.11 disaster. Food is vital for and, in our context, embodies the risks we take in our lives. 
As the above-mentioned cases suggest, foods unavoidably take part in the complex interac-
tions between humans and non-humans, and are simultaneously themselves the outcome of 
such interactions (Mol 2008). Note that our emphasis is not on the binary relationship of 
predator/game or friend/foe that food may generate. Instead, we explore the physiological 
and moral relationship that would be created by the act of eating together, offering or sharing 
food, a relationship which can lead us to share a sense of living in the same world (cf. Tsing 
2015). As Sternsdorff-Cisterna writes, ‘It is an intimate act of ingestion, which connects the 
body to the outside world and connects givers and recipients of sustenance in affective rela-
tionship’ (Sternsdorff-Cisterna 2015:464).12
During his struggle to reduce radiation in the soil, Ishii from Saitama encountered Igarashi 
from Kashiwa. Although neither of them were farmers, they had a deep concern about the 
crops they grew. Then, Komatsu, a young journalist from Iwaki, Fukushima, a coastal town 
near F-1, contacted Igarashi. When the disaster hit, Komatsu returned to his hometown and, 
as a spokesperson for a local fish product company, started transmitting ‘on-site’ information 
about fish, mainly via the Internet. In the subsequent years, fish and the fishery in Iwaki 
were endangered by not only radiation but also uncertainties it entails. Ironically, Komatsu’s 
effort to provide accurate information was often accused of his ‘biased’ view via social media 
by those acutely aware of health damage or those against nuclear power. In the fragmented 
space of social media, it is difficult to bridge gaps between different  already-formed circles. 
He changed his strategy.
Collaborating with Igarashi and local veterinarians working for the prefectural aquarium 
of Fukushima, Komatsu launched a project, The Sea Laboratory (Umi rabo) and The See 
Laboratory (Shirabe rabo) in 2015. They go out to the sea of Fukushima to catch fish and 
375
Has ANT been helpful for public anthropologists in Japan?
obtain marine soil, and then inspect their radiation level. He encourages local consumers and 
anglers to join. Thus on the boat of The Sea Laboratory is always a heterogeneous group. 
In The See Laboratory, a monthly public event they hold at the aquarium, the veterinarians 
report the result of inspection (although the values vary among species, they are generally 
low and show a steady decrease over time) and to eat together the fish they caught. In face 
of delicious-looking fish, people typically reach out their hand, regardless of their view on 
radiation. ‘What convinces people is neither reason nor logic,’ Komatsu assures, ‘but pleas-
ant taste.’ Eating together fosters friendly relationships among professionals, citizens and 
fish. Pleasantness is crucial here, like Kashiwans’ attachment to their hometown. Certainly, 
emphasis on taste risks descending into emotional propaganda, or naturalises the difference 
of social class (Bourdieu 1987). In this respect, of great importance is that, with a ‘scientific’ 
name, Komatsu builds his project around scientific research. 
As a former journalist displaying his capabilities by conducting the radiation tests and 
holding social events, Komatsu associates with multiple actors, and changes the atmosphere 
of the politics slowly. In 2016, Komatsu started a second project, ‘Place of Fish’ (Sakana no 
ba), a monthly event to get people together to eat local fish and drink local sake in Iwaki. This 
project was inspired by Ohashi, whom Igarashi introduced to Komatsu. A former would-be 
theatre actor and graduate student who studied anthropology with Inose and Kimura, 
Ohashi runs a small bar located in a busy shopping street in Ueno, Tokyo. No, he does 
not run a bar but creates a stage, Ohashi tells us, where a heterogeneous group of actors, 
 human and non-human, including seafood and sake from tsunami-affected areas, interact. 
With sympathetic interaction, a network of humans and non-humans expands. When a net-
work expands, the actors unfold their potential accordingly, which, in turn, help the network 
incorporate new actors.
Conclusion
In this chapter, we have narrated emerging networked actions after the 3.11 disaster. As 
our cases show, in the network, the distinction of the actor (activist) and the observer can 
easily dissolve – a student of ANT becomes naturally a public anthropologist (cf. Criado 
and  Rodriguez-Girault, this volume). And by expanding a network continuously, as Fortun 
(2001) suggests, we can keep things unsettled and resist the hasty closing of the black box. 
In the beginning, we asked: How has ANT been helpful for public anthropologists after 
the 3.11 disaster in Japan? ANT helps us in several ways: To attend to local, down-to-earth 
activities as well as large-scale movements; to follow what was going on there; to narrate 
them not as a ‘hero legend’ nor as ‘best practice’ transferable to other sites, but as a story 
that affects the readers; and to understand the dynamism of how a network and its actors 
transform each other through interaction. Above all, in the aftermath of a catastrophe, ANT 
reminds us that writing is a way to contribute to bring forth a better reality. 
Notes
 1 Democratic Party (DPJ) was a seemingly reformist party, which  existed from 1998 to 2016. Liberal 
Democratic Party (LDP) is conservative, the ruling party for most of the years since 1955 in Japan.
 2 DPJ took the reins of government in 2009, criticising LDP government’s political corruption. 
However, mass enthusiasm for ‘change’ turned quickly into frustration because of DPJ’s inde-
cisiveness. Although DPJ reformed little the governmental regime LDP had elaborated, LDP 
regained the reins in 2012, blaming the DPJ government for all the problems related to the 3.11 
disaster.
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 3 Since space is limited, we have to omit a variety of the actions in and out of Japan, in which an-
thropologists are taking part (Gill et al. 2013; Naito et al. 2014; Manabe 2015).
 4 In fact, real-time macro-behaviour was simulated and visualised by SPEEDI (System for Prediction 
of Environmental Emergency Dose Information), developed by The Nuclear Safety Division of the 
Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology (MEXT). However, thousands 
of sheets of the simulation maps produced by SPEEDI were not used for evacuation nor even pub-
lished for about two months.
 5 Many attempts to contextualize the disaster or predict its future course based on prior cases were 
also made (but largely from those in the third category).
 6 In the course of events, several experts – including atomic physicist Ryugo Hayano and volca-
nologist Hayakawa Yukio – transmitted technical knowledge via their twitter accounts. As a 
 ‘layperson,’ however, the video director did not aim to transmit his own knowledge but instead 
used his account to build collaboration on the civic radiation monitoring map.
 7 ‘Amateur’ obviously carries no derogatory connotations here, but simply points to the fact that 
engaged citizens were not ‘professional’ (i.e. trained) radiation monitoring experts.
 8 During the rapid economic growth of Japan after the Second World War, Saitama developed as a 
commuter town of Tokyo (cf. Robertson 1991). In the dynamic interaction between natives and 
newcomers, disability emerged as a critical social issue. In the 1970s, a group of people with and 
without disabilities launched an action to make the society more inclusive. They resisted local prac-
tices of shutting family members with disability in their houses and acted against national education 
policy separating classes for disabled students and able-bodied students.
 9 This section is written based on Igarashi et al. 2012.
 10 At around the same time as the roundtable, the mayor of Kashiwa expressed his opinion on his per-
sonal blog, which was heavily criticized since it revealed his insufficient understanding of radiation. 
He apologized and promised to address the radiation issue seriously. Subsequently, the municipal 
office started to calculate the radiation of local vegetables.
 11 National standard prescribed by Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare in 2012 is 100bq/kg 
(cecium-137).
 12 Foods also interact with radiation and, as a result, can transform at a molecular level. Such a micro 
level transformation can cause unexpected effects on living organisms, and the relationship among 
them. Thus, eating (contaminated) foods would pose additional questions such as: Is an individual 
human or non-human actor to be treated as an actor, or as a collection of actors (i.e. genes)? How 
can we follow them? By taking seriously radioactive substance as an actor, what alternative political 
perspective will be opened?
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36
How to move beyond the 
 dialogism of the ‘Parliament of 
Things’ and the ‘Hybrid  Forum’ 
when rethinking  participatory 
experiments with ANT?
Emma Cardwell and Claire Waterton
Section 1: Thinking about participation with ANT
In Reassembling the Social, Bruno Latour (2005a) describes the defining moment of ANT as 
that when three social theorists ( John Law, Michel Callon and himself ) each managed to 
persuade others that three objects formerly understood to be non-social (respectively: reefs, 
scallops and microbes) could be described as associated with social entities.1 The concept of 
association inspired detailed redescriptions of such objects, in ways which showed that ‘they 
make others do unexpected things’ (2005a: 106). The work of the analyst, as these authors 
saw it, was to get closer to entities that were traditionally seen as non-social, follow them 
and trace, in minute detail, their relations, translations and mediations. In order to do this, 
the very meaning of the social and the natural would need to be ‘dissolved simultaneously’ 
(Latour 2005a: 109).
These early iterations of ANT worked primarily to produce better accounts of how scien-
tific knowledge was made: The socio-material practices that went into creating indisputable 
‘facts’ which were accepted as existing ‘out there’ in an ontological world that existed inde-
pendent of human agency. This core orientation has significant implications for experiments 
in participation. In a world where scientific and political controversies are often inseparable 
(e.g. climate change, GM foods, avian flu, tobacco, human reproduction, etc.), attempts to 
unsettle ‘natural’ facts are vital to the tricky task of participating in contemporary democratic 
politics. 
In this chapter, we will outline the basics of an ANT approach to participation. We be-
gin with a discussion of three key texts: Callon, Lascoume and Barthe’s (2009) Acting in an 
Uncertain World, Latour’s (2004) Politics of Nature and Latour’s chapter (2005b) From Realpolitik 
to Dingpolitik (published in Weibel and Latour’s 2005b Making Things Public: Atmospheres of 
Democracy). These texts spark readers to reimagine the spaces, procedures and philosophies 
in play around technoscientific controversies in public life. The insights of ANT, their au-
thors believed, could address the proliferation of such controversies, and contribute to better 
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democratising democracy. Through subtly different but overlapping argumentation, they 
advocated:
-  intervening in technical and scientific knowledge-making;
-  opening out the idea of expertise through the championing of different understandings; 
-  reconfiguring lay and expert knowledges in research; 
-  building new evidence;
-  creating ‘spaces’ or ‘collectives’ where people and things might gather together to dis-
cuss, differ and dispute; and
-  supporting an explicitly experimental mode of engagement around controversy.
In each of the texts, the authors established specific ideas about how to achieve the afore-
mentioned. We outline these in section 1. Then, in section 2, we explore the performance 
of these ideas ‘in the wild’ through an experimental participatory collective formed around 
blue-green algae in a lake, Loweswater, in Cumbria, Northern England. After that, in sec-
tions 3 and 4, we query what a subsequent project, which looks at how farmers make decisions 
about the management of cattle slurry,2 can tell us about moving beyond these approaches in 
rethinking participatory experiments in the spirit of ANT.
Science in the wild: hybrid forums
We begin our whirlwind tour of an ANT approach to participation with the ideas of Callon, 
Lascoumes and Barthe (2009) in Acting in an Uncertain World. Here, Callon and colleagues ad-
vocate for widening participation in the socio-material construction of scientific knowledge 
via ‘hybrid forums.’ Participation is seen by these authors as an appropriate response to onto-
logical uncertainty and scientific controversy. They advocate a ‘technical democracy’ – one 
where political institutions are expanded and improved, to open out controversies through 
inclusive, public collaborations in knowledge-making and research.
A hybrid forum (henceforth HyFo) is a group that comes together to address a problem. The 
HyFo is hybrid both because the members are heterogeneous (scientists; politicians; interested 
laypersons), and the problem is addressed in many different domains (technological; ethical; 
economic). It is a forum because it creates an open, public space for debate, from which no 
one (and no subject) is excluded. A HyFo’s members explicitly recognise that knowledge 
 creation – even knowledge creation concerning the natural world – is inherently a political 
act. That is, it involves a politics performed through (public) dialogue, rather than delega-
tion to political professionals or elected officials. HyFos are therefore based on collective 
experimentation and learning. They scramble the division between laypersons and officially 
appointed experts. This makes the HyFo a ‘normatively oriented space’ and one that has 
specific ‘dialogic procedures’ (Callon et al. 2009: 161).
Both the socio-material construction of science and the political implications of this con-
struction are explicitly recognised in the HyFo, and participation in knowledge creation 
is extended beyond the milieu of the expert. Science leaves the protected space of the lab-
oratory and goes ‘into the wild.’ Clear-cut decisions – the arrival at a final and absolute 
truth – are not necessarily the desired outcome of the HyFo; instead, a favourable outcome 
is an ongoing ‘series of rendezvous’ (2009: 223), repeated meetings that make provisional 
decisions, open to change as information, circumstances or priorities change. In Acting in an 
Uncertain World, Callon et al. lay out guidelines for how the successful HyFo should be both 
executed and evaluated.
Emma Cardwell and Claire Waterton
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The participatory non-human: the Parliament of Things
Further contributions to ANT participatory thinking are found in Latour’s (2004) book Poli-
tics of Nature and in extensions of his arguments there in the essay ‘From Realpolitik to Ding-
politik or how to make things public,’ written for the exhibition catalogue Making Things 
Public (Weibel and Latour 2005). In Politics of Nature, Latour proposes a ‘new constitution’ to 
do away with the ‘illicit’ divide of nature (as represented by Science – note the capital ‘S’) and 
society (aka Politics). This new constitution would allow participants in democracies to work 
towards a ‘common world,’ not split into society and nature, where both humans (society, 
the realm of politics) and non-human ‘things’ (nature, the realm of science) are afforded due 
political process. This, in other words, is a vision of an enlarged democracy in which the 
hybridity of nature-society is recognised. In his later elaboration of this argument, Latour 
suggested that ‘Dings,’ where ‘the Ding designates both those who assemble because they are 
concerned as well as what causes their concerns and divisions,’ needed to be brought back into 
politics (2005b: 8, our emphasis). Dings, Latour argued, should become the centre of atten-
tion in what he called an ‘object-oriented democracy’ (2005b: 8).
Dingpolitik, or the ‘parliament of things,’ involves a vital move whereby participants in 
democracies start to work around ‘matters of concern’ rather than ‘matters of fact.’ For  Latour, 
a ‘matter of fact’ (henceforth MoFact) is firmly linked to a particular conception of ‘Scientific 
knowledge.’ Such ‘Scientific knowledge’ – an essential part of the post- enlightenment ‘mod-
ern constitution’ (Latour, 1993) – works by defining an objective nature. Latour deliberately 
gives this kind of ‘Science’ a capital ‘S’ to symbolise its power and to signal the way it closes 
down dissent and takes the place of politics in conventional decision-making fora. Latour 
suggests that such MoFact retain the power to render matter ‘mute’ and to make nature ‘in-
contestable’ (Latour, 2004:10). MoFact, in other words, work to stifle and deny politics, even 
in situations of controversy. 
To address this, Latour puts forward a new concept: ‘matters of concern’. To conceptual-
ise things as matters of concern (henceforth MoConcern) is to allow for the transformation 
of MoFact, impotent as they are in their Scientific form, into participatory ‘things’ that are 
lively and have agency. 
Latour’s proposition is that new collectives are needed to allow us to move away from 
Science towards a situation where – similar to within the HyFo – both lay and expert prac-
titioners might engage in the making of knowledge. These new collectives would not be 
silenced by indisputable scientific ‘facts.’ Rather, they would become politically active in 
MoConcern. Non-human ‘things’ would play a vital role (Latour 2004: 69), and be rec-
ognised as having the power to trigger ‘new occasions to passionately differ and dispute’ 
(Latour 2005b: 5).
In the Parliament of Things (PoT), participants are not required (as Scientists are) to leave 
their attachments, passions and weaknesses at the door in favour of an imagined objectiv-
ity. All scientific and political participants of collectives have the unavoidable ‘disabilities’ 
of weakness, passion and attachment, Latour argues; it is impossible to adopt a ‘view from 
 nowhere’ (Nagel 1986), or speak on behalf of the world objectively. We are all inherently 
‘politically challenged’ and democracy demands we recognise this. Latour rhetorically asks, 
‘Are we not, on the whole, totally disabled?’ (Latour 2005b: 20), and urges participants to 
embrace this ‘disability,’ rather than chase the ideal of becoming perfectly eloquent, enlight-
ened and objective disembodied thinkers. 
Taken together, Acting in an Uncertain World, Politics of Nature and Making Things  Public 
advocate a more open model for doing science, which is inclusive not just of a wider human 
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demos, but also the vitality of the non-human material world – recognising that matter 
 matters – in the production of scientific knowledge. Furthermore, all participants in the new 
knowledge-making collectives should acknowledge their own ‘constitutive attachments’ 
(Callon et al. 2009: 265) or ‘disabilities’ (Latour 2005b: 20) as essential to the work of de-
mocratising democracy.
So what does this mean in practice? In the next section, we describe how several simple 
principles drawn from these ANT ideas were adapted and utilised ‘in the wild’ (Callon et al 
2009: 104), that is, within a specific participatory collective that emerged in Loweswater, 
Cumbria, in the north of England. 
Section 2: ANT in the wild: a participatory experiment  
in Loweswater
In 2004, a group of three ecologists working with farmers around a lake that was exhibiting 
deteriorating water quality invited two sociologists of science (Claire Waterton and Jake 
Morris) to join their team. At that time, the Loweswater Lake was subject to increasingly 
frequent and unpredictable ‘blooms’ of cyanobacteria, or ‘blue-green algae.’ Cyanobacteria 
are organisms that depend on, and are ‘limited by,’ high nutrient loads within lake water, 
typically attributed to farm run-off of fertiliser or animal excrement. These algae can be poi-
sonous to animals and sometimes humans, and the deteriorating quality of the lake, situated 
within the popular Lake District National Park, was becoming an issue of public concern. 
The sociologists learned that, from the early 2000s onwards, scientists and environmental 
agencies had been monitoring the lake water using specified sampling methods to detect 
nutrients and to measure water flow. The data produced by this sampling would feed into a 
nutrient budget for the lake and contribute to a model that would enhance understanding of 
its thriving algal populations. 
Asking the ecologists about the water quality sampling they had been doing, the sociol-
ogists heard about the use of standard techniques, the importance of replicability and the 
necessity that sampling was ‘do-able’ for scientists. Asking farmers about water quality and 
the possibility of monitoring pollution, however, brought up very different issues. Firstly, 
farmers questioned the possibility of deriving an accurate picture of catchment processes 
from samples that are taken only once every month. Secondly, farmers asserted that the ecol-
ogists’ depth gauge was too far upstream of the lake to take into account the nutrient loading 
that four tributary streams were contributing. Thirdly, farmers spoke openly of the politics of 
monitoring. They knew that some of the issues in the lake concerned leaky farm infrastruc-
tures, but at the same time they felt that, for reasons of sensitivity, neither they nor the ecolo-
gists could realistically monitor these: ‘You couldn’t do samples outside of everyone’s slurry tanks…’
The controversy not only involved the politics of measurement. Whilst scientists were 
monitoring water quality under the observant eyes of farmers and local residents, cya-
nobacteria were ‘blooming’ with increasing frequency on the surface of the lake. When 
this happened, the surface of lake turned a lurid green and Loweswater farmers acutely 
felt the blame of those witnessing the unsightly blooms. They also felt the blame of the 
regulatory authorities – for example, the National Trust who owned the lake,3 the Lake 
District National Park Authority charged with preserving the beauty and health of the 
Cumbrian lakes and fells, and the Environment Agency (EA) responsible for good water 
quality nationally. 
This uncomfortable atmosphere of blame, rising in concert with the appearance of 
blue-green algae on the surface of the lake, was oddly associated with one of the most 
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taken-for-granted trends in the UK countryside since the mid-19th century: The ongoing 
‘agricultural improvements’ since the invention and widespread uptake of technologies such 
as field drains, mechanised farm machinery, artificial fertilisers and so on. Such improve-
ments allowed for increases in the acreage of improved grassland on farms, increased live-
stock numbers per farm and an increase in the yields of pastures. What the algae began to 
vividly evoke, by the early 2000s, it was a sense of the complex and unintended ecological 
and social consequences of these agricultural improvements which, in turn, engendered a 
tangible atmosphere of dismay, anger, stigma and shame. 
If a participatory forum was going to be developed around the issue of the blue-green 
algae at Loweswater, it needed to acknowledge entrenched positions involving hierarchies of 
knowledge and feelings of stigma and blame, and to provide a way to understand the human, 
non-human, economic, social, cultural, historical, emotional and political complexities in 
which all participants were implicated.
A new collective
The sociologists decided that a good way to respond to this situation might be to use some 
of the ANT participatory ideas outlined earlier. A new ‘Loweswater Knowledge Collective’ 
was proposed. This would be a PoT where it would be accepted that:
-  nature is not self-evident;
-  knowledge and expertise have to be debated; 
-  uncertainty is the main condition humans are in (rather than a condition of having 
knowledge); 
-  what is important is the creation of connections between people and things; 
-  doubt and questioning are extended to all our representations.
These principles were taken on board by participants from the very first full meeting of the 
new collective, which participants renamed the Loweswater Care Project (LCP) in June 2008.4 
Thereafter, evening meetings were held every two months, until December 2010. At each 
meeting, questions – about nature, knowledge, expertise, representations, uncertainty, etc. – 
were raised, and talks and investigations proposed by participants were given and discussed. 
Wide-ranging issues were brought into the forum, including: The spawning grounds of brown 
trout; the use of household detergents in the valley; a recent piece of legislation, the European 
Water Framework Directive; the maintenance of the banks of streams around the lake; the ex-
istence of well-functioning and less well-functioning septic tanks; changing rainfall patterns; 
changing patterns of, and futures for, farming in Loweswater; and unexpected ecological rela-
tions in the de-oxygenated water of the lake. 
The simple principles referred to above were used to appraise and interrogate the large 
quantities of new information coming into the collective. These principles directly ques-
tioned the ‘natural’ and the ‘factual,’ thereby transforming MoFact into MoConcern. They 
allowed all participants to inquire, contest and unsettle established facts as a bona fide mode 
of engagement, freeing them from the previous necessity to assign responsibility and blame. 
Participants became inquisitive: Nature and natural processes were no longer taken as 
self-evident; all claims to knowledge and expertise had to be debated; doubt and question-
ing, including doubt of scientific methods and monitoring, but also of lay claims and coun-
terclaims, were encouraged and nurtured. The principles also helped the collective think 
about fact making and knowledge in more provisional ways, accepting the inevitability of 
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uncertainty. They helped the collective build connections and create its own knowledge 
through a number of research investigations designed by participants themselves.
For example, drawing on the idea that ‘nature is not self-evident,’ participants invited a 
representative of the UK State’s agency for water quality – the EA – to explain the classifi-
cation of ‘moderate ecological status’ that had been designated for Loweswater. The desig-
nation of ‘moderate’ as opposed to ‘good’ ecological status implied that the lake has a water 
quality ‘problem.’ This invitation highlighted participants’ weaknesses and attachments; 
they admitted that they had little insight into the way in which this complex classifica-
tion had been drawn up, and were also aware of the threat that ‘moderate ecological sta-
tus’ implied for farmers, as breaching environmental regulations carried punitive financial 
consequences. 
The EA representative came to an evening meeting and described the way in which 
moderate status had been designated. She informed participants that four pieces of 
 scientific evidence (regarding oxygen, plant life, algae and fish in the lake) were needed 
to make the designation. But as she came to the end of her talk, she admitted that the 
classification of ‘moderate status’ for Loweswater had been established with only three 
pieces of data, as the data on fish populations were missing. A heated debate ensued. 
A farmer intervened:
Farmer: ‘Sounds like guesswork science to me…’
The EA representative was taken aback: ‘Sorry?’
The farmer reiterated: ‘Sounds like guesswork science to me…If one of these things [the four pieces 
of evidence] can knock it back to ‘poor’ and you can’t count the fish, you haven’t a hope, if fish is 
one of them!’
The farmer questioned the very basis on which the official designation had been given. Many 
participants in the room backed his reasoning. Not only the farmers, but also the scientists, 
were vulnerable now, with the EA representative acknowledging that there were ‘problems 
with the fish classification tool we are using.’ The ‘constitutive attachments’ of different par-
ticipants were visible to all. Following the farmer’s questioning, participants learned, through 
fraught and difficult discussion, exactly what combination of nature and artifice was involved 
in designating the ecological status of Loweswater. In addition, investigating water quality as 
a MoConcern, as they did here, the collective also embraced the realm of emotion, feelings 
and affect.
Affect is a complex term, but here denotes the ways ‘feelings’ or ‘emotions’ are inherently 
and pre-personally immanent in the material world (Massumi 2002; McCormack 2003, 
2010: 643). Affect is important. Discussions that took place in the collective were argumen-
tative, passionate and moving. They exposed not only the vulnerabilities and attachments 
of participants but also their intelligence, inquisitiveness, creativity and sensitivity, and the 
emotional intensity of the forum had material consequences for the collective itself, the 
‘things’ at its centre and the way in which its relationships were made. 
Section 3: An omission in the parliament: can we learn 
to worry about slurry through theories of care?
The interactions of the LCP bring up an issue of vital importance for the dialogic experiment 
of the HyFo and PoT. Namely, that the attachments, weaknesses and passions that Latour 
encourages us to embrace on our entry into the parliament, just like things themselves, have 
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agency. Embracing ‘disability’ is not simply a process of drily accepting that we all have 
bounded rationality. Disabilities have affective and relational consequences, and produce and 
demand particular configurations of labour and sensitivity from all members of the collec-
tive, having indelible effects on the potentiality of directions the collective may take.
Think, for example, of the unwillingness (mentioned in section 2) to monitor farms’ in-
dividual slurry tanks, despite the widespread suspicion that these were important sources of 
nutrient pollution. Slurry – the liquid mixture of cattle excrement and water that arises as a 
result of certain kinds of cattle housing on beef and dairy farms – was considered to be one 
of several contributing factors to water enrichment in Loweswater, as it contains significant 
amounts of the nutrient phosphorus. However, the LCP never worked out precisely how to 
formulate questions around slurry, or how to investigate slurry production, storage and use 
as a fertiliser in the catchment. Within the pre-existing affective atmospheres of Loweswater, 
the toxic culture of blame that had been wrapped around the ‘objective’ presentation of water 
quality played an important part here. The desire of participants to move away from these 
negative relations, and the need to rebuild trust, played a significant role in the unfolding of 
the forum and the democratic decisions it made.
This sense of affect steered how some issues were, and others not, opened out for scrutiny 
in the LCP, because of the difficult affectual atmospheres they contained. As one ecologist 
participant reflected:
It may be that there are things…like slurry tank management, things that we haven’t 
directly challenged in this project that are a problem for some of the farmers. And you 
know, that is an issue.5
The forum, it seemed, could not apprehend slurry without re-energising the pernicious spec-
tre of blame that would shut down discussion entirely.
encompassing affect: from matters of concern to matters of care
How can we make sense of our finding that disability mattered in Loweswater and that par-
ticipants’ vulnerabilities had an effect? That attachments, weaknesses and passions didn’t just 
allow for open debate, but drove debate in certain directions at the expense of others? 
A useful resource for thinking with this is Maria Puig de la Bellacasa’s (2017) Matters of 
Care: Speculative Ethics in More Than Human Worlds. Here, Puig de la Bellacasa proposes that 
we extend the movement from MoFact to MoConcern by further conceptualising contro-
versies as matters of care. A matter of care (MoCare) weaves Latour’s MoConcern into the rich 
history of thinking about care in feminist theory. 
To care, Puig de la Bellacasa reminds us, is a verb; it is ‘a necessary practice, a life- 
sustaining activity, an everyday constraint’ (2017: 160). Care is unavoidable, an inherent 
part of the necessary yet mostly dismissed labours of the everyday maintenance of life. Care 
circulates unequally, and is not innocent: Its labours fall more heavily on some shoulders, 
be they human or non-human, than others (the night worker, for example, who cleans the 
academic’s office, or the worms in soil that allow us to grow food). Caring for one thing 
can mean killing something else (as we dig up weeds in caring for gardens). As care is always 
happening, the important question we must ask is ‘What worlds are being maintained and 
at the expenses of which others?’ (Puig de la Bellacasa 2017: 44; see also Haraway 1994). 
Nothing holds together without a more-than-human chain of care, and those relations are 
deeply situated.
385
How to rethink participatory experiments?
Circling back to Loweswater, can we understand the failure to open out the issue of slurry 
in the collective as a matter of care? Within the context of a historical situation of toxic 
blame, we can see participants attempting to balance care for the lake’s environmental status 
with care for local farmers, so long villainised by Science. The need for the group to care 
for other things (such as farmers’ emotional well-being) in order to ensure the parliament’s 
maintenance and survival worked to render slurry ‘mute’ as a ‘Ding.’ Did this ‘disable’ the 
collective in the act of caring for the polluted lake? Does that mean the forum was ineffec-
tive? In the short-term timescale of ‘traditional’ political decision-making, yes. But as Callon 
et al. (2009) take care to mention, hybrid fora and their attachments and entanglements take 
time and are iterative. The LCP developed, in time, into another community-run participa-
tory forum, the Loweswater Care Programme, working in partnership with the West Cumbria 
Rivers Trust. As part of this, significant progress was made on tacking ‘point source pollu-
tion’ from leaky slurry tanks in the valley.6
A parliament for slurry: fact, concern or care?
Slurry, then, was a troublesome ‘Ding’ in Loweswater, and in 2016, the current authors had 
the opportunity to encounter it again, via a call made by a partnership organisation, SARIC 
(the Sustainable Agriculture Research and Innovation Club), to study (deep breath) ‘the 
provision of decision-support on organic slurry storage and treatment techniques to enhance 
nutrient use efficiencies.’
The assumption of the research call was that farmers needed to take better heed of scien-
tific knowledge in their slurry management decisions. This was very much embedded in the 
‘modern constitution’ of Nature/Science that Latour has critiqued. The ‘issue’ to be ‘solved’ 
was not slurry as a material entity, or the nature–culture practices entangled within it, but 
farmers’ ‘inefficient’ and unscientific decisions, the ‘fix’ for which – a ‘decision support’ 
tool – was decidedly technical.
As we got to know the material-semiotic landscape in which the research project was 
positioned, it became apparent that a semi-stable assemblage existed around the slurry con-
troversy. This consisted of many MoFact: Devices for establishing water quality status (such 
as those we met in Loweswater), agronomic science determining crop nutrient uptake, and 
policy guiding and enforcing farmers’ activities. Importantly, this assemblage also included 
a huge number of experts (scientists, policymakers and agricultural advisors) labouring to 
improve the status of freshwaters in the UK, to care for the environment.
However, this assemblage was not achieving its intended aim, so tweaking was consid-
ered necessary. As one soil scientist put it: ‘There are really good decision support tools out there, 
but a significant number of people don’t engage…We need to identify the barriers to engaging with this 
information.’ Within this Science-based chain of care, the ‘problem farmer’ was the weak 
link, making poor decisions with slurry on farm. If the problem farmer would change, the 
assemblage could achieve their two priorities of maximising agricultural output and achiev-
ing ‘good’ environmental status. Our expected role as social scientists in the proposed project 
was to produce the knowledge necessary to manage this ‘problem farmer,’ in the same way 
that Science allows us to manage Nature.
Of course, this positioning was deeply problematic, particularly from an ethical point 
of view. We therefore attempted to open up space within the research (which we called 
 ‘Slurry-Max’) to let farmers – and slurry – speak.7 This process revealed a very different re-
ality to that of the ‘problem farmer’ not understanding their ‘valuable resource.’ We learned 
that slurry was unpredictable, powerful and dangerous. There was usually too much of it 
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when wet weather and ground conditions made it a pollutant, and not enough when they al-
lowed it to be a fertiliser. Its qualities were variable, and didn’t fit neatly into the ‘book values’ 
denoted by agronomic science (the averages that make up official estimates of the nutrient 
content of slurry, which had huge standard deviations). Farmers, far from being uninformed, 
understood this well, giving considered reasons as to why they couldn’t follow the scientific 
advice. In short, ‘the thing’ of slurry, voiced through Slurry-Max’s empirical work with the 
material itself and with those that were working daily with it,8 turned out to be very different 
from the concept of slurry that was embedded within the science-policy assemblage and the 
SARIC research call.
Section 4: Democracy in the wild
How could ANT thinking on participation help the researchers in this scenario? It was 
clear from the beginning that we would not have the freedom to establish a slurry HyFo 
or PoT. And even had we wanted to, the huge national scale of the ‘nutrient management’ 
science-policy assemblage would make that problematic. ‘Slurry’ as a ‘thing’ at this scale is 
too much, too diffused and too varied to truly be granted due process – the ‘Ding’ loses the 
advantage of a position in the PoT. The HyFo and PoT, we found, can be difficult to achieve 
within the pre-existing assemblages – operating at pre-existing scales – which maintain our 
ongoing worlds. 
So, must we give up on the idea of participation under circumstances where the democratic 
conditions of the HyFo or PoT cannot be achieved, and layperson ‘publics’ and non-human 
things are not procedurally afforded due process? Should the Slurry-Max researchers have 
turned away from ANT, and provided the assemblage with the means to ‘tame’ the problem 
farmer, as they had been asked to do?
Of course, the answer is no. But how can we move beyond the privileged space of the 
HyFo and PoT, to create the conditions for an expanded ‘technical democracy’ in the wild? 
We can find some answer to this by returning to Matters of Care (2017). Puig de la  Bellacasa 
stresses that, unlike the HyFo and PoT, care is not a ‘recipe’ for doing our encounters 
(2017: 90), but rather a trope that we can use to think through a non-normative politics of 
 knowledge. She writes that this is ‘always specific; it cannot be enacted by a priori moral 
disposition, nor an epistemic stance, nor a set of applied techniques, nor elicited as abstract 
effect’ (ibid: 90).
In the messy, imperfect fora in which most contemporary politics play out, such a stand-
point can aid us in seeking a better democracy. If, as Puig de la Bellacasa suggests, we think of 
care as the ongoing, unavoidable labour whereby some worlds are maintained at the expenses 
of others, it is, of course, inevitable that we are constantly, in every act, doing politics. Consid-
ering this, we should perhaps move beyond thinking of participation as procedural politics, 
choreographed within bespoke ‘hybrid fora,’ and instead consider it as embedded within 
ongoing patterns of taking part. This implies that participation becomes a kind of unevenly 
distributed process of inclusion and exclusion, choice, care and labour, which is inherent to 
all our collective activities.
Applying this to the problem of slurry management, we can see that the proposed SARIC 
project expected the most of, and listened the least to, two actors: Small farmers and slurry. 
Our concern as social scientists was then to attempt to ‘democratise democracy’ by ampli-
fying the voices of these actors in the fora of the assemblage. In Slurry-Max, the researchers 
attempted to achieve this by close interrogation of the existing assemblage of care around 
nutrient management, tracing which participants – both human and non-human – were in 
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danger of being objectified or silenced, or bearing an unreasonable burden of care. Then, we 
attempted in our own actions of world-making to respectfully ameliorate these conditions, 
drawing attention to which worlds were being supported and made, and at the expenses of 
which others. 
In this way, we acknowledge that we are acting in a world where fully democratic cos-
mopolitical parliaments are not always possible – or at least, are always inherently bounded. 
We suggest that one way forward could be to think beyond participation as a discrete idea – 
or as something that can absolutely and procedurally be ‘achieved’ – and instead, attempt to 
live, as world-makers, with inclusionary care at the centre of our doings.
Politics in the contemporary world can sometimes seem a million miles from the ideal of 
the more-than-human democracy of the PoT. But that doesn’t mean we have to give up on 
the work of democratising democracy. In a parliament in which we are all partial and dis-
abled, it’s vital to remember that this means all participants require care. By thinking about 
participation as an active process of taking care within the parliaments we are already part 
of, we can work towards participatory futures beyond the privileged space of a HyFo, and, 
disabled as we are, strive for a better world for all.
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Notes
 1 The three studies are: Law (1984), Callon (1984) and Latour (1984). Les Microbes Guerre Et Paix; 
Suivi de, Irréductions (see p. 106 of Latour 2005).
 2 Slurry is ‘faeces and urine produced by housed livestock, usually mixed with some bedding mate-
rial and some water during management to give a liquid manure with a dry matter content in the 
range from about 1%–10%’ (Pain and Menzi 2003).
 3 Technically, the National Trust owned the lakebed, not the water within it.
 4 Participants voted to change the name of the collective to the ‘Loweswater Care Project’ (LCP). 
See www.lancaster.ac.uk/fass/projects/loweswater/noticeboard.htm for minutes of meetings of the 
LCP.
 5 Ecologist Lisa Norton reflecting on the achievements and gaps of the Loweswater Care Project at 
the workshop, ‘New Forms of Participatory Environmental Governance: Experiences and Chal-




 8 Empirical research included: 11 in-depth farmer interviews, conducted on farm; three in-depth 
farmer interviews, conducted by telephone; focus groups with around 100 agriculture students in 
four agricultural colleges in England, Wales, Northern Ireland and Scotland; face-to-face survey 
questionnaires with 84 farmers at auction marts and agricultural shows in England, Wales and 
Northern Ireland; face-to-face survey questionnaires with 18 agriculture students in Scotland.
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In conversation with Claire Parnet, Gilles Deleuze (2002: 2) evokes the image of the be-
coming of the orchid and the wasp: A ‘double capture’ whereby, and momentarily, each 
becomes a function of the other’s doings. In considering actor-network theory and design 
practice, this image is appealing as it can be understood to stage two ways by which their 
practices can be seen to converge. In the first, each discipline captures something from the 
other. For orthodox scholars of ANT design becomes another empirical domain to describe. 
For designers, ANT becomes another explanatory resource with which to capture the social 
and warrant the arrival of the new. A second way of relating, recalling Isabelle Stengers’ 
‘reciprocal capture,’ a variant of double capture, opens up the possibility of the emergence of 
shared practices of empirical socio-material speculation where adding designed propositions 
to collectives brings into being new prospects and capacities to act. In what follows, and 
after a brief discussion of the possibility of ANT and design as a constructivist proposition, 
I outline how ANT can be understood to support design practitioners. I then draw on the 
case of an interdisciplinary project, involving designers and STS practitioners, to discuss 
how a workshop for exploring the use of smart energy monitors – and resourcing the design 
and deployment of an interactive research device amongst UK-based energy communities – 
 involved practices of retroscription and procomposition. Here, retroscription characterises 
the visual and analytic evocation of the lived and situated experience of using smart moni-
tors, whereas procomposition involves the mobilisation and re-patterning of retroscriptions 
into novel speculative compossibilities.
Reciprocal capture and speculative questions
For Stengers (2010: 36),
we can speak of reciprocal capture whenever a dual process of identity construction is 
produced: regardless of the manner, and usually in ways that are completely different, 
identities that coinvent one another each integrate a reference to the other for their own 
benefit.
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In her diagnosis of modern science, reciprocal capture provides a way of understanding the 
upshots of complex and dynamic relations between located scientific/research (knowledge) 
practices, in what she dubs an ‘ecology of practices’ (ibid. 32) where the interdependent com-
bination of the political and the scientific produces new modes of existence and evaluation. 
In the context of science, reciprocal capture describes how novel (scientific) practices (and 
entities) arise out of the becoming together, rather than coming together, of other practices 
and how such practices present themselves to one another.1 The term practice is noteworthy, 
here, as it underscores the inherent immanence of research, knowledge and its (human and 
more-than-human) participants. Perhaps of more importance is Stengers’ insistence on the 
specificity – or constraints – of practices, where, rather than assuming an equivalence be-
tween science and technology (e.g. technoscience), but not discounting their interrelation, 
the question or challenge, is to distinguish the particular types of creation they make possible 
and their modes of existence. Thus, the subatomic neutrino particle has a dual existence as 
an entity inhabiting the reality of quantum physics and as an active member of scientific 
experiments. It is produced by and the producer of practices, simultaneously objective and 
constructed.
Reciprocal capture therefore invites the rethinking of the confrontation of ANT, in 
its various invocations, and design – or any social science and artistic discipline for that 
 matter – not where the problems, constraints and products of the respective practices remain 
somewhat indifferent and untroubled by their encounter (the wasp and the orchid return to 
carrying out their business) – but as special kind of double capture vectorising the creation of 
new practices which are, themselves, capable of creating novel entities, assemblages, practices 
and speculative possibilities. Stengers provides a caution, however, in that the adaptation of 
the term to non-scientific practices, such as ANT and design, requires thinking through 
the specificity of these knowledge practices. We must actively ‘relate knowledge production 
to the question it tries to answer’ (2008: 92) and this includes the constructs of particular 
 practices – what and with what they shape and how they shape epistemic things. The be-
coming together of particular practices will necessarily create their own obligations and 
constraints, their own modes of creation and existence.
Clearly, practitioners of design and ANT are posing questions different to those of experi-
mental physicists. If the interrelated notions of reciprocal capture and the ecology of practices 
operate as tools to think with practitioners without losing the specificity of their practices, 
then these tools demand that we use them reflexively to think through the becoming- 
together of ANT and design. This, in part, echoes Marilyn Strathern’s (1992: 10) adage ‘it 
matters what ideas one uses to think other ideas (with),’ which might be rephrased as ‘it mat-
ters what matters we use to think other matters with….’ In the context of the fusing of ANT 
and design, it matters what concepts, devices and techniques we use to think and make with 
and what assumptions they carry into research. In this becoming, ANT unequivocally loses 
any kind of pretension to neutrality towards the compositions that it dramatises – a caveat 
that should bear on the optics of visualising controversies (Venturini et al. 2017) – arguably 
an orthodox version ANT enhanced by information design. 
This insistence on the specificity and interplay of research practices invites constructivist 
and speculative questions of the conjoining of ANT and design – about the kinds of knowl-
edge practices it engenders, the devices it crafts, their becomings, compossibilities and how 
they are answerable to researchers, practitioners and community members, etc. This, then, 
involves approaching each research problem with the question of what it is composed of 
and what this composition is capable of, i.e. the compossibility immanent to the question 
at hand.2
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Asymmetries of practice
It never ceases to mystify colleagues whenever, in answer to being asked my profession, 
I cagily admit to being both a ‘designer’ and ‘social scientist’ – ‘STS scholar’ being especially 
esoteric. ‘Strange combination!’ is the usual response, suggesting an inexplicable mixture of 
practices and knowledge. The more I examine the two disciplines, however, the more they 
seemingly go hand in glove. The complex of sub-disciplines and genres that comprise design 
has a long and elaborate history of engagement with the social sciences and vice versa. It is 
impossible to do justice to these entanglements and vectors, suffice to say multiple shared ge-
nealogies exist. Some, admittedly partial, examples, however, help to point towards the vari-
ous co-becomings of two contemporaneous disciplines. In some cases, the two are ostensibly 
indistinguishable, such as the foundational graphic isotypes of Otto Neurath (for overviews, 
see Cartwright et al. 2008, Neurath and Cohen 2012) or various variants of ‘participatory’ 
design (Ehn 2017), including its more recent engagement with ANT (Binder et al. 2011). 
The related fields of Human–Computer Interaction (HCI) Design and Computer-Supported 
Cooperative Work (CSCW) have both emerged, in part, by way of encounters with ethnog-
raphy (Button 2000) and ethnomethodology (Suchman 2006) and intricate crossovers and 
co-developments with approaches associated with STS scholars (Cooper and Bowers 1995, 
Jensen 2001, Star 1995, Suchman 1999). The aforementioned also testifies to how the social 
sciences are also routinely mobilised in industrial and commercial design practices (Wilkie 
2010) as well as academic settings. More recently, adaptations of design and social science 
are at play in relatively new fields. On the one hand, what is characterised as speculative and 
critical design (Dunne and Raby 2013) has been captivated by the public understanding of 
and engagement with science and technology (Kerridge 2015) whilst on the other, recent in-
novations such as service design (Kimbell 2009) and the so-called ‘social design’ (Armstrong 
et al. 2014), which, amongst other enterprises, provide consultancy for non-profit, voluntary 
and non-governmental as well as government policy organisations.
This brief summary serves to overturn the view that traffic between ANT and design 
is exceptional. It is anything but. In this potted light, it is just another confrontation that 
dramatises difference questions, issues and problems, or, to paraphrase Barry et al. (2008), it 
stages another transformation in the epistemic and ontological imagination of design, where 
sociocultural research effects a change in how sociality is conceived and acted upon/within 
and vice versa. Furthermore, what is readily apparent from the aforementioned are the rhi-
zomatic relations between social science and design, and the ecology of practices that this in-
variably includes. This, then, points to complex (a)symmetrical – or non-metrical – relations 
between the diverse multiplicity of practices of the two domains as a dynamic heterogeneous 
patterning that bears immanent equivalence and difference. It also suggests that the interrela-
tions between design and ANT undergo continual ordering and reordering as new practices 
are folded into prior commitments.
Within this ongoing multiplicity of practices, there are various instances where ANT has 
been implicitly and explicitly taken up by designers for purposes of design pedagogy (Wilkie 
et al. 2018), to write accounts of design practice and designs (Calvillo González 2014, Wilkie 
2010, Jaques Forthcoming), to reimagine and recompose participatory design practices and 
user-involvement, in, for example, healthcare (Storni 2015), to develop experimental research 
devices (Wilkie et al. 2015) as well as efforts to infuse design into the milieu of policy inno-
vation (Kimbell 2015). DensityDesign, a research laboratory based in the Design Department 
of Design at the Politecnico di Milan, is both indicative of the organisational embedding of 
interdisciplinary engagements between design and ANT as well as a particular coalescence of 
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interests between sociological research into big data, controversy mapping and communica-
tion design (Valsecchi et al.). As part of the MACOSPOL (Mapping Controversies on Science 
for Politics) project, led by Bruno Latour, DensityDesign was also involved in the development 
of digital ‘tools’ for tracing public engagement with science and technology. The preoccupa-
tion of STS researchers with the design of digital tools for controversy analysis can, arguably, 
be traced back to the ‘Web Geographies’ project, a collaboration between Science Dynamics 
at the University of Amsterdam and members of the Computer Related Design Department at 
the Royal College of Art, London, which developed into govcom.org (Rogers 2000).
The multiplicity of practices that comes to light given the aforementioned could be 
neatly explained (away) as having immanent epistemological, methodological and ontologi-
cal valencies. Thus, and for instance, forms of user-centred and participatory design enlarge 
their respective collectives to include both human and more-than-human participants and 
reconsider the kinds of situated ontological politics (Berg 1998) they collude in and enact. 
New techniques, or methods, for identifying actors and rendering collectives and the com-
position of issues and controversies are devised by, for instance, activist and policy agencies 
alike.  Finally, it proposes a redistribution of epistemic practices amongst those involved or 
implicated (Clarke 1998) in processes involving design, such as designer–scientist– laboratory 
engagements, DIY hackathons, activist workshops (see  Criado &  Rodríguez-Giralt, this 
volume) or probe workshops. One take on this (Latour 2008) figures the designer as a ‘cau-
tious Prometheus’ whose artfulness, craft and skills are pressganged into the (STS) task of 
rendering political ecologies (ibid. 13). Implicit to this, however, is the premise that such 
practices primarily involve retrospective optics – scrutinising the present and/or past rather 
than animating the possible. More explicit is the subsuming of design to the obligations and 
requirements of STS – in such practices, designers equip ANT scholars with renewed tech-
nological and visual capacities, devices and techniques. Furthermore, it palpably risks reviv-
ing the optical illusion of the neutrality of ANT as the visualisation from nowhere where 
its practices remain withdrawn from view. Rather than appease the actualist obligations of 
ANT in which diagnosis is the principle commitment, design practices demand a shift to 
not only envisioning collectives and their composition or embellishing the specific modes 
of existence of objects but exploring the possibilities of collectives, their composition and 
the modes of existence of novel entities. This is precisely the risk or the exigencies of design 
practice, i.e. the potential to move from an actualist to a speculative constructivism (Wilkie 
et al. 2017). At base, this means adding propositions to a collective, such as that made by 
Scandinavian participatory designers in 1982 who inserted an innocuous cardboard box, 
with ‘DESK TOP LASER PRINTER’ handwritten on its side, into the workplace of news-
paper typographers and journalists in order to reimagine the proofing machine and thus, 
their cooperative working practices (Ehn and Kyng 1991), or the deployment of an inter-
active radio-like device amongst local communities endeavouring to face down climate 
change by way of energy- demand reduction. In both, the insertion into, and this addition 
to, a collective explores its concrete possibilities to change and develop new practices.
In what follows, I elaborate on this additive version of engagement carried out in relation 
to local community efforts to effect energy-demand reduction in the UK. In this approach, 
design demands that ANT becomes a procompositional practice. In doing so, I explore how 
script theory and script analysis, emblematic of the retrospective compositional analysis (of 
technology), metamorphose in its encounter with design practices. Script theory is par-
ticularly germane here, not least since at its inception it concerned how ‘technical objects 
and people are brought into being in a process of reciprocal definition’ (Akrich 1992: 222). 
More significantly, script theory has passed through various encounters with design, from 
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its inception in relation to the analysis of the design and use of electricity generating and 
metering technologies in West Africa, to its reformulation – by way of an encounter be-
tween Dutch and Norwegian feminist debates and ‘constructivism’ – in the identification of 
genderscripts (Oudshoorn 1996) that operate in, for example, digital design (Rommes et al. 
1999) and product design practices (van Oost 2003). More recently, script analysis has been 
modified for design pedagogy and design research (Wilkie et al. 2018) and software  design 
(Allhutter 2012) where the identification and analysis of compositions form the  starting 
point.
Procomposing smart energy monitors
The ‘Re-scripting Energy’ workshop took place as part of the early design research phases of 
the ‘Sustainability Invention and Energy-demand Reduction: Co-Designing Communities 
and Practice (ECDC for short) project, one of seven projects funded under the Research 
Councils United Kingdom (RCUK) Energy Programme. The scope of the ECDC project 
was to explore and understand individual’s and local communities’ own understanding and 
effective use of energy-demand reduction technologies and regulation. In so doing, the proj-
ect would inform UK government efforts to meet energy and environmental policy targets 
for reducing carbon emissions and tacking climate change. The attention placed on local 
energy communities – a principal requirement of the RCUK funding – complemented and 
diversified existing government policy objectives for addressing energy-demand reduction 
by ‘nudging’ individual consumption (e.g. smart monitors) and macroeconomic (e.g. cap and 
trade emissions trading) intervention. As a small part of these emerging practices and tech-
nologies for managing energy and ameliorating climate change, the three-year ECDC  project 
brought together design researchers and STS scholars in order to engage with a number of 
local energy communities, based in England, and, in doing so, to investigate, raise issues and 
speculatively experiment with the nature of social and technical community practices.
Over the three-year course of the project, various kinds of engagement with the issue 
of community energy-demand reduction were conducted including participant observa-
tion with community members, probe workshops (an energy community variant of cultural 
probes; Gaver et al. 1999), social media ‘bots’ (Wilkie et al. 2015) and exhibitions. Much of 
this effort directly informed the centrepiece of the project, namely the conception, develop-
ment and three-month deployment of 36 Energy Babble research devices (Gaver et al. 2015). 
The ‘Re-scripting’ energy workshop took place during the early stages of the project and its 
purpose was to examine the interplay between the ‘frameworks of action’ and competencies 
inscribed into existing ‘smart metering’ technology and the actual practicalities of their in-
stallation, as well as the potential for some kind of designed intervention into the monitor’s 
script. All of this was conducted by way of group-based analysis and visualisation (by team 
members and invited design and STS practitioners). The choice of smart meters here was cer-
tainly not arbitrary given the UK government’s huge financial investment and political com-
mitment to the promises of a well-defined techno-behavioural fix with feedback solutions 
that make visible – and supposedly calculable – energy consumption to the individual end 
user.3 There was also growing evidence that, in practice, smart monitors were failing to live 
up to expectations, whether as a result of the complex domestic settings they were installed 
in (Hargreaves et al. 2010) or the efficacy of the energy consumer figured as an  economic–
behavioural actor, troubled, in part, by the ‘boomerang effect’ (Schultz et al. 2007).
Practically speaking, the workshop involved participants having to instal (or at least try to) 
and use a smart energy monitor for a period of time (typically one to two weeks) prior to 
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the workshop. Three different monitors were used here, which were seen as indicative of 
two distinct consumer-based approaches to monitoring and feedback available in the UK at 
the time: The first as an exemplar of indirect and impressionistic and the latter as utilitarian 
and quantitative. Participants then brought their energy monitor – and experience of using 
it – to the workshop. During the first part of the workshop, participants were asked, in 
groups, to identify and visually diagram the programme of action inscribed into the mon-
itor. The second part of the workshop then involved using the diagram to identify entry 
points for intervening in and proposing redesigns of the monitors, hence the title of the 
workshop – rescripting. 
For my purposes in this chapter, then, the workshop serves as a – somewhat crude – model 
of how social scientific practices of retrospective analysis can be combined with the pro-
spective practices of design and its obligation to proposition formulation. In the following, 
I discuss two practices, which I tentatively call retroscription and procomposition, that, on 
the one hand involves an active participation in lived reality of using a smart energy monitor 
and transferring this experience, by way of visualisation, into a diagram of use in which the 
efficacy of the appliance is laid bare. Crucial here is that the diagram differs from the aims 
of the traditional STS scholar to produce a (somewhat closed) written analysis (Akrich and 
Latour 1995: 259). Instead, what is produced is a visual analysis primed for procomposition: 
Which is, at base, a lure for the rearrangement of the composition and acts of invention where 
elements are modified, realigned, added or removed, thus effecting a relational change in the 
patterning of collective.
Retroscription
During the workshop, Liliana, a designer on the project, narrated an account of her failed at-
tempts to install and use an Alertme Starter Kit in the rented accommodation she was living 
in at the time in North London. The story of Liliana’s encounter with the electricity meter 
is quite ordinary, and yet it is precisely the unremarkable nature of having to find a key to 
a locked door in a communal area, circumvent warning signs, identify the meter belonging 
to her flat amongst others using manuals left by her landlord and then finally, blindly attach 
the transmitter to a cable hidden from view by a duct. Back in her flat, Liliana found that the 
signal from the transmitter was too weak and thus invisible to the display device.
Whilst Liliana narrated her experience, other participants in the workshop worked to-
gether to produce a visual diagram of the Alertme’s script elicited by Liliana’s account as well 
as including aspects of their own experiences to the mix – often aligned with Liliana’s expe-
rience. In addition, the monitor, its packaging and manuals were examined for indications of 
its putative energy-monitoring and saving script. The visualisation rendered three versions 
of the monitor. First, wherein the script ‘worked’ under somewhat restricted conditions, 
producing a discrete energy-user as a calculative individual concerned with minor variations 
in cost saving and dependent on online connectivity. Second, where the monitoring set-up 
(transmitter and display) minimally worked in displaying data sourced from the meter which 
remained somewhat unintelligible due to the lack of accurate live kWh unit supplier costs 
or any sense of connection to the UK national grid. Third, where the kit failed to work due 
to irresolvable conflicts between the script and the situated reality of its point, or site, of 
application.
In retroscripting the active participation with Alertme smart energy monitor, the work-
shop participants are doing more than merely tracing an issue or network. Here, retro-
scription connotes an active involvement with, or dramatisation of, a device, its script and 
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therefore enactments of – in this case – the politics of energy consumption. Second, the 
processes of transfer and transcription that retroscription involves aim not to remove or 
downplay the techniques and technologies of capture, such as visualisation, that enable the 
rendering of experience but rather seek to reflexively include these in the process. Finally, the 
prefix ‘trans’ denotes the potential for thoroughly changing the script in combination with 
its elements – the possibility of transversing, transcending and misaligning the script as part 
of the process of analysis. 
Procomposition
If retroscription involved the rendering of past situated and collective experiences of using an 
energy monitor into a visualisation, then procomposition included the mobilisation of the expe-
riences of monitoring-in-use and of demand-related appliances as part of the design and deploy-
ment of the Energy Babble (see Figure 37.1 and Gaver et al. 2015) speculative research device. 
The Energy Babble, a radio-like interactive research device that ‘spoke’ audible energy and 
climate-related content drawn from the Internet, social media and community member voice 
messages, deliberately aped generic aspects of smart energy monitor scripts in form and function.
As Figures 37.1–37.3 show, the Energy Babble is relatively small appliance that is designed 
to be placed into a domestic or workspace and connect to the Internet either by Wi-Fi or 
Ethernet. Once connected, the Energy Babble emits an algorithmically constructed stream of 
energy-related information sourced from the Internet including scrapes from Twitter feeds, 
results from searching Twitter, samples from URLs mentioned in tweets, reports of (any)
things being switched off (including ‘lights,’ ‘heat’ and ‘the internet’) and current energy- 
demand updates from the UK National Grid. In addition, the spoken content of the Energy 
Babble also included replays of messages left by energy community members invited by auto-
mated prompts to respond to questions about their energy-related views and activities. Finally, 
the Babble included a Markov algorithm that produced an assortment of locally sensible and 
nonsensical spoken messages by rewriting grammatically correct (but typically semantically 
Figure 37.1 The Energy Babble (© Alex Wilkie)
Alex Wilkie
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incorrect) strings from the corpus of content it collects and utters. As such, the Energy Babble 
played on and put into play new ways of monitoring and eliciting  energy-demand reduction 
and environmental feedback. In short, a new appliance-based feedback procomposition in 
which the solution to energy-demand reduction is yet to be determined.
Figure 37.3  Pages from the Energy Babble manual showing the quick start guide for the 
 device (© Interaction Research Studio)
Figure 37.2 An exploded view of the Energy Babble (© Interaction Research Studio)
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The process of designing the Energy Babble also suggests that procomposition work – a 
point where design and STS converge – is complex, circuitous and involves combinations of 
skilled practices. As the aforementioned figures indicate, this involves, at base, the intricate 
interplay between and coordination of interaction design, industrial design, graphic commu-
nication, photography and sound design. The interplay in this case also suggests that, although 
practical design action may be embodied, it also routinely cuts across or transverses the col-
lective involved in designing where skills and craft are shared and outcomes co-produced.
Locating procomposition only in such activities not only betrays a relation between or-
thodox design practices (three-dimensional, graphic, etc.) and procomposition but also on 
how a multiplicity of novel design techniques and approaches are enacted as well as emerge 
during this engagement. To realise the final Energy Babble device involved any number 
of encounters, experiments, proposals and trials involving both humans and non-humans. 
Here, Probe Workshops (Michael et al. 2018) were held with members of energy communi-
ties to investigate the meaning and configurations of community, elicit members’ expecta-
tions of climate change and environmental futures and explore affective or aesthetic aspects 
of energy use; automated algorithmic software robots (Bots) were designed and deployed on 
Twitter to detect and identify energy-related practices and actors (Wilkie et al. 2015). 
Conclusion
To return to the conversation between Deleuze and Parnet (and Stengers) and the inter-
related notions of double and reciprocal capture, the question of equipping designers is 
 transfigured into the possibility of design mutually becoming-with ANT. As sketched out 
earlier, this entails the rendering, or retroscription, of political collectives, in this case UK 
energy communities, AND the addition of new speculative propositions – procompositing 
these collectives in the form of an interactive material-semiotic research device to excite and 
prehend the possibilities of new energy-demand reduction practices and make such things 
matter. The upshot of the reciprocal capture of design and ANT does not rest with matters 
of fact nor description: It animates compossibility in the making of speculative propositions 
as lures for procomposing new political collectives.
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Notes
 1 See (Fraser 2010: 75) for clarification of ‘becoming together.’
 2 On the nature of possibles, it was Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (cited in Messina and Rutherford 
2009: 962) who asserted that not all possibles are compossible and that compossibility entails the 
possibility of actual existence in a common world. In other words, there are situated and contin-
gent restrictions on speculative relations. See Deleuze 2004: 100–101 on the relation between the 
compossible and the incompossible.
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How to run a hospital with ANT?
Yuri Carvajal Bañados
~Humus
In October 2014, the 40-year-old Puerto Montt Hospital, designed for a Chilean town 
of 150,000  inhabitants, moved into new premises, emerging as the institution with the 
highest concentration of professionals and specialists in the region, with equipment com-
parable to the best available in the country and a building of a unique style that you would 
only expect to find in the most elite areas of the country’s private sector. I started to work 
there seven months later. In the midst of a national controversy about building hospitals 
under a system of concessions, where private companies obtain a licence to provide services 
(e.g. laundry, catering and building maintenance) and build clinics as a means of resolving 
the crisis of an inefficient and backward public sector, the opportunity to work in this 
place, completely public, well equipped and with an indisputable advantage over the local 
private sector, was something that, as a public health worker seeking new experiences, I 
could not ignore. I had, by that stage, completed a doctoral thesis on health statistics in 
which I deployed ANT ideas and developed postdoctoral work in two books (Carvajal, 
2017; Carvajal and Gaete, 2016).
Although I entered as just another doctor trying to discover something new and to be part 
of an interesting experiment, I had some idea of what I was rummaging for. I had previously 
worked for six months in a good office, as an average bureaucratic official. Then, the posi-
tion of Director of the Hospital, as mandated by the schedule of the National Civil Service, 
was called to a contest as a position of Senior Public Management. Several hospital officials 
whispered that I should run for the position and I did so. I was selected in the final list and on 
March 1, 2017, started working as the director. I did not conceal my interests or my visions 
of what a hospital is supposed to be. I acted according to the rules and I was the candidate 
with the highest score.
Can this be an ANT story?
In what way can an intellectual approach that does not consider organisations to be stable 
structures nor accept that some sites inherently have cognitive or hierarchical privileges, be 
useful to govern an institution? It is not easy, as 99.99% of those who work in the hospital 
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would argue, against ANT, that organisations have an ‘up’ and a ‘down’; that there are ver-
tices and bases; that organisational charts are a faithful representation of the organisation and 
that a person whose door says ‘Director’ effectively directs it. And some of them – as I will 
tell you later – are willing to wage a religious war to defend the flow diagram of the institu-
tion as a faithful reflection of the organisation.
In my own field, Public Health, I am a solitary navigator who maintains that ANT is a 
valuable tool for this practice. I use the definition of the discipline ‘training in social sciences 
for health workers’ as a wide flag. Despite its immaculate simplicity, it has not been waved 
by any of my colleagues. Perhaps, if a small conglomerate of physicians shared this sum-
mary version of the discipline, questions about my approach would become more difficult. 
I might be asked to explain what social sciences I speak of and why they are relevant for 
health  workers. So far, in fact, my closest colleagues and friends have been irritated by my 
homologation of the doctors with Callon’s heteronomous engineers. Few believe me when 
I say medicine is a technique, an adequate understanding of which can only arise from the 
sociologies of that technique.
Beyond the position I hold and the functions that I may or may not assume, the question 
of the hospital itself arises. How does an approach in which hospitals are places of collective, 
hybrid and technical life can help make it technically rigorous, collectively democratic, eco-
nomically viable and anthropocenically responsible? How do my epistemological concerns 
and the intrigue of knowing what statistics are made of and how they work (one of my 
favourite ANT areas) help to produce knowledge that is more grounded, statistically more 
comprehensible, interdisciplinarily more real and ethically more debated? How, in other 
words, can you run a hospital with ANT? 
In this chapter, I will talk first about the ‘hospital metaphors’ that I coined during a year 
of work, and then describe some events and problems that have disturbed me, in order to 
explore how a heteronomous doctor (ANT) has been directed by a hospital.
Hospital metaphors
Labyrinths and the multicoloured city
Often, during my time as the director, I have felt that I am in a labyrinth of epistemological 
paths that lead to dead ends, technical detours that offer shortcuts to new deviations, ethical 
dilemmas that cross alternate roads that appear to hold similar results, psychologies that lead 
to sociologies and vice versa and engineering failures that summon common sense as an aid 
and vice versa. How can one direct a labyrinth? How is it possible to walk tirelessly, without 
the magic of Daedalus and Icarus to look at it from above? How can I be something other 
than the subject of a behavioural experiment, who busily travels the immediate corridor in 
front of him, knowing that the experimenter’s purpose is only to measure how long it takes 
me to get to an exit? (Figure 38.1)
The second metaphor behind the labyrinth is that of a city: A world in which there are 
possible colours and sociologies, in which disease is an encounter of science and technology, 
psychologies and negotiations, uncertainties, biological folds, ethical problems, legal norms, 
economies, administrative rules and professions. A city where there is civility, where some 
have city rights (i.e. a life more of their own) than others.
This metaphor can be sweet. If it were true, we would be unable to distinguish the city 
from the hospital-city, and could live in it as if it were a small-scale version of everything that 
the big city holds. It would therefore not be necessary to direct it. Certain urban planning 
Yuri Carvajal Bañados
402
rules, traffic lights at intersections, a tax system and a police regulation would suffice. It is 
almost as if it regulates itself. That sweetness becomes elusive when the hospital becomes a 
fiefdom, a walled zone, an impregnable territory, a space that is pleased to maintain unbreak-
able frontiers, to govern itself with relentless sovereign rules, to coexist under the Kafkaesque 
weight of an authority without limits, in the state of exception of a permanent war, which 
makes bacteria, neoplastic cells, inflammation, autoimmunity and death the absolute enemies 
against which there is no truce.
But the city also has something that Elman Service called chiefdoms, groups of a few 
thousand humans with a centralised command and a couple of hierarchical levels (cited in 
Diamond, 2017). The regular need to intervene in the daily running of the hospital puts into 
question all the subtlety of a self-regulated city, in this peculiar place where there are beds 
for patients and officials who work during the night, a city that never stops. Although it was 
useful for Goffman to talk about total institutions (Goffman, 2012), the truth is that there are 
many gaps and conditions for patients or officials to carry out secondary adjustments. That is 
what I will talk about below: My experience of the immanence of the hospital as a technical 
place and the production of truths about disease.
Hospital stories
Story 1: The war of professions
I owe a lot of my fortune and my sorrows to ANT. Armed with an understanding of the 
clinic as the fundamental pillar of the hospital, I seek to understand technical practices as re-
gimes of true diagnosis production: This pathology, this prognosis, this functional alteration, 
this anatomical or histological problem. I increasingly transfer the weight of decisions to the 
technicians of the professions, placing physicians as an obligatory step. I am not vehement 
or bold: I hope that conditions appear gradually, although from the first day I declare my 
purpose. I used three verbs in my inauguration speech: ‘to develop,’ referring to clinical 
medicine and technical truth; ‘to articulate,’ talking about the seamless cloth, the work of 
Figure 38.1  The map is not the territory: planning the simulation centre (taken by the author)
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ants on the sociologically continuous surface of hospital life; and ‘to value,’ delineating the 
two ethical issues that I relay (emphasis on what is important and the calculation of prices as 
a secondary effect, and the environmental sustainability of the hospital).
Four months after I arrived, I called a contest to appoint new heads of medical services, 
and unleashed a war of nurses against me. I found myself in the middle of the war of profes-
sions that the hospital incubates in its womb. The flag – with all due respect to Mol – is care 
management, a specific category that is raised as a humanist flag (but with a ‘managerial’ 
preamble) against the technical inhumanity of doctors. Ah, Foucault, I curse the day your 
spirit entered my soul and carved in me that
if some event of which we can at the moment do no more than sense the possibility – 
without knowing either what its form will be or what it promises – were to cause them 
to crumble, as the ground of Classical thought did, at the end of the 18th century, then 
one can certainly wager that man would be erased, like a face drawn in sand at the edge 
of the sea.
(Foucault, 1993, p. 375)
A profession rises, denouncing inhumanity and protecting its autonomy as the guarantee 
against the excesses of the technique. In front of me, nothing but the flags I loathe: Denun-
ciation, autonomy, humanism and anti-technique. I step back from this great epistemological 
stumble. What is it that I do not know? How can I get to move towards other truths? I dive 
into the war of professions. I feel that this ‘omnium bellum contra omnes’ is nourished by the 
difficulties of cognition in the wild, which is always the unique and original body in which 
we try to capture the disease, as a confluence of ‘immutable mobiles.’ The hospital tries to 
be a standardised space and, at the same time, to standardise patients as much as possible, to 
make them sleep, to sedate them, to sit them up.
But in this war, there is an increasing gap between the myth of authorship, which comes 
from antediluvian times of medicine, and the technical modernity of a technical network 
that produces diagnoses, treatment and prognoses, therapeutic successes or failures. How to 
make professions understand that today they are part of a cloth that is increasingly folded, 
bigger, but made with fewer stitches? Another war of a wrong knowledge, of the poverty of 
the life of social sciences in this sociologically overheated world, of the radical lobotomy of 
collective knowledge performed on the students of the clinical world, amplified by a practice 
that is silenced by ethnographic knowledge.
Wars are simple solutions to tangled problems. Loosening the knots requires some seren-
ity. War is quick, but its results, as we already know, are evanescent. In the coming week, 
as I write this, the new heads of service will assume their roles. The local Court of Appeal 
has rejected an appeal filed by 268 nurses against the hospital, represented by me, and we 
await the decision of the Supreme Court in about a month. The impregnable juridical reality 
against the autonomous knowledge, whether it validates them or not, the organisation of a 
hospital belongs, partially, to the judges. A gap between the tradition of diagnosis and care 
authorship, of professions as protective cells, guardians of a knowledge that today is produced 
collectively. After the war, come the spoils. What objects are stolen by the victors?
Story 2: Conjugating the verb ‘LTE’
In the law on ‘Duties and rights of patients’ (Law 20.584, April 24, 2012), there is the expres-
sion ‘limitation of therapeutic effort.’ It is not a central phrase nor is it defined in its preamble. 
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It is only considered in article 17, second paragraph, that ‘if the insistence on the indication 
of the treatments or the limitation of the therapeutic effort is rejected by the person or by 
their legal representatives, the opinion of said committee may be requested.’ The aforemen-
tioned body is the Healthcare Ethics Committee, an institution from each establishment that 
must discuss the requirements of professionals and patients regarding the ethical aspects of a 
clinical decision.
‘Patients who have decided to not be resuscitated,’ ‘proportional measures’ and ‘limitation 
of therapeutic effort’ are expressions that circulate in any hospital. The question is how to 
provide a formal and accepted deliberative mechanism for these situations. I take a step back 
and agree to exclude the word euthanasia from this reflection. Therefore, I speak of a state 
of proximity of death, of extreme indignity, of insufferable pain. My bioethics professor will 
get sick of my ambiguous compositions, of the imprecision of my criteria or their inability to 
become objective parameters.
However, I think that this problem arises from that same insufficiency. When what pre-
dominates is uncertainty and the questions are fragmented around life and death, like two 
insurmountable abysses, the search for stable parameters faces a desert. I see the public dia-
logue of facts and decisions as the only viable path: In the increasingly public debate about 
what happens when a patient is connected to a ventilator and has a multiple organ failure; 
what to do in such an unfortunate situation. This is a debate that should involve laymen 
and experts, patients, caregivers and relatives, in real time and with scrupulous sovereignty 
(Figure 38.2).
I believe we should let the acronym LTE (‘limitation of therapeutic effort’) obtain the 
full right of a city in the ethical life of hospitals. Let it stop being a jargon used only in semi- 
private areas, and allow its transformation into a verb and its conjugation be passed into 
public speech, a world in which any of us could fortunately be ‘lte’d.’
Figure 38.2  Statistical map (public image, Puerto Montt Hospital)
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Story 3: Multiple parliaments
If the hospital is an intensely technical place, a pragmatic arena of turns and results, of effects 
that demolish any result anticipated by the theory, an intellectually prospective place, a place 
in which ‘a step of real movement is worth more than a hundred programs,’ where does arbi-
trariness give way to logic? I do not know of such places other than discussion sites, whether 
magazines, books, congresses, parliaments of things or hybrid forums. This hospital has more 
than 60 committees where its actions are discussed, excluding the innumerable meetings of 
services, units, departments, teams, offices and centres. It is an intense political life, because 
perhaps this is where the new protocols obtain their city rights, the ever-changing institu-
tionality that governs the sick, the diseases and the caregivers.
Tracking the life of one of these committees involves entering the seamless cloth, visiting 
the Oncology Committee, for example, in charge of discussing cancer patients and defin-
ing their treatment on a case-by-case basis. We might observe a documented and recorded 
discussion involving surgeries, radiotherapies and cytotoxic drugs, and understand the com-
mittee as a driving force of the hospital regarding the use of surgery rooms, pathological 
anatomy, medication acquisition, development of specialties and sub-specialties, and imaging 
requirements. Who is directing, then? Who is the sole author? There is no privileged place to 
narrate other stories: Breastfeeding committee, integrative medicines, welfare, acquisition, 
pharmacy, adverse events, healthcare ethics, emergency operation and so on. Coordinating 
these parliaments requires more than one official journal. We have established two statisti-
cal bulletins and a hospital clinical journal (http://www.hospitalpuertomontt.cl/index.php/
hpm/90- letras-cl %C3 %ADnicas; Figure 38.3).
Figure 38.3  Clinical map (public image, Puerto Montt Hospital)
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Story 4: A hectic morning
Although the hospital lives in a state of tension and its movements always feel urgent, it also 
has valleys, secular and geological rhythms. Sometimes, those rhythms come together, syn-
chronise and express their unity in a brusque way. It is difficult then to disentangle what is 
urgent, what is secular and what is geological. Here are my notes:
Tuesday 13. It starts with a coffee of sensitivities and specificities. In the prenatal control of a 
pregnant woman, there is a positive HIV test result. The protocol states that this delivery 
must be by caesarean section, as to avoid vertical transmission of the virus. Breastfeeding 
is also to be suspended. We strictly comply with the protocol, but the mother shows us a 
negative HIV test, taken previously. While waiting for the confirmation of the diagnosis 
(unlikely with the current data), the patient questions our decisions.
I then listen to a hospital worker, son of a hospital worker who had hip surgery. A catheter 
remained inside her after the surgery. We punctured her artery instead of her vein, 
which is why that device was left longer than usual. The son is calm because there 
were no later complications and the surgery was successful. It was a nice conversation 
with a worker whom I already knew. Injured by a TBI, he uses a cochlear implant. He 
disconnects it to sleep and his audible alarm clock is useless. He solved his problem by 
inventing, with his father, a mechanical alarm that is connected to his bed. A tech-
nological innovation of daily life of which I only learned due to this feudal role of a 
worker-rating supreme judge.
Later, I see the daughter of an elder who was brought by her brothers into our emergency 
room. The woman’s sons ask for a voluntary discharge, although the diagnosis is serious. 
The difference between a liberal autonomist vision and a sociologically inclusive vision 
is minimal. How to decide what is better in the midst of the signs of an over- demanded 
service in these days of respiratory syncytial virus, overwhelmed by older people brought 
by family members who are also overwhelmed in their home, and who seek out more 
experienced caregivers – us? How can I think about a consultation that cannot take more 
than a few minutes, whose decision should be quick? How to respond to these voices that 
now resonate calmly in my office, in the rural world, the family dispute over a cow or a 
fence that should be placed 100 metres farther to the west?
Our voluntary discharge protocol is still pending. A decision that is not easy, but that just as 
LTE, should involve more conversations, notifications and recording systems.
I then receive a family whom we did not notify of the death of their father and husband. They 
confirm that they noticed we removed his wedding ring, and we do not know where it 
is. I only have apologies and the investigation protocol, but I try to understand who this 
man was. His son tells me that he is one of the three most notable citizens of the city 
who died that year, an exiled Spanish man from Vigo. A day later, one of my best friends 
shares a similar story, and I tell him about this. It is the same family. The hospital that I 
direct has brought grief to the family of my close friend.
I write here of adverse events, events in which reality suddenly reveals an unfamiliar face, 
an unexpected, unpredictable or probabilistically negligent course. Where professions lose a 
little grip and go into technically wild areas. The dialogue between professions, sometimes 
interrupted, jumps into an area of dialogue and camaraderie. Engineers rub shoulders with 
technologists, doctors with electricians and computer technicians with accountants.
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Adverse events have an ambiguous definition, because they just try to capture a fact that 
only retrospectively turns out to be such. The timeline breaks it. It was neither an event nor 
an adverse one, but it existed. From a specific moment, it is recognised as such. That episte-
mology collapses what we understand as facts in medical positivism: Things are always what 
they are; the name is always the thing.
Adverse events speak of a counterpart, of the production of facts as a systematic objective 
that organises the purpose of the hospital world, such as the diagnosis, treatment and docu-
mentation of the healthy – often a battery of exams without any remarkable findings. This 
reveals that even the technical world is a sociologically organised world, a piece of plasma in 
which norms are constituted and where material supports are instituted to hold those rules 
together. Protocols, records, auditing systems, checklists, and golden rules are all part of those 
instituting forms. Promoted as the soul of quality, they displace the force of cooperation, of 
the continuum, of the symbiosis, to recordable rules that can be verified in the future.
The technique to come in medicine, if we are at a threshold … ‘a new experience of the 
disease is about to be born’ (Foucault, 1991: 9), will have to turn on itself and dismantle its 
machinery. I foresee that the biome, the holobionts as our problems, will lead this new tech-
nique. Only symbiosis and ties can make us free. Understanding this present can be part of 
inventing the hospital of the 21st century.
* * *
Coda
Sunday morning. Five days ago, I stopped being the Director of the Hospital. The editorial 
processes are mysterious too. My sedentary, compact, unitary, self-contained version, reviewed 
over and over with Ignacio and Celia, now seems dislocated. When I told them the news, well 
aware of my delays as an author, they proposed a new deadline to include this coda of sorts.
The arrival of a government that seeks to expand microeconomic spaces in its administration 
practices is particularly critical for the workings of a Public Hospital. Chile has been part of a 
massive economic experiment, but the hospitals of the National Health Service have remained 
scattered islands in that ocean, at the mercy of tides and waves. Surrounded and harassed by 
increasing sea levels, they have survived in a dignified manner. These last two months have 
revealed symptoms of things that are moving in a dangerously different direction. The recent 
law of the voluntary interruption of pregnancy has been modified in a regulatory and illegal 
manner, a crude expression of the new wave (cms.colegiomedico.cl/2018/05/1, in Spanish).
Someone on the right side of the spectrum tells me that it is ‘disgraceful’ that I am a 
 Director under this new administration, and I deeply breathe in the discomfort of their 
culture. I resign, in a gesture that seeks to avoid a political collision that involves a public 
hospital and our beloved ANT. I escape.
I now write a new summary of these two years trying to run a hospital with ANT. This 
is the version of the person moving to a different place, not the person sitting on the chair of 
the Director’s office. My first lesson is:
At least in third world countries, an ANT practice will be considered leftist.
(Perhaps, like Rimbaud, we could say ‘I always belonged to an inferior race,’ although few or 
no one knows of our radical dissidence with Marx, Trotsky or Adorno.)
The second ANT lesson is a global summary of everything:
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ANT is lived as a kind of public happiness for those it touches.
I have already said that the description of a hospital, as a sociological fact from ANT, in this 
experience unleashed forces that took me by surprise. Many of them are narrated earlier. 
Thus, I will mention others here.
Many mornings, very early, the head of neurosurgery approached the Director’s office 
to talk about Alfonso Asenjo, creator of the specialty in Chile in the 1940s, founder of the 
Public Institute of Neurosurgery of the country (which bears his name), whose scientific 
production reaches 531 articles. He ‘converts’ me into his enterprise to restore the documen-
tary Parkinsonismo y cirugía (1962) directed by Sergio Bravo, narrated by Francisco Coloane 
(National Prize of Literature in 1964), with music by Gustavo Becerra (National Prize of 
Musical Arts of Chile in 1971), camera by Pedro Chaskel, Enrique Rodríguez and Fernando 
Bellet (http://www.cinetecavirtual.cl/fichapelicula.php?cod=33). This process is currently 
underway through an agreement with the Neurosurgery Service, represented by the hos-
pital, to finance the restoration of the documentary and schedule exhibitions in the main 
building and the hospital.
My neurosurgeon colleague surprises me with the books he brings as a gift. The last one 
is about Spinoza and the neurosciences. This hospital is, perhaps, the last place where I would 
suspect that someone shares my philosophical interest in the Dutch glassmaker. The fact that 
his interest in Spinoza comes from neuroscience and mine from Deleuze is but a detail. What 
I experience is the surprise that a specialist delves so deep into the roots of his profession and 
practice. My colleague is also a martial artist and 8th dan. His sense of worth of the mastery 
and respect that every disciple has for his Sensei is also present in this challenge. Even as the 
approach to the process of restoring a film as an expression of a world of collaboration and 
creation, a happy encounter between scientists and artists, under the wing of the University, 
in a Chile whose values matter to us.
The other happy manifestation that I bring up is that of a paediatric dentist whose 
hobby is to calm her patients down by telling stories and performing little clown tricks. 
Gathered in a ritual lunch every Tuesday along with other dislocated people and a small 
tree that we carried with us to the table, today there is a hospital narrative medicine com-
mittee. Her practice of telling stories to children, crowned with giraffe horns and flanked 
by a case with small gifts, has grown rapidly to involve other colleagues, in the recognition 
of the narrative truth of hospital medicine. Another fruitful intellectual dialogue has been 
carried out in the area of biomedical engineering (Bavestrello and Carvajal, 2018), so I 
can say:
The most specialised technicians can be proper intellectuals and closer to the 
 philosophical depths of ANT than we may think.
The fourth ANT lesson comes from breaking with sedentarism. The hospital exercises its 
edge at every moment. However, less than 200 metres from the magnetic resonator, there are 
houses without sewerage. Just third world things, technology and its coexistence.
I cross the street and participate in a neighbourhood meeting. Disturbed by the presence 
of this monster, whose proportions far exceed more than a thousand times the size of their 
houses and families, and the effects of an unusual and disturbing vehicular proliferation, 
street trading and garbage, the residents listen to me with respect. I call them to take a joint 
action against those undesirable results. The next day, I attend a meeting of the teachers’ 
council of the Cayenel School, an indigenous name by which this marginal neighbourhood – 
that used to be beyond the walls of the city with a prison of the 1960s, now empty – was 
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known. Today, everyone calls this place ‘the hospital district,’ in a symbolic and unfortunate 
degradation of a toponym that indicates the presence of the absent, the non-extinction of the 
anthropologically extinct.
I propose to collaborate with the public school, inviting the children to our laboratories, 
to our auditorium, to hold exhibitions in our playgrounds. They reply to me proposing a 
chess tournament. The following week, a fluid movement begins between the public hospital 
and the public school, whose recent expressions are the images of this text.
Therefore, my fourth lesson would be:
Crossing a street means eroding an ANT border.
Once my resignation was known, an official from the REAS Unit (Spanish for Waste from 
Health Care Establishments) approached me to organise the official start of glass recycling 
at the hospital in the last week of my duties. The city in which we live does not have public 
waste containers; using the hospital to that end will be a remarkable contribution. If clinical 
medicine is the source of introduction of anthropocentric forces under the epithet of the 
disposable or the anti-: plastics, ecological and/or endocrine disruptors, antibiotics, antineo-
plastic, antiparasitic (Bernhardt et al., 2017, Kolpin et al., 2002, Richmond et al., 2017), it 
is also possible to summon from ANT the forces that lead to a non-anthropogenic medicine 
(Figure 38.4).




ANT is an important un-ANThropogenic force.
Finally, a pragmatic question: numbers. We are under growing rules of government through 
numbers and figures. Process indicators, result indicators, integral control balances. I will 
only say that the Puerto Montt Hospital is in 24th place out of 57 similar hospitals through-
out the country, achieving over 75% of its goals, a threshold that allows it to be recognised 
as a Self-managed Network Establishment. The evaluation of the Director’s performance 
was 99.93%, in terms of compliance with the agreement with Senior Public Management. 
Finally, although its production has been growing steadily, its levels of debt last year were 
65% lower than in 2016. This is not a miracle. If the hospital performed more health actions, 
it is obvious that we spent more. However, we were able to show the value of what we were 
doing and obtain financing for our services. Although ANT does not govern by and for 
numbers, our results are backed up by them. Our results are not backed up by a government 
that goes by universal rules, removed from local conditions and a situated and dialogu-
ing reflexivity (http://www.hospitalpuertomontt.cl/images/cuentaspublicas/CUENTA%20 
PUBLICA-2017.pdf ). Finally, then,
ANT worked for the Puerto Montt Hospital as a valuable enzyme.
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Bañados, Y. C. 358–9, 400–10
Barad, K. 128, 288
Barry, A. 29, 391
Barthe, Y. 379
Bazerman, C. 103
Beaulieu, A. 314n7, 315n9
Becker, H. S. 47
Beck, U. 47, 302
Beisel, U. 233, 246–54
de la Bellacasa, M. 363, 386















black-box network 29, 30, 239, 243, 283, 
285, 286, 312, 355, 362, 370, 374, 375
Black–Scholes equation 52, 53
Blanchot, M. 163
Blaser, M. 302
blog 170, 348, 364–6
Blok, A. xx–xxxii, 1–3, 73–5, 155–7, 233–4, 
265, 295–7, 303n1, 319, 357–9, 370
Bloor, D. 274
Boa Vista rain forest 26, 27, 80
Boltanski, L. 65, 70




Boyle, R. 123, 224, 274
Brand, S. 291n2
Bretton Woods System 202
Brives, C. 247
Brown, S. 80, 81, 146–7
Bruun Jensen, C. 11n3, 43, 73, 76–84
de la Cadena, M. 157, 210, 215–16, 302, 335n5
Calışkan, K. 259
Callén, B. 11n6, 286, 288
Callon, M. 2–3, 6, 9, 41, 46–54, 56–8, 60, 61, 
117, 196, 235, 256–7, 259, 261, 283, 298, 300, 
306, 321, 339, 344n4, 358, 362, 378–9, 385, 
387n1, 401
Candea, M. 30
Canguilhem, G. 274, 277
capacity building 249
Capital (Marx) 58
capitalism 3, 56, 61, 66, 148, 156, 171, 200, 
202, 206, 208; capital, conversion to 59; 




Cardwell, E. 358, 378–87
care: agnosticism and 4–10; for our scholarly 
accounts 190–7; questions of 156; repertoire 
9–10; slurry management 385–6;  
theories of 383–4
Casanova, P. G. 212, 216
Castells, M. 200, 202
causal efficacy 138, 140
Centeno, A. 360
centralising power: agency 267–9;  
in city 265, 266
centres of calculation 58
Chakrabarty, D. 215
Chandler, A. D. 105
Changshan (Chinese herb) 220
Chaosmosis (Guattari) 181
Chinese medicine (CM) 157, 220, 228–9; 
and ANT 220, 224, 227–8; correlativity 
223–4; diagnosis 226; patterning 226–7; 







Civilizing Markets (Callon) 54
Claes, P. 238
Clark, N. 155–6, 158–66
climate change 161–2; see also global warming
clinical practice, good 249
clinical trials 247–51
Cochoy, F. 175
cognition: artifacts 104; deficit model 335n11; 
heterogeneous components of 103–4; 
innovation 104; see also writing and cognition
Cohen, S. 258
Cold War 206, 207, 299, 300




companionship 30–1, 31n3, 361; ethics 361; 
intellectual 73–5, 80




The Concept of Nature (Whitehead) 314n1
concept-prototypes 30
conceptualisations, experiential 227













cosmopolitics 66, 134, 152, 175, 265, 302, 329, 342
cost–benefit analysis 260
Couldry, N. 96
Cozzens, S. E. 366n3
creative capitalism 248, 249
creative reuse 31n1
Criado, T. S. 11n6, 286, 288, 358, 360–6
crime scene 235, 240
critique 65–6; of natural science 67–8
Cronon, W. 268
Csák, R. 303n1
curiosity 193, 194, 198n4
Cutting the Network (Strathern) 25
cyborg 74, 121, 122, 125–8, 130, 181, 239
Cyborg Manifesto (Haraway) 127
Cyborgs & Citadels (Hess) 25–6
Danto, A. 201
Dant, T. 288
Dányi, E. 295, 298–303
data revolution 108
data set 21, 206, 351, 352, 353, 355n7
Davies, W. 117
The Day That Got Lost in a Handbag (Kainz) 134
Death of the Social 116
de-composition 113
De Laet, M. 284, 286
Deleuze, G. 47, 58, 61, 73, 75, 77–82, 84n4, 
84n6, 93, 173, 182, 184, 264, 273,  
314n6, 389, 397
dementia 74, 75, 134, 135, 141
democracy 114, 119, 147, 165, 296, 302, 341–2, 
362, 363, 379–81, 385–7
Denis, D. J. 109, 234, 283–91
Derrida, J. 102
Descola, Philippe 222
description, mode of 67
Despret, V. 273, 276, 278, 281n5
Deveraux, G. 274
Deville, J. 186
Dewey, J. 19, 113, 114, 117, 118, 335n7
Díaz, A. 360
Die Brücke 203
Difference and Repetition (Deleuze) 77, 83n3
digital sociology 346–8
digital walking stick 31n2




Dispersion (Price) 205, 207, 208




Do Economists Make Markets? (Garcia-Parpet) 48
Doganova, L. 234, 256–61, 394
Domingues, J. M. 211
Domìnguez, R. F. 285, 289
double capture 389, 390
Du Gay, P. 51




ecology: material 287–9; of practices 148–51
economics 58, 59; actors 46, 60, 256; goods 50; 
psychology 59; theology 59
economic valuation devices: of “ecosystem 
services” 256; from market devices 259–61; 









Eisenstein, E. L. 103
empirical: analysis of science 67; and 
conceptual worlds 24–7; angelology 146, 
147; differences 221, 222, 224, 226, 227; 
engagements 4, 11n5; process 326n1; 
re-invention 339; strategy 117; travel 
arrangements of ANT 65
Energy Babble 395–7
energy-demand reduction 358, 392, 393, 
396, 397
engineers, Japanese 40–1
En torno a la silla (ETS) 360, 361, 364, 365
enunciation 91; dynamics 91; relations 91, 92, 
95–6, 96
environmental harms: disqualification 
333–5; ethnographic opportunity 334–5; 
eventfulness 329–31; temporality of natural 
causes 331–3; violence 335n10
environmental politics 329
Environmental Protection Agency 330
epistemic disconcertment 214
epistemology 117–18, 161; error of 80
eschatology, environmental 59
Essay Concerning Human Understanding 
(Locke) 314n1
Essay with Knots (Price) 205
ethnography 24–9; ANT 24–5; machine 




European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and 
Drug Addiction (EMCDDA) 301–2





experience of capture 151–2









Färber, A. 234, 264–71
Farías, I. xx–xxxii, 1–3, 73–5, 155–7, 










flat-felled seams 16, 17
follow the actor 2, 24, 27, 30, 31, 77, 276, 279, 
281n7, 297, 320, 325, 326, 326n1, 345–9; 
following the references 77–8
Fontaines-en-Sologne case 48
Fontanille, J. 95




Foucault, M. 105, 106, 163, 168, 175, 178n3, 
273, 279, 281n14
Fourcade, M. 259
fragility 5, 8, 141, 164, 169, 172, 234, 287–9
Fraser, N. 176
Frazer, James 37, 38
From Realpolitik to Dingpolitik (Latour) 378, 380
Fujimura, J. H. 283






Gaia: hypothesis 155, 160, 161, 164, 165, 296; 
theory 342
Gander, R. 204
Garcia-Parpet, M-F. 48–51, 54
Gardey, D. 299
Garfinkel, H. 47, 134
Gates Foundation 247–50, 253
gender 125–6; and sexuality 176; see also sex/
gender
generalised symmetry 75, 145–8; see also 
symmetrical anthropology
genetics: cultural and economic impacts of 237; 
material 237, 240; modification 330; research 









Gomart, E. 182, 183, 190
Goody, J. 74, 101–3
Google Map 370
Graham, S. 284




Greenwich Village, Manhattan 172–3
Greimas, A. J. 74, 91, 94–7, 98, 98n3
Guattari, F. 47, 58, 61, 77, 78, 80–2, 93, 173, 
181, 184, 264, 273




Halsall, F. 156–7, 200–8
Hansen, M. 184
Haraway, D. J. 30, 31n3, 68, 74, 84n4,  
109, 121–3, 130n3–130n5, 178n5, 181,  
222, 239, 283, 291n1, 313, 339; ANT and 
129–30; cyborgs and imploded binaries 
125–8; material-semiotic and apparatus of 
bodily production 128–9; modest witnesses 
and god-tricks 123–5
Harman, G. 79, 82, 119n1, 163, 165
healthcare: MOSQUIRIX™ 248–50; 
practices 191–3; vaccine or ‘malaria 
reducer’ 250–2




HeLa cell line 242
Henke, C. R. 284, 289
Hennion, A. 5, 175, 182, 183, 190, 301
Hermant, E. 106, 269, 276
Hess, D. 25–6
heteronormativity 169–71
Hetherington, K. 296, 328–35
high-speed rail 296, 320–3, 325
History of Sexuality (Foucault) 175
Hjelmslev, L. 89, 91, 93, 98n2
Hobbes, T. 274
homo economicus 46, 47
hospital: Coda 407–10; hectic morning 406–7; 
labyrinths and multicoloured city 401–2; 
multiple parliaments 405; verb ‘LTE’ 403–4; 
war of professions 402–3
Hostage Video Still with Time Stamp (Price) 205
Houston, L. 289
How building learn (Brand) 291n2
Hughes, C. 24
human difference 236–8, 242
humanism 171, 185, 203, 403
Humanistic Discipline (Panofsky) 203
humans and non-humans 21, 41, 74, 80, 115, 
118, 128, 158, 160, 162, 166, 182, 190, 241, 





hybrid 127; forums 300, 358, 379, 405; 
hybridisation 114, 157, 220; mode of existence 
146, 147; systems 104
hyperobject 328, 334
ideology 69–70
Igarashi, Y. 372, 374, 375, 376n9
image read 241
immune-system clearance 252
immutable mobiles 74, 101, 106, 108, 184, 279, 
286, 403
In Catastrophic Times (Stengers) 144
incompatibility 89
incubation and speculation 70–1
individualization/singularization 50
I need some meaning I can Memorise (The Invisible 
Pull) (Gander) 204
inequalities: continuing 246; rural 335n9
information design 390
information revolution 105
infra-language 2, 35, 39, 42, 43, 91, 97, 157, 220, 
222, 224–8
infrastructures 169, 174, 178n4
Ingold, T. 284, 287, 288
innovation 61; centric accounts 284, 285
Inose, K. 358, 369–76




intellectual practice xx–xxxii, 1, 50, 54, 73, 155, 
157, 190, 191, 196, 210, 265, 269, 270; project 
195–6; technology 103
interface methods 297, 346, 347, 355
internal colonialism 210, 216; ontological 
colonisation 212–13
International Sociological Association 210, 214




The Invention of Modern Science (Stengers) 80
inversion 50
irreducible singularity 165
Ishii, M. 371, 374
Jackson, S. J. 289
Jameson, F. 202
James, W. 113, 143
Japan: earthquake 369–70; public network 
374–5; remaking 371–4; repairing 370–1; 
tsunamis 369–70
Jenle, R. P. 51–2
Jensen, C. B. 11n3, 43, 73, 326n1
Jerak-Zuiderent, S. 156, 190–8
Jérôme, P. 74, 109, 291n1
Jimenez, A. C. 29
Index
416
Johnson, E. 74, 121–30
Joselit, D. 205
Joyce, P. 268
Kant, I. 16, 302
Karchmer, Eric I. 220, 221
Kavenna, J. 117
Keim, W. 212
Keller, E. F. 68
Kemmer, L. 267




knower, figure of the 190–1; intellectual project 
of ANT 195–6
Koolhaas, R. 269, 311, 314n2, 314n5
Kuan Sin Yin (KSY) 223, 225
Kuhn, T. 1
Kyŏngju, South Korea: coordinating objects 
323–5; global–national scaling 322–3;  
high-speed railway controversy 321–2






lateral comparison 43; machinic to 41–2
lateral ethnography 26–8
Latour, B. 3, 6, 9, 11n8, 26–7, 30, 35, 36, 39, 42, 
47, 56–61, 64, 66–70, 71n2, 71n3, 73, 75,  
76–83, 83n1–83n3, 84n4, 84n6–84n8, 90, 
91, 93, 94, 96, 102, 103, 106, 107, 112, 117, 
119, 124, 126, 127, 134, 144, 146–8, 152, 
152n1–152n3, 159–66, 170, 171, 177, 181–3, 
187, 195, 210, 211, 213, 215, 222, 233, 241, 
246, 250, 253, 257, 258, 266, 268, 269, 
273–80, 281n8, 283, 298–300, 302, 306, 318, 
319, 329–33, 335n4, 337–42, 343n3, 346, 348, 
358, 362, 366n8, 378, 380, 387n1, 392
Lave, J. 104
Law, J. 11n4, 39, 87, 107, 117, 122, 160, 200, 
206–8, 210, 214, 217, 235, 269, 273, 276, 277, 
279, 281n9, 283, 298, 300, 318, 387n1
The Laws of the Markets (Callon) 47, 48, 51
Ledesma, S. 360
Lee, N. 80, 146–7
Leibniz, G. W. 397n2
Lei, Hsiang-lin 220
Lépinay, V. A. 77
liberal democracy 300
Lienhardt, G. 39
Lin, W.-Y. 157, 214, 217, 220–9
literary technology 103
local, everything is 17–19
Locke, J. 314n1
The Logic of Sense (Deleuze) 78, 84n6
Logics of writing (Goody) 105
Loon, E. V. 314n5
loose translations 66–7








Lynch, M. 73, 76–7
Lynes, P. 166
Lyotard, Jean-Francois 202
Maanen, J. V. 314n8
McCormack, D. P. 156, 181–7
McFarlane, C. 269
McGoey, L. 248




Mackenzie, A. 2, 14–22, 52–4
magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) 192–3
Maia, J. M. 211
maintenance and repair 283–4, 290; before 
breakdown 284–7; fragility and material 
ecology 287–9
Making Things Public (Latour) 299
Malaria Clinical Trial Alliance (MCTA) 249
malaria: inhibitor 251; mortality 251; reducer 
250–2; vaccine trials 248–50
Malinowski, B. 38–40
managerial revolution 105
Marcus, G. E. 314
Margulis, L. 161
market: competition 57; construction of 58, 59; 
marketisation 3, 53, 60, 259–61; perfect 49; 
reformist 53–4
marmalade-making 14–17, 15, 21
Marrero-Guillamon, I. 335n5
Marres, N. xxviii, 74, 96, 112–20, 300, 331, 
335n7, 347, 355
Marxism: and economists 70; model 202
Marx, K. 58, 60, 65
Massumi, B. 184
materiality 6, 90, 102, 128, 129, 133, 169, 
170, 184, 185, 201, 239, 284, 287, 339, 
340, 343, 350
material organization, haphazard 269
material-semiotic 7, 74, 87, 121, 122, 128–30, 
130n5, 147, 177, 223, 227, 228, 237, 239, 340, 




matter of care 134
Matters of Care (Bellacasa) 386
matters of felt unknowns 135
Mattozzi, A. 73–4, 87–98, 128
Maurer, B. 42
Mauss, Marcel 42
May 15th (15-M) movement 360, 361,  
363–5, 366n1
media 2, 96, 112, 114, 117, 177, 184, 297, 301, 
320, 345, 348–54
Meneses M. P. 210




Millo, Y. 52, 54
modern city 264, 266, 267–9
modern constitution 146, 151, 181, 274, 280n4, 
299, 332, 380, 385
modernity 69
modes of existence (MoE) 69–70
modest witnesses 123–5
Mol, A. 5, 39, 90, 201, 208n2, 210, 221, 228, 
237, 247, 265, 269, 273, 276, 277, 284, 286, 
287, 298, 300, 318, 403
molar (arborescent) assemblages 173
Mommersteeg, Brett 306–15
moral values 267; morals 67
Morita, A. 2, 27, 34–43, 370




multiplicity 6, 9, 35, 42, 43, 66, 78, 101, 103, 
107, 148, 150–2, 165, 175–7, 212, 221, 226, 
227, 238, 239, 243, 264, 268, 269, 277, 279, 
296, 310, 319, 323, 325, 391, 392, 397
multiverse 175
Muniesa, F. 3, 50, 52–4, 56–61, 71n4, 98n1, 259
Museum of Modern Art (MoMA) 290
Muslim influences 212
Myers, N. 184
Nam June Paik 290
Nanolab snapshot 236, 240
narration: dynamics 91; relations 94–5
Nathan, T. 273–5
The Natural Contract (Serres) 162, 299
natural science 30, 67–8
nature: allowing 338–9, 342–3; assumption 
341–2; behave in democracy 342; describing 
to troubling 338; global or all-encompassing 
340–1; modified 343; nature-semiotics 
339–40; re-inventing 339; size of 337–8







networks 237, 239, 374–5; of actants 22n3; 
excess of 162–4; and infrastructure 30; 
of relations 225; rhizomes and 77–9;  
socio-material 220; with non-human 160




Nixon, R. 332, 335n10
non-humans 158–60; climate change 161–2; 
humans and 21, 41, 74, 80, 115, 118, 128, 158, 
160, 162, 166, 182, 190, 241, 253, 300, 301, 
369, 374, 375, 397; metamorphosis 164–6; 
networking 160, 162–4
non-Western STS 35, 41
nuclear accident 369–71; see also 3.11 disaster
Nyamnjoh, F. 213
object: arrangements 172; bibliographic 21n1; of 
knowledge 129; oriented democracy 380; site 
307–8; and situations 259; subject and 139–41, 
156, 157; target 185; written 101–5, 107
Obrist, H. U. 314n5
Office for Metropolitan Architecture (OMA) 
309, 310, 312, 314n2
oligopticons 106
ontoformative agenda 213–15
ontological: autonomy 213–15; disconcertment 
196; innovations 215–16; multiplicity 175; 
politics 29, 157, 214, 215, 217, 277, 298, 392





Orr, J. E. 284
Osborne, G. 309
Ossandón, J. 2–3, 10, 46–54, 71n1
Paasonen, S. 177
Pandora’s Hope (Latour) 26, 79, 280n2, 340
Panofsky, E. 203
panopticon 106
Parabon Snapshot-tool 235, 238, 240, 242
paradigmatic ANT exemplars 1
para-discursive elements 16
Paraguay 286, 296, 328, 332, 335n9
parliament of things (PoT) 80–3, 150, 299, 
300, 329; democracy in wild 385–7; 
encompassing affect 384–5; experiment 
in Loweswater 381–2; hybrid forums 379; 




parliaments 299; liberal democracy 300; limits 
of parliamentary democracy 300–3; politics 
298–9; as sites and meta-sites 298–300
Parnet, C. 389, 397
Pasteur, L. 36–9, 161, 298
Patel, S. 212
patterning 226–7
Patterson, C. 309, 310, 314n4
pectin molecule 15, 15
Peirce, C. S. 87–9, 113
performativity 2, 46–8, 51–4, 147, 276, 325, 338; 
after 46–8; economics performs markets 52
Pétite Réflexion sur le Culte Moderne des Dieux 
Faitiches (Latour) 274, 280n1









plurality and singularity 207–8
political compromise 60
Political Epistemology (PE) 273, 276, 277, 279, 
280, 281n5, 281n8
political theory 181, 298, 300–2, 343
politics 109; cosmopolitics 66, 134, 152, 175, 
265, 302, 329, 342; environmental 329; 
ontological 29, 157, 214, 215, 217, 277, 298, 
392; parliaments 298–9
Politics of Nature (Latour) 165, 340, 341, 378, 380
Pols, J. 183
Pontille, J. D. 74, 101–9, 291n1
Pope, A. 145
position-posture 95, 119n4
The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge 
(Lyotard) 202
poverty 296, 332–4, 403
Povinelli, E. A. 331, 332, 334
Power, M. 343n1
pragmatic sensibility 239; pragmatic 
respecification 239
Pragmatism 119, 119n2; epistemology 117–18; 
interpretation 115–16; social 116–17; un- and 
redoing 112–15
presentational immediacy 140
presentism 237, 239, 243
Price, S. 200, 205–6
probabilistic categorisation 241
problematisation xxvii, xxxi, 1, 3, 26, 35, 74, 
113, 114, 155, 269, 280, 284, 300, 301, 364
problem-making, joint 358, 361, 364–6
program of action 92




public health 233, 246, 250, 330, 333, 400, 401
Publics and Counterpublics (Warner) 176
Puig de la Bellacasa, M. 9, 190, 197, 287
Putin, V. 82
Queer Phenomenology (Ahmed) 171–2, 174
queer theory 155–6, 168–9, 173, 174; 
experimentality and play 174–8; 
heteronormativity 169–71; infrastructure 
174; institutions 169–74; intimacy 169–74; 
scholarship 176
queer world-making 172, 176
questionability 134
Quijano, A. 217n3
Rabeharisoa, V. 34, 196
race 233, 235–7; absent presence 239–41; 
diffracting 237–9; folds of time 241–3; 
ghostly ANTics 243–4
Race, K. 155–6, 168–78
racial differences 126, 233; capitalism 171; 
histories 242, 243
racist 116, 242
radiation levels 371–3, 375




Rajan, K. S. 247, 250




Reassembling the Social (Latour) 47, 81, 171, 195, 
275–6, 378
rebase command 18; a branch 17–19, 18
recalcitrance 9, 82, 239, 273, 278, 280, 281n8
reciprocal capture 11n9, 152, 389–90, 397
reciprocal conferral 81
recombinant DNA 258, 261
re-composition 112, 113
Redistribution (Price) 205
Reed, I. A. 212
Reed, P. 269
regime of enunciation 59
relationality 90, 160; insight of 97; predisposition 
28–30; transformations 91–2, 92
relative existence 80
repertoires 9–10




rhizomatic (molecular) assemblages 173




rightness, sense of 170
risk, relative 237
risk-taking behaviour 237
Roberts, Celia xx–xxxii, 1–3, 73–5, 155–7, 
233–4, 295–7, 357–9
Rodríguez-Giralt, I. 358, 360–6
Rogers, R. 96, 347
Rorty, R. 118
Rosa, M. C. 157, 210–17
Rosner, D. K. 286
Rotman, B. 299




Santos, B. 210, 215
de Saussure, F. 88, 88–92
Savransky, M. 75, 143–52
scale-making 78, 296, 319, 325
scales of compulsory reference 320–1
Schaffer, S. 123, 274
Scheffer, T. 299, 303n1
Schillmeier, M. 74, 133–41
Schlender, H. 331, 333, 334
Schmidgen, H. 78, 83n2
scholarly accounts: figure of the knower  
190–1; how to care for 196–7; 
intellectual project 195–6; speculative 
commitment 191–5
Schurr, C. 183
Schuttpelz, E. 112, 115
science and technology studies (STS) 4, 5, 11n9, 
19, 24–7, 35, 43, 53, 54, 116, 119, 122, 156, 
168, 214, 233–4, 250, 253, 256, 257, 268, 
283, 284, 295, 301, 306, 338, 362, 363, 
366n4, 390–2, 401
science: archipelagos of 249; critique of 81, 82; 
experimental 36–7; global infrastructures 
247–8; and technology 25–6; see also 
natural science
Science as Practice and Culture (Pickering) 338
science citation index (SCI) 223, 225
Science in Action (Latour) 58, 80, 105
Science on the Run (Bowker) 76
scientific: capitalisation 58; knowledge 3, 103, 
128, 146, 175, 248, 257, 258, 276, 277, 279, 
281, 339, 363, 373, 378–81, 385; management 




seeing 106, 123, 124, 197, 234, 241, 299, 319
Selfcare as Warfare (Ahmed) 170–1
self-clarification 65
self-description 67
semiotics: ANT from 90; coming out as 92–3; 
conditions 97; enunciational relations 95–6, 
96; narrative relations 94–5; of relational 
transformations 91–2, 92; signs to relations 
89; ‘still’ 87; then 87–9, 88
sensory perception 138, 139
Serres, M. 6, 145, 162, 164, 299
sewing seams 14, 16, 16–17
sex/gender 125–7, 177




Shapin, S. 123, 274
shi (propensity) 221, 225–8, 229n4
The Shock of the Old (Edgerton) 284
signification models 87–8, 88
signifier 88
signifier-signified relation 93
Simians, Cyborgs, and Women (Haraway) 125, 181
Simone, A. M. 267
simulator 122–5, 127–9
single nucleotide polymorphisms (SNPs) 238
Sinha, V. 217n1
sites: analysis and planning 307; as an 
object analysis 307–8; building 309–11; 
ethnographer 311–13; factory 309–14; future 
of 309; and meta-sites 298–300; movements 




Sloterdijk, P. 46, 54, 265
Slurry-Max 385–7
Smart, B. 214
smart energy monitors 393–4
Smith, D. 109
snapshot 5, 18, 235, 236, 238, 240, 242, 243
social: complexity 137; construction 48, 82, 162, 
169, 175, 237, 247, 307, 308, 318; and dementia 
133–4; design 117, 391; difference 169, 266; 
impact bonds 260; interaction 128, 284, 345; 
movements 34, 213, 214, 318, 320, 328, 361, 
362, 364, 366n3, 366n4, 366n8, 371; networks 
50, 203, 364; order 65, 237, 284; relations 40, 
134–6, 176, 247, 307, 308; socialness 138
social media: automation 348–9; methodological 
manoeuvres for tracing 350–4
social science 68
social theory 47, 54, 210
society 38, 78, 79, 115–19, 162, 256, 380
sociology of associations 256; associology 177
sociology of attachment (Gomart and Hennion) 
182, 183
The sociology of sociability (Simmel and 
Hughes) 177
sociology of translation 9
Index
420
socio-material: accomplishment that 
leaves no traces 354–5; asymmetries 
practice 391–3; digital sociology 346–8; 
entities 70; grounding of social 346–8; 
procomposing smart energy monitors 393–4; 
procomposition 395–7; reciprocal capture 
389–90; retroscription 394–5; and speculative 
questions 389–90
socio-technical device 259
software 14, 16–18, 108, 239, 240, 284, 285, 
348–52, 354, 370, 393, 397
solid knowing 190–1
Southern ontological politics 214
Southern sociologies 157, 211–12
soy farming 328, 332, 334, 335n3
specific shi as an object of practice 226–7
speech act theory 266
Spencer, H. 37
Spencer, M. 302, 303n1
Spinoza, B. 79, 182
splintering urbanism 268, 269
Spradley, J. 314n8
standardisation 105–6
Star, S. L. 7, 9, 197, 283, 284, 286, 290
Stengers, I. 37, 59, 75, 80–3, 152n1, 273, 276, 
278, 302, 329, 330, 333, 363, 389, 390; angels 
demand 145–8; divergent alliance 143–5; 






Strathern, M. 25, 28, 37, 38, 42, 326n1, 330, 390
strawberry market 48–51
Strebel, I. 286
Street Breakers (SB) 372, 373
Strong Programme 10n1
Studies in Ethnomethodology (Garfinkel) 47
subjectivity: Berlin wall 274; clinical devices 
277–8; constructing 275–6; division of 
applied psychology 278–80; fabrication of 
selves 274–5; fractionally coherent subject 
207; and modes of production 277–8; and 
modes of research 276–7; and objectivity 274; 
perception 308; production of worlds 276–7; 
psycho-morphs 276; psycho-techno-social 
devices 276









tabula rasa 307, 312, 314
Tactical Strike and Reconnaissance, Mach 2 
(TSR2) 206–8
Tales of the Field: Writing Ethnography 
(Maanen) 314n8
Tarde, G. 59, 133
technical constraint 147
technical democracy 379
technology transfer 40, 57







A Thousand Plateaus (Deleuze and Guattari) 78
Three Little Pigs, the (Stengers) 82
3.11 disaster 369–70; see also Japan
therapeutic effort, limitation of (LTE) 403–4
Thrift, N. 156, 182, 184, 187, 267, 284
Tonkiss, F. 270
trading zones 155
transactional data 346, 347
transformability 134
translation 222–3; of culture 38; operations of 
57; technique of 134
travel, ANT as mode of 66–8
trials of strength 7, 301




Twitter 297, 347, 349, 350, 351, 352, 353, 354, 
355n1, 370, 395, 397
Tylor, E. B. 37
unacknowledged revolution 103
uncertainty 193, 252, 253, 370, 373, 379, 404; 
material ecology 288, 290
unintended consequence 67–8, 250
United Kingdom 206–7
The Universal Gateway of the Bodhisattva 225
Unpacking Intervention in Science and Technology 
Studies (Zuiderent-Jerak and Jensen) 11n3
Untilled (Huyghe) 204
urban: assemblages 264–70, 318, 319; 
coexistence 265; cosmopolitics 265; 
development 266, 313, 318, 319; imagineering 
265, 266; planning 401, 402; public transport 
234, 266, 267; urbanism 268, 269, 319
vaccines: against malaria 247, 248; development 






Venturini, T. 348, 354
Verran, H. 196, 210, 214, 215, 217, 302











The Wall of Transcendental Shame (Star) 197
wanggyŏng 323–5
Warner, M. 169–71, 173, 174, 176
War of the Worlds (Latour) 82
Waterton, C. 358, 378–87
Watson, M. C. 329
wave energy converter 28–9
We Have Never Been Modern (Latour) 80, 84n4, 




wheelchair activists 360, 361
Whitehead, A. N. 74, 75, 133–41, 314n1
Wilkie, A. 11n9, 358, 389–97
Wilson, A. 174
Winthereik, B. R. 2, 24–31
witnessing 38, 123, 124, 127, 185, 224, 241, 
315n9, 381
Woolgar, S. 26, 102, 257
words and things 27
World Health Organisation (WHO): Malaria 
Programme 250; ‘Strategic Advisory Group 
of Experts on immunization’ (SAGE) 251
world-mattering 220–2
World Wide Web 202; see also Internet
writing and cognition 103–4; biomedical 











Zhan, Mei 221, 227
zheng (pattern) 221
The Zimbabwe Bush Pump: Mechanics of a 
Fluid Technology (Marianne and Mol) 
195–6, 286
Zuiderent-Jerak, T. 11n3, 363

